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FOREWORD
Initially when asked to write the foreword for this ninth annual survey
of the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
I thought to chide the Journal because its annual survey issues have not con-
tained enough critical analysis of the court's opinions. Of course, the Journal
can be critical, as it was when it almost took my hide for what I think was
one of my better opinions. See Note, Cary v. Board of Education: Academic
Freedom al the High School Level, 57 Den. L.J. 197 (1979). Perhaps I agree with
Justice Holmes, of whom it is said, he did not mind when the law reviews
insisted he was wrong, but he took it less well when they said he was right.
Upon reflection, I have decided the Journal's approach is realistic and
proper. Rather than engage in critical analysis of only a few opinions, the
Journal undertakes each year to comment on virtually all of the court's pub-
lished decisions, classifying and summarizing most of them without criticism.
The volume of our opinions is great. We disposed of 1660 appeals during the
survey period; 306 opinions were designated for publication. No other publi-
cation generally distributed in the circuit summarizes our opinions. There-
fore, theJournal performs a more valuable service to the Tenth Circuit bar
than it would by restricting its publication to a few critically analyzed cases.
In the survey issue the Journal does not forgo critique entirely; each year it
selects one to three cases for extended comment.
The survey issue's technique of giving some attention to almost all of
our decisions de-emphasizes the importance of individual decisions. For sev-
eral reasons this is not bad. First, our court does not have the final say. We
are subject to seldom exercised review by the Supreme Court. Also, many of
our cases are diversity suits; state courts can later say we erred in interpret-
ing their law. Second, discerning which are the important cases is difficult.
The Supreme Court's decisions to grant or deny certiorari often surprise us.
Sometimes what we thought to be a run-of-the-mill decision becomes a
landmark case.
A few Tenth Circuit decisions during each survey period are obviously
significant. One this time was Walls v. H'adden, 651 F.2d 1354 (10th Cir.
1981), requiring prisoners sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act to be
segregated from other inmates in the federal prison system. This opinion,
generally acknowledged to be correct, has caused significant changes in the
operation of the federal prison system. Every judge will remember cases
each year in which he or she participated that seem to have special signifi-
cance. One case that readily comes to my mind this year is Rodriguez-Fernan-
dez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (whether immigration
authorities may indefinitely detain excludable aliens in prison). I doubt that
our pronouncement will be the last word in that area. Another is Sz/kwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981) (whether federal regulation
of nuclear plants preempts punitive damage awards under state law for off-
site injury), which the Supreme Court has agreed to review. See 103 S. Ct.
721 (1983).
Something new in this issue is an article titled "The Political and Ad-
ministrative History of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit," by the Honorable Arthur J. Stanley, Jr. and Ms. Irma Russell.
The article is part of a major project the court has undertaken to compile a
meaningful history of the Tenth Circuit. In connection with the nation's
bicentennial celebration, each circuit was urged to prepare a written history
of the court. Our court assigned me the responsibility of recruiting authors
for a multi-author history of the district courts in our six-state area and of
the court of appeals itself. No doubt the project will take years to complete.
In addition to recruiting and motivating authors, other difficulties exist.
Some of the prominent figures in history are still living; others are only re-
cently deceased. How do we evaluate their roles without the perspective
that comes with the passage of time? Can we comment meaningfully on
judges who have not yet completed their judicial careers and who also may
be sensitive to criticism? Not all of the decisions have been worked out.
Parts of the history are complete, however, and a number of authors have
been recruited for the unfinished segments. The article appearing in this
issue of the Journal will ultimately be published as Chapter 1 of that history.
One other portion of the Tenth Circuit history, that of the Wyoming
territorial and district judges, has already been published in two parts by the
Wyoming State Historical Society, 53 Annals Wyo. 22 (1981); 54 Annals Wyo.
10 (1982). The equally colorful histories of the territorial and district courts
of Utah and New Mexico are almost ready. Someday we will have chapters
on the federal courts of all six states of the Circuit, and much more. Perhaps
some will appear in issues of theJournal, which has shown itself to be directly
and actively concerned with the work of the Tenth Circuit.
JAMES K. LOGAN
February 16, 1983
THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in New Mexico in
1915 and grew up in Santa Fe. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale in 1940.
During World War II he served as a Major
in the U.S. Army and was decorated with the
Croix de Guerre. Judge Seth has been a
director of the Santa Fe National Bank, chair-
man of the Legal Committee of the New Mex-
ico Oil and Gas Association, and counsel for
the New Mexico Cattlegrowers' Association.
He has also been a regent of the Museum of
New Mexico and a director of the Santa Fe
Boy's Club. In 1962 he was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit by President John F. Kennedy. He
has been Chief Judge since 1977.
JUDGE ROBERT H.
McWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas in 1916 and moved to Denver in 1927
where he has lived ever since. He received his
A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the University of
Denver. In 1971, he was awarded an Honor-
ary Doctor of Law degree from the
University.
During World War II, Judge McWilliams
served in the United States Army and was
with the Office of Strategic Services. He has
served as a Deputy District Attorney, a Colo-
rado district court judge, and was a member
of the Colorado Supreme Court for nine years
prior to his appointment to the Court of
Appeals.
Judge McWilliams is a member of the Judi-
cial Conference Committee on the Adminis-
tration of the Criminal Law, Phi Beta Kappa,
Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi Delta Phi, and
Kappa Sigma. He was sworn in as a Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in 1970.
JUDGE WILLIAM J.
HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma governor,
Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma, in 1923. He and his family moved
to Oklahoma City in 1927. He served as a
First Lieutenant in the Army during World
War II. He then returned to complete his
undergraduate studies at the University of
Oklahoma, receiving his B.A. in 1947. He
graduated from Harvard Law School in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952, Judge Holloway was an
attorney with the Department of Justice in
Washington, D.C. Afterwards, he returned to
private practice in Oklahoma City where he
was appointed to the Tenth Circuit by Lyn-
don B. Johnson. He is a member of Phi Beta
Kappa and Phi Gamma Delta.
JUDGE JAMES E. BARRETT
The son of the late Frank A. Barrett, who
served as Wyoming's Congressman, Governor,
and U.S. Senator, Judge Barrett was born in
1922 in Lusk, Wyoming. He attended the
University of Wyoming for two years prior to
his service in the Army during World War II.
After the War, he attended Saint Catherine's
College at Oxford University. He received his
LL.B. from the University of Wyoming in
1949. In 1973 he was given the Distinguished
Alumni Award from his alma mater.
Prior to his appointment, Judge Barrett
had been involved in private practice in Lusk
and had served as County and Prosecuting
Attorney for Niobrara County; Town Attor-
ney for the towns of Lusk and Manville; and
attorney for the Niobrara County Consoli-
dated School District. In 1967 he was
appointed by Governor Stanley K. Hathaway
to serve as Wyoming Attorney General and he
remained in that position until 1971.
Judge Barrett is a member of the Judicial
Conference Subcommittee on Federal Juris-
diction, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court of Review, and is a trustee of
Saint Joseph's Children's Home. He was
appointed to the Court in 1971.
JUDGE WILLIAM E. DOYLE
Judge Doyle was born in Denver in 1911
and received his A.B. from the University of
Colorado in 1940. He obtained his LL.B. and
J.D. degrees from George Washington Uni-
versity. He served as Deputy District Attor-
ney for Denver from 1938 until 1941, a
Colorado district court judge in 1948 and
1949, and Chief Deputy District Attorney
from 1949 until 1952. During 1959-61 he was
a Justice on the Colorado Supreme Court.
Judge Doyle has been a Visiting Professor
of Law at the University of Colorado and a
Professor of Law at the Westminster College
of Law (University of Denver College of Law)
in Denver. He is a former Chairman of the
Judicial Conference Committee to Implement
the Magistrates' Act and is presently a mem-
ber of the Judicial Conference Committee on
the Administration of the Bankruptcy System.
He is a member of the Order of the Coif, the
Order of Saint Ives, Pi Sigma Alpha, and Phi
Alpha Delta.
He was appointed to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1971 following ten years
as a United States District Judge for the Dis-
trict of Colorado.
JUDGE JAMES K. LOGAN
Judge Logan was born in Quenemo, Kan-
sas, in 1929. He received his A.B. from the
University of Kansas in 1952 and was gradu-
ated magna cum laude from Harvard Law
School in 1955. He went on to be U.S. Cir-
cuit Judge Walter Huxman's law clerk in
1956 and then practiced with the Los Angeles
firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. lie
became Dean of the University of Kansas
Law School in 1961 and served in the capac-
ity until 1968.
Since 1961 he has been a visiting professor
at Harvard Law School, The University of
Texas Law School, Stanford University, and
the University of Michigan. He was a com-
missioner for the U.S. District Court from
1964 until 1967 and was a candidate for the
U.S. Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a mem-
ber of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the Coif,
Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta Kappa,
Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi, and Phi
Delta Phi. He has co-authored numerous
books on estate planning and administration.
In 1977 he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929 and lives in Provo. He gradu-
ated from Brigham Young University in 1957
with high honors. He received his J.D. from
the University of Chicago and became the
law clerk for Justice Jesse A. Udall of the Ari-
zona Supreme Court in 1960. From 1961 to
1974, Judge McKay was with the firm of
Lewis and Roca in Phoenix, taking two years
out to serve as Director of the United States
Peace Corps in Malawi, Africa. He was a law
professor at Brigham Young University from
1974 until he was appointed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in 1977.
JUDGE STEPHANIE K.
SEYMOUR
Judge Seymour was born in Battle Creek,
Michigan, in 1940. She graduated from
Smith College, magna cum laude, in 1962 and
earned her J.D. from Harvard Law School in
1965. She was admitted to the Oklahoma bar
in 1965.
Judge Seymour has practiced law in Bos-
ton, Massachusetts, 1965-1966; in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, 1967; and Houston, Texas, 1968-
1969. Most recently, she has practiced with
the Tulsa firm of Doerner, Stuart, Saunders,
Daniel & Anderson from 1971 to 1979. Judge
Seymour is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, and
the American, Oklahoma, and Tulsa County
Bar associations. She served as a bar exam-
iner from 1973 through 1979.
Judge Seymour was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit by President Carter in 1979.
SENIOR JUDGE JOHN C.
PICKETT
Judge Pickett was born in Ravenna,
Nebraska, in 1896. He received his LL.B.
degree from the University of Nebraska in
1922. In 1920, he was a pitcher for the Chi-
cago White Sox. During World War I, he
served as a Second Lieutenant.
From 1935 until 1949, Judge Pickett was
Assistant United States Attorney for the Dis-
trict of Wyoming; in 1949, he was United
States Attorney. He is a past member of the
Judicial Conference and has served as Chair-
man of the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on the Administration of the
Criminal Law.
Judge Pickett was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
in 1949 and has been a Senior Judge since
January 1, 1966.
SENIOR JUDGE JEAN S.
BREITENSTEIN
Judge Breitenstein was born in Keokuk,
Iowa, in 1900. His family moved to Boulder,
Colorado, in 1907. After graduation from the
University of Colorado, where he received his
A.B. in 1922 and LL.B. in 1924, he served as a
Colorado Assistant Attorney General from
1925 until 1929. He was an Assistant United
States Attorney from 1930 until 1933.
Between 1933 and 1954, he practiced law in
Denver. In 1954, he became a United States
District Judge.
Judge Breitenstein has served as Chairman
of the Judicial Conference Committee on
Intercircuit Assignments and is a past presi-
dent of the Denver Law Club.
A member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, and Phi Alpha Delta, Judge Breitenstein
holds LL.D. degrees from the University of
Colorado and the University of Denver. He
was appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1957 and became a Senior Judge
on July 31, 1970.
SENIOR JUDGE DAVID T.
LEWIS
Judge Lewis was born in Salt Lake City,
Utah, in 1912. He received his B.A. degree
and his J.D. from the University of Utah. In
1971, he was awarded an Honorary Doctor of
Laws degree from his alma mater. During
World War II, Judge Lewis served in the
Criminal Investigation Division of the Army
and in 1947-48 he was a member of the Utah
Legislature. He was a Utah district judge
from 1950 to 1956.
Judge Lewis has been a member of the
Judicial Conference of the United States since
1970 and was elected Chairman of the Con-
ference of Chief Circuit Judges in 1974. He
was voted the "Judge of the Year" in 1974 by
the Utah State Bar Association.
Judge Lewis is a member of the Order of
the Coif and Phi Delta Phi. He was
appointed to the Tenth Circuit in 1956 by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower. He became
a Senior Judge on December 3, 1977.
SENIOR JUDGE DELMAS C.
HILL (Retired)
Judge Hill was born in Wamego, Kansas,
in 1906. He received his LL.B. from Wash-
burn College in 1929. From 1929 to 1943 he
practiced law in Wamego, serving as an Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney from 1934 to 1936. He
was general counsel for the Kansas State Tax
Commission from 1937 to 1939 and Chair-
man of the State Democratic Committee from
1946 to 1948. During World War II he was a
Captain in the U.S. Army. In 1945, he
assisted in the prosecution of General
Yamashita in Manila. He was a U.S. District
Judge from 1949 until 1961 when he was
appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Judge Hill became a Senior Judge
on April 1, 1977.
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THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT
HONORABLE ARTHUR J. STANLEY, JR.*AND IRMA S. RUSSELL**
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was created by dividing the Eighth
Circuit. Until the recent formation of the Eleventh Circuit,' this was the
only time geographical boundaries had been altered since the present federal
circuit court system was instituted in 1891.2 The Tenth Circuit came into
existence in April 1929, the eve of a period in our nation's history that was to
see vast-almost revolutionary-changes in our system of justice.
I. BACKGROUND: APPEALS IN THE EARLY DAYS
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the
United States "in one Supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish."'3 The Judiciary Act of
17894 created a three-tier system similar in theory, though quite different in
practice and jurisdiction from the three-tier system in effect today.5 The Act
established thirteen district courts, one per state. Although the country was
divided into three circuits-Southern, Middle, and Eastern, 6 there was no
counterpart to the current United States judge of the court of appeals. The
six Supreme Court Justices had the duty of riding circuit. Two justices were
* Senior United States District Judge, District of Kansas; LL.B. 1928, Kansas City
School of Law (University of Missouri, Kansas City). Judge Stanley has served as United States
District Judge since 1958.
** Attorney, Olathe, Kansas. B.A. 1969; B.S. 1974; M.A. 1972; J.D. 1980, University of
Kansas. Ms. Russell served as law clerk to Tenth Circuit Judge James K. Logan from 1980 to
1981.
1. The new Eleventh Circuit, composed of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, was created
out of the Fifth Circuit. The reconstituted Fifth Circuit is now composed of the District of the
Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. IV 1980).
2. Before the Act of 1891, boundaries were changed on several occasions. In 1802 six
circuits were created, embracing all the states then in the union. Additional changes were nec-
essary when states were added to the union. In 1842 the boundaries of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits were redrawn. Act of August 16, ch. 1891, 1842, 5 Stat. 507. In 1863, the
boundaries of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits were redrawn when Indiana was detached from
the Seventh and included in the Eighth. Act of Jan. 28, 1863, ch. 13, 12 Stat. 637. See Sur-
rency,A Histoqy of Federal Courts, 28 Mo. L. REv. 214, 225 (1963). It has been proposed that the
Ninth Circuit be split. See A Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System,
The Geographic Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits- Recommendation for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223,
234 (1973) [hereinafter Geographic Boundaries].
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
4. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
5. In addition to this three-tier system, other courts that derive their powers from Article
III were later created by statute. See Maris, The Federal Judicial System, 12 MOD. FED. PRAC.
DIG. 815, 821-22 (1960).
6. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74.
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assigned to each circuit and would sit with a district judge to constitute the
circuit court. 7 Two districts, Maine and Kentucky, were not under the juris-
diction of any circuit court.8
These circuit courts not only exercised appellate jurisdiction, but origi-
nal jurisdiction in certain cases.9 They held concurrent original jurisdiction
in diversity cases with an amount in controversy in excess of $500.1 In 1793,
Congress provided that only one Supreme Court Justice need sit on each
circuit court, which meant that a single justice and two district judges could
constitute the circuit court.'1  It also empowered the single Supreme Court
Justice to sit as the circuit court in cases in which the district judge "shall be
absent, or shall have been of counsel, or be concerned in interest in any cause
then pending .... 12 Congress later provided that each justice need sit as a
circuit judge during only one session each year.'
3 Despite reform attempts' 4
and the creation of the courts of appeals in 1891,15 this system remained
basically unchanged in theory until IS 1.16 In practice, the Supreme Court
Justices stopped riding circuit sometime in the second half of the nineteenth
century. '
7
The office of circuit judge was created in 1869,18 with one circuit judge
assigned to each circuit. The additional judge provided several alternatives
for review of appellate matters: Circuit court could be held, as before, by the
7. Parker, The FederalJudicza/S,stem, 14 F.R.D. 361 (1954). Under 28 U.S.C. § 42 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980) the Supreme Court allots a justice to each circuit to serve as circuit justice.
Although the justices are authorized to sit on the appellate court, they are no longer required to
do so. 28 U.S.C. § 43(b) (1976). The circuit justices who have been assigned to the Tenth
Circuit are as follows:
Willis Van Devanter, 1929-1937 (279 U.S. iv) (1929).
Pierce Butler, 1937-1940 (302 U.S. iv) (1937).
Stanley Reed, 1940 (309 U.S. iv) (1940).
Frank Murphy, 1941-1943 (314 U.S. v) (1941).
Wiley B. Rutledge, 1943-1949 (318 U.S. iv) (1943).
Tom C. Clark, 1949-1957 (338 U.S. v) (1949).
Charles Whittaker, 1957-1962 (353 U.S. iv) (1957).
William 0. Douglas, April 2, 1962-April 16, 1962 (369 U.S. vi) (1962).
Byron R. White, 1962-present (370 U.S. iv) (1962).
8. See supra note 6.
9. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78. The circuit court had original
jurisdiction to hear most civil litigation, including diversity cases, and to hear important crimi-
nal cases involving violations of federal statutes.
10. Surrency, supra note 2, at 215. In 1842 the circuit and district courts were given con-
current original jurisdiction for trials of noncapital crimes. Act of August 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 3,
5 Stat. 516, 517.
11. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 333.
12. Id. at 334. For example, Aaron Burr was tried by a circuit court composed only of
Chief Justice John Marshall and District Judge Cyrus Griffin. See United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 25 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14.692b).
13. Act of June 17, 1844, ch. 96, 5 Stat. 676.
14. See Surrency, supra note 2, at 228-31. In 1801 the Midnight Judges Bill provided for 16
additional circuit judges and increased the number of circuits to six. It also reduced the number
of Supreme Court justices to five and relieved them of circuit duty. The entire statute was
repealed the following year. See Maris, supra note 5, at 816.
15. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
16. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1027. The Act created exclusive
appellate jurisdiction in the circuit courts except for decisions that could be appealed directly to
the Supreme Court. See id at 1133-34.
17. Surrency, supra note 2, at 223.
18. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44.
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Supreme Court Justice assigned to the circuit, the local district judge, and
the new circuit judge, or by any two of these three sitting together. 9
The Judiciary Act of 1891 (Act) 20 established the basic foundation of
the current federal judiciary system. To reduce the overloaded docket of the
Supreme Court, the Act created a circuit court of appeals for each of the
existing circuits. 2 1 The Circuit Court of Appeals heard appeals from both
district and circuit courts.
22
When the circuit courts were abolished in 1911,23 their original jurisdic-
tion vested in the district courts. 24 The jurisdiction of the courts of appeals
was appellate only, and extended over all final judgments of the federal dis-
trict courts except those directly appealable to the Supreme Court.25 In
1925 Congress significantly limited the types of cases that could be directly
appealed to the Supreme Court,26 thus enlarging the jurisdiction of the cir-
cuit courts. Their jurisdiction was later further enlarged to include enforce-
ment of the orders of certain agencies, 2 7 review of decisions of the Tax
Court,2 8 and of actions by federal agencies.2 9 The Judicial Code of 1948
changed the name Circuit Court of Appeals to Court of Appeals.
30
When a new state was added to the Union, a single judicial district with
one judge was added to the federal judicial system. The only exception to
this rule was Oklahoma which was organized into two districts at the time it
joined the Union.3' Later, some other states were also divided into addi-
tional districts. Redistricting was not always accomplished in conjunction
with the appointment of an additional judge for the new district. 32 In cases
where an additional judge was not appointed, the only benefit gained by
19. Surrency, supra note 2, at 232.
20. Act of Mar. 2, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 827.
21. Surrency, supra note 2, at 233.
22. Id
23. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1087. The Act is entitled, "[ain Act
to codify, revise and amend the laws relating to the judiciary."
24. Surrency, supra note 2, at 216.
25. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 128, 36 Stat. 1087, 1133-34.
26. See Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 128, 43 Stat. 936; see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291, Prior Law
on Appellate Jurisdiction. Before this Act parties had a right of direct appeal from the district
court to the Supreme Court as follows:
Any case in which the jurisdiction of the court was in issue, in which case the question
ofjurisdiction alone was certified to the Supreme Court; final sentences and decrees in
prize causes; any case which involved the construction or application of the Constitu-
tion of the United States; any case in which the constitutionality of any law of the
United States or the validity or construction of any treaty made under its authority
was drawn in question; and any case in which the constitution or law of a State was
claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States.
Act Mar. 3, 1891, § 5, 26 Stat. 827 (currently found at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (1966) (historical
note)). The 1925 Act abolished the right of appeal to the Supreme Court except in specific
cases. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1253 (1976).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1976).
28. See Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-713, § 3, 80 Stat. 1107, 1109 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 7482 (1976)).
29. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-702 (1976).
30. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 870 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 43
(1976)).
31. Act of June 16, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-234, § 13, 34 Stat. 267, 275 (codified in scattered
sections of 16 and 28 U.S.C.)
32. See Surrency, supra note 2, at 238-39.
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redistricting was additional locus for the court. Generally, each district had
its own federal district judge, though occasionally two districts would share a
single judge, 33 as occurred in Oklahoma. At present Oklahoma is the only
state in the Tenth Circuit comprising more than one federal judicial district;
it is divided into three districts with some judges appointed to serve in all
three.
The creation of the Tenth Circuit in 1929 was actually the second time
a "Tenth Circuit" had been created in the United States judicial system. In
1863, Congress created ten circuits and increased the number of Supreme
Court Justices to ten.34 The first Tenth Circuit embraced California and
Oregon.35 After three years, this circuit was abolished and the states redis-
tributed among the nine circuits. 36 Subsequently, as new states joined the
Union, they were assigned to one of the nine circuits. In 1940 the District of
Columbia Circuit was added for specific purposes. 37 Later, the District of
Columbia Circuit was given the same authority of the other circuits38 and
the chief judge of the District of Columbia Circuit was included as a mem-
ber of the Judicial Conference. 39 The Eleventh Circuit was added in 198040
because of the growing caseload in the old Fifth Circuit.4 1 Division of the
Ninth Circuit has been advocated. 4 2 In 1982 the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals and the appellate functions of the United
States Court of Claims were combined into a new United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
43
II. CREATION OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT---SOCIAL CLIMATE
When the Tenth Circuit was created in April 1929, the social and polit-
ical climate in the United States was marked by optimism and apparent
stability. 44 Of the new Tenth Circuit's non-Indian inhabitants, many were
only a generation away from the pioneers who had settled along the Oregon
and Santa Fe Trails. Their parents and grandparents taught them self-reli-
ance and independence. Inhabitants also included the descendants of min-
ers and adventurers who came west seeking fortunes and then settled down
33. Id at 239-40.
34. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 100, 12 Stat. 794.
35. Id
36. Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209.
37. Act of Dec. 29, 1942, ch. 835, § I(d), 56 Stat 1094.
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1976). This was accomplished partially in order to conform the
system to the Supreme Court's expectations. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325
U.S. 283, 288 (1945) (Court referred to "the eleven circuits forming the . . . federal judica-
ture");seealso O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); Swift & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 311 (1928).
39. P. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 40 (1973).
40. See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 2,
94 Stat. 1994 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. IV 1980)).
41. See H.R. REP. No. 1390, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. 1, reprinted n 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4236, 4237.
42. See supra note 2.
43. Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in
scattered sections of 5, 16, 18, 19, 26, and 28 U.S.C.).
44. In at least economic terms, this apparent stability proved false. In October 1929, just
seven months later, the stock market crashed and the depression began.
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to establish towns, ranches, and farms. The states in the Tenth Circuit had
entered the Union under varying circumstances, and their people were va-
ried in heritage, culture, and life style as were the Indians who had farmed
the valleys and roamed the mountains and plains long before the white set-
tiers arrived.
At the time, most Americans were moderately prosperous, self-satisfied,
and confident of the future. The dollar was backed by gold. In Wealth of
Nations,45 the bible of many respected economists and politicians, Adam
Smith argued that society's good is promoted by the activities of profit-seek-
ing entrepreneurs. John Maynard Keynes' view that government should
manage the economy would not gain its followers until the Depression had
taken its toll.
46
Jurisprudence, "the science which treats of the principles of positive law
and legal relations, '47 was of interest chiefly to philosophers and law profes-
sors. Courts generally did not see their function as requiring consideration of
"the ultimate effect which would be produced if each rule were applied to an
indefinite number of similar cases, and to choose that rule which, when so
applied, will produce the greatest advantage to the community."
'48
Practice and procedure in the federal courts were governed by rules that
had prevailed without radical change since the enactment of the Judiciary
Act of 1789.49 The Federal Rules of Civil, Criminal, and Appellate Proce-
dure had not been promulgated. 50 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 5 ' had not yet
overruled Swif? v. Tson.52 Federal practice differed radically on the law and
equity sides, Cases at law were conducted in accordance with the procedural
law of the state in which the court sat, while the Federal Equity Rules gov-
erned the trial of cases in equity. The published rules and regulations of the
federal agencies did not, as they do now, take up fifteen feet of shelf space.
The number of administrative law cases had not yet burgeoned to the point
that led Justice Frankfurter to declare in 1957: "Review of administrative
action, mainly reflecting enforcement of federal regulatory statutes, consti-
tutes the largest category of the court work, comprising one-third of the total
cases decided on the merits."' 53 Ernesto Miranda had not been born. "The
Trilogy" of habeas corpus cases was still thirty years from decision. 54 The
class action, the child of equity, was mentioned more often in scholarly dis-
sertations than in court opinions.
The eighteenth amendment had not yet been repealed by the twenty-
45. A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
46. See, e.g., J.M. KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PEACE (1920); J.M.
KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY (1936).
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 767 (Rev. 5th ed. 1979).
48. Id
49. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
50. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective Sept. 16, 1938; the Rules of
Criminal Procedure Sept. 1, 1945; the Rules of Appellate Procedure July 1, 1968.
51. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
52. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
53. Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of JustiCes, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 793
(1957) quoted in K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 13 (1960).
54. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Town-
send v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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first, and thus the "noble experiment"-the prohibition of the manufacture,
sale, and transportation of intoxicating liquors-was still underway. Cases
charging violations of the prohibition laws, the Volstead Act,55 cluttered the
criminal dockets of federal trial and appellate courts.
III. LEGISLATION CREATING THE TENTH CIRCUIT
5 6
The efforts of Congress and the bar to alleviate congestion in the circuit
courts, particularly in the Eighth Circuit, began in 1925 and culminated in
1929 with the creation of the Tenth Circuit. Before the creation of the
Tenth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit contained thirteen states touching both
the northern and southern borders of the country (Minnesota and New Mex-
ico) and stretching from Iowa on the east to Utah on the west. After study-
ing the problem of congested dockets, a subcommittee of the American Bar
Association (ABA) drafted a bill, H.R. 5690, that would have redrawn the
areas of all the existing circuits as well as adding a tenth circuit. The Tenth
Circuit would have included the following states: Arizona, California,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. 5 7 The bill was
presented to Congress in 1927 without the ABA's endorsement or, indeed, a
consensus of the committee that had created it. 58 It received an overwhelm-
ingly negative response from attorneys and the Congress.
59
Opposition to the bill centered on its failure to create any new judge-
ships6° and also the switching of states from one circuit to another. Con-
gressman Newton objected to the plan because of the differences in the
procedural and substantive law of the existing circuits. 6 1 Some traditional-
ists were opposed to creating an additional circuit on the ground that the
number of circuits should be equal to the number of Supreme Court Jus-
tices. 62 Since 1837 the number of Supreme Court Justices had remained
55. Pub. L. No. 66-6810, 41 Stat. 305, repealedby Liquor Law Repeal & Enforcement Act
1935, ch. 740, § 1, 49 Stat. 872.
56. This section draws significantly from D. Bonn, The Geographical Division of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (Sept. 1974) (research report written for the Federal Judicial
Center).
57. Id at 4.
58. Id at 3. Similarly, in recent recommendations the Commission on Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System rejected the idea of realigning all the circuits to equalize the
workload.
We have not recommended a general realignment of all the circuits. To be sure,
the present boundaries are largely the result of historical accident and do not satisfy
such criteria as parity of caseloads and geographical compactness. But these bounda-
ries have stood since the nineteenth century, except for the creation of the Tenth Cir-
cuit in 1929, and whatever the actual extent of variation in the law from circuit to
circuit, relocation would take from the bench and bar at least some of the law now
familiar to them. Moreover, the Commission has heard eloquent testimony evidenc-
ing the sense of community shared by lawyers and judges within the present circuits.
Except for the most compelling reasons, we are reluctant to disturb institutions which
have acquired not only the respect but also the loyalty of their constituents.
62 F.R.D. 223, 228 (1973).
59. Bonn, supra note 56, at 4-5.
60. Id
61. Id at 7.
62. Id at 5.
[Vol. 66:2
POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
fairly constant at nine, 63 although it had once dropped to seven.
64
Some even disputed whether the Eighth Circuit was overloaded with
cases. Judge Kimbrough Stone, Senior Judge65 of the Eighth Circuit, de-
clared that in his eleven years on the bench, his court had "never been even
one case behind its docket and it is not now."'6 6 However, the Eighth Circuit
frequently had to use district judges on the circuit court; indeed, district
judges wrote forty percent of the circuit's decisions. 67 This practice of using
district judges on the circuit court was criticized during debates on congres-
sional bills aimed at this problem by Justices Taft and Van Devanter68 and
members of the bar of the Eighth Circuit, particularly because it created
delay at the trial level.
69
After the resounding defeat of H.R. 5690, Chief Justice Taft suggested
that a less sweeping change might accomplish the desired purpose: "My
own impression is that the best thing to do, if you want to do something that
can be done at once and not involve conflicting considerations, is merely to
divide the Eighth Circuit and let all the other circuits stand as they are."
'70
In January 1928, a special ABA subcommittee composed solely of Eighth
Circuit lawyers met to consider dividing the Eighth Circuit. Two bills pro-
viding for such a division were presented to Congress during May 1928.
Congressman Walter H. Newton of Minnesota submitted H.R. 13567, which
called for a division of the circuit into northern and southern areas with
63. Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, 5 Stat. 176 (establishing nine as the number of Supreme
Court Justices).
64. See Parker, supra note 7, at 362.
65. At that time, "senior judge" was the title used for the position known today as "chief
judge." See 28 U.S.C. § 45 (1976) (revisor's note). The title "chief judge" was given by Con-
gress in recognition of this position's great increase of administrative duties. See H.R. REP. No.
308, accompanying H.R. 3214, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A6 (1947). See also P. FisH, supra note 39,
at 244.
66. Letter from K. Stone to I.G. Hersey (Feb. 20, 1928) (on file in the National Archives,
House Jud. Comm. Files) (cited in Bonn, supra note 56, at 8).
67. Hearings on HR. 5690, HR. 13567, and HR. 13757 Before the House Comm. on theJudictag,
70th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 63, 72 (Testimony of Justice Van Devanter) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
68. Id. at 66-72.
69. Letter from G.B. Rose to L.C. Dyer (Feb. 17, 1928) (on file in the National Archives,
House Jud. Comm. Files) (cited in Bonn, supra note 56, at 18). Senior Judge Stone noted the
problem in a letter to A.C. Paul:
As this bill [The Thatcher Bill-H.R. 13757] provides for but three circuit judges in
each of these two circuits (or groups), the inevitable result in the second group would
be that two district judges would have to sit in every case, in order to keep up with the
docket. This is so because the experience of this court has shown that 30 opinions is a
good annual average for a judge working diligently, which means that each judge can
sit in only 90 cases a year. As this group averages 270 or more cases annually, the
above result is inevitable. This extensive use of district judges would seriously interfere
with and delay trials in the district courts. Two-thirds of the opinions would be writ-
ten by district judges and such opinions would often be delayed because of pressure of
district court work on those judges.
Letter from K. Stone to A.C. Paul (June 30, 1928) (on file in the Library of Congress) (quotedin
Bonn, supra note 56, at 18).
70. Testimony of W.H. Taft, in Heartigs, supra note 67, at 66. Chief Justice Taft also sug-
gested that Nebraska be included in the Tenth Circuit because of its proximity to Kansas and
Wyoming and because the railroad from Chicago to Colorado passed through Wyoming and
Nebraska. Id at 67. Because there was no circuit judge residing in Nebraska, its inclusion
would not have affected the number of judges in either circuit.
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Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, and Ar-
kansas remaining in the Eighth Circuit, and Colorado, Wyoming, Utah,
Kansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico forming the new Tenth Circuit. The
bill provided for five judges in the reconstituted Eighth Circuit and four in
the Tenth, an increase of three judges for the area covered by the old Eighth
Circuit.
7 1
Congressman Maurice Thatcher of Kentucky, submitted H.R. 13757,
proposing what was regarded as an east-west division of the circuit. Under
his proposal, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Wyoming would remain part of the Eighth. The Tenth Circuit would con-
sist of Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, New Mexico, and
Utah. This division was patterned after a proposal made by Justice Willis
Van Devanter of Wyoming who felt it followed "recognized routes of travel
and commerce." 72 The Thatcher Bill also provided for nine judgeships, as-
signing six to the Eighth Circuit and three to the Tenth Circuit.
73
The Newton Bill was endorsed almost unanimously by the bar and
judges,74 and by two major railroads. 75 Several judges noted favorably that
the Newton Bill kept the mountain states intact and grouped the agricul-
tural states together, thus providing a basic division by type of litigation-
primarily mining and irrigation in the mountain states and agricultural in
the other states. 76 The Newton Bill also appeared to divide the case load of
71. The bill also provided that judges would remain where they were residing and would
preside in the circuit comprising that district. The Eighth Circuit would continue to hold court
at St. Louis and St. Paul. Denver was to be the seat of the new Tenth Circuit. See supra note 67.
72. Testimony of Justice Van Devanter, in Hearings, supra note 67, at 72.
73. The seats of the Eighth Circuit were to be St. Paul and Cheyenne; those set for the
Tenth Circuit were St. Louis, Denver, and Oklahoma City. Cheyenne had been listed as an
alternative seat of court to Denver for the Eighth Circuit under § 126 of the Judicial Code, but
was rarely used. See supra note 67.
74. It is unclear, however, whether the judges and lawyers received copies of the Thatcher
Bill. When the House Judiciary Committee was studying the two bills and wanted the views of
the district judges in the Eighth Circuit, Congressman Newton said he would ask A.C. Paul to
write to those judges whose opinions he did not have. At the Jan. 11, 1929 hearings, Newton
said that he had spoken with Mr. Paul: "I did not say anything to Mr. Paul about presenting
the Thatcher bill, because I did not understand that I was to do so." Testimony of W.H.
Newton, in Hearings, supra note 67, at 90. Because of illness, Mr. Paul was not at the committee
hearing and, thus, it is unclear what he did. In their responses, some of the judges mentioned
only the Newton Bill, stating that they received "the bill" or the "Newton bill," while others
specifically stated they favored the Newton Bill over the Thatcher Bill.
75. Both the Northern Pacific Railroad Co. and the Missouri-Kansas Texas Railroad Co.
wrote letters to the Committee favoring the Newton Bill. Bonn, supra note 56, at 25. The
interest of a Nebraska attorney who worked for the Union Pacific gave rise to speculation by
another attorney from that state:
It is my understanding that Mr. N.H. Loomis of the Union Pacific Law Department is
devoting an unusual amount of time and attention to the consideration of the Newton
Bill and its progress in Congress, and I am at a loss to know just what his deep and
particular interest in the Bill can be. We know, of course, that railroads are always
deeply interested in the appointment of Federal Judges and I am wondering whether
Mr. Loomis would be opposed either to you or me. It may be that he is only interested
in having the court sit at Omaha on account of the probable increase in passenger
traffic which might result.
Letter from J.C. Kinsler to Sen. G.W. Norris, Neb. (Feb. 23, 1929) (on file in the Library of
Congress, Norris papers) (cited in Bonn, supra note 56, at 25).
76. Testimony of District Judges Kennedy and Farris, in Hearings, supra note 67, at 113-15;
Letter from Finley, Allen, & Dunham to I.G. Hersey (Jan. 2, 1929) (Hearings, supra note 67, at
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the old circuit fairly evenly.
77
By the close of the January 11, 1929 hearings, the Newton Bill had been
approved by all six circuit judges of the Eighth Circuit, the bar associations
of eight states of the circuit, fifty-two attorneys from the Eighth Circuit, and
by the ABA. 78 On January 28, 1929, after a few revisions, Congressman
Newton introduced the revised bill, H.R. 16658, to the House Judiciary
Committee. 79 On February 18, 1929, the House unanimously passed the
Newton Bill. After one amendment adding Kansas City, Missouri, as a seat
of the Eighth Circuit, the bill passed the Senate on February 23, 1929. The
House agreed to this amendment on February 25, and President Hoover
signed the bill into law on February 28, 1929.80
The Act required the Tenth Circuit to hold an annual term of court in
Denver and Wichita, and in Oklahoma City "provided that suitable rooms
and accommodations for holding court at Oklahoma City are furnished free
of expense to the United States."8 ' The legislative history of the Act, how-
ever, reveals no reason for this proviso. Five circuit judgeships were allo-
cated to the diminished Eighth Circuit and four to the new Tenth Circuit.
Section 4 of the Act, in effect, transferred Judges Robert E. Lewis of Colo-
rado and John H. Cotteral of Oklahoma from the Eighth Circuit to the
Tenth.8 2 President Hoover appointed United States District Judges Orie L.
Phillips of New Mexico and George T. McDermott of Kansas to fill out the
new court.
The Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction is unique in that one of the districts in
the circuit contains areas outside the state.8 3 The District of Wyoming in-
134); Letter from Utah Bar Ass'n to I.G. Hersey (Jan. 8, 1929) (Hearings, supra note 67, at 130)
(cited in Bonn, supra note 56, at 49).
77. Judge Stone stated in a letter to A.C. Paul:
On the basis of cases filed in 1927 there are 222 cases in the first group [Eighth Circuit]
and 179 in the second [Tenth Circuit]; on the three year average there are 232 in the
first and 174 in the second group. To take care of this difference, the Newton Bill
provides for five judges in the first group and four judges in the second. By this in-
crease from the present six judges to nine in both of the two new circuits, the bad effect
of dividing the circuit is lessened.
Letter from K. Stone to A.C. Paul (June 30, 1928) (on file in Library of Congress) (quoted in
Bonn, supra note 56, at 23).
78. Bonn, supra note 56, at 27.
79. Notably, Wichita was added as a seat in the Tenth Circuit in response to suggestions
from W.A. Ayres, a representative from Kansas, and an ABA resolution calling for a seat of the
court in Wichita. Bonn, supra note 56, at 27. Omaha was also added as a seat for the Eighth
Circuit. Id. See also id at 27 for a list of other changes made in H.R. 13567 by H.R. 16658.
80. Act of Feb. 28, 1929, Pub. L. No. 840, § 126, 45 Stat. 1346 (presently codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 41-48).
81. Act of Feb. 28, 1929, Pub. L. No. 840, § 126, 45 Stat. 1347.
82. Section 4 reads:
Any circuit judge of the eighth circuit as constituted before the effective date of this
Act, who resides within the eighth circuit as constituted by this Act, is assigned as a
circuit judge to such part of the former eighth circuit as is constituted by this Act the
eighth circuit, and shall be a circuit judge thereof, and any circuit judge of the eighth
circuit as constituted before the effective date of this Act, who resides within the tenth
circuit as constituted by this Act, is assigned as a circuit judge of such part of the
former eighth circuit as is constituted by this Act the tenth circuit, and shall be a
circuit judge thereof.
Id at 1348.
83. 28 U.S.C. §§ 82-131 (1976). Some districts include entities that are, for many purposes,
treated as states. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 88 (1976) (District of Columbia); 28 U.S.C. § 119 (1976)
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cludes "those portions of Yellowstone National Park situated in Montana
and Idaho,' 8 4 and the statements of jurisdiction of Idaho and Montana ex-
pressly exclude the portions of the respective states within Yellowstone.
8 5
Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 1294 indicates an appeal from a reviewable deci-
sion of a district court is to be taken to the "court of appeals for the circuit
embracing the district."'8 6 United States Attorneys are appointed to serve in
a particular judicial district,8 7 and the duty to prosecute for offenses against
the United States applies "within his district." a Thus, the District of Wyo-
ming's jurisdiction over the entirety of Yellowstone seems clear. However,
courts have occasionally overlooked the boundaries of the district, drawing
the jurisdiction along state lines, even though the cases arise in Yellowstone
National Park.8 9
IV. THE FIRST SESSION OF THE CIRCUIT
The court convened for its first session on April 1, 1929, for the "pur-
pose of organizing said court. '"90 Senior Circuit Judge Robert E. Lewis pre-
sided. Circuit Judge John H. Cotteral and Marshal Richard C. Callen were
present. The first order of business was the appointment of Albert Trego of
Denver as Clerk of Court. Next the Court adopted its seal. Judges Orie L.
Phillips and George T. McDermott, then judges of the districts of New Mex-
ico and Kansas respectively, were assigned to the circuit and designated to
sit for its first session.91
On the second day of the session, the rules of practice were adopted,
providing for three regular terms to be held annually, one each at Denver,
Oklahoma City, and Wichita. Denver was designated as the location for the
clerk's office. It was ordered that practice, as far as feasible, was to be the
same as in the Supreme Court of the United States. Provisions were made
(Puerto Rico); 48 U.S.C. §§ 1405x-1405z (1976) (Virgin Islands); 48 U.S.C. § 1424 (1976)
(Guam).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 131 (1976).
85. Id §§ 92, 106.
86. Id § 1294(1).
87. Id §541.
88. Id. § 547.
89. In the case of United States v. Sanford, 503 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S.
996 (1975), for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Montana district court's dismissal of an
indictment for game violations in a portion of Yellowstone Park falling within Montana. The
Ninth Circuit again dismissed on other grounds, United States v. Sanford, 536 F.2d 871 (9th
Cir.), and again was reversed by the Supreme Court, 429 U.S. 14 (1976) (per curiam), all with-
out mention of the original failure of jurisdiction in the District of Montana. See Martin v.
United States, 546 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denid, 432 U.S. 906 (1977); Rubenstein v.
United States, 488 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1973).
This division of jurisdiction raises an interesting question regarding what law should be
applied in diversity cases arising in the Idaho and Montana portions of Yellowstone Park.
Under the rule of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny, federal courts
that exercise jurisdiction over a case solely by virtue of diversity of citizenship are to apply the
law of the state where the cause of action occurred. Id at 71-73. Apparently, then, a court must
apply Idaho or Montana law in diversity actions that arise within the boundaries of those states,
even though jurisdiction lies within the judicial district of Wyoming. The question has yet to
require judicial resolution.
90. 1 Tenth Circuit Record 1 (Apr. 1, 1929) [hereinafter cited as Record].
91. Id at 4-5.
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for the admission of attorneys and for the preparation of bills of exception on
appeals from the district courts.
92
On the third day of its first session, the court admitted Julius C. Gunter
to practice as an attorney.93 Gunter was a former justice of the Supreme
Court of Colorado and former governor of the state. On Mr. Gunter's mo-
tion, the court admitted to practice before it seventy-four lawyers from Colo-
rado and three from Wyoming.94 Rules were adopted governing review of
the decisions of the United States Board of Tax Appeals. Cases transferred
from the Eighth Circuit were ordered entered on the court's dockets for dis-
position in due course.
9 5
V. THE FIRST YEARS OF THE CIRCUIT
The Act of February 28, 1929, creating the Tenth Circuit, provided for
the transfer from the Eighth Circuit of all cases arising in the states assigned
to the Tenth Circuit in which no hearing had yet been held. By order of the
Eighth Circuit entered March 20, 1929, ninety such cases were transferred to
the new court. Of the first 238 cases transferred from the Eighth Circuit or
filed in the Tenth Circuit during the period April 1, 1929, to June 24, 1931,
the clerk classified eighty-nine as sounding in equity, 106 as law cases, and
forty-three as criminal. Thirty-two of the cases originated in the District of
Colorado, thirty-two in Kansas, twenty-two in New Mexico, thirty-seven in
the Eastern District of Oklahoma, thirty-four in the Northern District of
Oklahoma, fifty-four in the Western District of Oklahoma, seventeen in
Utah, and ten in Wyoming.
96
In addition to the official records, Mr. Trego, the first clerk, prepared a
set of hand-printed cards giving a brief summary of each of the first fifty-six
cases disposed of by the court. These cards and the docket summary sheets
show that the nature of the cases reaching the court in its first year differed
markedly from the type of litigation with which the court now deals. As
Howard K. Phillips, the present clerk, expresses it:
The sample [of the cases summarized on the cards] reflects the
period through which the nation was living at the time. For
example:
The crimes included violations of the Volstead Act. Bootleg-
gers and illegal distillers were being caught and prosecuted.
The cases reveal, in disputes over property of failing banks,
bankrupt estates, and attempts to defraud people who have money
or property, that hard times are just over the threshold.
We are still a young enough area to have numerous disputes
concerning the validity of patents issued to homesteaders. Several
of the earliest cases sought cancellation for lack of required resi-
dence, improvements or cultivation.
92. Id
93. Breitenstein, The United States Court of Appeals for the TenthJudiial Circuit, 52 DEN. L.J. 9,
10 (1975).
94. Id
95. Record, supra note 90, at 33.
96. Summary Sheet, Vol. 1, General Docket, U.S. Court of Appeals, 10th Cir.
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The "energy" importance of the area is reflected by suits in-
volving coal lands, oil and gas lands, and mineral rights.
Taxes were a problem then, as now.
9 7
When the new court convened for its first session in Denver, its judges
could not have foreseen the changes in the American judicial system that
events would force on the courts. At that time, despite the warnings of a few
financial prophets, it was generally believed that the national economy
rested on a solid base. The Great Depression, ushered in by the stock market
crash of October 1929, vindicated the judgment of those few. The "Dust
Bowl Years," brought about by the drought of the 1930's, disrupted the
economy of all of the states within the circuit. Many farmers and stockmen,
as well as those whose livelihood depended on agricultural stability, lost their
farms and their businesses. Many banks and once-promising enterprises
failed.
In due course nature restored the land to its pre-drought condition, but
the effects of the Depression and especially of the governmental measures
adopted to alleviate depression-related distress remain with us to the present
time. In their attempts to deal with the nation's economic problems, the
executive and legislative branches created new agencies and granted them
unprecedented emergency powers. Changing conditions compelled the
courts to re-examine many time-honored legal concepts, with the result that
judges became more inclined toward sociological interpretation and applica-
tion of the law.
98
The eight judges presiding over the district courts in the circuit were not
the disciplined and less colorful jurists we know today. The constitutional
guarantees of tenure during good behavior and undiminished salary fostered
judicial individualism. 99 The district court judges were akin to monarchs
ruling over their domains. Peter Graham Fish's comment on single-judge
district courts before the Court of Appeals Act of 1891 is relevant to the early
days of the Tenth Circuit as well:
They became lions on their relatively remote thrones. However
they might find or make the law, delay or accelerate the flow of
cases, reward or punish friends and foes with patronage and
favorable bench rulings, concerned none but themselves. Only ap-
pellate court reversals on points of law and impeachment for
crimes and misdemeanors limited their conduct.'o
It may safely be assumed-as older lawyers who practiced before some
of them still testify-that the judges of the federal trial courts of the first
quarter of this century were rugged individualists. They ran their own dock-
97. Letter from Howard K. Phillips to Judge Arthur J. Stanley (Sept. 5, 1979).
98. See R. POUND, I JURISPRUDENCE 158-78 (1959).
99. See Breitenstein, supra note 93.
John C. Pollock of Kansas had been a district judge since December 1, 1903; Tillman D.
Johnson of Utah since 1915; Colin Neblett of New Mexico since 1917; Robert L. Williams of the
Eastern District of Oklahoma since 1919; Thomas Blake Kennedy of Wyoming since 1921; J.
Foster Symes of Colorado since 1922; Franklin E. Kennamer of the Northern District of
Oklahoma since 1924; and Edgar S. Vaught of the Western District of Oklahoma only since
1928.
100. P. FISH, supra note 39, at 13.
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ets and were not disposed to yield to any person or any other court in the
exercise of their judicial powers.
VI. COURT ADMINISTRATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
A. The Judicial Conference of the United States
Growing popular dissatisfaction with cumbersome procedures and de-
fective judicial administration did not go unnoticed by many jurists and aca-
demicians, including Dean Roscoe Pound and William Howard Taft. Taft,
as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, was the prime
mover in legislation in 1922 creating the Judicial Conference of the United
States. ""
The bill proposing the original conference of senior judges was hotly
debated. Some senators feared that the Judicial Conference would be able
to give orders to every district judge in the Union. One senator protested
that the bill was "an assault upon the independence of the judiciary which
may grow and grow to sap and undermine that independence."' 0 2 Another
opponent predicted that the Conference would "become the propaganda or-
ganization for legislation for the benefit of the Federal judiciary."' 10 3 In the
House, the floor manager for the bill saw the Conference as not only provid-
ing a stage for the exchange of ideas but also leading to a greater uniformity
throughout the federal judicial system. The Chief Justice explained that the
Conference could not even criticize a judge, although he expressed the belief
that peer pressure would induce a fellow judge "to cooperate much more
readily in an organized effort to get rid of business and do justice."'0 4 With
the help of Attorney General Cummings, the original Conference was instru-
mental in bringing about the enactment of the Administrative Office Act of
1939.105
Until recent amendments,'0 6 the powers of the Conference to act di-
rectly on individual judges were ill-defined.' 1 7 Today the Judicial Confer-
ence may hold hearings, take testimony, issue subpoenas, give orders
necessary to the exercise of its authority, discipline a judge, and certify a
judge's disability.' 0 8 In addition, the Conference circulates information on
docket conditions and "submits suggestions and recommendations to the
various courts to promote uniformity of management procedures and expe-
l01. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-298, 42 Stat. 837-40 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 331, 456 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). The Act authorized the Chief Justice to summon
the chiefjudge-then called the senior judge--of each circuit to a meeting to "make a compre-
hensive survey of the condition of the business in the courts of the United States and prepare
plans for transfer of the judges to districts in which they are needed, and to make suggestions to
the various courts as may seem in the interest of uniformity and expedition of business."
102. 62 CONG. REC. 4863, 5280 (1922).
103. 62 CONG. REC. 203 (1921) (remarks of Clarence Lea) (quoledin P. FiSH, supra note 39,
at 36).
104. P. FISH, supra note 39, at 39 (citing Informal Address by William Taft, Report of the
44th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association 564 (1921)).
105. See Maris, supra note 5, at 823.
106. Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 4, 94 Stat. 2040 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. V 1981)).
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. V 1981).
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ditious conduct of court business."' 0 9 The "suggestions" of the Conference
carry great weight, as a recent Associated Press article indicates:
The Judicial Conference is a powerful body that conducts all its
work behind closed doors and is little-known to the public at large.
Among its functions are the drafting and revising of the federal
rules of procedure and evidence, rules that determine how civil and
criminal trials are conducted in the federal courts."10
Few, if any, federal judges today ignore the "suggestions" of the Conference.
The Conference also continuously studies the operation and effect of the fed-
eral rules of practice and procedure' and recommends to the Supreme
Court rule changes that are intended to promote simplicity and fairness and
to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay." 2
Initially the Judicial Conference consisted of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and the chief judges of the several circuits.' 1 3 A 1956
amendment added to the group the chief judge of the Court of Claims.' 
14
Although Chief Judge Orie L. Phillips of the Tenth Circuit had advocated
district court judge participation as early as 1943, it was not until the 1957
session of the Conference that district judges were included. One judge is
elected to the Conference by the circuit and district judges of each circuit.
Later still, the Chief Judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was
added to the Conference's membership."' The 1982 creation of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit combined the Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals and the appellate functions of the Court of Claims. 1 6 The
Chief Judge of the new Court of Appeals replaced the prior separate repre-
sentatives of those courts. The United States Claims Court, reorganized as
an Article I trial court, no longer is represented on the Judicial Conference
of the United States."i7 In 1984, two bankruptcy judges will be admitted to
the Conference." 8
Although Chief Justice Taft, the most active proponent of the legisla-
tion creating the Judicial Conference, favored including the Attorney Gen-
eral as a member, the Senate Judiciary Committee disagreed and eliminated
that portion of the bill.' 19 But the statute does provide that, upon the re-
quest of the Chief Justice, the Attorney General is to submit reports to the
conference "on matters relating to the business of the several courts."'
120
109. Id
110. Kansas City Times, Feb. 4, 1980.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976).
112. Id.
113. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 15, 62 Stat. 902 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
114. Act of July 9, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-659, § (d), 70 Stat. 497. See also P. FISH, supra note
39, at 254-57.
115. Act of Sept. 19, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-253, § 1, 75 Stat. 521 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331
(1976)).
116. Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, §§ 105, 111, 96 Stat. 25,
27-29.
117. d at 29.
118. They will be added Apr. 1, 1984. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 208, 92
Stat. 2549, 2660.
119. P. FiSH, supra note 39, at 32-33.
120. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976).
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Conference committees, which may include nonmembers, play a vital
role in the ongoing work of the Conference. The committees meet on the
call of the chairman who is appointed, like the committee members, by the
Chief Justice. The chairmen attend the conference sessions and submit re-
ports of their respective committees for Conference consideration. The com-
mittees study not only matters referred to them by the Conference, but also
subjects brought to their attention by committee members or by other
judges. Then they submit recommendations to the Conference. In this man-
ner, as well as through their Conference representatives, judges contribute to
Conference deliberations. In 1968, the Conference established formal selec-
tion criteria, ordering that "general committees normally have a member
from each circuit and that standing committees and special committees
should have seven members, at least four of whom should be district
judges."' 2 1 Unless the Chief Justice decides otherwise, members serve non-
renewable terms of six years.
B. The Adminis/rative Offce of the United States Courts
During the Tenth Circuit's first ten years the administration of the fed-
eral courts was vested in the Department of Justice, as it had been since
1870.122 The courts depended on the Attorney General to prepare the judi-
cial budget, pay the salaries of court personnel, and provide needed supplies.
The Attorney General fixed the compensation of the clerks of the district
courts and the courts of appeal. Many federal judges, believing the Justice
Department was inattentive to the courts' needs, criticized this system.
12 3
Some members of Congress questioned whether the Justice Department's su-
pervisory power might influence judges in certain cases and thus inhibit the
impartial administration of justice.
124
The American Bar Association, led by its president, Arthur T. Vander-
bilt, proposed legislation to transfer the administrative functions of the judi-
ciary to an Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Chief Justice
Hughes and Attorney General Cummings approved the plan, although some
members of the Supreme Court, led by Justice Brandeis, opposed it on the
ground that it was the function of the courts to adjudicate, not to
administer. 125
After much discussion and many compromises, a bill was enacted creat-
ing the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The administra-
tive and fiscal responsibilities that the Attorney General had exercised were
121. See P. FISH, supra note 39, at 278 (quoting Judicial Conference Report at 45 (1968)).
122. P. FISH, supra note 39, at 91.
123. Id at 102.
124. Sen. William E. Borah of Idaho stated: "In different ways and by different methods
other than by the usual practice judges are given to understand the views of the Government as
to what the law is and what the decision should be." 50 CONG. REC. 3166-67 (1913) (quotedin P.
FisH, supra note 39, at 103). Another Senator wondered how a federal jurist, under the constant
scrutiny of the Department of Justice, could be a fair and upright judge in litigation in which
the Department represented the Government. 72 CONG. REc. 10883 (1930) (remarks of Ken-
neth McKellar) (cted tn P. FISH, supra note 39, at 103).
125. See P. FISH, supra note 39, at 134-44.
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transferred to the Director of the Administrative Office. 126 The Administra-
tive Office Act of 1939127 has been heralded as "probably the greatest piece
of legislation affecting the judiciary since the Judiciary Act of 1789. ' ' 128 The
Act accomplished four important purposes: 1) it set up the Administrative
Office under the supervision of the Judicial Conference; 2) it made the
judiciary financially independent; 3) it created the Circuit Judicial Councils;
and 4) it required annual circuit conferences that include district and circuit
judges and members of the bar.' 29 The Administrative Office prepares the
budget for the judiciary, gathers statistics descriptive of the courts' opera-
tion, disburses funds, and performs other administrative functions.
To preserve the traditional autonomy of federal courts and judges, Con-
gress placed the Administrative Office under the supervision and direction of
the Judicial Conference. 130 The office's Director and Deputy Director are
appointed and subject to removal by the Supreme Court.131
The Judicial Conference wanted the Administrative Office to be "on
tap," but not "on top."' 132 The judiciary, not the Administrative Office, was
to constitute the fundamental source of administrative power and ultimate
responsibility for administrative decisions. The judiciary continued a watch-
ful attitude toward the Administrative Office and determined that the office
was to remain simply a tool for effective administration rather than a power
in itself.133 Orie L. Phillips, Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit from 1940 to
1956, noted the judges' continuing concern that the "Administrative Office
may get away from Us.'
3 4
VII. JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COUNCILS
The most controversial provision of the 1939 Act created a judicial
council in each circuit.13 5 Originally each council consisted only of the cir-
cuit judges in active service and, unlike the judicial circuit conferences, the
councils included no district court judges or bar representatives. 36 District
judges lobbied for representation on the circuit council, but while the coun-
cils welcomed their presence at sessions affecting the operation of district
courts, district judges were not permitted to participate as members until
1981. Presently, if the council contains six or more circuit judges, at least
three district judges must be included in each circuit's judicial council; if the
council contains fewer than six circuit judges, at least two district judges
126. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-611 (1976).
127. Pub. L. No. 76-299, ch. 15, 53 Stat. 1223.
128. See Parker, supra note 7, at 369; Maris, supra note 5, at 823.
129. See supra note 126.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1976).
131. Id § 601.
132. P. FisH, supra note 39, at 135.
133. Id at 145.
134. Id at 225 (Interview with Orie L. Phillips, Chief Judge, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 22,
1965)).
135. Pub. L. No. 76-299, § 306, 53 Stat. 1223, 1224.
136. Id. The idea of additional peer representation from these groups was considered and
rejected. See P. FIsH, supra note 39, at 159-61.
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must be appointed to the council.1 37 The Judicial Council of the Tenth
Circuit now consists of the chief judge of the circuit, four other circuit
judges, and two district judges. The Council is empowered to make "all
necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the busi-
ness of the courts within its circuit."'
138
Both Peter Graham Fish and Chief Justice Burger have criticized the
judicial councils. 139 Calling them "pillars of passivity," Fish has speculated
that the councils are inactive because of deference to trial judges and the
pervasive concept of an independent judiciary.' 40 In its early years, the
Tenth Circuit Judicial Council did little to affect the administration of jus-
tice in the circuit. 14' Since minutes of the council meetings were not kept
until February 1957, a meaningful assessment of the Council's accomplish-
ments during the early sessions is difficult. When new statutes were enacted,
such as the first Magistrates Act, the Jury Selection and Service Act, and the
Criminal Justice Act, councils had more duties assigned to them and conse-
quently began meeting more often. Also, in more recent times, the Judicial
Conference of the United States has sought and relied on the advice and
recommendations of the circuit councils in various matters.' 42 By recent
amendments effective October 1, 1981, the circuit judicial councils are now
empowered to hold hearings, to take testimony, and to issue subpoenas
which are necessary to carrying out their duties.' 43 By setting the maximum
age of seventy years for the office of presiding chief judge, Congress allevi-
ated one of the most difficult administrative tasks--convincing senile judges
to retire from the office.
14 4
An order of the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit led to what Jus-
tice Douglas called "the liveliest, most controversial contest, involving a fed-
eral judge in modern United States history."' 145 It brought the question of
137. 28 U.S.C. § 332 (Supp. IV 1980) (effective Oct. 1, 1981) provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) The chief judge of each judicial circuit shall call, at least twice in each
year and at such places as he may designate, a meeting of the judicial council of the
circuit, consisting of-
(A) the chief judge of the circuit, who shall preside;
(B) that number of circuit judges fixed by majority vote of all such judges
in regular active service; and
(C) that number of district judges of the circuit fixed by majority vote of all
circuit judges in regular active service, except that-
(i) if the number of circuit judges fixed in accordance with subpara-
graph (B) of this paragraph is less than six, the number of district judges
fixed in accordance with this subparagraph shall be no less than two; and
(ii) if the number of circuit judges fixed in accordance with subpara-
graph (B) of this paragraph is six or more, the number of district judges fixed
in accordance with this subparagraph shall be no less than three.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
139. See P. FIsH, supra note 39, at 405; Burger, The Courts on Trial, 22 F.R.D. 71, 77 (1958).
140. P. FISH, supra note 39, at 405-09.
141. Letter from Emory G. Hatcher, Circuit Executive to Judge James K. Logan (Sept. 19,
1980).
142. Id
143. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976).
145. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 130 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). An-
other example of significant action by the Council in this area was certifying the disability of
Judge Ross Rizley of the Western District of Oklahoma pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (1976)
on Mar. 26, 1965.
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the powers of the judicial councils into sharp focus, and may have provided
the impetus for amendments to section 332.146 In December 1965, acting
under 28 U.S.C. § 332, the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit issued an
order directing that no cases were to be assigned to Judge Stephen Chandler,
United States District Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma.
1 47
Judge Chandler sought a stay of the Council's order from the Supreme
Court. His request was denied on the ground that the order was "entirely
interlocutory pending prompt further proceedings."' 148 The Council sched-
uled a hearing, but cancelled it after learning that neither Judge Chandler
nor any other judge desired to attend. 149 Thereafter, the Council issued an
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 137 and 332, authorizing the judge to sit only
on the cases assigned to him prior to December 28, 1965.150 Judge Chandler
acquiesced in the assignment of cases, but later challenged the order in a
petition to the Supreme Court, alleging that his acquiescence was a result of
both undue duress and a strategy to deprive the Judicial Council of jurisdic-
tion to assign cases under 28 U.S.C. § 137.151
The Supreme Court noted both the "imperative need for total and ab-
solute independence ofjudges in deciding cases or in any phase of the deci-
sional function,"' 5 2 and the legislative grant of power to the Judicial
Council which is necessary to enforce reasonable administrative stan-
dards. 15 3 Ultimately, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the
Council's order was proper because it concluded the case was not in a pos-
ture for the extraordinary relief sought. 1' 4 Congress had provided a proce-
dure for evaluating ajudge's ability to discharge the duties of the office when
the judge is eligible to retire, but had specified no procedure for disciplining
a recalcitrant judge who was ineligible for retirement. 155 The Court indi-
cated that clarification of the statute was necessary:
Standing alone, § 332 is not a model of clarity in terms of the scope
146. The Senate Report on the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disa-
bility Act of 1980 states in part:
The purpose of the proposed legislation is to establish a procedure for investigat-
ing and resolving allegations that a member of the Federal judiciary has been unable
to discharge efficiently all the duties of his or her office by reason of mental or physical
disability or has engaged in conduct which has been inconsistent with the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts.
An investigation of a complaint filed against a judge of the United States may
result in the dismissal of the complaint, a certification of disability, a request that the
judge voluntarily retire, an order that, on a temporary basis, no further cases be as-
signed to the judge, private or public censure or reprimand, the filing of a report to the
House of Representatives suggesting the possibility of impeachment, or other action as
deemed appropriate under the circumstances.
S. REP. No. 362, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4315.
147. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 78 (1970). The order indicated that if all
the active judges in the district could not agree on the assignment of cases, the Council would
make assignments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 137. 398 U.S. at 78.
148. Id at 79.
149. Id at 80.
150. Id
151. Id at 86-87.
152. Id at 84-85.
153. Id
154. Id at 86-87.
155. Se 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (1976).
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of the judicial councils' powers or the procedures to give effect to
the final sentence of § 332. Legislative clarification of enforcement
provisions of this statute and definition of review of council orders
are called for. 156
Despite this criticism, the statute has since been deemed constitutional.
157
Justices Douglas and Black dissented from the majority's opinion, de-
claring that the Council's action was, in effect, a removal of Judge Chandler.
Justice Black noted that every federal judge "is subject to removal from of-
fice only by the constitutionally prescribed mode of impeachment."'' 5 8 In
the view of Justice Douglas "there is no power under our Constitution for
one group of federal judges to censor or discipline any federal judge and no
power to declare him inefficient and strip him of his power to act as a
judge."' 59 Since this decision, Congress has provided the councils with pro-
cedures for certifying the disability of a judge.160
Under the broad language of section 332, the councils have for many
years influenced the operation of the trial courts within their circuits in vari-
ous ways. 16 1 If the judges of a district court are unable to agree upon rules
and orders for dividing the workload among them, then by statute, the cir-
cuit councils must issue the needed orders.162 A district court may end pre-
maturely a regular session only if the council consents.' 63 No district may
put into operation its plan for the random selection ofjurors until it has been
approved by a panel consisting of the members of the circuit council and the
chief judge of the district.164 Similarly, a district court's plan for furnishing
representation for indigent criminal defendants 16 5 and its plan for the
speedy disposition of criminal cases166 require approval by the circuit coun-
cil or a panel that includes members of the council. Additionally, judicial
councils have rulemaking power 16 7 and, thus, may promulgate rules that
provide additional avenues for processing complaints of judicial miscon-
duct. 168 These rules do not provide an additional method of appealing the
merits of a decision, however, except in cases where no other remedies are
156. 398 U.S. at 85 n.6. The Court also noted that "nothing in the statute or its legislative
history indicates that Congress intended or anyone considered the Circuit Judicial Councils to
be courts of appeals en banc." Id at 83 n.5.
157. Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 481 F.2d 41, 45 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 880 (1973).
158. 398 U.S. at 142 (Black, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 137 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 372(b), (c) (Supp. V 1981). In the Judicial Councils Reform and the Judi-
cial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Congress established a procedure for receiving anol
reviewing complaints of judicial misconduct. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332, 372 (Supp. V 1981). For a
thorough analysis of the Act, see Neisser, The New FeeralJudicial Dirciptine Act. Some Questions
Congress Didn't Answer, 65 JUDICATURE 143 (1981).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
162. Id. § 137.
163. Id § 140.
164. Id § 1863.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
166. Id. § 3165.
167. Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 880 (1973).
168. See Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 613 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1980).
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available to cure the effects of the misconduct. 169
The councils' powers to supervise the flow of cases in the trial courts and
to order the courts' nontenured supporting personnel to cease improper
practices have never been disputed. As Congress intended, the judicial coun-
cils remain the linchpin of judicial administration.
VIII. JUDICIAL CIRCUIT CONFERENCES
The Act established the judicial conferences of the circuits as another
mechanism for improving federal court efficiency. Unless excused by the
Chief Judge, all circuit and district judges must attend their respective cir-
cuit's annual conference. 170 Only the Circuit Justice and the circuit and
district judges attend the first day's session. In these executive sessions the
program ordinarily is restricted to the work of the courts within the circuit.
The trial and appellate judges, meeting as a single group, discuss ideas and
problems.
The Act also requires each circuit's court of appeals to provide for mem-
bers of the bar to be represented and participate at the Judicial Confer-
ence. 17 1 The circuits have responded in various ways. Some rotate lawyer-
delegate participation. 172 In others each circuit and district judge may in-
vite a certain number of members of the bar.' 73 The Tenth Circuit Rule
provides that any member of this circuit's bar in good standing may become
a member of the circuit conference by declaring in writing an intention to
become a member.174 By the terms of the circuit rule, if a lawyer-member is
absent from two successive annual sessions without leave of the Chief Judge,
he or she is dropped from membership. 175 Since all members of the circuit
bar in good standing are eligible for membership, as a practical matter, fail-
ure to attend meetings only results in the lawyer being dropped from the
circuit's mailing list.
In assessing the accomplishments of the circuit conferences, Chief Jus-
tice Burger has stated that "less than a majority of the Circuits have consist-
ently held meaningful conferences and in some places the conferences which
are held fall far short of what Congress intended."' 176 Peter Graham Fish
has remarked that most conferences have proved less than satisfactory. 177 He
believes that success of the circuit conference depends upon the chief
judge.178 The chief judges of the Tenth Circuit have improved federal-state
relations by controlling the programs of the circuit and by specially inviting
judges of the state courts and the presidents of the state bar associations
within the circuits. Tenth Circuit conferences have provided a meaningful
169. Id. at 769.
170. 28 U.S.C. § 333 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., 6th CIR. R. 16(c).
173. See, e.g., 5th CIR. R. 23.3.
174. 10th CIR. R. 19(b)(2).
175. Id.
176. Burger, supra note 139, at 78-79.
177. P. FIsH, supra note 39, at 341.
178. Id.
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and dynamic medium of communication between the bench and the bar.
The programs presented at the general sessions have traditionally been on
subjects of broad interest, timely, instructive, and well presented by knowl-
edgeable speakers. 179 In conjunction with the Judicial Conference of the
United States, the circuit conferences and councils have been instrumental
in setting up a promotional policy for judicial employees and prescribing
standards for probation officers and for referees in bankruptcy.180 The ses-
sions have provided platforms for advocates and opponents of proposed
changes designed to improve the administration of justice. In this way, the
use of pretrial conferences and discovery, which had been resisted by many
older judges and practitioners, has been "sold" to the bench and bar. At his
own and other judicial conferences, Judge Alfred P. Murrah, an enthusiastic
supporter of the "new" rules, so persistently and successfully advocated their
use that it was said in judicial circles that his middle initial stood for
"Pretrial."
IX. OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The need to efficiently manage and administer cases docketed for ap-
peal' 8 ' and to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts in order to alleviate
congested dockets has long been recognized.' 82 This need has intensified in
recent years because the number of appeals filed in the federal courts of
appeals has skyrocketed. Between 1960 and 1973, the filings in all circuits
increased by 301%.t83 In 1981,184 26,362 new appeals were filed in the
United States Courts of Appeals, again the greatest number on record.
1'8 5
This is a rise of nearly fourteen percent over 1980 and is fifty-eight percent
higher than filings in 1975.186 The increase resulted in 599 new appeals for
each three-judge panel of the courts of appeal.
18 7
Some commentators have termed the overload of the judicial system "a
crisis." 188 The factors contributing to this stunning increase include the
179. See, e.g., Proceedings, 1969 Tenth Judicial Circuit Conference, 49 F.R.D. 347 (1969)
(Chief Justice Burger's first official appearance as Chief Justice at a circuit judicial conference);
Proceedings, Tenth Judicial Circuit Conference, 44 F.R.D. 245 (1967).
180. See Mars, supra note 5, at 824.
181. See Burger, Shool for Judges, 33 F.R.D. 139, 140-41 (1964).
182. See Burger, Has the Time Come?, 55 F.R.D. 119 (1973) (need for eliminating some fed-
eral jurisdiction and coordinating state and federal systems of justice).
183. The Geographical Boundaries ofthe SeveralJudzhial Circuits-Recommendations for Change, 62
F.R.D. 223, 227 (1974).
184. Statistics are gathered for the 12-month period ending June 30, 1981. 1981 Annual
Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
185. Id. at 186.
186. Id
187. Id at 13.
188. See, e.g., W. Heydeband, The Technocratic Administraton ofJustice, 2 RESEARCH IN LAW
AND SOCIOLOGY (1979). Heydeband asserted that:
The American judicial system is in a state of crisis. The main surface systems of this
judicial crisis are that the resources and the organizational capacity of the judiciary
are not keeping pace with the rising demand for its services. As a result, the nature of
adjudication and judicial administration as well as the tasks and the output of the
courts are being transformed. But while there is little disagreement over the surface




rapid rise in crime in this country,18 9 statutory recognition of rights such as
those of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,190 the increasing tendency in this coun-
try to seek judicial resolution of disputes,19 1 and the judicial broadening of
constitutional rights of criminal defendants. The rate of increase of appel-
late cases is far beyond the rate of increase in federal district court filings. 
19 2
If the rate continues, by the year 2010 over one million cases will reach the
federal appellate courts each year, and 5,000 appellate judges will be needed
to cope with the load.
1 93
Legal commentators and judges agree that the answer to the overload of
cases is not increasing the numbers of judges. Justice Frankfurter noted that
a powerful judiciary is a small judiciary.194 In 1971, both the Committee of
Court Administration of the Judicial Conference of the United States and
the Conference itself concluded that more than fifteen judges in a circuit
would prove "unworkable."' 9 5 Judge Henry J. Friendly has also argued for
a limited number of judges in the federal judiciary.
[T]here must come a point when an increase in the number of
judges makes judging, even at the trial level, less prestigious and
less attractive. Prestige is a very important factor in attracting
highly qualified men to the federal bench from much more lucra-
tive pursuits. Yet the largest district courts will be in the very met-
ropolitan areas where the discrepancy between uniform federal
salaries and the financial rewards of private practice is the greatest,
and the difficulty of maintaining an accustomed standard of living
on the federal salary the most acute. There is real danger that in
such areas, once the prestige factor was removed, lawyers with suc-
cessful practices, particularly young men, would not be willing to
make the sacrifice. 19 6
Many suggestions have been made to help reduce the case load of fed-
eral circuit and district courts, including wider use of arbitration,
decriminalization of some activities, more delegation of jurisdiction to ad-
ministrative agencies, the nonjudicial processing of certain matters such as
divorce and probate,19 7 an increase of the amount-in-controversy require-
ment for diversity actions, and such judicial actions as, where permitted,
awarding the prevailing party attorneys' fees or court costs to discourage
frivolous claims.198 Even if these ideas are adopted and successfully used to
limit federal court jurisdiction, it is clear that the judiciary can meet its
Id. at 29.
189. See Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 90-91
(1976).
190. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1985 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
191. Burger, supra note 189, at 91.
192. Federal district court filings increased 58% in the same time period. See generally, Geo-
graphic Boundaries, supra note 2.
193. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975).
194. See Bork, Dealing With the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 234 (1976); Chief
Justice Warren, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute (May 20, 1964)
(reprinted at 35 F.R.D. 181, 182 (1964)).
195. Geographical Boundaries, supra note 2, at 227-28.
196. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 29-30 (1973).
197. Refkind, Are We Asking Too Much Of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 105 (1974).
198. Sanders, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 112-19 (1974). See Roadway Ex-
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growing responsibilities only through the most efficient administration
possible.
In a speech at the American Bar Association's 1969 convention in Dal-
las, Chief Justice Burger said:
The Courts of this country need management which busy and
overworked judges, with vastly increased caseloads, cannot give.
We need a corps of trained administrators or managers, just as hos-
pitals found they needed them many years ago, to manage and
direct the machinery so that judges can concentrate on their pri-
mary professional duty of judging. 199
The need for improved administration has stemmed primarily from the un-
precedented increases in the number of appeals. In the 1960's and 1970's the
movement in the judiciary to improve the administration of justice and
court management resulted in the addition of administrative positions that
more than doubled the judiciary's total number of administrative personnel.
The following section will discuss briefly some of the mechanisms the Tenth
Circuit has adopted to meet the need for efficient administration, including
the clerk of court, circuit executive, staff attorneys, and the Appellate Infor-
mation Management System (AIMS).
A. Clerk of Court
The Clerk of Court has been the circuit's ministerial officer since the
circuit was formed. 200 The clerk's powers and duties are set forth in statutes,
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Rules of the Tenth Cir-
cuit. 20 1 The clerk is custodian of the court's records and papers, receives and
accounts for monies paid to the court, initiates a docket for each appeal, and
enters all filings in appeals. He or she issues calendars of cases for the terms
of court, enters orders of the court as the appeal progresses, files opinions,
and enters judgments disposing of appeals. Upon disposition of petitions for
rehearing, the clerk issues the court's mandate and, if certiorari is sought, the
clerk upon request prepares the certiorari record.
When the Tenth Circuit was formed in 1929, the first matter of business
undertaken by the court was to appoint the clerk, a Denver attorney named
Albert Trego. After the clerk had given bond in the sum of $15,000 with
surety approved by the court and had taken the oath of office, the court
adopted its seal and announced it was fully organized and in session.
20 2
Shortly afterward, Trego hired a deputy clerk. No personal files on Trego or
council minutes relating to the period of his tenure exist, though circuit files
reveal that Trego served continuously until his death late in 1939.
Robert B. Cartwright, who had been a law clerk to Judge Orie L. Phil-
press, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Note, Nemeroff v. Abelson, Bad Faith and Award of
Attomys' Fees, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 468 (1979).
199. Address by ChiefJustice W. Burger, American Bar Association meeting in Dallas, Tex.
(Aug. 12, 1969).
200. The court's authority to appoint a clerk and the clerk's authority to appoint necessary
deputies, with approval of the court, is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 711 (1976).
201. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 711,951-956 (1976); FED. R. App. P. 45; 10th CIR. R. 1, 3, & 13.
202. Record, supra note 90, at 2.
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lips since 1931, succeeded Trego on December 14, 1939. Cartwright was
reputed to have known every detail of every active case on the docket.
20 3
After serving as clerk for 27 years, Cartwright took early retirement in 1966
because of his health.
20 4
Mr. Cartwright was succeeded by his chief deputy, William L. Whitta-
ker, a Colorado lawyer. Whittaker had also served as a law clerk to Judge
Phillips. After serving as chief deputy from January 3, 1966, Whittaker was
appointed clerk when Cartwright stepped down at the end of that year.
Whittaker served until September 1970 when he resigned to go to Washing-
ton to serve as a deputy to Judge Murrah who became Director of the Fed-
eral Judicial Center after his retirement.
20 5
The current clerk is Howard K. Phillips, a Denver lawyer who suc-
ceeded Whittaker in September 1970. After serving in the Air Force during
World War II, Phillips practiced law in Denver until appointed a Denver
municipal judge from 1963 to 1964. He was manager of safety and excise for
Denver in 1968, and then was appointed clerk of court in 1970.
The office of the clerk has grown rapidly since 1970,206 when the staff
consisted of six deputies and only 743 appeals were filed. Even in 1975
filings were only up to 980, but by 1980 they were up to 1,402 and by 1981
they had risen another 12.5% to 1,577. Cases resolved during the year to-
taled 612 in 1970, 839 in 1975, 1,274 in 1980, and 1,244 in 1981, which left
pending cases at 580 in 1970, 716 in 1975, 1,298 in 1980, and 1,631 in
1981.207 By 1980 the office had sixteen deputies.
As the caseload increases, the operation of the clerk's office becomes
more complex. Acting in conjunction with the clerk's office, there are now
staff attorneys, an appeals expediter, a systems analyst, a LEXIS operator, a
computer system, and a word processing system. The AIMS computer pro-
gram has greatly aided retrieval of needed case information. Because of the
computer system, the clerk is able to report each month, with relative ease,
the total number of cases argued, cases pending, motions pending, and other
useful data. Similarly, the clerk prepares mailing lists of attorneys involved
in cases being argued on the next calendar and prints them on mailing
labels.
B. Oftce of the Circuit Executive
208
The movement toward better court administration led, in 1969, to legis-
lation that proposed the appointment of court administrators. Support for
the proposal came from many sources, including Bernard G. Segal, then
president of the American Bar Association, and Chief Judge David T. Lewis
203. Letter to Judge James K. Logan from Howard K. Phillips (Sept. 8, 1980).
204. Letter to Judge Alfred P. Murrah from Robert B. Cartwright (Sept. 22, 1966).
205. Judge Alfred P. Murrah served as Director of the Federal Judicial Center from May
1970 to October 1974.
206. The year refers to the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1981.
207. See Management Statistics for United States Courts, 1975, 1980, and 1981.
208. This section draws significantly from a summary written by Emory G. Hatcher, Circuit
Executive for the Tenth Circuit.
[Vol. 66:2
POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
of the Tenth Circuit. 20 9
The Circuit Executive Act was signed into law on January 5, 1971. The
Act empowered circuit councils to appoint circuit executives and to vest in
them broad administrative control of all nonjudicial activities of their courts,
thus relieving circuit judges of many administrative chores. 210 The stan-
dards for certification of a circuit executive are set forth by statute,2 11 and
are applied by a board created for that purpose. 21 2 On August 1, 1972, the
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit appointed Emory G. Hatcher the first
circuit executive of the Tenth Circuit; he continues to serve in this position.
Subject to general supervision by the chief judge of the Tenth Circuit,
the circuit executive exercises administrative control over many of the
court's nonjudicial activities, including planning, organizing, and adminis-
tering a personnel system, acting as a liaison officer between the court of
appeals and the General Services Administration regarding furnishings and
space needs, advising the clerk of the court as to maintenance of the account-
ing system, conducting studies and making recommendations regarding the
business and administration of the court of appeals and the district courts
within the Tenth Circuit, and collecting and analyzing statistical data relat-
ing to court business. 21 3 Since the appointment of the circuit executive,
many notable administrative developments have been instituted in the
Tenth Circuit. Personnel policies and procedures have been streamlined.
The Tenth Circuit has adopted a comprehensive personnel manual-the
first in any United States court-that includes a grievance procedure and an
equal employment opportunity plan.
The Tenth Circuit was the first to apply to the Federal Judicial Center
for approval to test computer-assisted legal research. The concept was insti-
tuted in 1973. The Judicial Center leased a LEXIS terminal; when the sys-
tem proved very successful, the Tenth Circuit included it in its budget on a
209. Chief Judge Lewis expressed his approval of the Act:
Although I have served as ChiefJudge of the Tenth Circuit for only a few months
I am already keenly aware of the administrative burden that goes with the position.
Perhaps my recent experiences have not been typical for at present we have only four
working judges on this Court of Appeals, there being two unfilled vacancies and one
judge seriously ill. As a consequence it has been difficult to delegate any of the admin-
istrative duties and I have had to devote my time to administrative matters that could
well be handled by a court executive.
I have no doubt that a court executive would do much to improve the judicial
machinery and would allow the judges to better perform their intended function, the
decisional process. I hope H.R. 17901 will be enacted into law.
Letter from Chief Judge Lewis to the Honorable Emanuel E. Celler (Aug. 7, 1970) (Tenth
Circuit files).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 332(e) (1976).
211. Id §332(f) (1976).
212. Id
213. The office of the circuit executive also acts as the court's purchasing officer; serves as
secretary to the Judicial Council and the District Judges' Association; prepares all budgets;
approves Criminal Justice Act vouchers; maintains records of all court property; negotiates all
space needs with the Administrative Office and General Services Administration; serves on the
Library and Rules Committees; acts as staff in the area of fiscal management; serves as person-
nel officer; recommends policies and procedures to the court regarding case management; re-




permanent basis. The Tenth Circuit now has terminals in Denver and
Oklahoma City.
The Tenth Circuit has printed a comprehensive loose-leaf Practitioners'
Guide to Tenth Circuit Procedures, which it sells to the circuit's practicing
bar. Again, this practice is the first of its kind and was made easier because
the Tenth Circuit has its own print shop, which is also unique to this circuit.
All of the court's slip opinions and internal forms are printed in-house. Ad-
ditionally, the print shop supplies many forms and all rules of court for the
eight district courts of the Tenth Circuit.
The circuit executive chairs an annual meeting of Tenth Circuit Clerks
of Court. As a result of these meetings, many areas of court management
have been improved and many procedures have been standardized. One
idea emanating from these meetings was the desirability of establishing a
uniform circuit-wide handling of petitions and complaints filed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, and 2255, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.214 John K.
Kleinheksel, one of the staff attorneys, was assigned to the project. With the
assistance of the clerks of court and an ad hoc committee comprised of dis-
trict court Chief Judges Alfred A. Arraj, Frederick A. Daugherty, and Wes-
ley E. Brown, a plan was presented and adopted at the Executive Session of
Judges at the 1976 Judicial Conference of the Circuit. The plan effected a
circuit-wide uniform district court rule providing for standardized forms and
uniform processing of these complaints and petitions.
C. StaffAttorneys i'n the Tenth Circuit
The court's policy of encouraging district court judges to freely grant
certificates of probable cause and leave to appeal informa pauperis resulted in
prisoner cases overburdening the court's calendar. The court appointed an
attorney to brief and argue each case. The Criminal Justice Act did not
provide for the payment of compensation to counsel appointed for post-con-
viction matters; thus, the attorneys appeared pro bono pubhco. Many newly
admitted attorneys volunteered for these cases and, as compensation, the
court waived the ten dollar fee for admission to the Bar of the Tenth Circuit.
Prior to the fall of 1966, there was little preliminary review of ddcketed ap-
peals. Consequently, appointed attorneys were sometimes compelled to brief
and strenuously argue contentions that were totally untenable.
To remedy this situation the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit ap-
proved the concept of a central staff of attorneys in September 1966, and the
court obtained funding from the Administrative Office. Originally, the staff
attorney's primary responsibility was to review each prisoner case and rec-
ommend the appointment of counsel when necessary. In those cases in
which counsel was not appointed, the staff attorney wrote a memorandum
on the case which was made available to the panel to which the case was
assigned.
On November 14, 1966, John J. McDermott, was appointed the first
214. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, 2255 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV
1980).
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staff attorney. Under the guidance of Chief Judge Murrah, his work sub-
stantially reduced the number of attorneys appointed in post-conviction
cases.
As the project continued, its scope gradually expanded to make other
staff services available to the courts. Staff attorneys prepared proposed
drafts of per curiam opinions in those cases in which no attorney was ap-
pointed. They processed certain civil rights cases, provided procedural and
technical assistance to appointed attorneys, and responded to the large vol-
ume of written inquiries from prisoners and other laypersons.
Reviewing the process after some time of operation, the court developed
two concerns: the possibility that equal protection was not being afforded
because the process gave different treatment to a group of cases in which the
appellants typically were paupers, and the lack of advance notice to the par-
ties that such different treatment might occur. Since the screening technique
had proved successful in handling post-conviction cases, there was reason to
believe that it might be beneficially applied to all cases. As a result, the
court adopted Local Rule 10 (now Rule 9),215 the summary affirmance or
dismissal rule. The rule permits the appellee to file a motion to affirm on the
ground that the issues presented "are so unsubstantial as not to need further
argument," or to file a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. More im-
portant, the rule permits the court, on its own motion, to summarily affirm
cases when proper.
Under the authority of Rule 9, the staff attorneys review a case as soon
as an appellant's brief or a motion to dismiss or affirm is filed. Recommen-
dations relating to summary affirmance or dismissal are made to the court
and, if a summary action recommendation is approved, the parties are noti-
fied and given an opportunity to file a written argument supporting or op-
posing the summary action. If, after examination of these arguments, the
court agrees that summary action is appropriate, the case is returned to the
staff attorney to prepare for the court's approval a proposed draft of a per
curiam opinion. These drafts are circulated together with the record and
briefs to three-judge panels of the court, sometimes by mail and other times
to "Rule 9" panels sitting in Denver at regular court terms. The judges
approve, modify, or rewrite the opinions before their issuance, or they may
sometimes reassign the cases for oral argument on the regular appeals
docket.
McDermott established an index of cases by the issues raised, which
allowed him to provide to each panel of the court information about cases
involving similar issues before other panels. This index assisted the Tenth
Circuit in its efforts to avoid conflicting decisions. In cases to be argued, he
provided both the court and counsel with copies of relevant, unpublished
Tenth Circuit opinions. Thus, even before LEXIS, attorneys and the court
were able to evaluate the most recent law in the Tenth Circuit relevant to
the case being argued.
The utility of the McDermott subject matter index decreased as the
215. 10th CIR. R. 9.
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number of cases increased. To overcome this weakness a pilot automation
project was undertaken. This computer experiment was informative and an-
ticipated many systems now used, but financial support was unavailable and
the experiment was dropped. 21 6 AIMS currently fills the need of comparing
recent cases.
In 1967, a second staff attorney was authorized because of the increased
responsibilities of the Staff Attorney's Office; Arthur J. Katsiaficas was ap-
pointed. Subsequently, McDermott was promoted to Chief Deputy Clerk,
and one additional staff attorney was authorized. By 1972, staffing had in-
creased to four staff attorney positions. With the approval of Chief Judge
Lewis, it was decided to request increases in the size of the central staff until
there was one such position for each active circuit judge. The fifth staff at-
torney position was approved in March 1975, and presently the court has
eight staff attorneys.
The need for a person to supervise the central staff soon became appar-
ent and the position of senior staff attorney was authorized October 1, 1975,
for nine of the circuits, including the Tenth Circuit. Richard Banta, who
had been a staff attorney since August 1972, was appointed as the Tenth
Circuit's first senior staff attorney in November 1975. Permission was
granted in May 1978 to reclassify one existing position to that of first assis-
tant staff attorney. John Kleinheksel, who had been a staff attorney since
July 1973, was appointed to this position in June 1978. In September 1978,
senior staff Attorney Richard Banta resigned and John Kleinheksel was ap-
pointed to succeed him on the next day. Elizabeth D. Page, who had been a
staff attorney since August 1974, was appointed in October 1979 to succeed
Kleinheksel as first assistant staff attorney. Both are currently serving in
these positions.
D. Appellate Information Management System
The Tenth Circuit was the field test site and the first court to use the
automated Appellate Information Management System (AIMS). In Decem-
ber 1976, representatives from ten of the eleven federal appellate courts met
to begin defining their requirements for the system. Taking its original im-
petus from work of the Second Circuit, an AIMS committee was formed
under the guidance of the circuit executives with each court represented by a
designated functional analyst. The Federal Judicial Center provided funds
and technical guidance. The functional analysts and the Federal Judicial
Center created the AIMS Functional Description, basing it upon the agree-
ment between the courts on standard terminology, procedures, and require-
ments. After each circuit's review committee approved the functional
description, the Federal Judicial Center used it to develop the computer pro-
gramming required to support AIMS.
Beginning July 1, 1979, all pending cases were entered into the data
base. From that date forward all new case information, new motions, and
216. Whittaker & McDermott, Computer Technology n an Appellate Court, 54 J. AM. JUDICA-
TURE Soc. 73 (1970).
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scheduled actions have been entered. In November 1979, the Second Circuit
became the second court to use the automated system. Subsequently, the
Seventh and Fifth Circuits have begun the use of AIMS, and plans are to
introduce the system to the other federal appellate courts.
The clerk's office enters into the AIMS computer information relating
to each case. AIMS will then provide the clerk's office with reports detailing
all actions due or overdue. The statistical reports are made through AIMS
as a means of identifying trends in the types and volume of appeals being
processed. AIMS provides immediate display at the computer terminal of
the current status of each case. The system provides judges with reports de-
tailing their individual caseloads and with statistics on the workloads of their
court. It can also be used as a research tool for finding pending or completed
cases that deal with specific issues. Staff attorneys receive reports identifying
and grouping cases by issues.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit was created almost simultaneously with the stock
market crash of 1929. It has survived the great depression of the 1930's,
World War II and several smaller wars, the prosperity and burgeoning
growth of the late 1940's through the 1960's, and the cataclysmic changes in
criminal law, civil rights, and federal law in general. Yet its size, measured
in active judges, has only doubled from four to eight. The judges have some-
how managed the dramatically greater caseload. Increased staff and imagi-
native innovations in procedures, of which the Tenth Circuit has been a
pioneer, helped make this possible. Some prospective changes are predict-
able-increased population and caseload is based in part on the energy re-
sources concentrated in Tenth Circuit states. Other changes are not so
predictable, although certainly there will be a continued evolution in proce-
dures. Since humans are mortal, different judges, and perhaps different
laws, will control the future of the Tenth Circuit, but the changes are almost
certain to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, built firmly upon the





The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a large number of cases
from administrative agencies during the recent survey period. One-fifth of
the cases involved disputes of agency interpretation of social security bene-
fits, with the remainder involving a variety of issues between federal admin-
istrative bureaucracies and citizens.
Traditional deference to agency action was apparent, with many of the
cases decided under the "substantial evidence" rule of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).' This is not to say, however, that the Tenth Circuit
automatically rubber-stamped all agency actions; several cases were reversed
and remanded when the court found that agency personnel or the district
courts acted arbitrarily and capriciously, abused their discretion, or misinter-
preted the law.
I. SCOPE OF REVIEW
A. Review of An Agency's Interpretation of Its Own Regulations
In Devon Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,2 the Tenth Circuit
held that an administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulations
controls the court's decision "unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation."'3 In 1973 Devon, a small natural gas producer,4 ac-
quired reserves from Commonwealth Group. Although Commonwealth's
jurisdictional sales had previously exceeded 10,000,000 Mcf, classifying it as
a large producer, its 1973 sales fell below that amount.
5
In 1976 Devon applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) for a small producer exemption,6 claiming that because Common-
wealth's sales in 1973, the year of Devon's acquisition, were below 10,000,000
Mcf, it was entitled to small producer treatment. FERC denied the exemp-
tion based on its unreported order which states that the status of a producer
is determined by the amount of sales in the preceding calendar year. Be-
cause Commonwealth's 1972 sales exceeded 10,000,000 Mcf, Devon had ac-
quired the reserves of a large producer and was not entitled to small
producer treatment. 7 The court ruled that FERC's use of the "previous cal-
endar year to determine status is reasonable, consistent with the regulations,
1. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976) provides that a reviewing court shall "set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be unsupported by substantial evidence .
2. 662 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1981).
3. Id at 700 (citations omitted).
4. 18 C.F.R. § 157.40(a)(1) (1982) defines a small producer as one who sells less than
10,000,000 Mcf of natural gas during the preceding calendar year.
5. 662 F.2d at 699.
6. 18 C.F.R. § 157.40 (1982).
7. 662 F.2d at 699.
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and in conformity with previous Commission practice."
In a similar case, Blue Cross Association v. Harris,9 the court of appeals
overruled the district court and upheld the Secretary of Health and Human
Services' interpretation of the Medicare Act.' 0 On the local level, medicare
is administered by contracts with private health insurance companies such as
Blue Cross and Blue Shield. These "intermediaries"" and "carriers"' 2 are
reimbursed by the federal government on the basis of the reasonable costs
incurred in operating the program.'
3
The Act further authorizes the Secretary to conduct experiments and
demonstration projects to determine whether either fixed price or perform-
ance incentive contracts are more efficient than payment of reasonably in-
curred costs.14 The Secretary, pursuant to the Act, sought competitive bids
for administering an experimental program in Wyoming, Colorado, and
Utah. Blue Cross and various hospital associations sought injunctive relief,
contending that the hospitals involved had a right to nominate their in-
termediaries,' 5 that the Act defines those who may be carriers, 16 and that
the Act requires the Secretary to obtain advice and recommendations from
competent specialists before issuing requests for competitive bids. 17 The dis-
trict court agreed with the plaintiffs' arguments and issued an injunction
against the execution of an agreement based on the competitive bids until
she obtained the advice from specialists as required under section 1395b-
1(b)' and made a good faith attempt to negotiate with the plaintiffs.' 9
On appeal, the Secretary insisted that the section of the Medicare Act
that authorizes experiments and demonstration projects does not require the
agency to comply with the nominated intermediary and statutory carrier
provisions. 20 Even if there were reasonable differences in interpretation, the
appellants contended the district court should have deferred to the Secre-
8. Id at 700. See aLso Kaiser-Francis Special Account C v. FERC, 675 F.2d 249 (10th Cir.
1982), an analogous case, in which the court held that an "agency's interpretation of its own
regulations is entitled to great deference on appeal." Id at 250 (citation omitted). Accord River-
ton Valley Elec. Ass'n v. Block, No. 79-2238 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1981), in which the Tenth
Circuit reversed the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming for reviewing day-
to-day administrative activities of the Rural Electrification Administration.
9. 664 F.2d 806 (10th Cir. 1981).
10. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26,
42, and 45 U.S.C.).
11. See ifta note 15 and accompanying text.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
13. Id § 1395g.
14. Id § 1395b-1.
15. Id § 1395h.
16. Id. § 1395u(o) (1976).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-l(b) (Supp. IV 1980). This section provides:
No experiment or demonstration project shall be engaged in or developed under sub-
section (a) of this section until the Secretary obtains the advice of specialists who are
competent to evaluate the proposed experiment or demonstration project as to the
soundness of its objectives, the possibilities of securing productive results, the adequacy
of resources to conduct the proposed experiment or demonstration project, and its
relationship to other similar experiments and projects already completed or in process.
18. Id




tary's interpretation. 2 1 The Tenth Circuit agreed, finding that the intent
and the language of the Medicare Act are clear that experimental contracts
are not restricted to nominated intermediaries or statutory carriers. 22 The
court added that assuming the statute authorizing experimental contracts
was ambiguous, "we must afford 'great deference to the interpretation given
the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.' ",23
The court further noted that where agency expertise is required, the Secre-
tary's construction of a statute must be sustained if it is reasonable, even if it
is not the only reasonable one, "or the one which this court would have
reached de novo."
24
In Tsosi'e v. Caifano,25 the Tenth Circuit held that a court should defer
to an agency's interpretation of the statute, but not if the construction rests
on the interpretation of another agency's statutes and regulations. 26 At issue
in the case were dual benefits Mrs. Tsosie, a disabled widow of a veteran,
received from Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 2 7 under the Social Se-
curity Act, and a surviving spouse pension from the Veterans Administration
(VA). 28 The VA pension of $227 a month included $118 for five children in
Mrs. Tsosie's custody. In addition, she received $27 a month in social secur-
ity widow's benefits. Her total income was thus $254 a month, but this in-
cluded the $118 VA allowance for her children.
29
In 1977, the Social Security Administration terminated the widow's SSI
on the ground that her income exceeded the statutory limit of $167.50 per
month. At a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected Mrs.
Tsosie's claim that the children's benefits should be excluded in determining
her income, and held that she was no longer eligible for SSI. The district
court affirmed the ALJ's decision.
30
On appeal, Mrs. Tsosie contended that the agency's action violated the
letter and spirit of the Veterans' Benefits Act 3 l and defeated the purpose of
the Social Security Act. 32 The Secretary argued that the language of the
Veterans' Benefits Act states that the Administrator shall pay the pension
"to the surviving spouse,"3 3 not to the children, indicating that the money is
intended to be the spouse's income.
3 4
The court ruled for Mrs. Tsosie, finding the Secretary's interpretation of
the applicable statute of the Veterans' Benefit Act was "unduly legalistic
and technical,"3 5 and gave little weight to the purpose and spirit of the Act.
21. Id
22. Id
23. Id at 810 (quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).
24. Id.
25. 651 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1981).
26. Id. at 722.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
28. See 38 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. V 1981).
29. 651 F.2d at 720-21.
30. Id. at 721.
31. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
32. 651 F.2d at 721. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
33. 38 U.S.C. § 541(a) (Supp. V 1981).
34. 651 F.2d at 721.
35. Id. at 722.
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Judge Seymour, writing for the court, likened the Secretary to "one who
listens to music for individual notes rather than for the melody: he misses
the theme."'36 The court held that the children's portion of a surviving
spouse's pension check is intended for the children's needs, and should not be
treated as the widow's income.
37
B. The Substantial Evidence Test
Section 706 of the APA provides that a reviewing court may set aside
agency action that is unsupported by "substantial evidence." 38 The United
States Supreme Court has described substantial evidence as "more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'39 Because ALJs often weigh
conflicting testimony, courts are reluctant to overrule agency action based
on an interpretation of facts which is supported by substantial evidence. For
example, during the recent survey period the Tenth Circuit upheld ALJs in
four cases4° denying disability insurance benefits 4' because substantial evi-
dence indicated that although claimants were disabled, they were not totally
unemployable.
Typical of these cases was Campbell v. Harrzs,42 in which conflicting med-
ical testimony was presented regarding the extent of the appellant's disabil-
ity. Campbell had been totally disabled from 1974 to 1979. In June, 1979,
medical examiners determined that he had recovered sufficiently to return to
work. One physician, however, determined that, in his present condition,
Campbell could not work. The United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma upheld the ALJ in denying further benefits on the
ground that his position was supported by substantial evidence. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the lower court, noting that although there was a disagree-
ment of medical opinion, there was substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ's decision.
4 3
In Dun-Par Engineered Form Co. v. Marshall,44 a contractor failed to pro-
vide protective handrails for his employees working on the open second floor
of a building under construction. The court upheld an $800 fine approved
by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC).
45
Dun-Par defended by arguing that it did not create the hazard by tak-
ing down or destroying existing handrails, and that the responsibility for
36. Id
37. Accord Webster v. Califano, No. 78-3492 (6th Cir. July 10, 1980). Contra Whaley v.
Harris, 650 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1981).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976).
39. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
40. McKinney v. Harris, No. 80-2050 (10th Cir. May 13, 1982); Francis v. Harris, No. 81-
1492 (10th Cir. Mar. 12, 1982); Chapman v. Schweiker, No. 81-1025 (10th Cir. Feb. 26, 1982);
Campbell v. Harris, No. 81-1095 (10th Cir. Feb. 8, 1982).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
42. No. 81-1095 (10th Cir. Feb. 8, 1982).
43. Id slip op. at 3.
44. 676 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1982).
45. Id at 1338.
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erecting them rested on the general contractor. 46 The court disagreed, how-
ever, relying on Central of Georgia Railroad v. OSHRC4 7 and Bratton Corp. o.
OSHRC,48 which enunciate the principle that the contractual responsibility
placed upon another contractor to provide protection does not necessarily
relieve the employer of the same responsibility. The court found Dun-Par
had the primary responsibility for its employees' safety.
49
Although Dun-Par had been previously cited twice for handrail viola-
tions, it objected to the characterization of its offense as "repeated." 50 Citing
its decision in Kent Nowhn Construction Co. v. OSHRC,5 1 the court noted that
the congressional purpose52 stated in the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA) was to encourage employers who have been cited previously to
take the necessary precautions to prevent further violations. 53 Judge McKay
specifically rejected the Third Circuit's definition of repeated violations as
"intentional flauntings of the Act."' 54 Thus, based on Dun-Par's record of
two previous violations, the court held that substantial evidence supported
OSHRC's position that the contractor was subject to an enhanced penalty.
55
In Marshall v. M. W Watson, Inc. ,56 the Secretary of Labor appealed the
decision of OSHRC to reduce the citations entered against a contractor by a
compliance officer for OSHA. After a fatal cave-in at an excavation site,
Watson, a contractor, had been charged with failure to provide adequate
safety instructions for its employees5 7 and failure to meet specific trenching
requirements. 58 An OSHA compliance officer investigated the accident and
recommended a $900 fine for the first violation and, deeming the second
violation to be willful, assessed a $9000 penalty. Watson contested the cita-
tions. After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the first citation, modified the sec-
ond from willful to serious, and assessed a $50 fine. The Secretary's petition
to OSHRC for a review of the ALJ's decision was not granted, making the
decision final. 59
After a review of Watson's past safety record, the court found that sub-
stantial evidence supported the ALJ's dismissal of the citation for failure to
provide adequate safety instructions to its employees. 60 The court pointed
out that Watson had met its burden in training its employees in hazard rec-
46. Id at 1335.
47. 576 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1978).
48. 590 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1979).
49. 676 F.2d at 1336.
50. Id 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976) provides: "Any employer who willfully or repeatedly
violates the requirements of section 654 of this title, any standard, rule, or order promulgated
pursuant to section 665 of this title, or regulations prescribed pursuant to this chapter may be
assessed a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation."
51. 648 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1981).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 561(b) (1976).
53. 676 F.2d at 1337.
54. Id (citing Kent Nowlin Consir., 648 F.2d at 1282). See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
OSHRC, 540 F.2d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1976).
55. 676 F.2d at 1338.
56. 652 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1981).
57. See 29 C.F.R. § 1926.21(b)(2) (1981).
58. 652 F.2d at 978. See 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(c) (1981).
59. 652 F.2d at 979.
60. Id at 980.
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ognition related to their work.6 ' With respect to the trenching violation, the
court analyzed the conditions surrounding the fatal cave-in. Substantial evi-
dence supported the ALJ's assessment of the violation as being serious, not
willful.
62
The court of appeals overturned a decision by OSHRC in Capital Electric
Line Builders of Kansas, Inc. v. Marshall,63 holding that there was insufficient
evidence in the record to support the finding of any violation. After an acci-
dent in which a lineman was electrocuted, an OSHA compliance officer
cited Capital Electric for violations of three safety standards: 1) allowing an
employee to work too closely to energized parts without insulating equip-
ment, 64 2) allowing an employee to remove grounds without using insulating
tools, 65 and 3) allowing an employee to work in an aerial bucket without a
restraining belt.66 All violations were deemed serious. Upon discovering
that a Capital Electric employee had been electrocuted one year earlier,
OSHRC amended the complaints to upgrade the violations to willful.
67
After a hearing, the ALJ found that Capital Electric had willfully vio-
lated the three regulations and fined the company $10,000. 68 In ruling
against Capital Electric, the ALJ emphasized that a death had occurred and
that the decedent was not using or wearing insulating equipment or body
belts.69 Capital Electric contended that the death was the result of the em-
ployee's "unforeseeable, unanticipated" failure to comply with company
safety rules. 70 The ALJ ruled that the employer had the burden of proof to
establish unpreventable employee misconduct.
7 1
The court, relying on Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
OSHRC,72 held that the ALJ improperly allocated the burden of proof.73 In
Mountain States, the court ruled that the burden of disproving unpreventable
employee misconduct rests with the Secretary of Labor.74 The court in Capi-
tal Electric ruled that this burden can be met by showing that the violation
was foreseeable because of inadequacies in the [employer's] safety precau-
tions, training of employees, or supervision. 75 The court determined that
despite the ALJ's error in allocating the burden of proof, it was unnecessary
to remand the case. The evidence was insubstantial to support a finding
that Capital Electric failed to provide adequate safety precautions, training,
61. Id. at 979.
62. Id at 980.
63. 678 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1982).
64. See 29 C.F.R. § 1926.950(c)(1) (1981).
65. See id § 1926.954(e)(2) (1981).
66. See id § 1926.556(b)(2)(v) (1981).





72. 623 F.2d 155 (10th Cir. 1980).
73. 673 F.2d at 129.
74. Id. at 158. See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.73(a) (1981). See also Brennan v. OSHRC, 511 F.2d
1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 1975). But see H.B. Zachry Co. v. OSHRC, 638 F.2d 812, 818 (5th Cir.
1981) (burden of proof placed on employer).




C. Arbitrary and Capricious Standard
Closely related to the substantial evidence test is the arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard. Whereas the substantial evidence test emphasizes the
facts and the question of whether the facts support a given conclusion, 77 the
arbitrary and capricious test emphasizes the conclusion drawn from the facts
and the resulting action taken. 78 A case which illustrates this distinction is
Curtis, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission ,79 where the administrative ruling
was flawed by its failure to meet both the substantial evidence and the arbi-
trary and capricious tests.80
Story, Inc., an intervening respondent and the subject of the case, is a
small independent trucking company owned and operated by Harold Story.
In 1978, Story filed for interstate common carrier operating authority.
Before operating authority could be issued, Story was statutorily required to
prove to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) that
the company was fit, willing, and able to comply with applicable laws and
regulations. 8 1 At the hearing, the ICC presented evidence that indicated
76. Id. Other cases decided under the substantial evidence rule during this survey period
were: Romero v. Harris, 675 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1982) (court of appeals reversed lower court's
order requiring recipients to reimburse overpayment of SSI benefits, because evidence did not
support conclusion that recipients were at fault, and because evidence did show that recovery of
the overpayments would frustrate the purpose of Title XVI of the Social Security Act); Morris
v. Harris, 663 F.2d 1014 (10th Cir. 1981) (Social Security Administration upheld in demanding
recovery of overpayment of survivor's benefits); Wilson v. Department of Health and Human
Serv., No. 81-1392 (10th Cir. Mar. 30, 1982) (Merit Systems Protection Board upheld in revers-
ing its own hearing officer who deemed a resignation had been coerced); Longhat v. Andrus,
No. 80-1171 (10th Cir. Jan. 15, 1982) (ALJ upheld in determination of heirs-at-law, despite
conflicting claims and evidence); Mid-Continent Coal & Coke Co. v. Federal Mine Safety
Comm'n, No. 79-2271 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1981) (ALJ upheld in assessing a penalty for a safety
violation leading to a fatal mine accident); Gentry v. Califano, No. 78-1844 (10th Cir. Sept. 21,
1981) (ALJ upheld in determining free rent to be unearned income reducing SSI benefits);
Carrizo v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, No. 80-1675 (10th Cir. Sept. 16, 1981)
(ALJ upheld in determining amount of overpayment of social security retirement benefits to be
recovered); Brown v. Railroad Retirement Bd., No. 78-1647 (10th Cir. Aug. 19, 1981) (Railroad
Retirement Board upheld in determination of decedent's beneficiary).
77. See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
78. See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974).
79. 662 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1981).
80. Other cases decided during the survey period in which the arbitrary and capricious
standard was applied include: Curtis, Inc. v. ICC, 669 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1982) (in challenge
to ICC issuance of operating authorities, court deferred to ICC's interpretation of its regulations
and the underlying facts); Wolf v. United States, 662 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1981) (Department of
Agriculture upheld in suspending participation in food stamp program for six months for a store
permitting its patrons to purchase non-food items); Carter v. Central States, Southeast and
Southwest Areas Pension Plan, 656 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1981) (pension fund trustees upheld in
denying benefits to a teamster who failed the 20-year continuous service requirement); Hechter
v. Department of Health and Human Serv., No. 80-2086 (10th Cir. Apr. 27, 1982) (agency
upheld in firing employee for failing to do assigned work); Vickers v. Hampton, No. 80-1813
(10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1982) (Civil Service Commission upheld in firing an employee for several
thefts of government property, despite its being the employee's first offense); Hawkins v. Merit
Sys. Protection Bd., No. 81-1267 (10th Cir. Feb. 9, 1982) (Board upheld in deeming resignation
voluntary and not coerced); Curtis, Inc. v. ICC, No. 80-1486 (10th Cir. Dec. 2, 1981) (ICC
upheld in challenge to its issuance of a certificate).
81. 49 U.S.C. § 10922(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
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Story's past disregard of the law. Story had previously owned and operated
an agricultural cooperative and had "found it difficult" 8 2 meeting the legal
requirements of section 10526(a)(5) of the Interstate Commerce Act.8 3 He
admitted at the hearing that his interpretation of this section was " 'my ver-
sion of it.' ",84 The ALJ noted, " 'there was not the slightest sign of contri-
tion by Mr. Story for his past illegality . . . [and] his adherence to self-
serving, twisted interpretations of the law . . . can only be described as bra-
zen.' "85 Despite this evidence of unfitness, the ALJ awarded a three-year
conditional certificate to Story, apparently influenced by Story's background
in the transportation business and his military service during the Vietnam
War.
86
The ICC rejected the ALJ's reasoning as irrelevant, but approved his
conclusion. 87 The Commissioners noted that Story had never been cited for
any violations of the law and that the conditional certificate would keep the
company under close scrutiny. 88
Judge Doyle, writing for the Tenth Circuit, pointed out that Story had
the burden of proving fitness.89 Therefore, it was the reviewing court's re-
sponsibility to ensure that the record contained sufficient evidence to support
the Commission's conclusion that the applicant had sustained its burden. 9°
The record indicated that Story had violated, and at times, flaunted statutes
and regulations. 9 ' The court determined that this evidence raised a reason-
able inference that the applicant would likely continue to violate the law.
9 2
Judge Doyle noted that the Commission's decision to reject that inference
"might have been comprehensible had some evidence indicated that Mr.
Story intended to comply with the law in the future."' 93 In the absence of
such evidence, the record did not meet the substantial evidence test.
94
The court ruled that the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capri-
cious because it had disregarded substantial contrary evidence and ignored
relevant legal criteria. 95 Specifically, the Commission had failed to apply a
five-part ICC test 96 used to judge an applicant's willingness to comply with
82. 662 F.2d at 683 (quoting ALJ).
83. 49 U.S.C. § 10526(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).




88. Id at 685.
89. Id at 686 (citing St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 938, 940
(D. Vt. 1971)).
90. 662 F.2d at 686.
91. Id
92. Id
93. Id (emphasis in original).
94. Id at 686-87.
95. Id at 687.
96. The five factors of the ICC test include:
(1) The nature and extent of. . . [the carrier's] past violations, (2) the mitigating or
extenuating circumstances surrounding the violations, (3) whether the carrier's con-
duct represents a flagrant and persistent disregard of [the] Commissions' rules and
regulations, (4) whether it has made sincere efforts to correct its past mistakes, and
(5) whether applicant is willing and able to comport in the future. ...
Associated Transp., Inc., Extension-TVA Plant, 125 M.C.C. 69, 73 (1976).
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the law when the record reveals past violations. 97
The ICC contended that the five-part test was not appropriate in
Story's case because the trucker had never actually been cited for any viola-
tions. The court rejected this argument, noting that this position is contrary
to other Commission pronouncements that "the existence of a criminal con-
viction or other court action is not a prerequisite to our considering . . .
evidence of unlawful conduct." 95
Concluding that the five-part test should have been applied, the court
reversed the Commission's decision as arbitrary and capricious. 99 The case
was remanded to the Commission for reevaluation of Story's fitness. The
court noted that sufficient time had passed since the issuance of the limited-
time certificatp to allow the Commission to determine whether "drastic im-
provement has taken place whereby the applicant demonstrates firm com-
mitment to compliance with the law, not only present but in the future as
well.""oo
D. Abuse of Dicretion
The court of appeals addressed the issue of whether the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) abused its discretion in denying preferen-
tial status to an alien seeking a permanent visa in Mila v. District Director of
Denver.°10 Finau Mila, a native of the Kingdom of Tonga and a naturalized
United States citizen, sought preferential immigration status' 0 2 for his sister
by adoption, Anau Fainga. Fainga was adopted by her natural mother's
older sister (Mila's mother) shortly after birth and raised as a member of
that family.10 3 Tongan law only recognizes legal adoptions for illegitimate
children, and because Fainga was born legitimately, her adoption was by
Tongan custom. 104 The INS refused to grant Fainga preferential status, as a
sister by adoption of Mila, because it interpreted the section of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act' 0 5 defining adopted children as being limited to
those children legaly adopted.'0 6 The Board of Immigration Appeals af-
firmed, holding that "if the civil law of a country does not recognize adop-
tions, no immigration benefits accrue under United Stttes immigration laws
97. 662 F.2d at 688 (citing Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., Extension-Columbus,
Georgia, 131 M.C.C. 640, 643 (1979)). See also Berger Common Carrier Application, 119
M.C.C. 894 (1974).
98. 662 F.2d at 689.
99. Md at 688-89.
100. Id
101. 678 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denid, 103 S. Ct. 726 (1983).
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981) (confers preferential status to brothers and sisters
of United States citizens in qualifying for permanent visas).
103. Mila v. District Director of Denver, 494 F. Supp. 998, 999 (D. Utah 1980), rev'd, 678
F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 726 (1983). For a discussion of the Tongan
practice of adoption, see Mila, 494 F. Supp. at 999-1000.
104. 678 F.2d at 124.
105. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(b)(1)(E) (Supp. V 1981) defines an adopted child as: "a child adopted
while under the age of sixteen years if the child has thereafter been in the legal custody of, and
has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at least two years ....
106. Mila, 494 F. Supp. at 999.
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based on adoptions alleged to have occurred in that country."'' 0 7
Judge Winder of the United States District Court of Utah reversed the
agency, reasoning that there was a true parent-child relationship between
Mila's mother and Fainga. He held that the INS had "no reason to make a
distinction between a society or legal system where . . .[adoption] is sanc-
tioned by law or where it is only recognized by custom."' 08
The Tenth Circuit sided with the agency, holding that a federal court
may overrule the INS only if the INS abuses its discretion by basing its deci-
sion on an improper understanding of the law. 10 9 The court, per Judge
Logan, said that so long as the agency's interpretation is reasonable and not
contrary to the intent of Congress, it "should be approved even though it is
not the only reasonable interpretation or the one the reviewing court would
make if deciding the issue in the first instance."" 0  In this case, the INS
interpretation of the statute required the adoption to be legal in the country
where it occurred." I
The appellants contended that the INS interpretation was unduly re-
strictive and thwarted the congressional intent of preserving the family
unit.' 12 The court rationalized the narrowness of the agency's interpretation
as having practical advantages: decreasing the likelihood of fraud, serving as
a bright line to determine which adoptions will be recognized, and ensuring
that persons who bring adopted children to this country are legally responsi-
ble for them.' 13 The court also noted that the legislative history was not
clear enough to rule that the INS interpretation is wrong.'
14
Judge McKay dissented, arguing that the intent of Congress in adopt-
ing the definition for foreign adoptions was to preserve family relation-
ships.' 15 He stated that the INS interpretation "places too much reliance on
some formal juridical anglo-American notions of adoption and too little em-
phasis on whether the country recognizes these relationships as genuine fam-
ily units. ' 16 He noted that although the majority recognized that the test
of legal adoption cannot turn on inheritance rights because neither statuto-
rily- nor customarily-adopted children can inherit, the majority never de-
fined what constitutes a legal adoption.' 17 Judge McKay found no basis for
discriminating between customarily- and statutorily-adopted children and
believed the trial court's decision should have been affirmed."18
The interpretation of a statute granting discretion to the Secretary of
107. Id
108. Id at 1000.
109. 678 F.2d at 125.
110. Id
111. Id The INS relied on a previous case also involving a Tongan customary adoption, In
re Palelei, 16 1. & N. Dec. 716 (1979). In that case the Crown Solicitor of Tonga had stated in a
letter that a customary adoption "does not give the child any legal right in the estate of the
foster parent and is not recognized as legally valid under Tongan law." Id at 718.
112. 678 F.2d at 126.
113. Id.
114. Id
115. Id at 126 (McKay, J., dissenting).





Health, Education and Welfare in terminating benefits occasioned the con-
troversy in Faidley v. Harris.1' 9 Mrs. Faidley, a disabled widow, was receiving
SSI benefits. In 1978 she married a man who was receiving social security
retirement benefits. 120 According to 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f)(1), the Secretary is
required to include any income and resources of a spouse who is ineligible
for SSI in determining the eligibility of an SSI beneficiary "except to the
extent determined by the Secretary to be inequitable under the circum-
stances."'' Mrs. Faidley's spouse, who was ineligible for SSI, received $295
per month in social security retirement benefits.' 22 This includable income
was $5.80 above the amount allowed by regulations. 123 Consequently, the
Secretary terminated all of Mrs. Faidley's benefits.'
24
Mrs. Faidley claimed that the Secretary violated its statutory duty by
failing to evaluate whether attributing her husband's income to her, so as to
disqualify her from SSI benefits, was inequitable. 125 The district court
found no violation of duty and affirmed the termination of her benefits. '
26
Relying on Hammond v. Secretar of Health, Education and Wefare, 1 27 the
Tenth Circuit ruled that the Secretary was not required "to engage in case-
by-case adjudications of inequitable circumstances .... ,,12' The court
held that the regulations 129 promulgated by the Secretary that provide for
exclusions from the general requirement of section 1382c(f)(1)13 0 accord eq-
uitable relief to beneficiaries. 13  It was within her discretion not to review
every inequitable situation of a claimant.
32
E. Interpretation of the Law
In Yoder v. Haris,133 the Tenth Circuit upheld the Social Security Ad-
ministration's (SSA) interpretation of a statute. Henry Yoder, a farmer, did
not file any income tax returns from 1962 through 1974. From 1964 through
1971, he belonged to farm cooperatives that bought milk from him. The
cooperatives filed tax returns (Forms 1099) with the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice (IRS) reflecting the amounts paid to Yoder. At some unspecified time
the IRS began auditing Yoder and required him to file delinquent tax re-
turns. Subsequently, Yoder applied for medicare benefits.1
34
119. 656 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1981).
120. Id at 583.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f) (1976).





127. 646 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1981) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(0(2) (1976) which uses
identical language to that of the equities clause in 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f)(1) (1976)). For a review
of this case, see Adminitrative Law, Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit Sure, 59 DEN. LJ. 173, 186
(1982).
128. 656 F.2d at 584.
129. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1100-1182 (1982).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c()(1) (1976).
131. 656 F.2d at 584.
132. Id.
133. 650 F.2d 1170 (10th Cir. 1981).
134. Id at 1171.
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The SSA denied Yoder's request, ruling he had not established a record
of self-employment income. 135 In determining the right to medicare bene-
fits, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) examines and
maintains records of the self-employment income earned by individuals.'
3 6
The Secretary may correct these records if application is made within the
statutory time limit.' 3 7 In updating these records, the Secretary has author-
ity to conform his records to "tax returns or portions thereof (including infor-
mation returns and other written statements) filed with the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue .... ,,138 If the time limit for updating records has ex-
pired, no amount of self-employment income may be credited to any ac-
count.139 Thus, there is a conclusive presumption that a claimant did not
have any self-employment income unless there is a timely correction in an
account or the filing of tax returns."40 In determining Yoder's eligibility to
receive medicare benefits, the issue before the SSA was whether the Forms
1099 filed by the farm cooperatives constituted tax returns within the mean-
ing of section 405(c)(5)(F).' 4' The SSA held the Forms 1099 did not consti-
tute tax returns because they did not show net self-employment income, but
only gross amounts paid to Yoder.'
42
The district court, however, ruled that section 405(c) (5) (F) is sufficiently
broad to permit the Secretary to update records from the Forms 1099.'43
The district court relied on Grzgg v. Finch,144 in which the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that self-employment income for a music teacher
could be deduced from the Forms 1099 filed by a music conservatory.
145
The trial court ordered the SSA to credit Yoder with earnings from 1964 to
1971 in the amounts filed by the cooperatives.'
46
The Tenth Circuit reversed, ruling that Forms 1099 did not constitute
tax returns of self-employment income for Social Security Act purposes.'
4 7
The court expressed its disagreement with Grigg and other supporting
cases,' 48 claiming the cases were not consistent with the language of the stat-
ute and its legislative history.'
49
135. Id
136. 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(A) (1976).
137. Id § 405(c)(4).
138. Id § 405(c)(5)(F).
139. See id § 405(c)(1)(B), (c)(4). These provisions permit the Secretary to update records
provided application is made within three years, three months, and fifteen days after the year in
question.
140. 650 F.2d at 1172.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(5)(F) (1976).
142. 650 F.2d at 1171.
143. Id.
144. 418 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1969). See also Maloney v. Celebreezze, 236 F. Supp. 222 (N.D.
Ohio 1964); White v. Celebreezze, 226 F. Supp. 584 (E.D. Va. 1963) rev'don other grounds, 359
F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1966). Contra Shore v. Califano, 589 F.2d 1232 (3d Cir. 1978); Singer v.
Weinberger, 513 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1975); Martlew v. Celebreezze, 320 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1963).
145. 418 F.2d at 664.
146. 650 F.2d at 1171.
147. Id at 1174.
148. See supra note 144. The court said: "While we agree with the beneficent result in
Maloney, we do not agree with the court's loose construction of section 405(c)(5)(F)." 650 F.2d
at 1172 n.l.
149. Id. at 1172-73.
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Judge Logan reviewed the legislative history of the statute, noting that
self-employed persons were originally excluded from social security benefits
because there was no feasible method to determine eligibility.' 5
0 In later
amending the Act, Congress adopted provisions for determining eligibility
by means of examination of income tax returns, provided that the SSA's
records of self-employment income become final after the time limitation to
correct them has expired.' 5 ' The court ruled that the intent of the statute is
to permit limelyfiled tax returns to be used to determine self-employment
income. 152 The court held that the Forms 1099 showing patronage divi-
dends paid to Yoder did not show net self-employment income, and thus
could not be used to rebut the presumption that Yoder did not have any self-
employment income which arose because of his failure to file any income tax
returns for twelve years.'
5 3
In Martin v. Harris,154 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals grappled with
the problem of the award of a widow's social security benefits when the dece-
dent was a bigamist. In 1969, the appellant married Elmer Martin, who
died in 1972. His first and "legal" wife, Jennie Lamore, from whom he had
never been legally divorced drew social security benefits from his account
from May 26, 1972, until October 18, 1972, when she remarried and thereby
became ineligible for benefits.' 55 Mrs. Martin applied for widow's benefits
in May, 1973. The SSA originally denied Mrs. Martin's benefits but was
subsequently overruled by an ALJ on appeal. The ALJ found that Mrs.
Martin was eligible for deemed widow's benefits under a statute that deems
a marriage valid for social security benefits purposes if the applicant believed
in good faith at the time of the ceremony that the marriage would be valid
and she was living with the insured at the time of death.
1'5 6
Mrs. Martin drew social security benefits until September, 1977, when
the SSA Appeals Council reopened her case. Based on the fact that Jennie
Lamore had previously received benefits from Mr. Martin's account, the
Council ruled that Mrs. Martin was ineligible.' 57 This ruling was based on
an exclusion clause of the deemed widow statute which states that the provi-
sions shall not apply "[i]f another person is or has been entitled to a benefit
.. .on the basis of the wages and self-employment income of such insured
individual and such other person is (or is deemed to be) a wife, widow, hus-
150. Id at 1173.
151. Id
152. Id
153. Id. at 1173-74.
154. 653 F.2d 428 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. deniedsub nom. Martin v. Schweiker, 454 U.S. 1165
(1982).
155. 653 F.2d at 429.
156. Id 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(l)(B) (1976), states in pertinent part:
In any case where under subparagraph (A) an applicant is not . . .the widow . . .of
such individual, but it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that such ap-
plicant in good faith went through a marriage ceremony with such individual result-
ing in a purported marriage between them which, but for a legal impediment not
known to the applicant at the time of such ceremony, would have been a valid mar-
riage, and such applicant and the insured individual were living in the same house-
hold at the time of death . . . then, for purposes [of the Act] . . . such purported
marriage shall be deemed to be a valid marriage.
157. 653 F.2d at 430.
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band, or widower of such insured individual .... "153
On appeal to the district court, the judge granted a preliminary injunc-
tion, ordered the SSA to continue Mrs. Martin's benefits, and remanded the
case to the agency for a determination of the meaning of the deemed widow
statute. 159 An ALJ heard the case, and again ruled that Mrs. Martin was
the deemed widow, but the SSA Appeals Council reversed. 16° The district
court upheld the Appeals Council, and Mrs. Martin appealed.
16 1
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Doyle, upheld the district court and the
Appeals Council. 16 2 The court concluded that the operative phrase in the
exclusionary clause is "if another person is or has been entitled to benefits
.... 163 Because Ms. Lamore had legally claimed and been given benefits
from Mr. Martin's social security account, Mrs. Martin was precluded from
claiming eligibility. 1
64
Mrs. Martin's main argument was that if the state in which her hus-
band was living when he died would find that the two were validly married,
she would be the widow.' 65 She also argued that one of the requirements
that must be met in order to receive benefits is that the widow be unmar-
ried. 166 She reasoned that because Ms. Lamore had remarried, she lost her
status as legal widow.' 6 7 The court dismissed both arguments by stating
"[tihis is not what the statute says."' 16 In support of its position that the
legal widow's rights are superior to the deemed widow's, the court cited cases
from the Third and Seventh Circuits. 169 The court also asserted that the
legislative history of the exclusionary clause verifies this interpretation.
70
In a vigorous and tightly reasoned dissent, Judge McKay disagreed
with the majority's "mechanical construction" of the deemed widow stat-
ute.17 1 He insisted that the statute was obviously intended to enable
"deemed widows,"' 172 to collect social security benefits. 173 The exclusionary
clause was added to prevent "double-dipping" whereby both a legal widow
and a deemed widow could dip into a wage earner's account. 174 To avoid
this situation, Congress gave priority to the legal widow over the deemed
158. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(B) (1976).
159. 653 F.2d at 430.
160. Id
161. Id
162. Id at 433.
163. Id at 431. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
164. 653 F.2d at 433.




169. Dwyer v. Califano, 636 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1980); Davis v. Califano, 603 F.2d 618 (7th
Cir. 1979); Woodson v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Tex. 1978). But see Rosenberg v.
Richardson, 538 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1976) (the appellate court approved a plan whereby the legal
widow and the deemed widow shared the benefits).
170. 653 F.2d at 433.
171. Id at 436 (McKay, J., dissenting). See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(B) (1976).
172. See supra note 156.
173. 653 F.2d at 433 (McKay, J., dissenting).




Judge McKay argued that the proper interpretation of the exclusionary
clause in view of this legislative intent was to allow a deemed widow to ob-
tain benefits whenever the legal widow became ineligible for them. 176 Thus,
because the insured's legal wife was ineligible, he believed Mrs. Martin
should be entitled to receive the benefits as the insured's only eligible
spouse. 177 Under the majority's interpretation, however, "the statute would
confer a benefit upon 'deemed widows' only in the unusual case where no
'legal widow' has ever been certified to receive a benefit and where the Secre-
tary nonetheless learns of the impediment to the 'deemed widow.' "178 This




The influence of enabling legislation on the award of attorneys' fees was
aptly illustrated in two cases. In Wesley Medical Center v. Schwetker, °80 the
plaintiffs were a group of Wichita, Kansas hospitals who had won a suit in
May, 1979 against the Secretary of HEW challenging the method used to
compensate emergency room personnel administering to medicare pa-
tients.18 1 In January, 1981, the plaintiffs sought a new writ of mandamus,
complaining that the Secretary had not yet complied with a similar writ
issued eighteen months earlier. 18 2 The district court issued the mandamus,
and awarded plaintiffs costs, interest and attorneys' fees, based on a finding
that the Secretary had acted in bad faith.1 8 3 The Secretary appealed the
award of attorneys' fees and interest on the ground of sovereign
immunity. 184
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, noting, "[g]enerally, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes the award of attorneys' fees
against the United States and its officers who are acting in their official ca-
pacity. . . . Sovereign immunity is not waived except by statute."',8 5 The
court, citing Alyeska Pipeline v. Wilderness Society, 18 6 ruled that there is no bad-
faith exception to the sovereign immunity rule.187 For the same reason, the
court overturned the award of interest,'88 relying on its own decision in
de Weever v. United States i89
175. Id
176. Id.
177. Id at 436.
178. Id at 435.
179. Id.
180. No. 81-1101 (10th Cir. Aug. 26, 1981) (per curiam).
181. Id slip op. at 2.
182. Id.
183. Id at 3.
184. Id
185. Id
186. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
187. No. 81-1101, slip op. at 4.
188. Id at 5.
189. 618 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1980) (interest may be assessed against the federal government
only pursuant to express statutory or contractual authorization).
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In Nunez v. Bergland,' 90 the issue was not whether there was statutory
authority for award of attorneys' fees, but whether the plaintiffs had pre-
vailed in the case.19 ' The case has a complex history, but the essential facts
are that a group of New Mexico citizens sued the Department of Agriculture
(USDA) and the State of New Mexico for equitable distribution of food
under the Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and Chil-
dren.' 92 The appellants prevailed and were awarded attorneys' fees.193 The
USDA and the State of New Mexico appealed, but during the appeal, Con-
gress amended the program. 194 The amendments, by giving the plaintiffs
what they had requested, rendered the case moot.19 5 The USDA and the
State of New Mexico contended that because the case had been rendered
moot, the plaintiffs had not prevailed. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, noting
that substantial precedent supported the proposition that "where the pro-
ceedings brought by the plaintiff act as a catalyst in achieving a primary
objective of the lawsuit, he can properly be considered a prevailing party
although he has not obtained a judicial determination on the merits."' 196
III. JUSTICIABILITY
Justiciability, the issue of whether a case is properly before the court,
was considered by the Tenth Circuit in several cases. Two cases were dis-
missed as being untimely. 197 In the following three cases, the court dis-
missed the suits because a justiciable case or controversy was not established.
A. Case or Controversy Requirement
In Environmental Improvement Division v. Marshall,198 the court upheld the
district court's ruling that insufficient injury had been alleged by the State of
New Mexico to confer standing.'9 9 The state had sued the Secretary of La-
bor to compel the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
to grant the state exclusive authority over its occupational safety and health
plan.2 0° 0 The Occupational Safety and Health Act 20 1 authorizes states to
develop their own occupational safety and health enforcement programs
190. Nos. 79-1704, 79-1705 (10th Cir. Aug. 3, 1981).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) provides, in part, that the party claiming
attorneys' fees must have prevailed in its action in order to be awarded the fees.
192. Nos. 79-1704, 79-1705, slip op. at 3. See 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
193. Nos. 79-1704, 79-1705, slip op. at 4.
194. Child Nutrition Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-627, 92 Stat. 3603 (1978).
195. Nos. 79-1704, 79-1705, slip op. at 5.
196. Id at 7 (citing Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1980); Morrison v. Ayoob,
627 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199
(8th Cir. 1980)).
197. Mono-Therm Indus., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 653 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1981)
(untimely protest to Federal Trade Commission rule); Salt Lake County v. Donovan, No. 81-
2010 (10th Cir. Dec. 21, 1981) (untimely request for review of a ruling by Federal Mine Safety
and Health Review Commission).
198. 661 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1981).
199. Id at 863.
200. Id at 861.
201. Pub. L. No. 91-396, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amendment in scattered sections of 5, 15,
18, 29, 42, and 49 U.S.C.).
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under federal supervision. 20 2 OSHA's rules envision a four-step procedure:
1) the state submits a developmental plan;20 3 2) after approval, OSHA su-
pervises and monitors the plan's enforcement for three years, but retains ju-
risdictional authority;20 4 3) during an optional period of concurrent
authority, OSHA may agree to release to the state the power to enforce parts
of the program; 20 5 4) OSHA grants final approval. 20 6 Final approval, or
"operational status," requires approval by the Assistant Secretary of Labor,
publication in the Federal Register, and publication of the description of the
plan in the Code of Federal Regulations.
20 7
In May, 1978, the Acting Regional Director of OSHA entered into an
agreement with New Mexico officials to confer operational status on the
state's program.208 In December, 1978, a new regional director rescinded
the agreement. 20 9 Citing several deficiencies in the state's program, he rec-
ommended reinstatement of concurrent authority. 2 0 The state brought suit
to compel OSHA to award the plan final approval, and to require the
agency to withdraw concurrent authority.
21 1
The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary, reason-
ing that New Mexico had not alleged sufficient injury to confer standing.2 12
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. Noting that the
May, 1978 agreement was never approved by the Assistant Secretary of La-
bor, nor published as required, the court ruled that the agreement was at
best "an informal interagency agreement which expressed a temporary de-
lineation of enforcement authority. ' 21 3 The court stated that although the
Act contemplates judicial review of final agency action, 21 4 OSHA's decision
to reinstate concurrent authority was an interlocutory decision; therefore, it
was inappropriate for judicial review.
21 5
In another case the court refused to review an interlocutory order by
FERC on the ground that the dispute was not ripe for adjudication. In Colo-
rado Interstate Gas Co. v. FERC,2 16 the court ruled that FERC's order granting
belated motions to several parties to intervene in a tariff adjustment request
by Colorado Interstate Gas (CIG) was merely a procedural device, and not
202. 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1976).
203. 29 C.F.R. § 1902.2(b) (1982).
204. Se 29 U.S.C. § 667(e) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 1954.3 (1981).
205. Id §§ 1954.3, 1902.20(b)(1)(iii).
206. Id § 1954.3 (1981).
207. Id.
208. 661 F.2d at 862.
209. Id
210. Id The deficiencies found by the director included the state's incomplete fulfillment of
all the developmental steps, the insufficiency of the state's personnel to enforce the plan, the
unacceptable performance by the state in conducting compliance inspections, and the noncom-
pliance of the state's operational procedures with the OSHA Field Operational Manual. Id.
211. Id
212. Id
213. Id. at 863.
214. Se 29 U.S.C. § 667(g) (1976).
215. 661 F.2d at 864. See also Utah Int'l, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1973); Amer-
ada Petroleum Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 231 F.2d 461 (10th Cir. 1956).
216. No. 81-1646 (10th Cir. Aug. 19, 1981) (per curiam).
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justiciable.2 17 Noting that the order "adjudicated no rights and resolved no
claims," the court determined that judicial action would be premature.
21 8
The court observed that provisions of both the Federal Energy Regulatory
Act 219 and the Federal Power Act 22 0 authorize judicial review of final FERC
orders for aggrieved parties, but not for procedural or interlocutory or-
ders. 22 ' The court said that orders may be reviewed only if they are defini-
tive, deal with the merits of a proceeding, and have some "substantial effect"
on the parties causing irreparable harm.222 The court rejected CIG's claim
that the expense and disruption of defending itself in hearings constituted
irreparable harm.
223
Finally, in Sacco v. United States Parole Commission 224 the court of appeals
dismissed an action as presenting no case or controversy. Sacco had chal-
lenged the Parole Commission's reasons for denying him parole as being ar-
bitrary and capricious. Before the appeal was completed, however, Sacco
was paroled. The court reasoned that because parole was the only relief he
sought, there was no case or controversy.2 25 The court pointedly rejected the
notion that the case was moot. The court distinguished the case from Wein-
stein v. Bradford,2 26 in which the United States Supreme Court ruled the case
was moot because the plaintiff's parole had already ripened into a complete
release from custody. The court noted in Sacco that the appellant was only
temporarily released from custody. Should he ever again come under the
control of the Parole Commission, the court pointed out, the Commission
would be required to make new findings of fact. 2 2 7 Thus, with a residual
issue remaining, the court was reluctant to declare the case moot, although it
presented no case or controversy at the time the appeal was considered.
228
B. Lack of Junsdction
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to consider several cases
that should have been tried in other courts possessing primary jurisdiction.
For instance, in Alamo Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Andrus,229 the appellate
court dismissed the case because the suit should have been tried in the Court
217. Id slip op. at 3.
218. Id. at 4.
219. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1976).
220. See 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1976).
221. No. 81-1646, slip op. at 3.
222. Id at 4 (citing Federal Power Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375
(1938); Public Serv. Co. v. Federal Power Cornm'n, 557 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1977)). See also
Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 611 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1979); Atlanta Gas Light Co.
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1973).
223. No. 81-1646, slip op. at 4. The court cited Federal Trade Comm'n v. Standard Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 232 (1980), which held that even substantial litigation expense does not constitute
irreparable harm.
224. No. 81-2047 (10th Cir. Mar. 9, 1982).
225. Id slip op. at 3.
226. 423 U.S. 147 (1975) (per curiam).
227. No. 81-2047, slip op. at 3.
228. Id at 2.




of Claims in accordance with section 1491 of the Tucker Act.
230
The dispute arose after the Alamo Navajo School Board (School Board)
contracted with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) for the operation of a
new elementary school under the Indian Self-Determination Act. 23 1 The Act
empowers the Secretary of the Interior to fund such schools uniformly,
232
but also provides for a special fund for use in emergencies and contingen-
cies. 233 Pursuant to the Act, the Secretary established an Implementation
Set-Aside Fund (ISAF)234 to be used to adjust errors due to "underprojec-
tions, data error, misclassification of students. . . or to provide for the initial
funding of new schools ... "235 The contract allocated funds to the
School Board to operate the school for 180 days during fiscal 1980, which
ran from October 1, 1979, to September 30, 1980.236 The School Board
misunderstood the fiscal year requirement and expended all of the allocated
funds during the 180 school days between October 1, 1979, and May 30,
1980.237 Left without funds to operate the school in August and September,
the School Board sued the Secretary for ISAF funds on the basis that this
was an unforeseen contingency.
238
The district court recognized that the APA239 did not confer jurisdic-
tion because the plaintiffs sought money damages. 240 It concluded, however,
that it had both mandamus and federal question jurisdiction. 24' The appel-
late court disagreed, relying upon Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians v.
Udall,242 which held that mandamus jurisdiction is inappropriate where an
official is exercising discretionary powers. The court ruled that the language
"emergencies or unforeseen contingencies," as contained in the statute au-
thorizing the ISAF, was ambiguous.24 3 The court concluded from its ambi-
guity that Congress intended to leave to the discretion of the Secretary the
determination of what constituted "emergencies or unforeseen contingen-
cies." 244 The court said further that mandamus is inappropriate where
other remedies are available. 245 The court stated, "'[m]andamus does not
supersede other remedies, but rather comes into play where there is a want of
such remedies.' "246
The court additionally held that the district court erred in accepting the
230. 664 F.2d at 233; see 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. IV 1980).
231. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 25, 42
and 50 app. U.S.C.)
232. 25 U.S.C. § 2008(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
233. Id. § 2008(d).
234. 25 C.F.R. § 31h.78 (1979).
235. 664 F.2d at 231 (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 31h.79 (1979)); see 25 U.S.C. § 2008(a), (d)
(Supp. IV 1980).
236. 664 F.2d at 231.
237. Id
238. Id
239. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
240. 664 F.2d at 232.
241. Id
242. 355 F.2d 364 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966).
243. 664 F.2d at 232.
244. Id
245. Id at 233.
246. Id (quoting Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1969)).
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case under the federal question rule,247 which does not give district courts
jurisdiction over contract disputes that must be brought exclusively in the
Court of Claims. 248 The court determined that the case was indeed a con-
tract dispute, despite the School Board's protestations.2 49 The court stated,
"[t]he exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims cannot be avoided by
framing a district court complaint to appear to seek only injunctive,
mandatory, or declaratory relief."
250
The court of appeals denied jurisdiction in another case, Coalition for Fair
Utility Rates v. Baker,25 ' because plaintiffs failed to exhaust the remedies
available in state court. Plaintiffs, Oklahoma non-profit organizations
whose members are electric utility consumers, brought suit against the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission, which regulates the state's public utili-
ties. 252 The purpose of the suit was to obtain a declaratory judgment au-
thorizing the Commission to award costs and attorneys' fees to consumers
who successfully intervene in ratemaking proceedings. The Coalition
claimed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)
253
authorized awarding such costs and attorneys' fees.
2 5 4
Initially, the plaintiffs had sought mandamus relief from the Oklahoma
Supreme Court to direct the Commission to set up procedures for awarding
fees and costs to intervenors. 255 The court ruled that the Commission's deci-
sion to award intervenors costs and fees was discretionary and dependent on
state law. 256 Additionally, the Oklahoma court ruled that PURPA provides
for a civil suit for fees against a utility in the state court.
25 7
The plaintiffs then filed suit in federal district court. The district court
dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs
had not been denied the right to intervene in a ratemaking proceeding by a
state court. 258 The court of appeals agreed, finding that PURPA provides
for federal jurisdiction only if attorneys' fees have been denied by a state
court.
2 5 9
247. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
248. 664 F.2d at 233 (citing Lenoir v. Porters Creek Watershed Dist., 586 F.2d 1081 (6th
Cir. 1978)).
249. 664 F.2d at 233.
250. Id (citing Bakersfield City School Dist. v. Boyer, 610 F.2d 621, 628 (9th Cir. 1979)).
251. 656 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
252. Id. at 594.
253. 16 U.S.C. § 2601-2708 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
254. 656 F.2d at 593. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2632(a)(2), 2633(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981).




259. 656 F.2d at 594-95. See 16 U.S.C. § 2632(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981), which states in part,
"[a] consumer . ..may collect such fees and costs from an electric utility by bringing a civil
action in any state court of competent jurisdiction ...."
The Tenth Circuit refused jurisdiction in another case, Sadegh-Nobari v. INS, 676 F.2d
1348 (10th Cir. 1982). The court ruled that an appeal of an INS refusal to consider a change of
immigration status should have been made in district court. Id. at 1350 (citing Cheng Fan
Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968)).
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C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The court of appeals applied the exhaustion of administrative remedies
doctrine to several cases during the past year, achieving disparate results.
For example, the court summarily dismissed two cases, Wi/iams v. Carlson
2 60
and MShan v. United States ,261 in which inmates at the Federal Correctional
Institute at El Reno, Oklahoma, protested actions of prison officials. In each
case, the court noted that the prisoners had failed to exhaust administrative
remedies available to them.
262
A similar result from an entirely different set of facts was reached in
Haynes v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. 26-1 Haynes, an American Indian, filed a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
protesting his discharge by Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. (ONG) and alleging
that the discipline was motivated by racial discrimination-a violation of
the equal employment opportunity provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.264 EEOC dismissed his charge, but issued Haynes a "right to sue"
letter. In his complaint filed against ONG in district court, Haynes broad-
ened his accusations against the company, alleging systematic discrimina-
tion, false accusations of misconduct, racial slurs, abusive language,
improper processing of procedural matters, and denial of company bene-
fits. 2 6 5 The district court dismissed the case on the basis that the "allega-
tions on the judicial complaint far exceed the allegations in the
administrative charge .... .. 66
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding.267 The appel-
late court ruled that an employee's discrimination suit must be limited to
claims reasonably related to those made in the original complaint to the
EEOC. 268 To allow the appellant to broaden the charges after bringing suit
in federal court would "frustrate the . . . policies of'encourag[ing] informal
conciliation of employment discrimination suits and . . . avoid[ing] bypass
of administrative remedies.' "269
In New Mexico Association for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico ,270 however,
the court specifically declined to require the plaintiffs to exhaust available
administrative remedies. Furthermore, the court pointedly refused to invoke
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in the case.
2 7'
This case arose under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 272 The
260. No. 81-1090 (10th Cir. Nov. 20, 1981).
261. No. 81-2216 (10th Cir. Apr. 12, 1982).
262. See also Admnistratwe Law, Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 58 DEN. L.J. 211-13 (1981).
263. No. 81-2051 (10th Cir. Apr. 2, 1982).
264. Id slip op. at 2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. IV 1980).
265. No. 81-2051, slip op. at 2-3.
266. Id. at 3.
267. Id. at 5.
268. Id at 3 (citing Oubichon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1973);
Donner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 477 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971)).
269. No. 81-2051, slip op. at 5 (quoting Ong v. Cleland, 642 F.2d 316, 320 (9th Cir. 1981)).
270. 678 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982).
271. Id. at 851. The defendants argued that the Office of Civil Rights should have com-
pleted its investigation of the case before the court had jurisdiction. Id
272. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV 1980) prohibits discrimination against any otherwise quali-
fied handicapped individual under any federally funded or assisted program.
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plaintiff association contended that New Mexico discriminated against
handicapped children by its failure to provide adequate therapy and serv-
ices, and by its inadequate funding of special education programs. The dis-
trict court found the state in violation of section 504 and ordered it to submit
a plan for compliance. 2 73 The trial court also permitted the plaintiffs to
prepare their own plan, which was ultimately adopted when the district
court rejected the state's plan as not being sufficiently responsive to section
504 requirements. 2 74 The state appealed, contending that the district court
erred on three grounds: 1) the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies and primary jurisdiction should have barred the suit; 2) the state was
incorrectly found in violation of section 504; and 3) the solution fashioned by
the district court was overbroad.
275
The appellate court easily disposed of the state's contention that the
district court violated the exhaustion of remedies and primary jurisdiction
doctrines, but reversed and remanded for further hearings on the other
grounds.276 The court recognized the similarity between the exhaustion of
remedies and primary jurisdiction doctrines, noting that both "promote
proper relationships between courts and administrative bodies through a
policy of suspending judicial consideration pending agency action. '2 77 Ex-
haustion requires that a claim be pursued at the administration level prior to
court intervention. 278 Primary jurisdiction mandates that disputes properly
pursued in either administrative bodies or in courts "are to be first decided
by an agency specifically equipped with expertise to resolve the regulatory
issues raised.
'279
The Tenth Circuit stated that courts must not mechanically apply the
exhaustion principle in every instance.2 80 It is those cases in which it is im-
probable that a plaintiff will obtain adequate relief from an agency action or
where delays will cause irreparable harm to substantive rights that courts
have dispensed with the exhaustion requirement.2 8' Noting that New Mex-
ico's administrative process could give neither adequate nor timely relief, the
court ruled that it would be fruitless for the plaintiffs to exhaust administra-
tive remedies.
282
The court ruled further that the district court was not required to in-
voke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and await the outcome of the Of-
273. New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 495 F. Supp. 391 (D.N.M.
1980), rev'd, 678 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982).
274. 678 F.2d at 849-50.
275. Id at 850.
276. Id. at 855.
277. Id at 850 (citing United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956)).
278. 678 F.2d at 850.
279. Id (citing United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334 (1959)).
280. 678 F.2d at 850 (citing Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1973)).
281. 678 F.2d at 850. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979);
Pushkin v. University of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981); Martinez v. Richardson, 472
F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1973).
282. 678 F.2d at 851. The remedies provided did not include a restructuring of the system
to comply with the statute, part of the relief sought. Additionally, the time factors involved
were further evidence of the inadequacy of the available remedies. Id.
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fice of Civil Rights (OCR) investigation before proceeding. 28 3 The court
reasoned that the only punitive action the OCR could take was to cut off
section 504 funding for New Mexico, 28 4 and such "purse-string discipline"
would not vindicate the plaintiffs' rights.
28 5
Interpretation of the regulations 286 adopted pursuant to section 504
were crucial to the appellate court's reversal of the district court's finding
that New Mexico had violated the regulations.28 7 The district court relied
on language in the regulations that compels public schools to develop pro-
grams that "are designed to meet the individual educational needs of handi-
capped persons as adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons are
met .... ",288 The Tenth Circuit, however, pointed out that this language
had been limited by the Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 28 9 which held that the Department of HEW had improperly inter-
preted section 504 as giving it authority to require affirmative action pro-
grams of all recipients of federal funds.29° The Act, the court insisted, was
designed to prohibit discrimination against the handicapped, not to order
affirmative relief.
29 1
The court of appeals noted, however, that the Supreme Court, in South-
eastern Community College, left the door ajar for some sort of relief for the hand-
icapped by suggesting that the "refusal to modify an existing program might
become discriminatory. '292 On this tenuous thread, but reinforced by Lau v.
Nzhols
2 9 3 and Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools,294 the circuit court ruled
that the refusal by New Mexico to modify educational programs to permit
handicapped persons to achieve the same benefits as nonhandicapped per-
sons constitutes discrimination. 295 The court observed, "[u]nfortunately the
trial court failed to address the Southeastern Communit College guidelines in its
opinion and order."'296 Instead, the district court mandated an affirmative
action program. The circuit court remanded the case with instructions to
reevaluate the evidence and devise a solution accommodating the Supreme




284. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980); See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.64, 80.8 (1981).
285. 678 F.2d at 851.
286. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.1-104.54 (1982).
287. 678 F.2d at 852-54.
288. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1)(i) (1982).
289. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
290. Id. at 411-412.
291. 678 F.2d at 852 (citing Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 410).
292. 678 F.2d at 853 (quoting Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 412-13) (emphasis in
opinion)).
293. 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (holding that discrimination occurs when programs are not modi-
fied for non-English speaking students).
294. 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding operation of school system deprived Spanish
sur-named students of statutory civil rights).





IV. RULEMAKING PROVISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
The rulemaking provisions of the APA298 were important to three deci-
sions handed down by the Tenth Circuit this past year. In Nademi v. INS,
299
the circuit court upheld the deportation of an Iranian student despite the
fact that the regulation under which he was removed was not promulgated
under the normal rulemaking procedure.
3 ° °
Nademi was ordered deported by an immigration judge pursuant to
section 241(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 30 ' He had vio-
lated the statute by failing to attend the college authorized by the INS on his
nonimmigrant entry visa. Nademi did not protest the action, but requested
a ninety-day delay to allow him to finish the semester. The immigration
judge denied the request, and ordered the Iranian to depart within fifteen
days, pursuant to a regulation amendment promulgated specifically for
Iranians during the 1979-80 hostage crisis.
30 2
Nademi contended that the amendment violated section 553 of the
APA because its promulgation was not preceded by notice and comment.
30 3
The court held that the amendment was exempt from section 553 require-
ments3° 4 under the "foreign affairs function" 30 5 and the "good cause"
exclusions.
306
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the regulation denied
them equal protection of the laws in violation of the fifth amendment.
30 7
The court relied on Malek-Marzban v. INS,30 8 where the Fourth Circuit held
that a classification of aliens must be sustained if it has a rational basis.
30 9
The court quoted with approval the Fourth Circuit's statement that the
"United States is not bound to treat the nationals of unfriendly powers with
the same courtesy and consideration it extends to nationals of friendly pow-
298. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
299. 679 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 161 (1982). This was a consoli-
dated appeal that included Sadegh-Pour v. INS, with identical grounds for appeal as Nademi.
679 F.2d at 812.
300. Id at 814.
301. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9) (1976).
302. 679 F.2d at 813; see 8 C.F.R. § 244.1 (1981), which reads in part, "[i]n the case of a
national of Iran, the amount of time within which he/she may be granted to depart voluntarily
... shall not exceed 15 days from the date the special inquiry officer renders his/her decision in
the case."
303. 679 F.2d at 813.
304. d at 814 (citing Malek-Marzban v. INS, 633 F.2d 113, 115-16 (4th Cir. 1981)).
305. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (1976) which reads in part, "[tihis section applies ... except to
the extent that there is involved ... a military or foreign affairs function of the United States
306. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976) which reads in part, "this subsection does not apply
(B) when the agency for good cause finds . . .that notice and public procedure thereon are
impractical, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." See also Yassini v. Crosland, 618
F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980).
307. 679 F.2d at 815.
308. 633 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1981).
309. Id. at 116. See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
957 (1980); Alvarez v. District Director, 539 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 918
(1977); Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975); Dunn v.
INS, 499 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1974).
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ers."3 1 0 The petitioners' contentions that the Commissioner exceeded his au-
thority were dismissed without extensive discussion.
3 "1
In Vzt l v. Andrus,3 12 the court of appeals set aside a BIA action that
transferred a free school lunch program for off-reservation Indians to the
Department of Agriculture (USDA), because the BIA failed to comply with
the notice requirement of section 553 of the APA.3 13  Under the Johnson-
O'Malley Act,3 14 Indian children attending off-reservation schools were pro-
vided free lunches regardless of need. To simplify its operation and reduce
costs, the BIA decided to transfer the public-school portion of the program to
the USDA, which was already providing free lunches in public schools on a
need basis. 3 15 The plan of transfer included a phase-in, phase-out period
extending for three years. The plan anticipated that during the 1973-74
school year, Indian children in public schools would not receive free lunches
unless they could establish need.
3 16
Prior to transferring the program, neither the BIA nor the USDA held
evidentiary hearings or rulemaking proceedings, nor did either agency give
public notice of the change, as required by the APA.3 17 The district court
ruled that the alteration of the school lunch program fell within the con-
tracts exception to the APA and that compliance with the formal rulemak-
ing procedures was not necessary.3 18 The Tenth Circuit reversed, noting
that congressional intent,3 19 precedent, 32 0 and the BIA's own rules32 1 all
supported the position that formal rulemaking procedures should be
followed.322
The court stated that the government must "bend over backwards" to
assure fair treatment to Indians when terminating benefits that have long
been provided. 323 The appellate court ordered the BIA to undertake formal
rulemaking if it chose to continue with the transfer plan.
32 4
310. 679 F.2d at 815 (quoting Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir. 1981)).
See also Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
311. The court found that there was a clear line of delegation of power from Congress to the
President to the Commissioner, and that the Commissioner was merely implementing foreign
policy, not formulating it. 679 F.2d at 814 (citing Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.
1980)).
312. 667 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982).
313. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976).
314. 25 U.S.C. §§ 452-457 (1976).
315. National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1768 (1976).
316. 667 F.2d at 933.
317. Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d) (1976).
318. Id. § 553(a)(2) exempts from the rulemaking requirements matters relating to, inter alia,
public contracts.
319. 667 F.2d at 934-35.
320. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286
(1942). See genera/y Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property,
Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1970).
321. Subsequent to a recommendation by the Administrative Conference of the United
States, the Department of Interior (including the BIA) adopted a rule stating that it agreed to
follow rulemaking procedures even if the subject matter was within the APA's exceptions for
grants, benefits and contracts. 36 Fed. Reg. 8,336 (197 1).
322. 667 F.2d 935-37.
323. Id. at 939 (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974)).
324. 667 F.2d at 939.
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In another case, American Mining Congress v. Marshall,325 the Tenth Cir-
cuit upheld a Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) rule that
was challenged both substantively and procedurally by the mining industry.
At issue was a regulation 326 promulgated by MSHA pursuant to the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. 327 This regulation requires mine opera-
tors to initiate area sampling programs for respirable dust in addition to the
personal sampling program required for miners in high risk areas.328 The
industry attacked the area sampling program on the grounds that it was
selected in an arbitrary and capricious manner, 329 and that the rulemaking
procedures established by the APA were not followed. 330 The court rejected
the arbitrary and capricious challenge, and ruled that the choice of sampling
methods and techniques were within the Secretary's discretion. 33t
The plaintiff contended the area sampling regulation was procedurally
invalid because certain documents in the rulemaking record were not date-
stamped, and the index omitted some documents while including some doc-
uments dated after the close of the comment period. These deficiencies, the
plaintiff maintained, deprived it of its right to comment and made "mean-
ingful judicial review impossible."' 332 The court, in rejecting this argument,
pointed out that the APA makes no mention of these requirements, citing
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 333
In Vermont Yankee the Supreme Court held that "formulation of procedures
[beyond those required by the APA is] basically to be left within the discre-
tion of the agencies. . . . 334 After reviewing the APA rulemaking require-
ments and the record of this case, the Tenth Circuit court determined that
the procedure had been correct and substantially complete.
335
V. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE PRIVACY ACTS
Three cases decided during the past year suggest that there is some
agency and lower court confusion over the correct interpretation of the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA)3 36 and the Privacy Act of 1974. 3 3 7 Alirez v.
NLRB,33 8 exemplifies this confusion. In Alirez the court of appeals reversed
the district court's interpretation of the FOIA. 33 9 This case arose after
325. 671 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1982).
326. 30 C.F.R. § 70.208 (1981).
327. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1976).
328. The personal sampling program is required by 30 C.F.R. § 70.207 (1981).
329. 671 F.2d at 1255-57.
330. Id at 1260-63.
331. The court noted that there is no perfect sampling method, and that the Secretary has
discretion to adopt any method that measures respirable dust concentration with reasonable
accuracy, even if the method is more burdensome to mine operators. Id at 1256. The plaintiff
also attacked various technical aspects of the area sampling program, but the court refused "to
substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary." Id at 1260.
332. Id at 1260-61.
333. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
334. 435 U.S. at 524, quoted in American Mining Congress, 671 F.2d at 1261.
335. 671 F.2d at 1262.
336. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
337. Id § 552a.
338. 676 F.2d 423 (10th Cir. 1982).
339. Id at 428.
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Alirez filed unsuccessful unfair labor practices charges with the National La-
bor Relations Board (NLRB) against his employer. The plaintiff then re-
quested access to the NLRB's investigatory file in the case. The Board
offered Alirez access to all documents except sixteen, which it deemed ex-
empt from disclosure. 3 4 0 Fourteen of the documents were statements by in-
formants, many of whom indicated they feared retaliation.3 4 1 The plaintiff
brought suit to force disclosure of the withheld documents under the FOIA.
The district court granted the plaintiff's motion, determining that disclosure
of the documents would not be an invasion of privacy contemplated by the
FOIA.342 However, it permitted the Board to delete data identifying the
informants.3 4 3 The NLRB appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the
lower court.
The appellate court noted that the FOIA is to be broadly construed in
favor of disclosure,3 44 that statutory exemptions are to be narrowly con-
strued,3 45 and that the burden of justifying nondisclosure is placed upon the
agency.3 46 Noting that the lower court had based its decision primarily on
Poss v. NLRB, 347 the appellate court reviewed Poss and established that the
plaintiff in that case compelled disclosure of informants' statements that
were not truly sensitive in nature.348 In Alirez, however, the Tenth Circuit
ruled that the district court abused its discretion by not taking the fact that
disclosure of the informants' statements would result in "serious invasions of
privacy, potentially subjecting Board informants and others to embarrass-
ment of reprisals from Mr. Alirez and their employer," into account.
349
The court noted that in cases similar to Ahrez a balancing of interests is
necessary; the court must determine whether the invasion of privacy is out-
weighed by the public interest in disclosure. Because the plaintiff sought the
documents for personal information only, the court found no public
interest.
350
Misunderstanding of the FOIA and the Privacy Act was also evident in
Wren v. Hams,35' a case in which the appellant was refused access to his
personal file held by the SSA. Mr. Wren sought access to his records under
the Privacy Act. 352 The district court prohibited disclosure under the exclu-
sion provisions of the FOIA. 353 The court of appeals reversed, suggesting
340. Id at 425. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
341. 676 F.2d at 425.
342. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1976).
343. 676 F.2d at 425.
344. Id. See, e.g., Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
345. 676 F.2d at 425. See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361-62 (1976).
See also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73
(1973).
346. 676 F.2d at 425 (citing Campbell v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 539 F.2d 58,
61 (10th Cir. 1976)).
347. 565 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1977).
348. 676 F.2d at 426.
349. Id. at 427.
350. Id
351. 675 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1982).
352. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976); 675 F.2d at 1145. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), (b)(6) (1976).
353. 675 F.2d at 1146.
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that the district court's order demonstrated a "fundamental misunderstand-
ing" of the relationship between the two acts.
3 54
The Tenth Circuit compared the primary purposes of the Privacy Act
and the FOIA, stating that, whereas the thrust of the FOIA is to "pierce the
veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public
scrutiny,"3 55 the purpose of the Privacy Act is to promote "governmental
respect for the privacy of citizens by requiring all departments . . . to ob-
serve . . . rules in the . . . management, use, and disclosure of personal in-
formation about individuals. '3 56 Although the Privacy Act severely limits
third party access to records, it permits the individual to read and copy his
own records. 35 7 On this basis, the court concluded that the Privacy Act pro-
vides the individual greater rights with respect to his own records than to the
public generally.
358
The Tenth Circuit observed that the district court made no attempt to
construe Mr. Wren's rights in light of the Privacy Act, but rather at the
insistence of the appellees, applied the exemptions of the FOIA. Because of




Administrative law reflects the inevitable friction created at the inter-
face between governmental bureaucracies and the citizens they serve. The
cases decided by the Tenth Circuit were more notable for their evenhanded
application of the law than for equitable considerations. What the decisions
lost in compassion and sympathy, they gained in stability and predictability
in the law.
Michael G Cooksey
354. 675 F.2d at 1145.
355. Id (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)).
356. 675 F.2d at 1145-46 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1183, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS 6916).
357. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1976) provides in part that each agency shall "upon request by any
individual to gain access to his record . . . permit him . . . to review the record and have a
copy made of all or any portion thereof .
358. 675 F.2d at 1146.
359. Id. at 1148. The Tenth Circuit decided another case, Hernandez v. Alexander, 671
F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1982), similar to the dispute in A1rez, discussed supra at notes 335-346 and
accompanying text. In Hernandz, all parties except the appellant appeared to agree on the




The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals this year was given the opportunity
to address issues of recent import in the field of antitrust, many of which
have been the subject of United States Supreme Court decisions. Among
those Supreme Court pronouncements which influenced the appellate court
were decisions that increased the scope of activities in interstate commerce,'
barred suits by indirect purchasers, 2 limited antitrust immunity under the
state-action doctrine,3 and prohibited contribution among antitrust defend-
ants.4 The legacy of these Supreme Court decisions, including one which
reversed a Tenth Circuit opinion,5 is the Tenth Circuit's adherence to estab-
lished Supreme Court antitrust sentiment.
This article will discuss the trend of Tenth Circuit decisions which es-
pouse the antitrust mandates of the Supreme Court. The court's other deci-
sions will be briefly reviewed.
I. THE "EFFECTS TEST" OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND THE HEALTH
CARE INDUSTRY
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a long-standing jurisdic-
tional issue in Mishler v. St. Anthony's Itospza/ Systems, 6 where a physician
challenged a hospital's refusal to include his name on a referral list as being a
restraint of trade under the Sherman Act. 7 In its holding, the court con-
fronted, both expressly and implicitly, two barriers traditionally raised
against physicians asserting claims under the federal antitrust laws in the
health care industry: 1) whether members of learned professions are subject
to the antitrust laws, and 2) whether a substantial enough effect on interstate
commerce has been shown to invoke federal antitrust jurisdiction.
The court, in conformity with the modern trend, broadened the scope
of the federal antitrust laws by implicitly recognizing application of the anti-
trust laws to the learned profession of medicine, and by expressly finding
that local hospital activities bear a substantial enough relationship to inter-
state commerce to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal antitrust laws. In so
holding, the court maintained its established position that to invoke federal
jurisdiction, it is the effect of the defendant's allegedly illegal conduct on
1. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
2. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
3. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
4. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
5. Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982), rev'g 630
F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court held that an ordinance enacted pursuant to
Colorado's "home rule" authority did not constitute state action exempting Boulder from anti-
trust scrutiny because the city's action did not promote a clearly articulated state policy. See
Suprene Court Review, Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 59 DEN. L.J. 399 (1982).
6. [1981-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,342 (10th Cir. 1981).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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interstate commerce that must be substantial, not the effect of the defend-
ant's overall business activities. 8
A. Learned Professions Doctrine
Legal rules which have protected certain professions or their practices
from the antitrust laws have been eroding in recent years. For example, the
"learned profession" exemption that insulated lawyers and physicians from
antitrust liability was struck down by the Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar.9 The Supreme Court recently reemphasized its adherence to
the principles espoused in Goldfarb in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society. 0
In Goldfarb, the Court refrained from strictly applying antitrust regula-
tion to lawyers and physicians by recognizing that some "forms of competi-
tion usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical
standards of a profession."" Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
noted in Goldfarb that some professional practices that promote valid health
or welfare goals might be beyond the purview of antitrust enforcement.
12
The same principle was recognized in Mar'copa.' 3 Despite the health profes-
sion's admirable goal of promoting quality health care, the growing volume
of litigation indicates that some practices of the health care industry may be
regulated by antitrust laws.'
4
The customary practice of hospitals allocating staff privileges to physi-
cians who are deemed qualified to use the hospital facility had been unfet-
8. [1981-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,342, at 74,586.
9. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The Court struck down a state bar association's minimum fee
schedule that discouraged price competition among lawyers who examined titles. The opinion
made clear that "certain anticompetitive conduct by lawyers [was] within the reach of the Sher-
man Act .... " Id at 793.
10. 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982). The Court struck down an agreement by two county medical
societies which established maximum fees that participating doctors would accept for services
performed under specified health insurance plans. The Court held the agreement was aper se
violation under the Sherman Act as price fixing. Id at 2475. See also Halper, Arizona v. Mari-
copa County: 4 Stern Antitrust Warning to Healthcare Providers, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Oct.
1982, 38.
11. 421 U.S. at 792 (citing United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336
(1952); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 611-13 (1935)).
12. 421 U.S. at 792.
13. 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982). The Court stated:
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 778 n. 17 (1975), we stated that the "pub-
lic service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular
practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently." See National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978). The price fixing agreements in this case, however, are
not premised on public service or ethical norms. The respondents do not argue, as did
the defendants in Goldfarb and Professional Engineers, that the quality of the professional
service that their members provide is enhanced by the price restraint.
Id at 2475.
14. See generally Borsody, The Antitrust Laws and the Health Industry, 12 AKRON L. REV. 417
(1979); Groseclose, Hospital Privilege Cases." Braving the Dismal Swamp, 26 S.D.L. REv. 1 (1981);
Halper, The Health Care Industy and the Antitrust Laws.- Colhsion Course?, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 17
(1980); Rosoff, Antitrust Laws and the Health Care Industry. New Warriors Into an Old Battle, 23 ST.
Louis U.LJ. 446 (1979). Weller, The Antitrust Swamp.- How Can Healthcare Professionals Avoid It?
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Oct. 1982, 26.
19831 ANTITRUST
tered by antitrust regulation. 15 In recent years, however, disputes between
physicians and hospitals over hospital privileges increasingly have been con-
sidered "in terms of their possible anticompetitive effect."' 6 In fact, recent
antitrust challenges to activities in the health care industry are recognized as
dominating a growing number of antitrust cases and have prompted sugges-
tions that the trend toward antitrust law enforcement in the health care in-
dustry will grow.' 7 Significantly, competition among physicians has been
exacerbated by the increasing number of medical school graduates entering
the health care field,' 8 the spiraling cost of health care, and pressures for a
more efficient health care delivery system.' 9
As physicians become more competitive,2 0 the endorsement conferred
by hospital privileges and hospital referral lists gains importance to doc-
tors. 2' Hospital policies which exclude some physicians but sanction others
may legitimately promote quality medical care, but those policies based
solely on thwarting competition will not go unchallenged. Courts are being
asked to consider the possible anticompetitive effects of staffing decisions
that hospitals once considered to be within their exclusive realm. 2 2 One po-
tential anticompetitive practice stems from a hospital's use of referral lists.
Referral lists contain the names of physicians who are recommended to
treat the specialized needs of hospital emergency room or clinic patients. In
theory, a referral list serves to channel patients only to those physicians sanc-
tioned by the hospital. 23 The Sherman Act 24 offers the remedial measure of
15. Rich, Medical StaffPrwvileges andAntitrust Laws, 2 WHITTIER L. REv. 667 (1980). See also
Goldsmith & Bertolet, The Present Status of hysician Privileges, 1981 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 121.
16. Council of Medical Specialty Societies, EXECUTIVE REPORT, Dec. 1981.
17. As stated in a review of the United States Supreme Court's business law decisions dur-
ing its 1981-82 term: "Drugs and the medical profession received an unusual amount of atten-
tion . . . in the business-related decisions handed down by the 1981-82 U.S. Supreme Court.
Three of the six major antitrust decisions, for example, dealt with the health-care industry." 51
U.S.L.W. 3109 (Aug. 24, 1982). See also Federal Antitnst Regulations' Effects on Medicine Seen Grow-
ing, AMER. MED. NEWS, Oct. 9, 1981, at 12, col. 1; Meadows, Bold Departures in Antitrust, FOR-
TUNE, Oct. 5, 1981, 180-88.
18. US Report Projects Oversuppy of Doctors by 1990, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1980, at A16, col.
1.
19. "The classical model of collegial physician control over health care delivery is being
replaced rapidly by a view of health care providers (institutional as well as individual) as intense
competitors for a limited health care dollar." Norris & Szabo, Communicaton Between the Antitrust
and the Health Law Bars: Appeals for More Effective Dialogue and a New Rule of Reason, 7 AM. J.L. &
MED. i, ii (1981). See also Lave & Lave, Medical Care and Its Delivery: An Economic Appraisal, 35
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 252 (1970).
20. "The prime reason for the increased competition among doctors is a 31% surge in their
numbers, to 437,000 from 334,000 between 1970 and 1978, a period when the population grew
by only 6.4%." Levin, Doctors Sue Hospitalsfor Staff Privileges as Competition Rises, Wall St. J., Sept.
29, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
21. "[I]t has become increasingly necessary for physicians to obtain and retain staff privi-
leges with at least one hospital in order to survive professionally." Goldsmith & Bertolet, supra
note 15, at 121.
22. Calvani & James, Antitrust Law and the Practice afMedine, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 75 (1980).
23. Hospital staff privileges permit a physician to practice medicine at the hospital, while
referral lists contain names of some, but perhaps not all, of the physicians who have been
awarded staff privileges.
For a discussion of tactics physicians may use to thwart competition among themselves, see
Note, Application of the Antitrust Laws to Anticompetitive Activities by Physicians, 30 RUTGERS L. REv.
991, 1006-09 (1977).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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treble damages to physicians who believe that the omission of their names
from referral lists unreasonably restrains competition. It was in this setting
that the case of Mishler v. St. Anthony's Hospital Systems 25 arose.
In Mish/er, Denver neurosurgeon Alan J. Mishler believed that his emer-
gency neurosurgery practice had been restrained by a local hospital, which
excluded his name from its referral list. The neurosurgeon filed suit against
one of the region's largest trauma hospitals and its emergency room direc-
tor,26 alleging that the defendants had conspired to destroy competition
2 7
and to monopolize 28 neurosurgery in Colorado and nearby states.
The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, con-
cluding that the neurosurgeon had failed to establish that the alleged con-
spiracy diminished interstate commerce. 29 Therefore, the lower court held,
the challenged activities did not invoke the federal antitrust laws.
B. Local Bustness Actilities, Interstate Commerce, and the Required Nexus
Since the expansion of the commerce power in the 1940's, it has been
difficult for most businesses, including community-oriented ones, to escape
the reach of the Sherman Act.30 The Supreme Court has expressed a liberal
policy in determining Sherman Act jurisdiction. "[I]f it is interstate com-
merce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which
25. [1981-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,342 (10th Cir. 1981).
26. Id. at 74,585.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). This key section of the Sherman Act, which remains substan-
tially unchanged since its enactment in 1890, requires concerted activity between two or more
persons before a restraint on trade can be found. Section I provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be guilty of a
felony ....
28. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 2 defines three separate crimes: monopolization, combi-
nation and conspiracy to monopolize, and attempts to monopolize. The distinction between
section 1 and section 2 is that section 1 requires concerted action, whereas section 2 may be
violated unilaterally.
Section 2 provides: "Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony ....
29. [1981-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) [ 64,342, at 74,585 (10th Cir. 1981).
30. Congress had a narrow view of its power under the commerce clause when it passed the
Sherman Act in 1890. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1890).
The Supreme Court shared the view that the power underlying the commerce clause was
limited. In the first antitrust case considered by the Supreme Court, United States v. E. C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), the Court narrowly interpreted the term "interstate commerce"
by ruling that manufacturing did not impinge upon interstate commerce activities. In that
decision, the Court found that a monopoly of the sugar refining industry related only to local
manufacturing activities and therefore was not subject to the Sherman Act, despite the refiner's
importation of raw materials and shipment of sugar out of state. This decision was overruled by
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
The limited construction of interstate commerce was put to rest in Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942). The Court expanded its interpretation of interstate commerce by finding that
raising wheat, even though intended for the farm family's consumption, was within the congres-
sional commerce power because it affected the wheat supply and distribution throughout the
nation.
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applies the squeeze." 3 1 Hospitals, which primarily serve intrastate needs,
have now fallen within the ambit of antitrust regulations because of this
judicial enlargement of the commerce power.
32
Historically, hospitals have been labelled "local" businesses having an
insignificant impact on. interstate commerce. Without a significant nexus
with interstate commerce to trigger federal antitrust jurisdiction, hospitals
have not fallen prey to the scrutiny of federal antitrust statutes. As a result,
until 1976, most courts had refused to find an implicating nexus between
interstate commerce and hospital decisions regarding staff privileges. 33 The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals acquiesced in this national hesitancy to in-
voke the commerce connection when it held that the decision by two
Oklahoma hospitals to deny staff privileges had a mere "insubstantial effect
upon interstate commerce." '34 But a year later, the United States Supreme
Court in Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital35 relaxed the showing
of "substantial effects" on interstate commerce which the Tenth Circuit and
other federal appellate panels had required for jurisdiction in medical anti-
trust cases.
36
In its ruling in Hospital Building, the Supreme Court pointed out that
the local acts of the hospital may have a substantial effect upon interstate
commerce for the purpose of establishing federal antitrust jurisdiction.
37
31. United States v. Women's Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
32. See Fried & Rabinowitz, Antitrut May Pose New Legal Issues for Hospitals, HOSPITALS,
June 1, 1982, at 66. See also supra note 14.
The commerce power is found in the U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. An antitrust plaintiff
may establish the necessary connection with interstate commerce in one of two ways: by dem-
onstrating that the challenged anticompetitive activity occurred in interstate commerce or by
showing that the activity, although wholly intrastate, had a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
33. The Supreme Court skirted the issue of whether professional services such as the prac-
tice of medicine fell under the umbrella of "trade or commerce." In 1952, the Court endorsed a
district court's conclusion that the sale of medical services did not fall within the scope of trade
or commerce of the Sherman Act. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326
(1952). For other decisions which denied relief under the antitrust laws for lack of a "substan-
tial effect" on interstate commerce in the health care industry, see Riggall v. Washington
County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1958); Spears
Free Clinic and Hosp. v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952); Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Rich-
ardson, 167 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. Ark. 1958), afd, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
884 (1959). But see Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973).
34. Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episcopal-Memorial Medical Center, 513 F.2d 684, 687 (10th
Cir. 1975). See also Note, The Medtcal Profession and the Sherman Act.- Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episco-
pal-Memorial Medical Center, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 196.
35. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
36. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episcopal-Memorial Medical
Center, 513 F.2d 684, 687 (10th Cir. 1975) ruled that allegedly illegal conduct must have a
substantial effect upon interstate commerce to invoke federal jurisdiction under the antitrust
laws. This decision conformed with earlier pronouncements by the court that "[t]o come within
the purview of the Sherman Act the restraint of commerce or the obstruction of commerce must
be direct and substantial and not merely indirect or remote." Spears Free Clinic and Hosp. v.
Cleere, 197 F.2d 125, 126 (10th Cir. 1952). The Supreme Court upheld the "substantial effects"
test in Hospital Building, but relaxed the criteria necessary to establish substantial effects. Thus,
both Wolf and Spears Free Clinic followed prior decisions which rejected arguments that an alle-
gation that antitrust activities reduced the flow of patients from out-of-state could meet the
"substantial effects" test. The Court, however, in Hospital Building looked to that very factor in
finding that the defendants' activities had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
37. The Court held that a local hospital could complain of efforts made by the defendants
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The decision in Hospital Building set the tone for courts to extend the reach of
the Sherman Act to hospital activities. Despite federal court opinions to the
contrary, 38 the Supreme Court in Hospital Building decided that the plaintiff
had shown a substantial connection with interstate commerce even if no re-
straints purposely directed towards interstate commerce were shown. 39 The
Court was satisfied that a sufficient contact with interstate commerce existed
through allegations that the hospital purchased eighty percent of its supplies
outside the state, treated a "substantial" number of out-of-state patients, re-
ceived significant revenues from out-of-state insurance companies and fed-
eral health programs, and was financially tied to an out-of-state parent
corporation and a lending institution.
40
The elimination of the "direct and purposeful" effects test on interstate
commerce was reinforced by the Court's decision four years later in McLain v.
Real Estate Board.4 1 In McLain, the Court concluded that purely local busi-
ness restraints invoked the Sherman Act's jurisdiction. 42 This holding seem-
ingly rejected the narrower view that the alleged violation itself must impact
interstate commerce, and suggested that Sherman Act jurisdiction could be
invoked if the defendant's general business activities had an effect upon in-
terstate commerce. 43 The McLain decision paved the way for a Tenth Cir-
cuit reversal on rehearing en banc of its initial decision in Crane v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 44 denying Sherman Act jurisdiction for alleged
antitrust violations similar to those complained of by Dr. Mishler.
In Crane, a pathologist alleged that the defendants had restrained his
practice at a hospital they owned. A Tenth Circuit three-judge panel origi-
nally held that the complaint did not invoke antitrust jurisdiction because of
its failure to show the substantial effect of the defendants' activities on inter-
state commerce.45 In light of McLain, 46 the en banc review of Crane found
jurisdiction anchored in the defendants' activities, which paralleled those
to block the hospital's expansion. The district court had dismissed the hospital's complaint on
jurisdictional grounds and the dismissal was upheld by the Fourth Circuit. Hospital Bldg. Co.
v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 511 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
38. Set supra note 33.
39. 425 U.S. at 745.
40. Id at 741.
41. 444 U.S. 232, 242, 246 (1980).
42. The interstate effect on activities was not obvious in MLan. The plaintiffs charged
that the local real estate brokers had conspired to fix prices on the purchase and sale of homes
by an agreement to honor established brokerage commissioned rates. The Court found suffi-
cient effect on interstate commerce because "[u]ltimately, whatever stimulates or retards the
volume of residential sales, or has an impact on the purchase price, affects the demand for
financing and title insurance, those two commercial activities . . . are shown to have occurred
in interstate commerce." 444 U.S. at 246.
The Court accepted as an indication of interstate activities the affidavits that out-of-state
depositors backed local lending institutions who, in turn, financed the sales of local homes; that
mortgages were often insured by federal programs; and that many mortgages were conditioned
on title insurance furnished by interstate corporations.
43. 444 U.S. at 244-45.
44. 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1980) (Breitenstein, J.), rev'don reh'g en bane, 637 F.2d 715, 719
(10th Cir. 1981) (Seymour, J.).
45. 637 F.2d at 718. The Tenth Circuit followed its reasoning used in Wolf v. Jane Phillips
Episcopal-Memorial Medical Center, 513 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1975). See supra text accompany-
ing note 34. For a more complete discussion of Crane, see Antitrust, Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit
Survey, 59 DEN. L.J. 221-23 (1982).
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that had also established the requisite effect on interstate commerce in Hospi-
tal Building.4 7 Receiving medical insurance from out-of-state, treating out-
of-state patients, and buying supplies from out-of-state companies "ade-
quately [met] McLain's call for identification of relevant channels of inter-
state commerce and their relationship to the challenged activities."'4 3 The
Tenth Circuit continued to maintain in Crane that the plaintiff was required
to demonstrate not that the defendants' general business activities had a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce, but that the allegedly illegal activities
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
49
The Tenth Circuit in Mishler, more attuned than in Crane to the ease
with which the Supreme Court established interstate commerce connections,
permitted Dr. Mishler to proceed with his antitrust claim. The suit alleged
that interstate commerce resulted from the defendants' out-of-state medical
insurance payments, out-of-state supply purchases, and treatment of out-of-
state patients.
50
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court's requirement that
the alleged conspiracy must diminish interstate commerce 5' and instead
pinned antitrust jurisdiction to a more provable allegation: the hospital's
illegal activity had occurred within the flow of interstate commerce or had
substantially affected interstate commerce. 52 In its reversal and remand to
the trial court, the Tenth Circuit displayed sensitivity to the language of the
Supreme Court's most recent expansion of Sherman Act jurisdiction through
McLain.
The appellate court in Mishler found that "although Dr. Mishler must
eventually prove a not insubstantial effect on interstate commerce," his com-
plaint had met the requirements of merely identifying the "relevant chan-
nels of interstate commerce and their relationship to the challenged
activities."'53 In remanding the case, the court noted that "even at trial, Dr.
Mishler [was] not required to show that the flow of interstate commerce
[was] diminished; an unreasonable burden on commerce may exist even
though the anticompetitive conduct may increase interstate commerce."
54
In so holding, the court again maintained that the allegedly illegal activities,
rather than the defendants' overall business activity, must substantially af-
46. The Supreme Court decided McLain on the same day the Tenth Circuit panel affirmed
the dismissal of Dr. Crane's complaint. Crane, 637 F.2d at 720.
47. Id at 725 (citing Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 741
(1976)).
48. 637 F.2d at 725.
49. Id at 723-24.
50. Mishler v. St. Anthony's Hosp. Sys., [1981-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 64,342, at 74,586
(10th Cir. 1981).
51. Id at 74,585.
52. Id at 74,586 (citing McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980)).
53. [1981-21 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 74,586.
54. Id. (citing Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Thorofare Markets, Inc., 587 F.2d 127, 132 & n. 14
(3d Cir. 1978); P. MARCUS, ANTITRUST LAw AND PRACTICE 86 (1980)).
After winning the appeal, the plaintiff decided not to return his case to the trial court.
Telephone interview with Sidney W. DeLong, attorney for the plaintiff-appellant Dr. Mishler





Judge Holloway concurred in the opinion but took issue with the rea-
soning used by the court. He noted that the en banc opinion of Crane had
misconstrued the jurisdictional showing required to establish antitrust au-
thority.56 Judge Holloway urged the court to consider the nature of the
defendants' overall business activities, rather than the unlawful conduct of
the defendants' activities, to establish the jurisdictional showing.
57 Although
Judge Holloway agreed that Dr. Mishler's complaint should not have been
dismissed by the lower court, he stated that the Tenth Circuit had deviated
from the intent of McLain by requiring a jurisdictional "showing that the
unlawful conduct itself had an effect on interstate commerce." '58 Commen-
tators, however, have criticized this broad interpretation of McLai'n, under
which a defendant's overall business activities, rather than the challenged
conduct, would be sufficient to invoke federal antitrust jurisdiction if the
activities bore a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
59
The impact of the extension of the Sherman Act to hospitals, which in
the past were shielded from federal antitrust enforcement because of their
"local" or intrastate activities, serves as a warning that the "threat of this
kind of litigation must not be overlooked." 6 The antitrust implications of
the expanded jurisdictional authority resulting from McLain have caused
confusion among the circuits.6 ' A federal judge who presided over a six-year
legal battle between a cardiothoracic surgeon and the Pennsylvania hospital
55. [1981-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) at 74,586.
56. Id (Holloway, J., concurring).
57. Id. (citing McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980)).
58. Id (citing McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 243 (1980)).
59. "Unfortunately, there also is language in McLain which suggests that a plaintiff need
only show that a defendant's total activities, independent of the alleged violation, have a sub-
stantial effect upon interstate commerce-if that language is read outside the context of the full
opinion." Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitst and Hospital Poileges: Testing the Con-
ventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 632 (1982).
The result of such a broad interpretation of McLain would eliminate the interstate com-
merce test from federal antitrust law, according to critics, because virtually all activities, no
matter how local, are likely to have effects on interstate commerce. Id at 632-33.
A number of lower courts have followed the broad interpretation advocated by Judge Hol-
loway. See Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1980); Western Waste Serv. Sys.
v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir.), cert. denid, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Feldman
v. Jackson Memorial Hosp., 509 F. Supp. 815 (S.D. Fla. 1981). The Tenth Circuit has been
consistent in its position that such a broad reading of McLain is improper.
60. Kopit, Gerson & Moses, Hospitals Must Consider Antitrust Implications of Multi-Institutional
Arrangements, 82 HOSPITALS, Mar. 1, 1982.
Antitrust litigation can be long and costly. This is particularly true because the re-
sponsible officers and directors may be subject to civil or criminal liability as a result of
a corporation's anticompetitive activities. The prevailing party might be awarded its
attorney fees, and the amount of the actual damages is tripled in settlements under the
antitrust laws.
Id at 1.
61. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have upheld the dismissal of hospital privilege antitrust
suits on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to meet the interstate commerce requirement. See
Capili v. Shott, 620 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1980); Moles v. Morton F. Plant Hosp., Inc., 617 F.2d
293 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980).
In Cardio-Medical Assoc. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 536 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Pa.
1982), a federal court held that a physician could not establish antitrust jurisdiction by alleging
the hospital had interstate activities. The court rejected the allegation that the hospital's overall
business had a substantial effect on commerce. It also noted that any implied allegation involv-
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that denied him staff privileges said that "Congress did not pass the antitrust
laws in order to ensure that every young surgeon can perform the type and
number of procedures that he considers to be most satisfying."
62
The implication in the Tenth Circuit is that many businesses, once con-
sidered local in nature, will now be vulnerable to antitrust challenges by
plaintiffs whose requisite showing of "substantial effects" on interstate com-
merce is now an easier burden of proof. The impact could be far-reaching
on antitrust defendants because nearly all businesses have some tangential
involvement in interstate commerce. But a more somber message may be
the one suggested by an antitrust scholar who has questioned that "with
interstate connections so readily found, is the insistence upon 'substantial
and adverse' interstate effects . . . but [a] meaningless charade?"
6 3
II. NEw APPLICATION FOR ILLINOIS BRICK
A. Indirect Sellers Equated to Indirect Purchasers
The Tenth Circuit seized an opportunity to extend a recent Supreme
Court doctrine in the appellate court's review of a class action brought by
wheat farmers in Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico. In Ziznser v. Continental
Grain Company,64 the wheat producers claimed six large grain exporters and a
former Department of Agriculture official violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, 65 and sought relief under sections 4 and 12 of the Clayton
Act.6 6 The lawsuits arose from the so called "great grain robbery" involving
ing the payment of patients' medical bills by out-of-state insurance companies and the federal
government would be insufficient grounds to invoke the Sherman Act.
Other courts have embraced the more relaxed interstate commerce test used by the Tenth
Circuit in MirAler. See McDonald v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 524 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Ga. 1981);
Malini v. Singleton & Assoc., 516 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Feldman v. Jackson Memorial
Hosp., 509 F. Supp. 815 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Denver v. Santa Barbara Comm. Dialysis Center,
[1981-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,946 (C.D. Cal. 1981). See also Everhart v. Jane C. Stormont
Hosp., [1982-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,703 (D. Kan. 1982) in which the court relied on the
Tenth Circuit's opinions in Mtshler and in Crane upon the rehearing en banc to find that a
cardiologist who claimed he was denied staff privileges at three Kansas hospitals had alleged
sufficient interstate commerce connections.
62. Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 891 (W.D. Pa. 1981). In Robinson the district
court refused to dismiss the surgeon's antitrust suit against a hospital and a group of cardi-
othoracic surgeons on the basis that the complaint failed to establish the interstate commerce
connection. Id. at 876-77. Yet, the court ultimately held that the hospital had legitimate com-
petitive goals which created valid reasons for preferring certain surgeons over others. Id. at 923-
24.
63. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 133 (3d ed. 1980).
64. 660 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982).
65. See supra notes 27 and 28.
66. Private antitrust actions are brought under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1976 & Supp. V 1981). It provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides. . . without respect to the amount
in controversy and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained in the cost of
the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The court may award. . . simple inter-
est on actual damages ....
Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976) permits venue in suit against a corpo-
ration in a district in which the corporation is not subject to service of process. It provides:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be
brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any
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the sale of over one billion dollars of United States wheat to the Soviet
Union in 1972.67
Edgar W. Cleveland, an Altus, Oklahoma wheat farmer, sought $150
million in damages in the first of three class action suits which listed Conti-
nental Grain Company and its vice president, former Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture, Clarence Palmby, as defendants. 68 Two other farmers, Joe
Zinser of Texas and John Spearman of New Mexico, filed similar class ac-
tion suits which were later consolidated with Cleveland's by order of the
Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation.
69
Cleveland's suit alleged that Palmby conspired with Continental Grain
Company and five other large grain companies to suppress the news of an
impending wheat sale to the Russians. 70 As a result, wheat farmers con-
tended that they sold their grain at prices lower than wheat would have
commanded had the public known about the Russian wheat deal. 71  The
suit charged that Palmby knew when he went to the Soviet Union in 1972 to
negotiate terms for the wheat sale that he was going to leave the agriculture
department for a job with Continental Grain Company.7 2 In subsequent
hearings before the House Livestock and Grain Subcommittee, Palmby re-
futed any conflict of interest and denied that agriculture department officials
had leaked information to Continental enabling the grain company to cover
the Russian orders before a rise in the domestic wheat price.
7 3
The investigation into Palmby "simply faded away for lack of evi-
dence, ' ' 74 but the wheat farmers were not dissuaded from pursuing their
claim under the expansive remedial treble damages provision of the antitrust
laws. 75 During discovery, however, a fatal flaw in the class action suits was
disclosed.
Most of the class members in the suit had sold their wheat to "middle-
district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases
may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
67. Langway & Gram, The Big Five, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 4, 1975, at 59.
68. Continental Grain Got Soviet Wheat Order 3 Days Before the US-Russia Grain Accord, Wall St.
J., Sept. 20, 1972, at 2, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Continental Grain Order].
69. In re Wheat Farmers' Antitrust Class Action Litigation, 366 F. Supp. 1087 (J.P.M.D.L.
1973). The three class action suits were:
Cleveland v. Palmby, in which named plaintiff Edgar W. Cleveland represented a class of
approximately 43,000 Oklahoma wheat farmers. In addition to Continental and Palmby, five
other grain companies were named as defendants.
Zinser v. Palmby, in which named plaintiff Joe Zinser represented a class of approximately
12,000 wheat farmers in 34 counties in the Panhandle and northern Texas.
Spearman v. Palmby, in which named plaintiffJohn Spearman represented between 600
and 1,500 wheat farmers in Curry County, New Mexico.
Continental Grain Co. and Palmby were named as defendants in all three suits.
70. Continental Grain Order, supra note 68, at 2.
71. Id.
72. Oklahoma Farmer Sues 6 Firmsfor 1150 Million in Russian Wheat Sale, Wall St. J., Oct. 25,
1972, at 4, col. 2.
73. Askey, Conflict-of-Interest Laws Face Review in Grain Deal, Rocky Mountain News, Oct. 16,
1972, at 4, col. 3.
74. Id
75. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976) refers to antitrust laws which include the Sher-




men" such as farmer-owned cooperatives and county grain elevators. Those
middlemen, in turn, sold the grain either to one of the defendant companies
or to someone else in the distribution chain.76 Documents obtained during
the discovery process showed that very few wheat farmers had dealt directly
with the named defendants in their suits. For example, the trial court found
that less than 100 farmers among the 43,000 Oklahoma wheat producers
represented in the Cleveland suit sold directly to Continental Grain Com-
pany. Only 212 of the 12,000 farmers represented in Zinser's suit and sixty-
two members of the Spearman class of between 600 and 1,500 New Mexico
farmers dealt directly with the company.
77
The wheat farmers' nine-year litigation was punctuated by a Supreme
Court decision which diminished the possibility of recovery by the wheat
producers. Illinois Brick Co. v. Ilhinois78 precluded the claims of indirect pur-
chasers, those who bought from middlemen rather than directly from the
named defendants.
For many antitrust law scholars, llinois Brick came as no surprise. In
light of the Court's unanimous decision nearly a decade earlier in Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machiney Corp. 79 the Court in Illinois BrIck either had
to approve or overrule Hanover's rejection of the defensive pass-on theory for
illegal overcharges to indirect purchasers. 80
In Hanover Shoe, the plaintiff shoe manufacturer alleged the defendant's
lease arrangement of its shoe manufacturing equipment created a monopoly
which resulted in illegal "overcharges.""' In defense, the defendant United
Shoe Machinery (United) asserted that Hanover Shoe suffered no legal in-
jury because it had passed on the illegal overcharges to shoe customers.
8 2
The thrust of United's argument was that indirect purchasers, rather than
direct purchasers, had been injured, and that Hanover Shoe could not re-
cover for their injury. The Court rejected this defense, but was faced with
the flip side of the argument in Ilhnois Brick.
The plaintiffs in Illinois Brick included the state of Illinois and 700 local
municipalities who sued a concrete block manufacturer. s 3 The plaintiffs did
not buy the concrete blocks directly from the manufacturer, but purchased
them through building contractors once the blocks were incorporated into
76. Zinser, 660 F.2d at 757.
77. Id at 758.
78. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
79. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). This case resulted from the lease system United Shoe Machinery
Corp. (United) used in marketing its shoe manufacturing equipment. Hanover Shoes, Inc.
(Hanover) brought an antitrust action for treble damages against United. Hanover claimed
that United leased, but refused to sell, its shoe manufacturing equipment to Hanover. Hanover
alleged the lease arrangement created a monopoly and, in addition, an illegal overcharge re-
sulted from the difference between what Hanover paid for its machine rentals and what it
would have paid had United been willing to sell its machines.
80. The Court decided to accept Hanover because to set it aside would "cut back or aban-
don" precedent and thus forget the hallowed doctrine of stare decisis in the "area of statutory
construction where Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation." 431
U.S. at 736.
81. 392 U.S. at 483-84.
82. Id at 488.
83. 431 US. at 726
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the masonry structure.8 4 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had fixed
prices and as a result, illegal overcharges were passed on through the middle-
men for the plaintiffs to bear.
85
The Supreme Court held that, having rejected the defensive use of the
pass-on theory of illegal overcharges in Hanover Shoe, it was required to reject
the plaintiffs' effort to invoke the pass-on theory offensively.8 6 The Court
ruled that direct purchasers may have had a cause of action, but the plain-
tiffs, as indirect purchasers, did not.
8 7
The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, relying on the
Supreme Court's analysis in Illinois Brick, laid to rest any notion of recovery
by the wheat farmers, who were by then considered "indirect" sellers. 88 The
three class representatives, Cleveland, Zinser, and Spearman, had not sold
wheat directly to any of the defendants. In fact, not more than 366 farmers
in all three classes had direct dealings with the defendants.8 9 The trial court
dismissed the actions "without prejudice." 90
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to determine whether
the principles of Illinois Brick were properly applied to indirect sellers in the
wheat farmers' suits. Judge McWilliams, writing for the court, traced the
progeny of Hanover Shoe9 1 and concluded that "[f]rom Ilh'nois Brick, we
learn[ed] that in an antitrust treble damage case involving price-fixing the
plaintiff must have dealt directly with the alleged violator."'9 2 Although the
plaintiff farmers were indirect sellers, and not indirect purchasers as in Illinois
Brick, the court found that this distinction did not preclude application of
the Illinois Brick rule to the wheat farmers' allegations that the depressed
wheat prices were passed along by middlemen.
93
The Tenth Circuit found support for its position in the Fifth Circuit,
which had applied the general rule of Ilhnois Brick to a situation similar to
84. Id
85. Id at 727.
86. Id at 730-46.
One of the major concerns expressed by the Court was the difficulty in tracing damages.
The Court believed the judiciary would face an insurmountable task if called upon to trace and
apportion damages. Id at 740-41. Another concern was the possibility of duplicate recovery by
exposing the antitrust defendant to treble damage suits instigated by a multitude of both indi-
rect and direct purchaser plaintiffs. Id at 730-31.
87. Id at 746-47. The private treble damage actions brought by masonry contractors, gen-
eral contractors, and private builders ultimately were settled. Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536
F.2d 1163, 1164 (7th Cir. 1976).
88. Zinser, 660 F.2d at 758.
89. Id
90. The trial court later amended its order to provide that the claims of all members who
did not sell directly to any defendant were dismissed with prejudice, and that the claims of those
who did sell directly to a defendant were dismissed without prejudice. Id at 759.
The Tenth Circuit court considered the appeal of a second group of wheat farmers seeking
class action certification in In re Wheat Farmers Antitrust Class Action Litigation No. II, No.
81-1745 (10th Cir. Sept. 3, 1981). The wheat producers appealed the district court's refusal to
certify their cases as class actions pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23. The Tenth Circuit dismissed
the appeal and held that the district court's order denying certification to the plaintiffs was
neither final nor appealable. In re Wheat Farmers', No. 81-1745, slip op. at 4.
91. Zinser, 660 F.2d at 759.




that of the wheat farmers. In re Beef Industyr Antitrust Litigation94 was a suit in
which cattlemen alleged that retail food chains had conspired to depress the
prices they paid to meat packers for beef, with the packers presumably pass-
ing those lower prices back to the cattlemen. The Fifth Circuit held that the
plaintiff sellers, who were ranchers or cattle feeders, had no right to recover
in an antitrust action against the defendant retail food chains unless the
plaintiffs had dealt directly with the food chains. 95
The line of cases upon which the Tenth Circuit relied to preclude the
wheat farmers' recovery has been criticized as displaying insensitivity by per-
mitting the wrong people to recover damages.9 6 Legislation to overrule the
Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick has been introduced, but has
failed. 97
The "bizarre result" of llfinois Brick and its progeny, as one commenta-
tor has suggested, is that the direct purchaser or seller of a monopolist may
have a cause of action to sue for the monopolist's under- or overcharge, while
the consumer who actually bears the brunt of that illegal charge has no right
of recovery. 98 This rule, if used to insulate the monopolist, would be an
94. 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Meat Price
Investigators Ass'n, 449 U.S. 905 (1980).
95. Although the ranchers in In re BeefIndustry Antitrust Litatton were permitted to recover
damages because they fell within a narrow exception to Illinois Brck4, no such exception was
found in the wheat growers' case. That exception recognized that if the plaintiffs had a pre-
existing cost-plus contract with the middlemen, then the plaintiffs would have a cause of action
against the defendants with whom they had had no direct dealings. The exception was first
recognized in Hanover Shoe where there was "an overcharged buyer [who] has a pre-existing
'cost-plus' contract, thus making it easy to prove that he has not been damaged .. .." Hano-
ver Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968). The Court in llinois Brick
mentioned that another exception might be permitted where the direct purchaser is owned or
controlled by its customer. 431 U.S. at 736 n.16.
The pre-existing cost-plus contract found by the Fifth Circuit arose from the practice of the
middlemen, the meat packers, applying a set formula to a "Yellow Sheet" reflecting the defend-
ants' wholesale beef prices. This formula determined the price meat packers would pay the
plaintiffs for their cattle. The Tenth Circuit found no comparable cost-plus contract to enable
it to find that the wheat producers fell within an exception to the application of the Illinois Brick
rule.
The Tenth Circuit indicated that it could apply exceptions to Illinois Brick sparingly:
"[E]xceptions to Illinois Brick are exceedingly narrow in scope, and we believe, should be few in
number. . . . [A]ny exception should not be given an expansive application, lest it swallow the
rule and become the rule itself." Zinser, 660 F.2d at 761.
96. See, e.g., Carrafiello, A Search for Symmet1r. The "Pass-on "Issue in Quest of Determination, 24
ANTITRUST BULL. 187 (1979); Watson, Bad Economics in the Antitrust Courtroom: Illinois Brick and
the Stngle "Pass-on" Problem, 9, No. 4 ANTITRUST L. & EcON. REV. 69 (1977).
97. A bill that would permit indirect purchasers to sue for antitrust damages was backed
by consumer groups and introduced as S. 598, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). The bill was re-
ported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee by a bare nine-to-eight margin, but failed on the
floor. Legislative attempts to overturn Illinois Brick have continued, but to this date have not
been successful. The main criticism of the proposed legislation is that it would burden the
courts and possibly result in double liability for defendants.
98. Watson, supra note 96, at 76. But see Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621
F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980) (Ilhnois Brick's concern with possible multiple damage recovery against
price-fixers did not bar suit for treble damages by printing company against manufacturer
where "middleman" was the wholesaling division of another manufacturer); Fontana Aviation,
Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1980). (Illinois Brick did not apply where
manufacturer and middlemen were both alleged to be co-conspirators in a common illegal en-
terprise with intended injury to buyer); Dart Drug Corp. v. Corning Glass Works, 480 F. Supp.
1091 (D. Md. 1979). (Illinois Brick did not bar recovery, even though plaintiff was not a direct
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anathema to the intent of antitrust laws, enacted to combat the inequities
resulting when farmers, shippers, and other suppliers have been overcharged
and underpaid. 99 However, in opting to stand firmly with Illinois Brick in
the wheat farmers' suit, the Tenth Circuit has maintained a policy consistent
with that expressed in Illinois Brick, thereby recognizing and addressing the
concerns expressed by the Supreme Court.
III. THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
In Pueblo Aircraft Service, Inc. v. City of Pueblo,1° ° the court declined to
impose antitrust liability on the defendant because of a state statute which
set forth state policy regarding municipal operation of airports, thereby im-
munizing the municipality against antitrust claims regarding that opera-
tion.' The court, in affirming the district court's grant of the city of
Pueblo's motion for summary judgment, paid particular attention to the
Supreme Court's reversal of its decision in Community Communications Co., Inc.
v. City of Boulder.
102
In Pueblo Aircraft, the city of Pueblo had assumed the exclusive responsi-
bility for the local airport and its operation, including the maintenance of
hangars and storage of aviation fuel, after acquiring the facility from the
federal government in 1948. The plaintiff, Pueblo Aircraft, ran an aviation
refueling, repairing, and storage business, called a fixed-base operation, at
the city-owned airport. When Pueblo Aircraft's lease at Pueblo's municipal
airport expired, the city awarded the bid for the lease to another fixed-base
operator. Pueblo Aircraft filed suit against the city under section 1 of the
Sherman Act103 and section 3 of the Clayton Act,' ° 4 alleging that the city
purchaser from the manufacturer. The court permitted recovery because the plaintiffs injury
was not based on any overcharge that had been passed on to it by entities between it and the
manufacturer).
99. H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 143-44 (1955).
100. 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 762 (1983).
101. COLO. REV. STAT. § 41-4-101 (1973) provides:
The acquisition of any lands for the purpose of establishing airports or other air navi-
gation facilities; the acquisition of airport protection privileges; the acquisition, estab-
lishment, construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipment, and
operation of airports and other air navigation facilities; and the exercise of any other
powers granted in this part I to any county, city and county, city or town are hereby
declared to be public governmental functions. . . for a public purpose, and matters of
public necessity; and such lands and other property, easements, and privileges ac-
quired and used in the manner and for the purposes enumerated in this part I are
hereby declared to be acquired and used for public purposes and as a matter of public
necessity.
102. 455 U.S. 40 (1982). See supra note 5.
103. See supra note 27.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976). This section is explicitly limited to exclusive dealing restraints
upon customers by suppliers. It provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce. . to lease or make a sale
or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other com-
modities . . . for use, consumption, or resale within the United States . . . or fix a
price charge therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition,
agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal
in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a com-
petitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
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violated antitrust laws by stipulating in its lease agreement with the fixed-
base operators that they buy aviation fuel from the city.
The district court found that Pueblo's home rule status 0 5 exempted it
from antitrust law as a result of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion
in Community Communications Co. 106 That decision held that the constitutional
delegation of powers to the city in local matters through its home rule status
conferred the status of state action on a Boulder ordinance.
Nevertheless, as if divining that the Supreme Court would poke a hole
in the Tenth Circuit's ruling, the district court "alternatively relied on a
specific statutory authorization granted to the city as a further ground for its
immunity determination."'' 0 7 This alternative rationale relieved the appel-
late panel from re-engaging in the analysis it had undertaken a year earlier
in Communit Communications Co. in order to conclude that the municipality
had license to avoid antitrust penalty.
The tenor of the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Pueblo Aircraft suggested a
paternalistic approach towards the right of local municipalities to manage
their own affairs unencumbered by federal intervention. The enabling legis-
lation found in the Colorado statute 0 8 gave the Tenth Circuit the modicum
of comfort it needed to find that Pueblo's actions were immune from anti-
trust intervention, yet in accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in
Community Communications Co.
The key distinction between the Pueblo Aircraft permitted activity and
the illegal one in Community Communications Co. was that Pueblo's operation of
its airport was in furtherance of a clearly articulated state policy,' 0 9 while
Boulder's ordinance was not. "o Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in
the five-to-three decision of Community Communications Co., said that for a mu-
nicipality to invoke antitrust immunity, the challenged activity must consti-
The allegation of this violation was intended to assail the city's lease agreement, which
required the fixed-based operators to purchase the aviation fuel they sold from the city. This
practice is commonly known as a tying arrangement.
105. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 gives cities in Colorado with a population of at least 2,000
people the power to adopt a charter authorizing the city to enact legislation in matters of local
concern. The constitution provides:
From and after the certifying to and filing with the secretary of state of a charter
framed and approved in reasonable conformity with the provisions of this article, such
city or town and the citizens thereof shall have. . . all other powers necessary, requi-
site or proper for the government and administration of its local and municipal mat-
ters .. ..
Id
106. Community Communications Co;, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.
1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). The appellate court held in Community Commvurnalions Co. that
the city of Boulder, which was a home rule city, had taken actions tantamount to the powers of
the state in Boulder's regulation of the cable television. For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's
opinion in this case, see Antitrust, Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 58 DEN. LJ. 249, 255-64
(1981).
107. Pueblo Aircraft, 679 F.2d at 807.
108. See supra note 101.
109. 679 F.2d at 808.
110. "The relationship of the [state of Colorado to Boulder's moratorium ordinance is one
of precise neutrality." Community Communcations Co., 455 U.S. at 55.
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tute the action of the state itself in its sovereign capacity, I tI or implement a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy."' 112
Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the involvement of a govern-
mental agency is not automatically sufficient to trigger the state action im-
munity;" 3 rather, the courts must find that the state has stamped its
approval on the anticompetitive behavior through legislative authoriza-
tion. 14 Further, the existence of such state authorization and policy must
apparently be derived from statutes.1 1 5 The Tenth Circuit sanctioned
Pueblo's activities by reference to the statute's express declaration that the
operation of the airport facilities was "to be [a] public governmental [func-
tion], exercised for a public purpose, and matters of public necessity."' 16
The Tenth Circuit, reproved by the Supreme Court in Community Com-
municaltons Co. for relying on a state position "of mere neutrality respecting the
municipal actions challenged as anticompetitive," '" 7 emphasized the legisla-
tive ratification of Pueblo's airport operations activity. The Colorado statute
authorizing the operation of municipal airports provided the affirmatively
expressed state policy necessary to exempt Pueblo's actions from the federal
antitrust laws.
The clear impression left in the wake of Community Communications Co. is
that municipalities, in order to operate governmental business uninhibited
111. Id at 52 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
In Parker, the California Agricultural Proration Act mandated that raisin growers partici-
pate in a marketing scheme that appeared to violate the antitrust laws by maintaining prices
and restricting competition. The Supreme Court held that the antitrust laws were not intended
to reach activity required by the state. The Court noted that the legislative history of the Sher-
man Act contained no suggestion of Congress' intent to restrain state action; the Act was di-
rected towards individuals and corporations. The action of the state was held to be a valid act
of government. 317 U.S. at 350-52. Thus, the Parker defense protects individuals and associa-
tions that engage in anticompetitive conduct mandated by the state.
The defense may be invoked only where the restraining regulation has been promulgated
by the state action in its sovereign capacity; the mandate must be of an "active government."
The "state action" defense is inapplicable to ministerial regulation, that is, where the state is
acting in its advisory capacity. Whether a formal governmental approval reaches the level of a
state command is contingent upon the state's role in formulating the restraint, its interest
therein, and the nature of the state's action. There has long been debate over the precise scope
of this defense. See, e.g., Posner, The Proper Relationshop Between State Regulation and the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1974); Note, Federal Antitrust Policy v. State Anticompetitive
Regulaton: A Means Scrutiny Linit for Parker v. Brown, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 179.
112. 455 U.S. at 52; see City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389
(1978), which narrowed the ruling in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Lafayette, the
Court held that a city was a "person" covered by the antitrust laws and could be sued for treble
damages for violating antitrust laws in its operation of a municipal utility. The opinion indi-
cated that the doctrine of state action immunity does not exempt all governmental entities
simply by reason of their status as such. When the state itself has not directed or authorized an
anticompetitive practice, the state's subdivisions must obey the antitrust laws.
113. See supra note I11.
114. Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); Califor-
nia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); New Motor
Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
115. Cf P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 130 (3d ed. 1980). Professor Areeda points out
that those statutes providing guidance for state authorization may be "far from explicit on the
point." Id.
116. Pueblo Aircraft, 679 F.2d at 811.
117. 455 U.S. at 55 (emphasis in original).
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by federal antitrust regulations, must be protected by virtue of express state
sanctions, such as statutory provisions. 18 The Tenth Circuit, sensitive to the
possibility that denial of antitrust immunity will impede cities in executing
local government programs and unduly burden federal courts, can likely be
expected to search state statutes for authorization of local government
activities.
IV. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ANTITRUST VIOLATORS
An issue of national interest in antitrust litigation is contribution among
antitrust defendants. The Tenth Circuit considered this question in a peti-
tion for rehearing en banc in Olson Farms, Inc. v. Countyside Farms, Inc. (Olson
II). 119 In its reconsideration of a decision rendered by a Tenth Circuit
panel nearly a year earlier, the appellate court followed the recent unani-
mous ruling by the Supreme Court, Texas Industries, Inc. v. RadcifMaterals,
Inc. ,120 which denied contribution among antitrust co-conspirators.
At common law, contribution among joint wrongdoers was not permit-
ted where the tort was an intentional one.1 2 ' Accordingly, a number of
lower federal courts have denied contribution among antitrust defendants
because Congress has not created a statute allowing recovery from co-con-
spirators. However, the Eighth Circuit in 1978 held that contribution was
118. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor, dissented in
Communi y Communications Co. and said that the majority's decision will "impede, if not paralyze,
local governments' efforts to enact ordinances and regulations aimed at protecting public
health, safety, and welfare." Id at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist maintained
that the Court's ruling "effectively destroys the 'home rule' movement in this country, through
which local governments have obtained, not without persistent state opposition, a limited au-
tonomy over matters of local concern." Id at 71.
Sen. Strom Thurmond, R-S.C., Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman, held a hearing on
June 30, 1982, to determine what, if any, legislative response was appropriate to the Supreme
Court's rejection of state action immunity for home rule municipalities after Community Communi
cations Co. Representatives of local government expressed concern that the uncertainties created
by Community Communications Co. would impede governmental policies and result in expensive
litigation.
William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, said the
Administration had not reached a conclusion that legislation would be an appropriate response
to local governments' concerns. Mr. Baxter said that when municipal conduct unreasonably
restrains commercial competition, there may be strong policies in favor of applying the antitrust
laws, absent a statewide policy to replace competition with regulation or monopoly public serv-
ice. The Justice Department would not seek criminal indictments against municipal officials
when the legality of their conduct was uncertain or openly undertaken without intent to violate
antitrust laws. 549 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 5-6 (July 6, 1982).
The concern that the Supreme Court's ruling would impede cities in executing local gov-
ernmental programs was addressed by a bill introduced into the Colorado Legislature which
would have exempted local governments from antitrust liability. H.B. 1238, 53d Gen. Assem-
bly, 2d Sess. (1982). This bill, along with H.R.J. Res. 1016, 53d Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1982),
introduced by Rep. Claire Traylor, R-Wheatridge, was postponed indefinitely.
119. No. 78-1773 (10th Cir., Nov. 8, 1979),petion on reh'g en bane (10th Cir., June 30, 1981).
120. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
121. See, e.g., Cirace, A Game Theoretic Anaysis of Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust
Treble Damage Suits, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 42 (1980); Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, Contribution
Among Antitrust Defendants.- A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J. L. & ECON. 331 (1980); Floyd,
Contribution Among Antitrust Violators. A Question of Legal Process , 1980 B.Y.U. L. REv. 183; Polin-
sky & Shavell, Contribution and Claim Redution Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis, 33
STAN. L. REV. 447 (1981); Sullivan, New Perspectives in Antitrust Litigation: Towards a Right of
Comparattie Contribution, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 389.
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available in antitrust suits under certain circumstances.' 22 The Tenth and
Fifth Circuits have held otherwise.' 23 In Texas Industries, the Court found
that neither federal statutory law nor federal common law permitted it to
fashion a right of contribution. 124 The Tenth Circuit, following this reason-
ing, ruled in Olson II that in the absence of any statutory provision permit-
ting damages contribution in antitrust cases, the antitrust violator has no
right to seek contribution from alleged co-conspirators.1
25
The appeal in Olson II concerned the question of contribution for dam-
ages incurred as a result of continued antitrust violations. Olson If was a
companion case to Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (Olson ) .126 0 lson
Ii's appeal concerned the district court's dismissal of Olson Farm's cross-
claim against Egg Products Co., Snow White Egg Co., Countryside Farms,
Inc., and a third-party complaint against Safeway Stores, Inc., for contribu-
tion or indemnity. The Tenth Circuit, with Judge Holloway concurring
only in the denial of indemnity, found that an antitrust defendant cannot
obtain contribution towards treble damage liability, and as a result, the egg
distributor found to have conspired with other distributors to fix prices paid
to egg producers was not entitled to contribution from co-conspirators who
were not defendants.1
2 7
In the Olson I case, Olson Farms' role as an "intentional" tortfeasor dis-
couraged the court from creating a right to contribution. 28 The Tenth Cir-
cuit, in Olson I, in declining to fashion contribution rules, held that "the
Congress. . .is in a far superior and more appropriate position to gauge the
impact on observance and enforcement of the antitrust laws from contribu-
tion and its various facets of implementation."' 29 This year, the Senate has
122. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th
Cir. 1979).
123. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979),
afdsub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); Olson Farms,
Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir. 1979). The federal
courts have recognized the fairness of the right to contribution in other areas of law and have
acted to permit such claims. See, e.g., Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S.
106, 111 (1974) (admirality); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951) (federal tort
claim); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978
(1975) (aviation law).
In de Hass v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), afdin part, rev'dtn
part on other grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970), the court allowed contribution among
intentional wrongdoers, although the statute did not specifically provide for it in this securities
case. The court expressed the opinion that there was a policy that contribution was part of the
regulatory framework of the securities laws, whether or not specifically stated in the statute.
124. 451 U.S. 630, 647 (1981).
125. No. 78-1773, slip op. at 3-4.
126. [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,995 (10th Cir. 1979). Olson Farms was found liable
for damages, but only an injunction was issued against another co-defendant, Oakdell Egg
Farms, Inc. The jury verdict was affirmed in Cackling Acres, Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541
F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
In Olson I, an antitrust conspiracy was alleged to exist between Olson Farms and Oakdell
Egg Farms, Inc. to fix prices and monopolize egg buying from fourteen egg producers. Olson
Farms was held liable for damages, but Oakdell Farms escaped damage liability.
127. No. 78-1773, slip op. at 3-4
128. Olson Farms was found guilty of conspiring to monopolize by persuading egg produ-
cers to sell eggs at low prices to the co-conspirators. Olson Farms paid a judgment of more than
$2,400,000, including interest. [1979-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) at 79,700 n.3.
129. Id at 79,704.
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hammered out a contribution bill to "provide for contribution of damages
attributable to an agreement by two or more persons to fix, maintain, or
stabilize prices under section 4, 4(a), or 4(c) of the Clayton Act."'
3 0
This Senate bill, the "Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act," is designed to
"rationalize the process of allocating damages in an antitrust price-fixing
suit, so that price-fixers will pay their fair share of any damages awarded and
so that businesses which find themselves in the midst of a price-fixing suit are
not left responsible for the liability caused by another's wrongdoing."13
The passage of this legislation to permit the contribution among antitrust
defendants will resolve the conflict between the Tenth and other circuits and
will "end the abuse of 'whipsaw tactics' by relieving a defendant of the lia-
bility attributable to the defendants who settle and by allowing the defend-
ant to seek contribution from those conspirators who do not settle, or are not
sued by the plaintiff."
13 2
V. CASE DIGESTS
In King & King Enterprises v. Champhn Petroleum Co. ,33 the Tenth Circuit
upheld a district court's determination of a statute of limitations issue. The
trial court had concluded that evidence indicating that the defendant oil
company actively tried to hide its collusive price-fixing activities was fraudu-
lent concealment as a matter of law.' 34 The appellate court affirmed this
conclusion, holding that the inherently self-concealing nature of price fixing
was not a matter for the jury to determine in connection with the statute of
limitations. The defendant had contended on appeal that most of the plain-
tiff's allegations of illegal price fixing were barred by the four-year statute of
limitations stipulated in the Clayton Act.'
3 5
The appellate court recognized that although the issue of fraudulent
concealment was ordinarily one for the jury, the evidence indicated that the
defendant gasoline retailer's covert collusion with others to set gasoline prices
did not put the plaintiff on inquiry of the defendant's price-fixing
activities. 136
In Montreal Trading Ltd v. Amax Inc. ,"37 the court denied standing to a
Canadian commodities firm that never bought potash from the American
potash producers it sued. The Tenth Circuit ruled that a nonpurchaser who
had not dealt with producers of potash did not have standing to sue for an
alleged price-fixing conspiracy. The court found the injury to the Canadian
commodities trading firm was too remote and too speculative to confer
130. S. 995, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
131. S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982).
132. Id. at 3.
133. 657 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1981),cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982) (White, J, dissenting).
134. 657 F.2d at 1155-56.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976). This section requires that antitrust actions be commenced
within four years of the date the cause of action was filed. The plaintiff filed its complaint on
Oct. 2, 1975; and the defendant "maintained that ... the plaintiff's claims [which] arose prior
to Oct. 2, 1971 were barred by the statute of limitations or ... should have been submitted to
the jury." 657 F.2d at 1154.
136. Id. at 1156.
137. 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982).
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standing. The commodities firm had claimed that it was unable to buy pot-
ash to sell to its customers because the defendants were engaged in a con-
certed refusal to deal with Montreal Trading Ltd. The appellate court also
held that the action had no more than a speculative effect on the United
States' economy, and therefore, federal court jurisdiction was not
justified.1
38
The court determined in Black Gold v. Rockwool Industries, Inc. 139 that for
purposes of appellate review, the trial court and jury rulings on antitrust
liability and damages are not final in the absence of a ruling on attorneys'
fees. The court looked at appellate decisions in federal civil rights actions,
which held that the trial court's failure to address a claim for attorneys' fees
rendered the judgment on the merits nonappealable.' 40 The Tenth Circuit
court found no reason to distinguish antitrust cases for purposes of determin-
ing when a judgment was final. The court dismissed the appeal because the
award of attorneys' fees was still under advisement.'41
An Oklahoma beauty and barber supply shop asked the Tenth Circuit
court in Blankens/p v. Herzfeld' 42 to determine whether a cosmetics manufac-
turer's refusal to sell to the supply shop was a conspiracy with another
Oklahoma beauty supply shop to restrain the plaintiff's competition.' 43 The
plaintiff had alleged that Helene Curtis and Herzfeld conspired to cut off
Helene Curtis' sales to the plaintiff because of a sales territory dispute be-
tween the plaintiff and the Herzfeld beauty supply outlets.
144
The Tenth Circuit found that antitrust claims against Helene Curtis
were properly rejected because the manufacturer had legitimate business
reasons for terminating sales to the plaintiff.' 4 5 The case was remanded to
the district court for a determination whether the Herzfeld organization con-
sisted of separate corporations which could have been guilty of a horizontal
138. 661 F.2d at 870.
139. 666 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1981).
140. Id. at 1309.
141. Id
142. 661 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1981).
143. The trial court's decision recognized that a § I per se violation could result from a
conspiracy between single participants on separate tiers of a distribution chain. While the
Tenth Circuit did not question this analysis, there is currently a split among circuits as to
whether a two-party, two-tier conspiracy can ever result in aper se violation. Compare Battle v.
Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 986 (8th Cir. 1982) (reh'g en banc granted); Donald B. Rice Tire
Co. v. Michelin Tire Co., 638 F.2d 15, 16 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Alloy Int'l
Co. v. Hoover-NSK Bearing Co., Inc., 635 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980); Cernuto, Inc. v. United
Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979) (accepting possibility of per se violation) with Ron
Tonkin Gran Turismo, Inc. v. Fiat Dist., Inc., 637 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.),cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831
(1981); H. & B. Equip. Co., Inc. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 579 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978) (noper se
violation without numerosity'on one tier); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d
Cir.) (reh'g en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
The First and Eleventh Circuits apparently recognize the per se violation. See Greyhound
Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. City of Pensacola, 676 F.2d 1380 (11 th Cir. 1982); Cory v. Look, 641 F.2d
32 (1st Cir. 1981). The Sixth Circuit apparently splits between panels. Compare Com-Tel, Inc.
v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404, 413 n.16 (6th Cir. 1982) with Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v. Nu-Car
Driveway, Inc., 691 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1982).
144. 661 F.2d at 842.
145. Id at 845.
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Sherman Act conspiracy against the plaintiff, even though Helene Curtis
was not involved.
Finally, in tydro- Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp. 146 the Tenth Circuit wres-
tled with the question of whether a lawsuit, brought without probable cause
and for an anticompetitive purpose, could qualify as an antitrust violation.
Hydro-Tech, a Colorado corporation, and one of its employees brought an
antitrust action against Sundstrand, stemming from a previous lawsuit
Sundstrand had filed against Hydro-Tech. Sundstrand alleged in its earlier
action that Hydro-Tech had misappropriated trade secrets.
Hydro-Tech sued Sundstrand, claiming that Sundstrand had instituted
the earlier lawsuit to drive Hydro-Tech out of business through long and
costly litigation. Hydro-Tech alleged that Sundstrand's litigation was "with-
out probable cause," and was a guise to eliminate competition by ousting
Hydro-Tech from the centrifugal pump business.'
47
The court, per Judge McWilliams, held that Hydro-Tech's pleadings
were inadequate to state a cause of action under an exception to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, 148 which sets forth the general rule that "attempts to
influence the government, including petitions to the courts, are exempt from
attack under the Sherman Act."' 49 Thus, attempts to obtain administrative
or judicial action, even if adverse to a competitor, are immune from the
antitrust laws, regardless of intent or purpose. Hydro-Tech, however, had
sought to invoke the antitrust laws through the "sham exception" to the
Noerr-Penn'ngton doctrine. That exception applies when the defendant is not
making a genuine effort to influence legislation through official action by a
government body so that the challenged activities are " 'nothing more' than
an attempt to interfere with the business relationships of a competitor."' t5 0
The Tenth Circuit, noting that the United States Supreme Court had
evidenced an intent in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unh/nited'5 '
that the sham exception be applied only upon a finding of some abuse of the
judicial process,' 52 ruled that the filing of a lawsuit "without probable
cause" does not suffice to invoke the exception.1 53 As a result of its holding,
the court did not address the issue of whether a single sham lawsuit is suffi-
cient to invoke the antitrust laws through the exception.'
54
The court's holding in Hydro-Tech demonstrates that pleadings under
the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine will be subject to exact-
146. 673 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1982).
147. Id at 1174.
148. The doctrine was developed in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965) and Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961). See also Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977); California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
149. 673 F.2d at 1174.
150. Id at 1175 (citing Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec-
utive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977)).
151. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
152. 673 F.2d at 1176 n.6. See also Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 456 F.2d 1361, 1366-
67 (10th Cir. 1972), where the court defined the term "sham" as meaning a misuse or corruption
of the judicial process.




ing scrutiny. The basis for such scrutiny is in the court's conclusion that "the
prosecution of a lawsuit, albeit without probable cause and for an anticom-
petitive purpose, is activity protected by the first amendment .... -155
Therefore, although the court recognized that pleadings are not to be dis-
missed unless it can be shown beyond a doubt that no claim is stated, the
potential chilling effect on first amendment rights by application of the doc-
trine requires more specific allegations than are normally required when as-
serting an antitrust violation based on the "sham litigation" exception. 1
56
Kyra Elizabeth Jenner
155. Id at 1172.




During the past survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dressed a number of divergent issues in the area of commercial law. The
most noteworthy decisions include a limitation on Federal Home Loan Bank
Board authority, and limitation of bank liability under Article Three of the
Uniform Commercial Code. As in the past, bankruptcy decisions dominated
the commercial area. The cases were divided between those decided under
the repealed Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and those decided under the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Where pertinent, the decisions under the re-
pealed Act have been analyzed under the Reform Act to indicate the current
status of the law. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit decisions affected other
commercial areas including secured transactions, Truth in Lending, and
usury. This article will discuss the majority of the reported commercial deci-
sions of the past term, and will analyze the appellate court's most notewor-
thy decisions.
I. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. Negotiable Instruments
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to find a standard of care
based on negligence implicit in section 3-405 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C. or the Code), finding the drawer of the check responsible for
the loss in Western Casualty &Surety Co. v. Citizens Bank of Las Cruces. I Western
Casualty & Surety Co.2 brought suit against the Citizens Bank of Las Cruces
and the Bank of New Mexico alleging that the banks failed to comply with
reasonable commercial banking practices and standards in the handling of
public monies. Western accepted a fraudulently procured and improperly
indorsed warrant of the State of New Mexico for payment in the amount of
$395,000. 3 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant banks on all claims. The issues presented on appeal were whether
the banks were entitled to the statutory defense of section 3-405 of the Code4
and, if so, what standard of care is required by section 3-405.
The Tenth Circuit court found section 3-4055 directly applicable. An
employee of the drawer, the State of New Mexico, supplied the State with
the name of a payee, the Greater Mesilla Valley Sanitation District, a ficti-
1. 676 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir. 1982).
2. Western Casualty was subrogated to the claims of the State of New Mexico by virtue of
its payment as surety on an employee blanket bond for state employees. Id. at 1345.
3. The warrant was presented to, accepted, and processed by Citizens Bank, and for-
warded to the Bank of New Mexico, fiscal agent for the state, for payment from state funds. Id.
4. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-3-405 (1978).
5. Id. Section 3-405 of the U.C.C. states in pertinent part:
(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is effective if:
(a) an imposter by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the maker or
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tious sanitation district,6 "intending the latter to have no . . .interest" in
the instrument issued.7 Section 3-405 places the loss on the drawer-employer
who is in a position to prevent such forgeries by its employees. 8 Western
Casualty argued that the banks were not entitled to the protection of section
3-405 because the indorsement was not identical to the name of the payee,9
and section 3-405 requires indorsement "in the name of a named payee."' 0
The Tenth Circuit held that the difference in spelling between the indorse-
ment, Greater Mesilla Valley Sanitation District, and the name of the payee,
Grater Mesilla Valley Sanitation District, was not significant and would not
defeat the banks' protection from loss under section 3-405.11
Western Casualty Co. also argued that the banks acted negligently in
accepting, processing, and making payment on the fraudulently procured
warrant. Section 3-405 does not stipulate a requisite standard of care for
banks and the New Mexico courts have not addressed the issue.12 Judge
McKay's opinion in Western Casualy noted that there is a split of authority
on the issue of whether a bank's negligence precludes protection from loss
under section 3-405.' 3 Some authorities argue that a drawer should be able
to proceed against a bank on a common law action for negligence under
drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confederate in the name of the payee;
or
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer intends the payee
to have no interest in the instrument; or
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him with the
name of the payee intending the latter to have no such interest.
6. The warrant was issued to a fictitious entity, the Greater Mesilla Valley Sanitation
District, which had been created by two state employees to defraud the State of money. 676
F.2d at 1345.
7. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-3-405(1)(c) (1978).
8. Comment 4 to § 3-405 of the U.C.C. explains the rationale for placing the loss on the
drawer in such cases under § 3-405(l)(c):
[T]he loss should fall upon the employer as a risk of his business enterprise rather than
upon the subsequent holder or drawee. The reasons are that the employer is normally
in a better position to prevent such forgeries by reasonable care in the selection or
supervision of his employees, or, if he is not, is at least in a better position to cover the
loss by fidelity insurance; and that the cost of such insurance is properly an expense of
his business rather than of the business of the holder or drawee.
U.C.C. § 3-405, Comment 4 (1981). Such cases are often referred to as "padded payroll" cases.
9. The warrant was payable to the Grater Mesilla Valley Sanitation District, while the
indorsement was in the name Greater Mesilla Valley Sanitation District. 676 F.2d at 1346.
10. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-3-405 (1978). The Western Casualty court noted that § 3-405
does not specify whether the payee's name and the indorsement must be identical in every
respect. 676 F.2d at 1346.
Generally, an indorsement need not match the payee's name exactly. See U.C.C. §§ I-
201(39) & Comment 39; 3-401(2) & Comment 2; 3-203 & Comment 3 (1981).
11. Comment I to § 3-405 of the U.C.C. states that the instrument must bear "what pur-
ports to be a regular chain of indorsements." The Western Casualty court explained that the
indorsement requirement is to ensure that the check presents a "normal appearance" and that
the person negotiating it "can reasonably be identified as the intended payee." 676 F.2d at
1346. See Comment, UC C § 3-405: Of Impostors, Fictitious Payees, and Padded Payrolls, 47 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1083, 1093 (1979).
The Tenth Circuit court noted that a bank would not be protected under § 3-405 if the
indorsement name were completely different from that of the payee. 676 F.2d at 1346 n.2.
12. Id. at 1347.
13. Much of the controversy is centered on § 3-406 and § 4-406, which allow a negligent
drawer to defeat a bank's defense to a forgery by showing that the bank acted negligently. Id at
1347.
Section 3-406 states that a drawer who has contributed to the making of an unauthorized
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section 3-405 by virtue of section 1-103,14 which supplements the Code with
general "principles of law and equity" unless "displaced by the particular
provisions" of the Code.' 5 In addition, jurisdictions outside the Tenth Cir-
cuit have held that negligence will bar a bank's protection under section 3-
405 because of the general requirement of good faith in dealing with negotia-
ble instruments imposed under section 1-203.1"
The Tenth Circuit held that because Code sections 3-406 and 4-406
explicitly shift the liability for forgeries from bank customers to negligent
banks,' 7 "the absence of such language in section 3-405 implicitly demon-
strates, in our view, an intent to displace common law negligence actions."' 8
The court reasoned that the section at issue was conceived as a banker's
provision that was intended to narrow the liability of banks while increasing
the responsibility of their customers,' !' and that the loss should be placed on
the party in the best position to prevent it-the drawer.20 The Tenth Cir-
cuit refused to find that a bank's negligence precludes protection under sec-
tion 3-405 and affirmed the summary judgment against Western Casualty.
The Tenth Circuit court's holding in Western Casualy obviates any obli-
gation of good faith by banks in check forgery cases under section 3-405.
Although the policy under this section of placing the burden of loss on the
employer in an embezzlement type of situation is sound, such a policy should
not diminish a bank's obligation to exercise due care and good faith in pay-
ing any check. The New York Supreme Court in a well-reasoned opinion,
Board of Education v. Bankers Trust Co.,' 1 held that the fact the forged
indorsements were effective under section 3-405 was not determinative of the
bank's liability. The court held that the drawee bank has an obligation to
exercise due care and can only charge a customer's account for checks cashed
in good faith. "If [the Bank] cashed these checks as a result of its own negli-
gence, and not in good faith, it is liable . . . notwithstanding the effective-
signature may not assert the lack of authority against a bank "who pays the instrument in good
faith and in accordance with . . . reasonable commercial standards." U.C.C. § 3-406 (1981).
Under § 4-406 a customer is allowed recovery against a bank if the customer "establishes
lack of ordinary care on the part of the bank in paying the item(s)." U.C.C. § 4-406(3) (1981).
14. Professors White and Summers argue that the standard of care provisions under § 3-
406 and § 4-406 should be applicable to prevent a negligent bank from avoiding loss under § 3-
405. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 16-8, at 638-39 (2d ed. 1980). See Sun 'n Sand, Inc. v. United Bank of Cal., 21 Cal.
3d 671, 695, 582 P.2d 920, 937, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 346 (1978). The Western Casualty court noted
that § 3-405 does not explicitly displace the bank's obligation to act with reasonable care, "it
simply does not discuss the bank's standard of care." 676 F.2d at 1347.
15. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1981).
16. § 1-203 requires that: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement." The official comment to this section defines
good faith as "honesty in fact."
For cases where negligence of the bank barred its use of § 3-405, see Owensboro Nat'l Bank
v. Sam Crisp, 78-CA-401-MR (Ky. App. Aug. 31, 1979) (cited in U.C.C. DIGEST, 1982 Cum.
Supp. No. 1); Board of Educ. v. Bankers Trust Co., 86 Misc. 2d 560, 383 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1976).
17. See sur/a note 13.
18. 676 F.2d at 1348.
19. Id. (quoting General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank &
Trust Co., 519 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975)).
20. See U.C.C. § 3-405, Comment 4 (1981).
21. Board of Educ. v. Bankers Trust Co., 86 Misc. 2d 560, 383 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510 (1977).
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ness of the endorsements."
22
A bank's obligation to exercise good faith in accepting, processing, and
making payment on its customers' checks, albeit forged, is mandated by sec-
tion 1-203 of the Code. The bank should not be able to avoid the loss under
section 3-405 if it acts negligently in making payment on such a forged
check.
B. A "Lease" as a Secured Transaction
In In re Fashion Optical, Ltd.23 the Tenth Circuit, interpreting an
Oklahoma statute, formulated a four-step ad hoc approach to determine
whether a purported lease is in reality a secured transaction. The bank-
ruptcy trustee appealed the district court's holding that a transfer of equip-
ment from Fashion Optical, Ltd. (bankrupt) to defendant Dr. Gebetsberger
was neither a fraudulent conveyance24 nor a transfer intended as security,
but was a true lease.
25
The controversy between the trustee and Gebetsberger focused on a
purported sale and leaseback of optical equipment. The bankrupt sold Geb-
etsberger $53,280 of new and used optical equipment for $50,000 in June
1977.26 The used equipment was valued at $7,265 and in the bankrupt's
possession before and after the alleged sale. The remaining $42,375 of equip-
ment was new and had been ordered by the bankrupt from an optical equip-
ment company. The bankrupt's checks in payment were returned for
insufficient funds, and Gebetsberger, a business associate and friend of the
bankrupt's president, intervened and purchased the equipment directly.
2 7
The equipment was delivered directly to the bankrupt's offices.
Approximately one week later, Gebetsberger entered into a purported
leaseback agreement with the bankrupt. The lease provided for rent of
$1,000 per month for sixty months, resulting in a total rental price of
$60,000.28 In addition, the agreement gave the bankrupt a five-year option
to purchase the equipment for the greater of ten percent of the original cost
or fair market value. Payments were made for thirteen months before Fash-
ion Optical became insolvent.
The trustee in bankruptcy argued that the arrangement was a transfer
intended as security 29 rather than a true lease, and thus subject to the filing
provisions in Article Nine of the U.C.C. Gebetsberger did not perfect any
security interest under the Code. 30 Therefore, the trustee would prevail if
the agreement was characterized as an installment sale to the bankrupt with
22. 383 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
23. 653 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 1981) (sub. noma. Steele v. Gebetsberger).
24. This portion of the decision will not be discussed herein.
25. 653 F.2d at 1386.
26. The bill of sale was dated June 23, 1977. On June 27, 1977, Gebetsberger paid $50,000
cash for the equipment. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1386-87.
29. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-201(37) (West 1972).
30. 653 F.2d at 1388.
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Gebetsberger retaining a security interest. 3 t
Based on Oklahoma's definition of a security interest, 32 the Tenth Cir-
cuit adopted a four-step approach to determine whether a lease is in reality a
secured transaction. First, the court held that the presence of a purchase
option does not automatically preclude a finding of a true lease. Second, if a
purchase option allows the lessee to become full owner by "merely paying no
or nominal consideration after complying with its terms, the inquiry ends."
33
The lease will be deemed a secured transaction as a matter of law, and thus
subject to the provisions of Article Nine. Third, if the option requires
greater than nominal consideration for full ownership, a true lease will usu-
ally be found. 34 Fourth, the absence of a purchase option will not automati-
cally imply a true lease. Thus, even though the lease does not permit
purchase at nominal consideration, it will still be deemed a security interest
if the economic realities tend to confirm "a secured transfer of ownership is
afoot."
3 5
The court was not, however, content to apply only the four-step ap-
proach 36 outlined above, but also considered the following factors, which
under Oklahoma law tend to indicate a true lease: 1) an option price that is
approximately the market value at the time of exercise of the option,
2) rental charges that compensate lessor for loss of value over the term of the
lease, 3) nonexcessive rentals and an option purchase price which is not too
low, and 4) facts indicating that lessee is acquiring no equity during the term
of the lease.37 The court also considered two additional factors under section
1-201(37)38 to determine whether a security interest was intended: 1) the
percentage that the option purchase price bears to list price, 39 and
2) whether the terms of the lease are such that they strongly favor exercise of
31. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-301(1)(b) (West 1972). See Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
§ 70(c) (formerly 11 U.S.C. § I 10(c)).
32. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-201(37) (West 1972) defines a security interest as:
[An interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or perform-
ance of an obligation. . . . Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined
by the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not
of itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon
compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to
become the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal
consideration does make the lease one intended for security.
33. 653 F.2d at 1388. The court cited the following cases to support this proposition: Per-
cival Constr. Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 532 F.2d 166, 171-72 (10th Cir. 1976),
affig 387 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Okla. 1973); Citicorp Leasing, Inc. v. Allied Inst. Distrib., Inc., 454
F. Supp. 511, 516 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Dynalectron Corp. v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 337 F.
Supp. 659, 661 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
34. 653 F.2d at 1389. See, e.g., Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Atlantic Mobile Corp., 252 Md.
286, 250 A.2d 246 (1969).
35. 653 F.2d at 1389. See, e.g., In re Brookside Drug Store, Inc., 3 Bankr. 120 (D. Conn.
1980).
36. This approach has been used in other recent decisions to determine whether a lease was
in fact a security interest. See Towe Farms, Inc. v. Central Iowa Prod. Credit Ass'n, 528 F.
Supp. 500, 503 (S.D. Iowa 1981); In re Int'l Plastics, Inc., 18 Bankr. 583, 586 (D. Kan. 1982).
37. 653 F.2d at 1389. See Percival Const. Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 387 F.
Supp. 882, 885 (W.D. Okla. 1973), aft'd, 532 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1976).
38. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-201(37) (West 1972).
39. The court noted this factor is especially relevant if the option price is less than 25% of
the list price. 653 F.2d at 1389.
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the option at the end of the lease term.40 The lease at issue fixed the option
price in terms of fair market value to avoid the inference of a security agree-
ment due to a low option price and favorable option terms.
The Tenth Circuit held that the absence of evidence on the equipment's
fair market value and useful economic life was crucial because the facts did
not otherwise indicate a security arrangement. 4' A security agreement
would be inferred if the market value of the equipment was, at the time for
exercise of the option, so low that the option price was nominal considera-
tion under section 1-201(37). Also, the fact that the total rental exceeded the
original cost could indicate interest payments in a financed installment
sale.4 2 Such an excess over original purchase price may not eliminate the
finding of a true lease.
43
The Tenth Circuit held that the inclusion of a fair market value price in
an option will not automatically meet the consideration requirement of sec-
tion 1-201(37), thereby indicating a true sale and lease-back agreement. If
there is evidence that the option price of market value is great enough so
that the lessee will be paying more than nominal consideration for the item,
then a lease will be found.44 The court remanded the case for a determina-
tion under the court's four-pronged approach of whether the purported lease
in question is in reality a secured transaction. It is unclear, however, how
much weight will be given to the Tenth Circuit's four-step test in light of the
court's reliance on a number of additional factors in conjunction with its
test. With its Fashion Optical opinion, the appellate court has merely added
another set of factors, and not a conclusive test, for determining whether a
lease is in fact a secured transaction.
II. LIMITATION OF FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD AUTHORITY
In Otero Savings & Loan Association v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board 45 a
divided Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (Bank Board) lacks authority to impose a compensatory "pen-
alty box" remedy in addition to a cease and desist order. The appeal arose
from an order4 6 of the Bank Board and the Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corporation (FSLIC) that Otero Savings and Loan Association's
(Otero) "Check-In" program violated section 1832(a) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Act. 47 The order directed Otero to close all checking
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1390. See, e.g., All-States Leasing Co. v. Ochs, 42 Or. App. 319, 600 P.2d 899
(1974).
42. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Priority Elec. Corp., 435 F. Supp. 236, 239
(E.D.N.Y. 1977).
43. 653 F.2d at 1390. A lease could be found if the equipment depreciated only slightly or
in fact appreciated in value over the rental period.
44. The court noted that fair market value could fall to a nominal level, especially toward
the latter part of an item's useful economic life, and thereby not meet the consideration require-
ments of OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-201(37) (West 1972). 653 F.2d at 1390.
45. 665 F.2d 279 (10th Cir. 1981).
46. An administrative proceeding was brought against Otero Savings & Loan Association
by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1730(e)
(Supp. IV 1980).
47. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (Supp. IV 1980) (as amended by Depository Institutions Deregula-
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accounts held by for-profit corporations and partnerships and to cease offer-
ing new customer "Check-In" or related automatic transfer system accounts
for a period of 268 days following the effective date of the order.48 The 268-
day penalty was conceived as an equitable offset, since Otero had achieved a
competitive advantage by offering "Check-In" accounts 268 days before they
were legally permitted.4 9 The Bank Board order was stayed pending this
decision. 50 Otero argued on appeal that it had not violated section 183251
and that the Bank Board and FSLIC had no power to grant the type of relief
encompassed by the order.
A. Factual Background
In April 1980, Otero, a Colorado state-chartered savings and loan asso-
ciation, began offering a checking account service known as the "Check-In"
program. 52 The program was an automatic transfer system of withdrawal
under which a customer opened two accounts, an interest-bearing savings
account and a non-interest-bearing checking account. When the customer
wrote a check, an amount equivalent to the check was automatically trans-
ferred from the savings account to the checking account and the check was
paid.
However, section 183251 prohibited a savings and loan association from
offering negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts before January 1,
1981. 5 4 NOW accounts are single accounts from which customers may write
checks. Both Otero's "Check-In" accounts and NOW accounts were inter-
est-bearing demand deposit accounts. Otero's "Check-In" accounts resulted
in more than $10 million in new deposits during the first three months they
were offered.55
Following an administrative hearing, the Bank Board issued a tempo-
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132. This section allows
all depository institutions to permit withdrawals from interest-bearing accounts, except ac-
counts of for-profit corporations, by negotiable or transferable instruments payable to third
parties only after Dec. 31, 1980.
48. 665 F.2d at 281.
49. Id at 287 n.7.
50. Otero Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Reserve Bank, 665 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1981) (grant
of preliminary injunction was proper where harm to public and associations if bank stopped
processing drafts was much greater than any harm which would be felt by bank). The order
grantihg preliminary injunctive relief appears in Otero Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Board of Gover-
nors, 497 F. Supp. 370 (D. Colo. 1980).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (Supp. IV 1980). See Otero Sav. &Loan Ass'n, 665 F.2d at 282 n.2.
52. 665 F.2d at 281; Rocky Mountain News, June 13, 1980, at 134, col. 1.
53. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1976) provides:
(a) No depository institution shall allow the owner of a deposit or account on which
interest or dividends are paid to make withdrawals by negotiable or transferable in-
struments for the purpose of making transfers to third parties, except that such with-
drawals may be made in the States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island,
Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire.
This provision was amended in 1980, see supra note 47.
54. See 665 F.2d at 282 n.2.
55. Rocky Mountain News, June 13, 1980, at 134, col. 1. Such accounts were also offered
by Majestic Savings and Loan of Denver and Sun Savings and Loan Association of Golden. Id.
1983]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
rary cease and desist order,5 6 which imposed the moratorium on opening of
any new Check-In-type of accounts. Otero appealed the order on the
grounds that its two-account "Check-In" system was not a NOW account
system and thus not illegal under section 1832. Otero also questioned the
Bank Board's authority to impose the moratorium.
B. Illegality of "Check-In" Accounts
The Tenth Circuit appellate panel held that Otero is an insured institu-
tion within the meaning of section 1724 of the Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation Act because its accounts are insured by the FSLIC. Therefore
it is a depository institution subject to section 1832(a). 57 Otero argued that
section 1832(a) prohibits one-account NOW systems prior to January 1,
1981, and not its two-account automatic transfer system.58 The majority
opinion by Judge Logan states that the statutory language of section 1832(a)
is broad enough to encompass both types of accounts and that the legislative
history of the section indicates that Congress did not intend to differentiate
between the two types of accounts. 59 Therefore, section 1832(a) applies to
prohibit Otero's "Check-In," automatic transfer system type account during
1980.
C. Bank Board's Cease and Desist Power
Otero also contended that the Bank Board did not have the power to
enforce section 1832 by a cease and desist order.6° Otero argued that only
those statutes which expressly provide for enforcement by the Bank Board or
FSLIC are enforceable by cease and desist orders. 61 Section 1832 contains
no express delegation of authority, and in fact, makes no provision for en-
forcement. A unanimous appellate panel affirmed the power of the Bank
Board and FSLIC to use its cease and desist powers62 to remedy violations of
section 1832(a).
The majority opinion'rejected Otero's argument that the FSLIC and
Bank Board may only enforce those statutes that contain specific delegations
of authority. Judge Holloway stated that the specific delegations may have
56. The order was issued pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1730(0(1) (Supp. IV 1980). 665 F.2d at
289 n.9.
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (Supp. IV 1980); set supra note 53. Cf. Wisconsin Bankers Ass'n v.
Mutual Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Wis., 96 Wis. 2d 438, 291 N.W.2d 869 (1980) (state-chartered
savings and loan, not insured by FSLIC, allowed to use negotiable order of withdrawal accounts
under state statute).
58. 665 F.2d at 282.
59. Id. at 282-83. Judge McKay's concurrence discussed the legislative history in detail,
however, much of the discussion is beyond the scope of this overview. Id. at 289-91 (McKay, J.,
concurring).
60. 665 F.2d at 283.
61. Otero cited the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976); the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o(a)(2) (1976); the Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 16921(b)(2) (1976); the Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (1976); and
the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1054(a) (1976) as examples of specific delegations of enforce-
ment authority. 665 F.2d at 284.
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1730(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) permits the Bank Board or FSLIC to act where
an institution has violated or is about to violate "a law, rule, or regulation."
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been included only as clarification of statutes that are enforced by different
agencies.6 3 The Bank Board relied heavily on a Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision64 holding that the Bank Board has broad authority over fed-
eral savings and loans to enforce rules and regulations, regardless of whether
Congress had expressly directed the Bank Board to enforce them. In addi-
tion, the Tenth Circuit panel emphasized that the Third Circuit 65 had
granted the Comptroller of the Currency 66 jurisdiction to enforce compli-
ance with a New Jersey anti-redlining statute by national banks located in
that state. The statutory language conferring cease and desist power to the
Comptroller 67 is identical to the language of section 1730(e), which confers
cease and desist power to the Bank Board against state savings and loan
associations.
68
The Tenth Circuit conceded that Otero, as a state-chartered institution,
is not subject to the same "all-encompassing regulation 'from its cradle to its
corporate grave' as are federally chartered institutions." 69 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that the language of section 1730(e)(1), which refers to vio-
lations of "a law," is quite broad. 70 Thus, the appellate panel held that the
FSLIC and the Bank Board have power under section 1730(e) to enforce the
prohibition of section 183271 by use of cease and desist orders.
D. Bank Board's Remedial Power
Although the Tenth Circuit panel was in harmony as to the Bank
Board's authority to enforce section 1832, the enforcement chosen by the
Bank Board created a note of discord. A divided Tenth Circuit court 72 va-
cated the portions of the Bank Board order that temporarily prohibited
Otero from opening any new "Check-In," NOW, or similar types of accounts
and from advertising such accounts for 268 days after issuance of the order. 
73
The Bank Board and FSLIC contended that the order was properly
based on section 1730(e)(1). 7 4 The Bank Board took the position that
63. 665 F.2d at 285.
64. Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 915 (1965).
65. National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 988 (3d Cir. 1980) (Bank Board's authority
over federal savings and loan institutions is pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976)).
66. The Comptroller of the Currency regulates federal banks with cease and desist power
under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1976).
67. Id.
68. Id § 1730(e).
69. 665 F.2d at 285 (citing People v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D.
Cal. 1951)).
70. 665 F.2d at 286.
71. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (amending scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., including 12 U.S.C. § 1832).
72. Judge Holloway wrote the majority opinion with respect to the validity of the remedial
order of the Bank Board, with which Judge McKay concurred, and Judge Logan dissented.
73. 665 F.2d at 286.
74. 12 U.S.C. § 1730(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
Such order may, by provisions which may be mandatory or otherwise, require the
institution or directors, officers, employees, agents, and other persons participating in
the conduct of the affairs of such institution to cease and desist from the same, and





Otero's illegal "jumping of the gun" by offering "Check-In" accounts before
they were legally permissible created an unfair advantage over its law-abid-
ing competitors.7 5 It was this advantage that the Bank Board's order at-
tempted to remedy.
The Bank Board argued that its remedial powers are equivalent to those
of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which has power to redress
unfair labor practices by ordering affirmative action to effectuate the policies
of the National Labor Relations Act. 76 The Bank Board argued that if the
penalty was struck down, Otero "will have succeeded in violating the law
with impunity. '77 The order, in pertinent part, stated:
Due to the length of time inherent in any cease and desist proceed-
ing, Otero's interpretation would mean that a party could violate
the existing statute, well in advance of the effective date of amend-
ments, knowing that the cease and desist process could not be
brought to bear before the arrival of the effective date. Whatever
legislative purpose may have been served in delaying the effective
date would, to a large extent, be thwarted.78
Otero, however, argued that the FSLIC and Bank Board may only pre-
vent unlawful conduct, take affirmative action to correct conditions resulting
from such conduct, and ensure that in the future the institution is law-abid-
ing. 79 Otero contended that the moratorium was beyond the Bank Board's
power to prevent illegal conduct because it would prevent Otero from en-
gaging in lawful conduct.80
Judge Holloway's majority opinion, relying on legislative history, 8 1
agreed that the Bank Board's powers are limited. Judge Holloway argued
that the Bank Board is permitted to ensure only that institutions operate in a
legal, safe, and sound manner. The Board does not have "a mandate to use
whatever means seem desirable" to ensure a competitive balance among
financial institutions.
8 2
Judge Holloway attempted to bolster this holding with several decisions
that actually appear to weaken the court's limitation of the Bank Board's
power. In First National Bank of Eden v. Department of the Treasuy ,83 the Comp-
troller of the Currency determined that a federal bank had engaged in un-
safe and unsound practices by paying excessive salaries and bonuses to its
executive officers. Based on language identical to section 1730(e), the Comp-
troller required the bank to limit future personnel expenses and required
75. 665 F.2d at 287.
76. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). The NLRB has au-
thority to require a wide variety of remedies. See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319
U.S. 533 (1943) (company union ordered to dissolve); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177 (1941) (company required to offer employment to certain persons).
77. 665 F.2d at 288.
78. Decision and Order at 21, reprined at 665 F.2d at 289.
79. 665 F.2d at 287.
80. Id. Now, "Check-In," and similar types of accounts became legal after Dec. 31, 1980.
12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
81. S. REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., repritedzn 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3532, 3538.
82. 665 F.2d at 288.
83. 568 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1978).
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reimbursement of excess bonuses.8 4 Judge Holloway's opinion explained that
the First National Bank of Eden's penalty "was properly directed to preventing
future specified abuses and reversing the direct, identifiable efects of the past prac-
tices on the bank's financial soundness."8 5 It is arguable, however, that the
Bank Board's order in Otero was properly directed at preventing future
abuses and "reversing the direct, identifiable effects of the past practices" of
illegally offered "Check-In" accounts.
The Tenth Circuit majority also relied on Groos National Bank v. Comptrol-
ler of the Currency,86 in which the Comptroller issued an order prohibiting a
bank from making future advances to a controlling shareholder. The bank
in Groos argued that there was no evidence that such dealings with the share-
holder constituted unsafe and unsound banking practices. The Groos court
upheld the order and stated that when the Comptroller finds a violation, it is
within his allowable discretion to fashion relief in order to prevent future
abuses of "problematic practices that have occurred in the past." 87 The
Tenth Circuit explained that the Comptroller was limited to addressing fu-
ture identified unlawful practices.88 Although the Tenth Circuit court drew
no distinction between "problematic" and "unlawful" practices, under Groos
the Comptroller can address broader, problematic practices, and is not lim-
ited solely to unlawful abuses.
Judge Holloway's opinion concluded that the Bank Board's cease and
desist orders were limited "even if Otero's past actions go unpunished."8 9
The Tenth Circuit noted that section 1832(c)90 permits the Bank Board to
assess fines for past violations of section 1832; however, in the instant action
no fine was imposed on Otero.9 1
Judge McKay concurred in the limitation of the Bank Board's remedial
power and stated that he doubted that Congress had intended to grant the
Bank Board authority to impose remedies except against practices which are
unsafe or unsound. Judge McKay argued that gaining a competitive advan-
tage in the market is not an unsafe or unsound practice for Otero's financial
future.
92
Judge Logan issued a strong dissent arguing that under section
1730(e)(1), the Bank Board has power to "take affirmative action to correct the
conditions resulting from any such violation or practice.' '9 Although Judge Logan
conceded that the Bank Board's grant of power is narrower than that of the
NLRB, he argued the Bank Board's power is sufficiently broad to support
imposing the moratorium on new accounts. 94 Judge Logan's opinion used
the legislative history and cases cited by the majority to lend support to his
84. Id. at 611.
85. 665 F.2d at 288 (emphasis added).
86. 573 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1978).
87. Id. at 897 (emphasis added).
88. Otero, 665 F.2d at 288.
89. Id. at 289.
90. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
91. 665 F.2d at 289 n.9.
92. Id. at 291-92 (McKay, J., concurring).
93. 12 U.S.C. § 1730(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
94. 665 F.2d at 292 (Logan, J., dissenting).
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conclusion that the Bank Board had power to remedy the conditions result-
ing from Otero offering illegal "Check-In" accounts. Judge Logan argued
that neither Bank of Eden nor Groos limit the Bank Board's power to ensure
future legal conduct by the financial institutions.
95
In addition, Judge Logan explained that the Bank Board could have
ordered Otero to close all new accounts it had wrongfully gained, but the
Board had rejected this remedy because of the inherent delays in implement-
ing the order, the inconvenience to Otero's customers, and the danger to
Otero's safety and soundness that could result from widespread withdraw-
als. 96 The Bank Board determined that section 1832(a) was designed by
Congress to limit competitive inequality, and the effective date was intended
to allow all affected associations "to reach the starting gate" at the same
time.9 7 Theoretically, if the Bank Board's remedy worked, Otero would be
deprived of new accounts equal to those it wrongfully gained.
Judge Logan argued that the moratorium on new accounts could not be
considered punitive, as the majority contended, based on the United States
Supreme Court test in Local 60, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB. 98
The Supreme Court considered NLRB orders to be punitive when the orders
neither removed the consequences of the violation nor dissipated the effects
of the prohibited action. 99 Judge Logan argued that this test was clearly
applicable to the Bank Board since it is authorized to take affirmative action
to correct conditions resulting from illegal, unsafe, or unsound practices.
Under this Supreme Court test, the moratorium is not punitive, Judge Lo-
gan asserted, because "it will correct at least partially the effect of the
violations." 10o
The well-reasoned dissent in Otero argues that deference should be
shown to the Bank Board's order,' 0 l which, while attempting to remedy
Otero's head start, also sought to protect Otero's safety and soundness, as
well as the innocent account holders.' 0 2 Judge Logan's opinion is strong
support for the contention that the Bank Board's remedial powers extend to
assessing the moratorium.
The majority opinion, which limits Bank Board authority, was weakly
argued and supported, and could create adverse consequences. The limita-
tion of the Bank Board's remedial power could be interpreted as allowing an
institution to violate an existing statute, well in advance of the effective date
of amendments, with impunity, due to the delays inherent in a cease and
desist proceeding. Such an interpretation could thwart the legislative pur-
pose for the amendments, and leave the Bank Board without remedy to cor-




98. 365 U.S. 651 (1961).
99. Id. at 655.
100. Otero, 665 F.2d at 293 (Logan, J., dissenting).
101. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969); Moog Indus., Inc.
v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958).




The recent case of In re Shannon 103 presented the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals with the interesting question of what time limitation applies to a
notice of appeal during the transition period of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 (the Reform Act).1 °4 The Reform Act made extensive changes in
the procedures by which appeals are taken from the bankruptcy court.
10 5
The provisions of the Reform Act become effective on different dates
throughout a transition period ending April 1, 1984, at which time the Re-
form Act becomes fully effective. 10 6 Section 248 of the Reform Act stipu-
lates a thirty-day deadline for notice of bankruptcy appeals to the circuit
courts, however, it is not effective until April 1, 1984,107 and the Reform Act
does not provide any express time for filing bankruptcy appeals to the circuit
courts until that date.
In Shannon, the plaintiff-appellant, Marian Berg, sought review of a Jan-
uary 12, 1981 order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Colorado dismissing her objection to the bankruptcy discharge of Jimmie
Shannon.1 08 Eighteen days later, Berg filed a notice of appeal to the district
court, along with a motion to extend the time for filing the notice. 0 9 The
bankruptcy court advised the parties that, by stipulation, an appeal could be
taken directly to the court of appeals. On March 10, 1981, a notice of appeal
was filed in the Tenth Circuit-nearly two months after the bankruptcy or-
der had been entered."I
0
The Tenth Circuit was concerned with the timeliness of the appeal, and
therefore, its jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Under the new Bankruptcy
Reform Act, both district courts and courts of appeal share original jurisdic-
tion over appeals from the bankruptcy courts."' The amendments to sec-
103. 670 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1982).
104. Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. and scattered sections of 15,
18, and 28 U.S.C.)
105. Id.
106. See Title IV of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, §§ 401-405, 92 Stat. 2682-85 (1978).
This statement may not be accurate following the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982),
which invalidated the broad grant ofjurisdiction granted to bankruptcy courts under 28 U.S.C.
§ 147 1(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Since § 1471 of the Act has been held unconstitutional, the
Act may not become fully effective without further legislative amendment.
107. See § 405 and § 402 of the Reform Act, 92 Stat. 2682, 2685 (1978).
108. 670 F.2d at 905.
109. The extension of time was granted retroactively to Jan. 30, 1981. 670 F.2d at 905.
110. Id.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1293 (1976) was amended under the new Act to provide:
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
panels designated under section 160(a) of this title.
(b) Notwithstanding section 1482 of this title, a court of appeals shall havejurisdiction of
an appealjfom a final judgment, order, or decree of an appellate panel created under
section 160 or a District Court of the United States or from a final judgment, order, or
decree of a hankruptcy court of the United States if the parties to such appeal agree to a direct appeal
to the court of appeals.
§ 236(a) of the Reform Act, 92 Stat. 2667 (1978) (emphasis added).
In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. IV 1980) states that district courts "shall have juris-
diction of appeals from all final judgments, orders and decrees of bankruptcy courts." § 238(a)
of the Reform Act, 92 Stat. 2667-68 (1978).
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tions 1293 and 1334 of title 28 of the United States Code'' 2 make clear that
the appeal filed in Shannon is within the circuit court's general appellate ju-
risdiction "so long as it was timely filed."' 13
In general, under section 2107 of title 28 of the United States Code 1 4 a
notice of appeal to the circuit courts must be filed within thirty days after
the entry of judgment. However, this section states that it specifically "shall
not apply to bankruptcy matters or other proceedings under Title 11."'
15
The new Reform Act amended section 2107 to make the thirty-day deadline
applicable to bankruptcy appeals after April 1, 1984.116 This congressional
oversight created the dilemma in Shannon.
Relying on the Eighth Circuit opinion of Andrews v. South Dakota Student
Loan Assistance Corp., 1 7 the Tenth Circuit held that the thirty-day time pe-
riod is currently applicable to bankruptcy appeals, and that the failure to
refer specifically to section 2107 in the transition period was inadvertent." 18
The court held that the transition provisions of the Reform Act were in-
tended by Congress to make the same jurisdiction and procedures currently
applicable as if the new Reform Act were fully effective.' 9 Therefore, the
Tenth Circuit construed the legislative intent to make the thirty-day time
limit effective as of the date the circuit courts acquired jurisdiction over di-
rect appeals from bankruptcy decisions.
120
The Shannon appeal, filed nearly two months after the bankruptcy judg-
ment, was dismissed as untimely. The Tenth Circuit further held that be-
cause the appeal was jurisdictionally defective when filed, appellate
112. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1293, 1334 (1976), amended by § 405(c)(1), (2) of the Reform Act, 92 Stat.
2685 (1978), provides, in pertinent part:
(c)(1) During the transition period, an appeal from a judgment, order, or decree
of a United States bankruptcy judge shall be-
(B) if the parties to the appeal agree to a direct appeal to the court of appeals
for such circuit, then to such court of appeals;
(2) During the transition period, the jurisdiction of the district courts, the courts
of appeals, and panels of bankruptcy judges to hear appeals shall be the same as the
jurisdiction of such courts and panels granted under the amendments made by sec-
tions 236, 237, 238, and 241 of this Act to hear appeals from judgments, orders, and
decrees of the bankruptcy courts established under section 201 of this Act.
113. 670 F.2d at 906.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
115. Id.
116. Section 248 of the new Reform Act, 92 Stat. 2672 (1978) amended 28 U.S.C. § 2107
(1976) by striking out the sentence that makes the deadline inapplicable to bankruptcy matters.
117. 636 F.2d 233, 235-36 (8th Cir. 1980).
118. The Shannon court held: "We can envision no legislative purpose in making an avenue
of appeal available during transition and intentionally omitting the time frame for appeal. We
believe the failure to specifically refer to 28 U.S.C. § 2107 in the transition sections of the Act
was inadvertent." 670 F.2d at 906. See In re Adamo, 619 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir.),cerl. denied, 449
U.S. 843 (1980) (inadvertence in supplying effective date of other sections of the new Reform
Act).
119. The court based its interpretation of legislative intent on H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 460, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 6416. See In re
Kutner, 656 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1981).
120. 670 F.2d at 907. See 28 U.S.C. § 1293 (1976),amendedby § 236(a) of the Reform Act, 92
Stat. 2667 (1978).
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jurisdiction never transferred from the district court.' 2 '
In re Calh'ster'22 presented the Tenth Circuit court with a second issue
involving appellate jurisdiction under the Reform Act over a bankruptcy
court order. Calhster was an appeal from an order of the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, 123 which granted creditor Inger-
soll-Rand Financial Corporation (IRFC) a "superpriority" and ordered the
payment of interim attorney fees awarded to counsel for the debtor and the
unsecured creditors' committee.' 24 IRFC, which was granted a "superpri-
ority" of $29,868, pursuant to section 507(b) of the Reform Act,
125 appealed
the order to the Tenth Circuit alleging that the bankruptcy court erred in
awarding interim attorney fees that would be paid in advance of its
superpriority.
The Cal/ster court agreed with the parties that jurisdiction is conferred
on the Tenth Circuit under the new Bankruptcy Reform Act. 126 The Tenth
Circuit court noted that there is some confusion regarding the applicability
of certain sections of the Reform Act during the transition period;'
2 7 how-
ever, the court relied on its holding in In re Shannon,' 28 that the intent of the
Reform Act's transition provisions "make currently effective the same juris-
diction and procedures that will apply to the bankruptcy court system when
the [Reform] Act becomes fully effective."' 29 Thus, section 1293(b) of title
28 will apply and confer jurisdiction to a court of appeals from afinal judg-
ment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy court. 130 The issue then is whether
an order conferring interim attorney fees is a final order.
Interim awards of compensation, such as the attorney fees in Calhser,
are authorized pursuant to section 331 of the Reform Act.' 3 ' Section 331
allows for repeated application to the court for reimbursement and compen-
sation, and such awards are subject to amendment or modification during
the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. 132 The Tenth Circuit held that
121. 670 F.2d' at 907. Because the appeal was defective when filed, mandatory dismissal
under Interim Bankruptcy Rule 8007 did not become operative and appellate jurisdiction re-
mained in the district court.
122. 673 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1982).
123. In re Callister, 15 Bankr. 521 (D. Utah 1981).
124. 673 F.2d at 306.
125. 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
126. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), codified in
28 U.S.C. § 1293(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
127. The transition period runs from Oct. 1, 1979, to Apr. 1, 1984, when the new Act be-
comes fully effective. 673 F.2d at 306.
128. 670 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1982).
129. Id. at 906.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1293(b) (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
131. 11 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. IV 1980) provides that:
A trustee, an examiner, a debtor's attorney, or any professional person ... may
apply to the court not more than once every 120 days after an order for relief in a case
under this title, or more often if the court permits, for such compensation for services
rendered before the date of such an application of reimbursement of expenses incurred
before such date . . . .After notice and a hearing, the court may allow and disburse
to such applicant such compensation or reimbursement.
132. Cal/isier, 673 F.2d at 306.
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such awards are within the court's discretion,13 and may be re-examined, 13 4
adjusted and ordered refunded 13 5 by the court during the course of the case.
Since interim awards are not final adjudications on the question of compen-
sation, the appellate panel held that they are interlocutory in nature.' 36
Thus, the court concluded it was without jurisdiction under the Reform Act
to review interim awards.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a number of divergent
issues under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the "Act")13 7 in In re Beery.' 3 8 The
principal issues presented by the bankrupt, Jerome G. Beery, were:
1) whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to convert his Chapter XI
reorganization proceeding into a Chapter 7 bankruptcy after the Chapter XI
petition was withdrawn, 2) whether bankrupt Beery was a farmer, and
3) whether the bankrupt's fifth amendment rights were infringed by the or-
der of the district court requiring him to testify at a bankruptcy hearing.
The Tenth Circuit court found against the bankrupt on all issues.
First, jurisdiction of a Chapter XI proceeding was held not to be lost by
the bankruptcy court upon the voluntary withdrawal of the petition.'
39
Bankruptcy Rule 11-42(a) prescribes that when a debtor files a motion to
dismiss the court should "enter an order after hearing on notice dismissing
the case or adjudicating him a bankrupt whichever may be in the best inter-
est of the estate."' 140 Although Beery's voluntary withdrawal of his petition
was not a motion to dismiss, the court considered it as such. 14 1 Thus, the
bankruptcy court did not lose jurisdiction, and could either dismiss the case
or adjudicate Beery a bankrupt. The bankruptcy court chose to adjudicate
Beery a bankrupt, but entered its order under rule 11-42(b)(1),' 4 2 instead of
rule 11-42(a) (2), with the finding of lack of prosecution. The Tenth Circuit,
however, found this to be of no consequence because the "necessary finding
that adjudication was in the best interest of the estate was made in any
event."' 4 3 In addition, the appellate court found that the basis of lack of
prosecution under rule 11-42(b)(1) was clearly satisfied by Beery's refusal to
133. Ste In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 190 F.2d 273 (3d Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. McGird v. Mintz,
342 U.S. 893 (1951).
134. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 331.03 (L. King 15th ed. 1981).
135. See In re Arlan's Dept. Stores, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 615 F.2d
925 (2d Cir. 1979) (interim award refunded to estate due to misconduct).
136. 673 F.2d at 307.
137. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, codified at II U.S.C. §§ 1-1200 (1976), repealedby Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
138. 680 F.2d 705 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 449 (1982).
139. 680 F.2d at 709.
140. Bankruptcy Rule 11-42(a)(2). This rule applies if the petition was filed, as here, under
Rule 11-6. 680 F.2d at 709.
141. Id.
142. Bankruptcy Rule 11-42(b) provides:
The court shall enter an order, after hearing on such notice as it may direct
dismissing the case, or adjudicating the debtor a bankrupt if he has not been previ-
ously so adjudged, or directing that the bankruptcy case proceed, whichever may be in
the best interest of the estate-
(1) for want of prosecution . ...
143. 680 F.2d at 709. The bankruptcy court based its findings on Beery's admission of his
inability to pay his debts and that his liabilities exceeded his assets by more than one million
dollars. Id. at 709-10.
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sign and verify his petitions and schedules. ' 4 4 Thus, the bankruptcy judge
had jurisdiction to adjudicate Beery a bankrupt and to direct the case to
continue as a straight bankruptcy.'
4 5
The bankrupt's second contention was that he should have been consid-
ered a farmer, and therefore, could not have been adjudicated a bankrupt
under section 779 of the repealed Bankruptcy Act 146 and Rule 11-42(e).
The Bankruptcy Act defines a farmer as one who is personally engaged in
farming or tillage of the soil, and who derives the principal portion of his
income from farming.147 Beery's appeal argued that the method used by the
bankruptcy court in determining that the principal source of his income was
not from farming was erroneous. ' 48 The bankruptcy court found that based
on gross income Beery's principal income was from grain and commodities
dealings rather than farming. 149 Beery argued, without evidentiary support,
that although his grain company had a large cash flow, the profit margin
was small.' 50 The circuit court, however, held that gross revenues or receipts
is the proper standard in determining principal source of income. 15 1 The
court reasoned that in many instances a bankrupt may not have much in-
come from any source. 152 The definition of farmer was clarified in section
101(17) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.153
Another issue on appeal was whether Beery's fifth amendment rights
were violated because of the bankruptcy court order that compelled the
bankrupt to testify without a grant of immunity.' 54 The Tenth Circuit
found section 25(a)(10) of the repealed Bankruptcy Act to be controlling on
the issue. Section 25(a)(10) states that the bankrupt shall, at the creditors'
meeting and under court order, submit to an examination concerning his
business and his bankruptcy. The statute provides that no testimony given
by him can be offered into evidence against him in any criminal
proceeding. '
55
The statute thus provides immunity against the use of testimony and
evidence derived from such testimony, if the testimony was the result of a
compulsory court order. Based on testimony derived from the 1977 hearing,
the Tenth Circuit found that Beery was clearly ordered to submit to exami-
144. "For want of prosecution" under Rule 1 1-42(b)(1) includes the failure to file schedules
and statements and the withdrawal and abandonment of a plan. See Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 11-42.
145. 680 F.2d at 710.
146. 11 U.S.C. § 779 (1976).
147. Id. § 1(17).
148. 680 F.2d at 713.
149. Id. Beery owned an enterprise known as Brownville Grain Co. that purchased grain
from farmers, sold it for cash and then paid the farmers. Id. at 715.
150, Id. at 717.
151, Id. at 714.
152. Id See 1 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 131 (5th ed. 1950).
153. I1 U.S.C. § 101(17) (Supp. IV 1980), defines farmer as a person who, "received more
than 80 percent of such person's gross income during the taxable year of such person immedi-
ately preceding the taxable year of such person during which the case under this title concern-
ing such person was commenced from a farming operation owned or operated by such person."
154, 680 F.2d at 718.
155. II U.S.C. § 2 5 (a)(10) (1976).
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nation, and thus, came within the protection of the statute.' 5 6 Therefore,
the Tenth Circuit refused to accept Beery's claim that his fifth amendment
rights were infringed upon by the order requiring his testimony.
157
Beery's constitutional privilege was protected by section 25(a)(10) for
compelled testimony'- 8 even though Beery was not expressly granted immu-
nity at the time his answers were compelled. The immunity was indepen-
dently granted under the statute. The Tenth Circuit court held that no
infringement of the bankrupt's fifth amendment rights had been
demonstrated. '
5 9
Although not involved in the Beefy decision, the Tenth Circuit noted
that section 25(a)(10) was repealed under the Reform Act. 160  Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, in order for a witness to be ordered to testify before
a bankruptcy court over the assertion of a fifth amendment privilege, the
United States Attorney must request an immunity order from the district
court. The witness could be required to testify if immunity were granted. If
not, the witness could claim his privilege against self-incrimination.
16'
IV. CASE DIGESTS
A. Assignment of Unearned Insurance Premiums Under the Truth In Lending Act
In 1980, the Tenth Circuit in James v. FordMotor Credit Co.,' 6 2 and its
companion case, Hernandez v. O'Aleal Motors, Inc., 16 3 held that the assignments
of unearned automobile damage insurance premiums are not security inter-
ests under the Truth In Lending Act (the Act),' 64 and do not have to be
disclosed by the sellers in the installment contract.' 65  The plaintiff-
purchasers filed a joint petition for certiorari. 166 While the petition was
pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Anderson Brothers Ford v.
Valencza 167 in accordance with the Tenth Circuit's holdings in James and
Hernandez that an assignment of unearned insurance premiums does not cre-
ate a security interest under the Act.
The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the Tenth Circuit's Her-
156. The appellate court noted that immunity under 11 U.S.C. § 25(a)(10) has not been
granted to bankrupts in all bankruptcy proceedings. 680 F.2d at 719. See, e.g., White v. United
States, 30 F.2d 590, 592-93 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 872 (1929) (bankrupt had testified
voluntarily).
157. 680 F.2d at 720. See 11 U.S.C. § 25(a)(10) (1976); IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
7.21[l] (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978).
158. The Beery court relied on Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The constitu-
tional problem is discussed further in United States v. Beery, 678 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1982).
159. 680 F.2d at 720.
160. Id. at 720 n.18. The statute, II U.S.C. § 25(a)(10) (1976), was repealed by 11 U.S.C.
§ 344 (Supp. IV 1980).
161. 11 U.S.C. § 344 (Supp. IV 1980), which applies 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980) to bankruptcy proceedings.
162. 638 F.2d 147 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 453 U.S. 901 (1981).
163. 638 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 453 U.S. 901 (1981).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976) as implemented under Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1982).
165. For a discussion of these cases see Overview, Commercial Law, Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit
Survey, 59 DEN. L.J. 227 (1982).:
166. James v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 453 U.S. 901 (1981) (cert. granted).
167. 452 U.S. 205 (1981).
[Vol. 60:2
COMMERCIAL LAW
nandez 168 decision insofar as it directed dismissal against the petitioners and
remanded on the question of alternative bases for liability against the auto-
mobile sellers on the automobile installment contracts that were not consid-
ered by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 169 On remand, the Tenth
Circuit in Brown v. Frontier Ford, Inc.,' 70 found the Supreme Court's directive
to consider the issue of alternative bases for liability "puzzling" because that
issue had never been presented to the court of appeals and was raised for the
first time in the plaintiff-purchasers' petition for rehearing.'
7 '
The Tenth Circuit deferred to the Supreme Court's holdings that "the
requirement of finality is to be practically rather than technically con-
strued."' 172 The court remanded the cases back to the district court for fur-
ther consideration of all issues, including alternative bases of liability, except
those based on the question of whether assignments of unearned automobile
insurance premiums were security interests. 
173
In the unpublished decision of Quandelacy V. Wayne Lovelady's Frontier Ford,
Inc., 174 the Tenth Circuit held it has become "firmly established" that an
assignment of returned or unearned premiums for physical damage automo-
bile insurance is not a security interest. Under the Truth in Lending Act,
such an assignment is not required to be disclosed on the face of the automo-
bile installment sales contract. 175 The court remanded the case to the dis-
trict court with directions to dismiss. Thus, the controversy concerning
disclosure under the Truth In Lending Act for assignments of unearned in-
surance premiums in an automobile installment contract appears to be set-
tled in the Tenth Circuit.
B. Postmaturity Interest Charge Not Within Usury Statute
In Smith Machtneiry, Co., Inc. v. Jenkins 176 a promissory note that provided
for a postmaturity interest rate above the statutory usury limit was held not
to be within the purview of the usury statute. Jenkins, the defendant-pur-
chaser, appealed to the Tenth Circuit court claiming that under New Mex-
ico statutes1 77 the postmaturity rate was usurious, requiring a forfeiture of
168. Nine cases involving purchaser-plaintiffs suing sellers or lenders under the Truth-in-
Lending Act were consolidated with Hernandez v. O'Neal Motors, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 491 (D.
N.M. 1979) including petitioners Jackson and Delores Brown, the named plaintiffs in Brown v.
Frontier Ford, Inc., 666 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 1981) which was remanded to the Tenth Circuit
during the period covered by this survey.
169. James v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 453 U.S. 901 (1981).
170. 666 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 1981) (the Hernandez case was not involved in the Supreme
Court remand).
171. Id. at 1293.
172. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964); Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949).
173. 666 F.2d at 1293.
174. No. 80-1452 (10th Cir. Nov. 16, 1981).
175. See Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205 (1981).
176. 654 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1981).
177. The New Mexico usury statute at issue is as follows:
Rates of Interest Allowed-Minimum Charge.-The interest rate shall be the rate agreed to
by the parties, except that [it] shall not exceed ten percent (10%) per annum computed
upon unpaid balances for the actual elapsed time during which such balances ... are
unpaid where the evidence of indebtedness is secured by collateral security ....
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the entire amount of interest charged on the note.'
78
The promissory note at issue required repayment in two annual install-
ments. The note bore an interest rate of ten percent until maturity and a
rate of twelve percent after maturity.' 7 9 The maximum interest rate allowed
by law at that time was ten percent. 180 Jenkins failed to make the first pay-
ment on the note and Smith Machinery brought an action seeking a judg-
ment on the note and court authorization to repossess the collateral.
81 The
lower court directed a verdict in favor of Smith Machinery.
The issue on appeal was whether postmaturity interest rates are covered
by the usury laws of New Mexico. The Tenth Circuit court followed estab-
lished case law in its holding that if the usury statute is silent, limitations on
interest rates charged do not apply to postmaturity charges.' 82 Such
postmaturity charges are deemed penalties for nonpayment rather than
charges for the use of money and are not subject to usury laws.' 8 3 However,
the appellate court noted that such charges may be considered usurious
when the usury law limits interest rates that can be applied on the "deten-
tion" as well as the use of money. 184 The New Mexico statutes at issue de-
note consensual agreements between the parties,' 8 5 indicating that a
withholding or detention by the borrower that is not consented to by the
lender is outside the purview of the usury statute.'
86
The Tenth Circuit held that the mere fact the parties agreed to a
postmaturity interest rate will not make the arrangement a "forbearance" of
payment subject to the usury statute.' 87 The promissory note did not allow
Jenkins to defer payment until after maturity. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit
court held that the situation was a "detention" of money rather than a "for-
bearance," and was not covered by the usury statute. 188
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-6-16 (1953).
178. The penalty statute for usury provides that:
The taking, receiving, reserving or charging a rate of interest greater than that allowed
by this act, when knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire amount of
such interest which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries with it or which has
been agreed to be paid thereon ...
Id. § 50-6-18 (1953).
179. 654 F.2d at 694.
180. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-6-16 (1953).
181. 654 F.2d at 695.
182. Id. at 696.
183. See, e.g., In re Tastyeast, Inc., 126 F.2d 879 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 696 (1942);
Scientific Prods. v. Cyto Medical Lab., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Conn. 1978).
184. 654 F.2d at 696 (citing Ulviden v. Sorhen, 58 S.D. 444, 237 N.W. 565 (1931)).
185. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-9A (1978) specifies the scope of the usury statutes.
[N]o person, corporation or association, directly or indirectly, shall take, reserve, re-
ceive, or charge any interest, discount, or other advantage for the loan of money or
credit or the forbearance or postponement of the right to receive money or credit except at the
rates permitted in Sections 56-8-1 through 56-8-21 NMSA 1978.
Id. (emphasis added).
186. 654 F.2d at 696.
187. Id.
188. Id. See Ferguson v. Electric Power Bd., 378 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), aft'd, 511
F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1975).
The defendant-purchaser also argued that he had paid the debt by delivering a bill of
lading for the machinery to a Smith Machinery salesman the evening before trial and, without
the company's consent, had placed it with common carrier to be shipped to the company. The
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C. Sale of Repossessed Homes Excluded From Uniform Consumer Credit Code
In Circle o. Jim Walter Homes, Inc.,' 8 9 the Tenth Circuit court held that
the sale of repossessed shell homes, financed at annual rates of ten percent or
less, are not consumer credit sales subject to the Oklahoma Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code (UCCC).' 90 The appeal involved consolidated class ac-
tions brought in federal court under its diversity jurisdiction against Jim
Walter Corp. and its subsidiaries.' 9' The members of the class were pur-
chasers of defendant's shell homes who contended that the defendant was
liable for violations of the Oklahoma UCCC because negotiable instruments
were taken as evidence of the purchasers' indebtedness in the sales
transactions. 192
Jim Walter Corp. built shell homes on real properties owned by the
purchaser-plaintiffs. The facts indicated that when credit sales were made,
negotiable notes were used to evidence the purchasers' indebtedness and
mortgages were taken on the real estate to secure the debt. In the event of
default, the repossessed homes and accompanying land were sold to new
buyers, often also on credit arrangements. The Oklahoma version of the
UCCC states that in a consumer credit sale, the seller may not take a negoti-
able instrument other than a check, as evidence of the obligation of the
buyer.19 3 A consumer credit sale includes the sale of "goods, services, or an
interest in land."'
94
The district court in Oklahoma held that the sales are not consumer
sales under the Oklahoma UCCC, and are excluded as sales of an interest in
land financed at ten percent or less.' 9 5 The appellant-purchasers argued
that this exclusion was inapplicable because the property was sold by a con-
tract for deed whereby, under Oklahoma law, no equitable or legal interest
passed until the buyers had fully performed. 196 In addition, the buyers ar-
gued that the original sales consisted only of the shell homes, which are
"goods" under the UCCC, and would retain that characteristic even though
the homes were repossessed and resold along with the underlying land.' 9 7
Tenth Circuit court held this insufficient proof that Smith Machinery had accepted it in pay-
ment of the debt. 654 F.2d at 697.
189. 654 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1981).
190. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-101 (West 1972).
191. 654 F.2d at 689. The resjudicata effect of a foreclosure suit followed by a judicial sale
was raised on appeal but will not be discussed herein.
192. Although three classes of purchasers were discussed by the trial court, only members of
Class I will be discussed herein. The members of Class I were purchasers of the repossessed
homes. 654 F.2d at 689-90. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-104(2)(b) (West 1972).
193. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-403 (West 1972) provides that: "In a consumer credit
sale or consumer lease, other than a sale or lease primarily for an agricultural purpose, the seller
or lessor may not take a negotiable instrument other than a check as evidence of the obligation of the buyer or
lessee." Id. (emphasis added).
194. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-104 (West 1972).
195. The statute, in pertinent part, excludes from the UCCC:
[Al sale of an interest in land if the credit service charge does not exceed ten percent (10%) peryear
calculated according to the Actuarial Method on the unpaid balances of the amount
financed on the assumption that the debt will be paid according to the agreed terms
and will not be paid before the end of the agreed term.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-104(2)(b) (West 1972) (emphasis added).




The Tenth Circuit panel affirmed the lower court in holding that the
sales by contract for deed were excluded from the UCCC. The appellate
court, relying on Tenth Circuit precedent,' 98 held that "regardless of when
legal title to land passes, the land is deemed to have been 'purchased' upon
the execution of a binding contract for deed."' 9 9 Oklahoma statutes are in
accord with this finding.2° ° In addition, the official comment to section 104
of the UCCC 20 explains that the ten percent interest rate exclusion was
intended to exclude home mortgages from UCCC coverage, while retaining
UCCC coverage of the higher interest rate, smaller type of real estate
loans.
202
The appellant-purchasers' argument that the shell homes were "goods"
under the UCCC despite being resold with the underlying property was eas-
ily dismissed by the Tenth Circuit court based on the general property law
rule that a building erected upon a tract of land becomes part of the land.
20 3
Thus, the sale of repossessed homes in transactions involving annual finance
charges of ten percent or less are excluded from the UCCC under Oklahoma
law.
Rebecca L. Wilcox
198. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 462 F.2d 908, 910 (10th Cir. 1972)
(court rejected the Internal Revenue Service's argument that no "purchase" occurred until deed
was delivered after full performance in contract for deed sale).
199. 654 F.2d at 690.
200. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-105(b) (West 1972) (sale of an interest in land includes
lease with option to purchase).
201. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. § 2-104(2)(b) (West 1972).
202. 654 F.2d at 690.
203. Id. at 691. See Shelton v. Jones, 66 Okla. 83, 167 P. 458, 460 (1917); Mid-State Homes,
Inc. v. Martin, 465 P.2d 791 (Okla. Ct. App. 1969).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND CIVIL RIGHTS
OVERVIEW
During the period covered by this survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals was presented with a variety of cases in the area of constitutional
law and civil rights. The majority of the cases arose under either section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. There were, however, several significant decisions in the areas of free-
dom of religion, freedom of speech and expression, and the right of the judi-
ciary to review military decisions.
I. SECTION 1983 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871
A. Basis for Liability
Congress, in 42 U.S.C. § 1983,' has provided a remedy for the depriva-
tion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
2
The party seeking relief must "demonstrate that he was deprived of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that any such
deprivation was achieved under color of law.
' '3
1. Due Process and Deprivation of Property
A basic concept of constitutional law is that due process must be af-
forded individuals in actions designed to deprive them of property.4 The
initial inquiry focuses on whether a property interest exists. Once a property
right is established, the scope of the due process protections may be ascer-
tained. Poolaw v. City ofAnadarko5 involved an American Indian who, after
being fired from the city's police force, was not reinstated after the police
review board determined that his termination was improper. Poolaw
claimed that he was subjected to employment discrimination due to his race
in violation of section 19816 and Title VII. 7 Poolaw also asserted a section
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). This section provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress....
2. Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 1980); see also Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
3. Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 1980); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976); Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
4. U.S. CONST. amend V.
5. 660 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1981).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). He alleged certain improper employment practices: "dis-
criminatory job classifications, promotional practices, and rates of pay." 660 F.2d at 461. Poo-
law also asserted that the city's failure to reinstate him after the review board found his
discharge improper to be "racially discriminatory because a Caucasian police officer was rein-
stated under similar circumstances." Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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1983 cause of action claiming he was denied equal protection and due pro-
cess of the law through the official conduct of the city.' The district court
dismissed the action for failure to state a claim.
The court of appeals reversed the district court's finding that Poolaw
failed to state a claim under section 1981. The court noted that section 1981
provides a remedy for employment discrimination on the basis of race, 9
whether it is from the public or private sector.10 Finding the existence of a
property right to be "irrelevant to a claim of denial or equal employment
because of race under section 1981," the court held that the allegation of
purposeful employment discrimination on account of the plaintiffs race, was
sufficient to state a claim. 1
Turning to the denial of due process claims,' 2 the court held that state
law must be examined to determine if Poolaw had " 'a legitimate claim of
entitlement to his position,' 13 or a " 'sufficient expectancy of continued em-
ployment to constitute a property interest.' ",14 This holding reversed the
District Court of Oklahoma which relied upon DeBono v. Vizas '5 and Montera
v. Mzias.' 6 In the consolidated cases of DeBono and Montera, the Tenth Cir-
cuit court held that due to the city manager's unfettered discretion regarding
police employment and cause for dismissal, no property interest was cre-
ated.' 7 In contrast, the Poolaw court held that because the Anadarko City
Charter specifically stated that a policeman may not be discharged without
cause, and provided for an independent, objective, and final decision of the
issue through administrative and judicial procedures, Poolaw did have a suf-
ficient interest in continued employment to require due process. 18
In Atencio v. Board of Education, 19 rather than examine the nature of a
property right, the court focused on the issue of the scope of due process
protections. Atencio was dismissed from his position as superintendent of
the school district by the Board of Education. The Board failed to follow the
prescribed conference procedures that were to precede termination. Regula-
8. 660 F.2d at 461.
9. Id. (citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975)).
10. 660 F.2d at 462.
11. Id.
12. In addressing the plaintiff's claims that the defendants deprived him of equal protec-
tion, the court held that: "[Tihe constitutional right to equal protection with regard to public
employment does not depend on the existence of a property interest in that employment." Id
The court found the same allegations that supported the plaintiff's claims under § 1981 were
sufficient to state an equal protection claim under § 1983. Id.
13. 660 F.2d at 463 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
14. 660 F.2d at 463 (quoting Hall v. O'Keefe, 617 P.2d 196, 200 (Okla. 1980)).
15. No. 77-1299 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 1978).
16. No. 77-1300 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 1978).
17. 660 F.2d at 463. In these cases the court applied a Colorado statute (COLO. REV.
STAT. § 31-4-213(2) (1973)) which creates a protected property interest in certain city jobs.
18. Because the question of the existence of a property interest in Poolaw is a question of
state law, the court determined the Oklahoma Supreme Court, if it were to decide the issue,
would find such an interest did exist in the case. 660 F.2d at 464. The court based its determi-
nation upon the holding of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Hall v. O'Keefe, 617 P.2d 196
(Okla. 1980). "[Tlhe terms of employment established by an employee... may create a suffi-
cient expectancy of continued employment to constitute a property interest which must be af-
forded constitutionally guaranteed due process." Id. at 200.
19. 658 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1981).
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tions provide that prior to notification of discharge for unsatisfactory work
performance, each employee is entitled to two or more conferences with
school personnel. 20 This requirement, Atencio argued, created a property
interest protected by the federal Constitution.
2 1
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a jury verdict for
Atencio, and dismissed the case for failure to establish the federal claim. In
addressing the necessity of following the procedures set forth in the regula-
tions, the court adopted the rationale of the Sixth Circuit: "[A] breach of
state procedural requirements is not, in and of itself, a violation of the Due
Process Clause."' 22 Noting that an " 'action under the civil rights statutes is
not a plenary review of a challenged state administrative procedure,' ",23 the
court found the proper avenue for review was that provided by New Mexico
law. 2 4 A federal constitutional violation would exist if Atencio was "denied
a fair forum for protecting his state rights."'2 5 The court of appeals, however,
found the procedure to be sufficient under the due process clause.
26
In Phelps v. Kansas Supreme Court, 27 the court examined what process is
due in a disciplinary action against an attorney. The Kansas Supreme
Court had upheld a Review Panel's finding of four violations of Kansas dis-
ciplinary standards by Phelps. In addition, the court found a fifth violation
that was not specified in the complaint. 28 In light of both the evidence
before it and Phelp's prior disciplinary history, he was disbarred. Phelps
filed a section 1983 suit in federal district court alleging a denial of due pro-
cess. Phelps claimed the addition of a violation, of which he had no notice
or opportunity to defend, constituted a deprivation of property without due
process of law. The district court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss.
2 9
The Tenth Circuit court held that due process was not violated. 30 The
fact that the Kansas Supreme Court found one statutory and three ethical
20. Id at 777.
21. Id
22. Id. at 779. In Bates v. Sponberg, 547 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1976), the court held:
It is not every disregard of its regulations by a public agency that gives rise to a
cause of action for violation of constitutional rights. Rather, it is only when the
agency's disregard of its rules results in a procedure which in itself impinges upon due
process rights that a federal court should intervene in the decisional processes of state
institutions.
Id at 329-30.
23. 658 F.2d at 779 (quoting Whitsel v. Southeast Local School Dist., 484 F.2d 1222, 1227
(6th Cir. 1973)).
24. 658 F.2d at 779.
25. Id at 780.
26. Id (citing Harrah Independent School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 197-98 (1979);
Prebble v. Broderick, 535 F.2d 605, 617 (10th Cir. 1976)).
27. 662 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 198 1),cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2009 (1982).
28. 662 F.2d at 650. The Review Board's findings were: I) dishonest conduct in violation
of DR 1-102(A)(4); 2) conduct prejudicial to the administration ofjustice in violation of DR I-
102(A)(5); 3) false statements in violation of DR 7-102(A)(5); and 4) signing a pleading in bad
faith in violation of a Kansas statute. The fifth violation, found by the supreme court, was a
violation of DR 7.102(A)(1) (prohibition against action which serves to harass or maliciously
injure another). Id
29. Id
30. Id at 652.
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violations arising out of the same incident, any one sufficient to sustain the
disbarment decision, enabled the Tenth Circuit to find no due process viola-
tions.3 ' As additional support for this holding, the court noted that "[tihe
evidence supporting the additional violation was the same as that supporting
the other ethical violations."' 32 The court likened this case to a criminal case
with multiple charges and the imposition of a general sentence. "[The] sen-
tence may be upheld if conviction on any one of the counts is
supportable."
33
In his dissent, Judge McKay objected to the majority's assumption that
the Kansas Supreme Court would have disbarred Phelps regardless of the
additional violations found. He argued that this assumption allowed the
majority to distinguish improperly the United States Supreme Court case of
In Re Rufalo.34 In Ruffalo the Court held that the "absence of fair notice as
to the reach of the grievance procedure and the precise nature of the charges
deprived [the attorney] of procedural due process."' 35 Judge McKay viewed
the majority's distinction that Ruffalo "involved two distinct incidents, only
one of which was charged," whereas Phelps involved "several charges grow-
ing out of the same incident, '36 as a distinction without a difference in a due
process analysis.
3 7
Rodziewicz v. Widener38 involved a prisoner's claim that his watch was
broken by the jail authorities while he was in custody. When the authorities
denied breaking the watch and refused to reimburse him, he sued for forty-
five dollars, alleging deprivation of property without due process. 39 In its
decision, the Tenth Circuit relied upon the recent Supreme Court case, Par-
rafl v. Taylor.4° Under Parrall if the deprivation was unintentional or did not
occur as a result of established state procedures, and the state provided a
remedy that met the requirements of due process, no claim was stated under
section 1983.4 1 The Tenth Circuit found both prongs of the test were met
and dismissed the constitutional claim.
42
2. First Amendment
In Owens v. Rush ,'43 the plaintiff appealed from a dismissal of a claim
that the defendants fired him from his position as under-sheriff in retaliation
for helping his wife file a Title VII discrimination action against the sheriff's
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id (citing Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 115 (1959)).
34. 390 U.S. 544, modied, 392 U.S. 919 (1968).
35. 390 U.S. at 552.
36. 662 F.2d at 652 (McKay J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 653.
38. No. 81-2290 (10th Cir. Feb. 11, 1982).
39. Id slip op. at 2.
40. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
41. Id at 543. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(1)(b) (1973) exempts from sovereign immu-
nity the prosecution of tortious claims arising from the operation of a penitentiary such as
Rodziewicz' claim.
42. No. 81-2290, slip op. at 3.
43. 654 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981).
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department. 4 4 Both Owens and his wife held positions in the sheriff's de-
partment. Anne Owens began legal proceedings against the Board of
County Commissioners for unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate
pay scales. Prior to her filing the lawsuit in federal court alleging violations
of numerous constitutional and statutory rights, Owens and his wife received
termination notices.
45
Owens claimed that the defendants' action violated his first amendment
right to free speech and association and interfered with a protected property
interest, his public employment.46 After determining that Owens did not
have a vested interest or property right in his position, the district court,
following the reasoning of Abeyta v. Town of Taos, dismissed the case.47 In
Abeyta, the Tenth Circuit held that former municipal employees had no pro-
tected property interest in their position unless circumstances indicated a
continued right to employment; absent a property interest in their employ-
ment due process was not required prior to termination. 48
In its decision in Owens, the Tenth Circuit noted the difference between
a procedural due process claim and a first amendment claim. While proce-
dural due process requires a property interest to trigger constitutional pro-
tections, a free speech claim under the first amendment does not.49 "The
First Amendment clearly affords protection against action penalizing or in-
hibiting the exercise of such constitutional rights, even absent a contractual
or tenure right to continued employment. '50 The Abeyta holding was inap-
plicable to the facts due to its reliance on the lack of a protected property or
liberty interest to sustain aprocedural due process claim. 5' Because " 'assist-
ing' litigation vindicating civil rights; attending meetings on necessary legal
steps; and associating for the purpose of assisting persons seeking legal re-
dress [are] 'modes of expression and association protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.. ,' "52 the appellate court reversed the district
court's dismissal of Owen's first amendment claim.
The court of appeals discussed the first amendment and its relation to
public employment more thoroughly in Chdlders v. Independent School Distrlct
No. /.53 Childers was a tenured teacher who claimed that he was involunta-
rily reassigned by the Board of Education in retaliation for exercising his
constitutional right to support a board candidate and to organize a teachers'
union. In his claim under section 1983, he argued that the reassignment
denied him a property interest without according him any due process pro-
44. Id. at 1372.
45. Id at 1373.
46. Id at 1377-78.
47. 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974).
48. Id Se. also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).
49. 654 F.2d at 1379 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972)).
50. 654 F.2d at 1379.
51. Id
52. Id (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 420-21, 428-29 (1962)). See also In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1977); Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
53. 676 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1982).
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tections. He also alleged impermissible infringement of his first amendment
rights.
5 4
In disposing of the due process claim, the Tenth Circuit court recog-
nized that while a tenured teacher has "a property right in continued em-
ployment [under Oklahoma law] he does not have a property interest in any
particular position."'55 By separating the right to continued employment
from the right to retain the same position, the court in Childers found that,
under Oklahoma law, a tenured teacher can be demoted with a consequent
reduction in salary without activating constitutional due process considera-
tions.56 Thus, the district court's dismissal was proper.
Turning to Childer's first amendment claim, the court recognized the
necessity of balancing the competing interests involved. While "[plublic em-
ployment may not be conditioned upon relinquishment of the right to en-
gage in activities protected by the First Amendment," 5 7 the state's interests
in regulating the speech of its employees differs significantly from its interests
in the regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.58 Quoting the
Supreme Court's test in Pickerng v. Board of Education59 and its own decision
in Key v. Rutherford,6° the court balanced the employee's private interest in
"commenting upon matters of public concern" with the interest of the em-
ployer, the state, "in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees."'6 1  If the employer can show that an
unrestricted exercise of first amendment rights will cause a significant dis-
ruption, the employee's rights will be limited to accommodate the state's
interest. Nevertheless, if the employee's activities are protected under Picker-
ing and Key, he must prove that his activities motivated the employer to
alter his employment status. The burden is placed on the employer to show
that he would have made the same decision in the absence of the protected
activity.62 The fact that Childer's employment was not terminated did not
foreclose his section 1983 claim. "Retaliation that takes the form of altered
employment conditions instead of termination may nonetheless be an uncon-
stitutional infringement of a protected activity."'63 In light of this holding,
the court reversed the district court's dismissal of this claim.
A first amendment analysis was also applied in the context of refusal to
renew athletic scholarships at a public university. Marcum v. Dah/64 involved
a suit by several members of the women's basketball team at the University
of Oklahoma who alleged that they were deprived of their scholarships as a
result of their exercise of their first amendment right of free speech. They
54. Id at 1340-41.




59. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
60. 645 F.2d 880, 884 (10th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of this case, see Constitutional Law
and Civil Rights, Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit Survq, 59 DEN. L.J. 239, 243 (1982).
61. 676 F.2d at 1341.
62. Id.
63. Id at 1342.
64. 658 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1981).
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also alleged a deprivation of property rights without due process.65 During
the 1977-78 season, the plaintiffs told the athletic director they were opposed
to the continued employment of their coach. After the season had ended,
they voiced the same objection to the press, stating they would not play if the
coach was retained. Subsequently, their scholarships were not renewed. 66
The district court judge granted the defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and dismissed the action.
6 7
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court's finding that the wo-
men's comments to the press were "not of general public concern" and as
such, did not warrant constitutional protection. 68 The comments to the ath-
letic director were not protected speech because they were "statements at the
school on the internal affairs of the school system [and] do not invoke First
Amendment protection."' 69 Thus, the plaintiffs' first amendment rights were
not violated.
The plaintiffs also contended that the refusal to renew their scholarships
deprived them of a property right without due process. The plaintiffs were
notified twice of the decision not to renew the scholarships and were given a
right to a hearing before the effective date of the scholarships. After the
second notification, the plaintiffs requested a hearing, but subsequently
withdrew the request. A hearing was held, however, with notification to the
plaintiffs' counsel, but no appearance was made. 70 In response to plaintiffs'
argument that a hearing was required before the decision not to renew was
made, the court quoted Fuentes v. Shevtn: 71 " '[I]f the right to notice and
hearing is to serve its full purpose, then it is clear that it must be granted at a
time when the deprivation can still be prevented.' "72 Due to the fact that
the hearing was "in ample time" prior to the effective date of the scholar-
ships, the court found no denial of due process and upheld the dismissal of
this claim. 73 To have held otherwise would have enabled an employee to
make any unprotected in-house statement and then protect himself by going
public in the press or other media.
3. Privacy Interests-Family
The Supreme Court has recognized that the relationship between a par-
65. Id at 733.
66. Id
67. Id
68. Id at 734.
69. Id The Tenth Circuit court, in dicta, apparently analogized a student on an athletic
scholarship at a public university to a public employee.
The exercise of a constitutionally protected right by a public employee does not serve
as a curative for all prior misconduct during the course of employment. A public
employee cannot expunge all prior transgressions from his employment record by
merely exercising a constitutional right. A discharge for exercise of first amendment
rights is impermissible. . . . The exercise of a first amendment right, however, does
not insulate a public employee from being discharged for occurrences prior to the
exercise of the right. (citations omitted).
Id
70. Id at 735.
71. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
72. 658 F.2d at 735 (quoting Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81).
73. 658 F.2d at 735.
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ent and child is constitutionally protected and that interference with that
relationship may give rise to a section 1983 action.7 4 While recognizing this
protection, Wise v. Bravo 75 demonstrates that not all interferences with these
rights rise to a constitutional level.
Wise involved an attempt by several police officers, including Bravo, to
enter Wise's home to retrieve his daughter and return her to her mother.
Wise's daughter was visiting him with the mother's permission. The mother,
however, had changed her mind and wanted the child back sooner than they
had originally agreed. Wise initially refused Officer Bravo entry to his
home, but then allowed him to enter when another officer indicated they
were there in their official capacity.76 Wise sued under section 1983 for in-
terference with his visitation rights, for an assault, and trespass. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the assault
and trespass claims, and dismissed the other claims.
77
In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit court reviewed several United States
Supreme Court decisions that recognized the existence of a fundamental in-
terest in personal rights. 78 The court, however, found "no substantive fed-
eral constitutional, statutory or common law governing family relationships,
including matters of custody and visitation rights between parents and chil-
dren." 79 This area was found to be uniquely within the state's power, sub-
ject to review under the fourteenth amendment.81° Colorado law provided
the plaintiff with several remedies."'
In upholding the trial court's dismissal of the claim for interference with
his visitation rights, the court held that although the officers' actions may
have constituted tortious interference with Wise's rights, the interference did
not rise to a constitutional level. Similarly, the court viewed the allegations
of assault and battery as a type of tort not actionable under section 1983
74. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1977) (right of unwed father to intervene in the
adoption proceedings of his child if he has sought custody of or shouldered significant responsi-
bility for the child); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (right of an expec-
tant mother to continue to teach as long as she is able); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
(right of an unwed father to a hearing on his fitness before his children are removed from his
custody after death of the mother); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (divorced father
to be given notice of any adoption proceeding regarding his children to enable him to contest
the adoption); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate is a basic right).
75. 666 F.2d 1328 (10th Cir. 1981).
76. Id at 1330.
77. Id at 1330-31.
78. Id at 1331. The court cited: Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 645 (1972); Arm-
strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
79. 666 F.2d at 1332.
80. Id. The court noted that "§ 1983 should not be viewed as a vehicle to resolve a dispute
involving visitation rights-privileges. That is a subject uniquely reserved to the state court sys-
tem. Any claim for relief that Wise may have exists under Colorado law and in the Colorado
state system." Id at 1333.
81. The court cited the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-10-
129 (1973) (provides visitation rights to the noncustodial parent); id. § 14-10-121 (enforcement




unless the Aggrieved individual's deprivation rises to a constitutional level.
This occurs only when the actions cause severe injuries or are "grossly dispro-
portionate to the need for action under the circumstances and [are] inspired
by malice. . . amounting to an abuse of official power that shocks the con-
science . *..."82 When the interference rises to this level, a claim under sec-
tion 1983 is made. Finding that Wise failed to allege conduct that met this
criteria, the court upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment.
33
4. Statutory Rights
Phsht'n v. Regents of Un'vers'y of Colorado,8 4 was a suit under section 1983,
by a doctor with multiple sclerosis, alleging that the University had discrimi-
nated against him in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (Act).8 5 Pushkin alleged that the medical school had denied him ad-
mission to the psychiatric residency program solely due to his handicap. The
University appealed the trial court's ruling, that Pushkin was "an otherwise
qualified handicapped individual who had been excluded from a program
receiving federal funds solely by reason of his handicap," and was entitled to
admission to the program.8 6 The Regents' appeal was based primarily on
their contentions that section 504 does not provide for a private right of
action.8 7 Whether a private right of action exists under section 504 is critical
because without it Pushkin would have had no standing to bring the action
under section 1983.
Section 504 is silent as to whether a private right of action exists.88 In
holding that a private right of action does exist, the Tenth Circuit court
noted that the Supreme Court had suggested that such a right exists8 9 and
that "[e]very court of appeals and district court .. .which considered [the]
question [have] held that a private right of action exists under the statute."
°
The Tenth Circuit court also examined the legislative history, finding that it
expressly "permit[ted] a judicial remedy through a private action."9' Addi-
tionally, the Cort v. Ash9 2 test for determining the existence of an implied
82. Id. at 1333.
83. Id
84. 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The statute reads in part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined by
section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
86. 658 F.2d at 1376. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 504 F. Supp. 1292, 1299
(D. Colo.) ajfd, 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
87. The other grounds for appeal were that Pushkin failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies and that the trial court's decision was erroneous. 658 F.2d at 1376.
88. Id at 1376-80.
89. Campbell v. Kruse, 434 U.S. 808 (1977).
90. 658 F.2d at 1377 (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit, in Coleman v. Darden, 595
F.2d 533 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979) recognized that a private right of action
may be available under § 504.
91. 658 F.2d at 1379. Se SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, REHABILITA-
TION ACT AMENDS. OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40, repn'ntedin 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6390-91.
92. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The test uses four inquiries:
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private right of action was met. 93
Finally, the court adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Cannon
v. University of Chicago,94 which held that because Title IX of the Civil Rights
Act was patterned after Title VI of the same Act, the implied private right of
action for discrimination in Title VI should be read into Title IX. 95 By
analogy, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that because section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act was also patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, the
implied private right of action should extend to section 504.96
Turning to the defendants' contention of failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies, the court held that all of the administrative remedies available
under the act need not be exhausted prior to bringing the suit. 97 The court's
rationale was that a party should not have to pursue a remedy irrelevant to
his particular needs. The Act provides for the possible termination of federal
funding for any organization in violation of the Act. If Dr. Pushkin were to
pursue and succeed with this course of action, it would not remedy the dis-
crimination. On the contrary, it would severely damage, if not destroy, the
program into which he was attempting to obtain admission.9
The final, and perhaps most significant question resolved by the court,
concerned the proper standard of review to be applied under the Rehabilita-
tion Act. The court rejected the University's contention that because no
suspect class, fundamental right, or irrebuttable presumption was involved,
the rational basis test should be applied. 99 Rather, the court interpreted the
statute as providing its own criteria for evaluating claims. The individual
must prove that he is otherwise qualified for the position sought and that he
was rejected solely on the basis of his handicap. 100 Pushkin met his burden of
proof, and the district court's order of injunction was affirmed. 10 1
B. Procedural Problems Under Section 1983
1. Statute of Limitations
Congress did not provide for a statute of limitations for suits brought
under section 1983. Therefore, the federal courts will generally apply the
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was en-
acted"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second,
is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a
remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on
federal law? (citations omitted).
Id at 78.
93. 658 F.2d at 1378.
94. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
95. Id at 709.
96. 658 F.2d at 1379-80.
97. Id at 1382.
98. Id at 1381-82.
99. Id. at 1383. This test would have allowed the University to discriminate if it could
articulate a rational basis behind its actions.
100. Id. at 1385.
101. Id at 1387-91.
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state statute of limitations applicable to the most analogous state action.' 0 2
However, in Childers v. Independent School Distrct No. 1, 103 the court of appeals
followed the Supreme Court's holding in Occidental Life Insurance Co. v.
EEOC 104 Occidental requires courts to look beyond the superficial require-
ments of the state statute to the underlying policies and compare them with
the policies of section 1983.105 The court drew a distinction between a state
right and a constitutional right, and stated that a statute of limitations
should be selected that is "sufficiently generous in the time periods to pre-
serve the remedial spirit of federal civil rights actions."' 10 6 An action seeking
to vindicate a federally created right should not be governed by the "proce-
dural hoops" required for state tort cases.
10 7
2. Standing to Sue Under Section 1983
Dohaish o. Tooley 108 illustrates the distinction between the concepts of
cause of action and standing. In Dohaish, the plaintiff not only failed to
present a cause of action, but could not establish standing to maintain an
action. The case involved the death of Saud Dohaish, a Saudi Arabian stu-
dent who died as a result of a bar fight.' 0 9 Eddie Santistevan was arrested
and charged with first degree murder. Shortly after the preliminary hearing,
a prosecutor from the Denver District Attorney's office successfully moved to
dismiss the charges. Subsequently, Abdullah Dohaish, the decedant's father,
filed a section 1983 suit in federal district court, alleging that the district
attorney's refusal to prosecute stemmed from prejudice and violated the
fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act. The district court dis-
missed the action for lack of standing.1 10
The Tenth Circuit evaluated the strengths of Dohaish's section 1983
action on two grounds: standing and the legal sufficiency of the action.llI
The court found standing to be absent; a -section 1983 action is a personal
suit, maintainable only by the individual who suffered the violation of his
civil rights. The court also noted that the citizenry has no recognized right
to bring a lawsuit based upon the nonprosecution of another.i 12 The inabil-
102. Spiegel v. School District No. 1, Laramie County, 600 F.2d 264, 265 (10th Cir. 1979).
103. 676 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1982). This case is also discussed supra text accompanying
notes 51-63.
104. 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
105. 676 F.2d at 1342-43.
State legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in
mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law
will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies .... State
limitations periods will not be borrowed if their application would be inconsistent with
the underlying policies of the federal statute.
Id at 1342 (quoting Occidental, 432 U.S. at 367)).
106. 676 F.2d at 1343 (quoting Shouse v. Pierce County, 559 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.
1977)).
107. 676 F.2d at 1343 (quoting Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1162
(9th Cir. 1976) (en banc)).
108. 670 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 60 (1982).
109. 670 F.2d at 935-36.
110. Id at 936.
111. Id
112. Id at 937 (citing Linda S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)).
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ity of the father to prove that his civil rights were violated, barred him from
pursuing the action. 1 3 Additionally, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity
from suit regarding the discretionary decisions inherent in their jobs.
Dohaish had other remedies. He could file an action requesting the state
court to require good cause for dismissing the charge,' 14 and he could file a
wrongful death charge against Santistevan." 5
C. Prisoner Rights
In Daniels v. Gilbreath 116 the court set out the requisite test to be applied
when a prisoner asserts a section 1983 action based upon cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Jesse Daniels
died in the Oklahoma Eastern State Hospital, where he was sent from the
McCurtain County Jail for psychiatric evaluation concerning his compe-
tence to stand trial.'' 7 While Daniels was in jail he received no medical
attention." 8 Jesse's father, Hervie Daniels, received permission to take him
from the jail to the hospital where he was to be evaluated. The father spoke
with the treating physician concerning Daniel's prior medical history. He
attempted to tell the treating physician about his son's allergy to certain
medicines, but failed to communicate this information.11 9 When Jesse's be-
havior at the hospital became such that medication was required, he was
given a sedative and died shortly thereafter. The cause of death was never
established. 120
In reversing a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court of appeals held
that the actions of the sheriff and his department were too indirect to have
been considered a proximate cause of death. "[T]here were intervening acts
subsequent to the time [Daniels] left the jail which rendered their actions
legally remote causes--causes which do not qualify as proximate causes.'
1 2 1
Their actions were removed both temporally and spacially from the activi-
ties associated with Daniels' death. Additionally, he would have been trans-
ferred to the hospital regardless of whether he was given his medication at
the jail. The court also noted that the subsequent events were
unforeseeable. '
22
Regarding Dr. Garcia, the treating physician, the court relied on Estelle
v. Gamble,' 2 3 in holding that an act of medical malpractice does not necessar-
ily rise to the level of constitutional violation. The court indicated that the
plaintiff may assert a claim for medical malpractice in state court. 12 4 Only a
113. 670 F.2d at 937.
114. Id. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-5-204 (1973).
115. 670 F.2d at 938. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-202 (1973).
116. 668 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1982).
117. He was arrested for the robbery and assault of an elderly woman. d. at 478.
118. Id at 478-79.
119. Daniels asserted that the physician "walked away" from him, however, this was never
established. Id at 479, 488.
120. Id at 479.
121. Id at 479-80.
122. Id. at 480.
123. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
124. 668 F.2d at 482.
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deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment barred by the eighth amendment.1 25 The court
held the evidence failed to show that the defendant, Dr. Garcia, "by his
conduct or failure to act, created a condition which was the substantial cause
of death," or that his conduct was done deliberately.1
26
D. Remedies Under Section 1983
The Tenth Circuit, in Garrick v. City and County of Denver,12 7 addressed
several issues concerning punitive damages in a section 1983 suit. Garrick
sought actual and punitive damages for alleged violations of his constitu-
tional rights by Jones, a Denver police officer. Jones shot Garrick several
times during a scuffle following a traffic stop. The jury awarded Garrick
$20,500 in actual damages and $70,000 in punitive damages.' 28
On appeal, it was argued that the exemplary damage award was exces-
sive and that the jury misconceived the purpose of punitive damages. Find-
ing defendants' assertion that the punitive damage award was reviewable
only under Colorado standards meritless, the court held damages under fed-
eral civil rights statutes are to be governed by federal standards.' 29 This
view is harmonious with decisions of the First and Fifth Circuits. 130 "Puni-
tive damages may be awarded under section 1983 even where they would
not normally be recoverable under local law in the state where the violation
occurred."' 13 1 The court upheld the $70,000 verdict, finding that the award
was not so excessive or inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience. 132
While punitive damages are generally assessable in section 1983 actions,
the Tenth Circuit in Ray v. City of Edmond,' 33 narrowed the scope of their
applicability. Ray filed a section 1983 action against the City of Edmond,
Oklahoma, and four of its police officers, charging violations of his civil
rights during his arrest and detention. After the remittitur, the plaintiff re-
ceived one dollar nominal damages for each of the five defendants and a
total of $125,350 in punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees. The court
reversed the punitive damage award against the city.' 34 Relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc. ,'35 the appel-
125. Id at 481 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05).
126. 668 F.2d at 488. The court emphasized the difference between the proof required in a
§ 1983 action and a case alleging negligence. The 1983 action must prove that there was a
willful failure to give medical attention where it was necessary. "In some circumstances a reck-
less quality attending the conduct would suffice." Id
127. 652 F.2d 969 (10th Cir. 1981).
128. Id at 970.
129. Id at 971 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U.S. 229 (1969); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035
(1980)).
130. See McCulloch v. Glasgow, 620 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1980); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d
799 (lst Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
131. 652 F.2d at 971.
132. Id at 972.
133. 662 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
134. Id. at 680.
135. 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (neither historical nor policy considerations support the exposure
of municipalities to punitive damage liability for bad faith actions of employees).
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late court held that a municipality is immune from punitive damages in
section 1983 actions.'
36
II. CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII
The Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with employment discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act)' 3 7 were almost equally
divided between racial discrimination cases and sex discrimination cases.
The scope of the protection afforded by the Act was examined as well as
procedural issues.
A. Standards for a Atna Facie Case
The Tenth Circuit refined its interpretation of the criteria set out by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,138 for establishing a
prima facie case of prohibited discrimination or disparate treatment. Under
McDonnell the plaintiff must show: 1) he or she belonged to a class protected
by Title VII; 2) he or she applied for a job or promotion and was qualified
for the position; 3) he or she was rejected for the job or from promotion
despite being qualified; and 4) after the rejection, the position remained va-
cant, while the employer continued to seek applications from individuals
with the plaintiffs qualifications. 139 The Court, in establishing this stan-
dard, noted, they "are not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing
factual situations." '1
4
In Mortensen v. Callaway, 14' the plaintiff, a civilian chemist employed by
the Army, alleged that she was passed over for a promotion because she was
a woman, and that after her complaint, she suffered retaliatory harassment.
In affirming the trial court's finding for the Army, the court held that while
the plaintiff had established a prima facie case, the Army had established
valid reasons for her rejection.'
42
The court of appeals, following McDonnell,143 limited to three the ele-
ments required for a prima facie case based on the particular facts. Her
showing that the position was filled by another, as well as her proof that she
belonged to a protected class under Title VII, applied for a promotion for
which she was qualified, and was rejected, were sufficient to establish a
prima facie case.'4 The trial court erred in requiring her to show also that
the position had remained open.
145
The court, however, failed to provide any criteria for determining in
136. 662 F.2d at 680. The court noted the effect of its decision in Ray was to "overrule any
suggestions to the contrary in our earlier opinions." Id See, e.g., Simineo v. School Dist. No. 1,
594 F.2d 1353 (10th Cir. 1979).
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-lb (1976).
138. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
139. Id at 802.
140. Id n.13.
141. 672 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1982).
142. Id at 823-24.
143. See text accompanying note 139-40.




future cases when a showing that the position was filled by another would be
sufficient, instead of proving that the position remained open and further
applications were sought. A close reading of the authority relied upon by
the court 146 indicates that the relevance of the criteria is determined by look-
ing to the purpose behind Title VII. Individuals should be allowed to bring
suits under Title VII when they "demonstrate that the alleged discrimina-
tion did not result from a lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy
in the job sought."' 14 7 Flexibility of the criteria for establishing a prima facie
case is necessary to meet the broad remedial purposes of Title VII.' 48 Thus,
proof that the position was filled by a member of the class from which it is
likely that the employer would draw if the employer were discriminating
would tend to serve the same purpose as a showing that the position re-
mained open after the plaintiff's rejection.
149
B. Scope of the Act's Protection
While Title VII provides protection from employment discrimination to
a broad class of individuals, it does not extend to all employees. Title VII
contains an exception for members of the "personal staff' of elected offi-
cials. 150 The applicability of this exception was examined in Owens v.
Rush. 15 1 Owens had been appointed to the position of undersheriff by the
sheriff after the election. Later Owens was fired for aiding his wife in her
effort to file a Title VII action of her own. 152 If Owens' job did not fall
within the exception, his actions on behalf of his wife were protected by Title
VII. 153 The dispute, therefore, focused upon the scope of the "personal
staff" exception.
The Owens court first established the broad parameters of the exception:
"Congress intended for the personal staff exception to apply to only those
individuals who are in highly intimate and sensitive positions of responsibil-
146. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977); Aikens v.
United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 514, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
147. Aikens v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 514, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1980),cert. denied, 453
U.S. 912 (1981).
148. 672 F.2d at 823.
149. After the establishment of a prima facie case, if the defendant meets his burden of
going forward by showing that his actions were proper, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show that the defendant's reasons were pretextual. See id.; Montgomery v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
Inc., 671 F.2d 412, 413 (10th Cir. 1982). See also Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981).
150. "[T]he term 'employee' shall not include ... any person chosen by [an elected official]
to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate
adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e() (1976).
151. 654 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981). This case is also discussed supra text accompanying
notes 43-52.
152. 654 F.2d at 1373.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976) provides, in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.
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ity on the staff of the elected official."' 154 The court found that the statute
should be narrowly construed so as not to defeat this intent. 155 In order to
make this determination, the nature and circumstances of each employment
relationship must be examined. 156 Factors the court considered relevant in
determining that Owens' position fell within the exception included Owens'
personal accountability to the sheriff, the sensitive and confidential nature of
the work, the fact that he was second in command and therefore took on the
sheriff's responsibilities when he was away or unable to perform his duties,
and the fact that the sheriff, through his bond, was liable for the undersher-
iff's actions when the undersheriff was in command.
15 7
III. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. Freedom of Religion
The inherent tension between the first amendment's establishment
clause and the free exercise clause was at issue in Lanner v. Wimmer. 158 In a
well reasoned opinion the Tenth Circuit held that although a released-time
program did not constitute aper se violation of the first amendment, certain
aspects of the program were unconstitutional.1
59
Parents of present and future public school students in Logan, Utah
brought a class action suit against the members of the school board challeng-
ing the constitutionality of a released-time program. 160 For more than thirty
years the Utah State Board of Education had permitted high school stu-
dents, upon written request of their parents, to be released for one hour each
day during school hours for religious instruction by the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 16 The plaintiffs alleged that this released-time
program violated both the establishment clause and the free exercise clause
of the first amendment.' 62 The district court held the program did not con-
stitute aperse violation of the first amendment, 16 3 but enjoined the granting
of credit for completion of the Old Testament and New Testament course,
the collecting of attendance reports, the recognition of enrollment in semi-
nary classes in fulfillment of minimum hour attendance requirements, and
the counting of seminary attendance in the formula for the school district's
eligibility for state funds.'6
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court that released-time pro-
grams, which permit students to leave during the school hours to attend reli-
154. 654 F.2d at 1375.
155. Id
156. Id at 1376.
157. Id
158. 662 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1981).
159. Id at 1359.
160. Id at 1356.
161. Lanner v. Wimmer, 463 F. Supp. 867, 870 (D. Utah 1978), a'd inpart, rev d in part, 662
F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1981).
162. 662 F.2d at 1356.
163. 463 F. Supp. at 883.
164. Id at 876-83.
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gious classes, do not unconstitutionally advance or inhibit religion.1 65 The
implementation of the program, however, was analyzed by the criteria de-
veloped by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 166 Under the Lemon
test, 1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 2) its primary
effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and 3) it must not foster
excessive government entanglement.
1 6 7
The appellate court affirmed the district court's finding that the attend-
ance-gathering procedure was unconstitutional. 16 8 Under this procedure,
student aides went to the released-time schools to pick up the attendance
slips provided by the public schools. Although this may have been a minor
matter, as the district court observed, there was a possibility of government
entanglement and hence, the court of appeals agreed that the use of the
"least entangling administrative alternatives" was required.' 69 While the
school had a legitimate interest in knowing where its students were during
the day, and the seminary's use of the school's slips was the most administra-
tively efficient method for keeping track of the students, the fact that the
public school collected the slips was not the least entangling alternative. "It
is less entangling but as solicitous of the state's interests to require released-
time personnel to transmit attendance reports to the public school."'
1 70
The court, on the other hand, found several aspects of the program con-
stitutional because they were designed to accommodate the program with as
little inconvenience to the students and the administrator as possible.
1 7 1
The court found these aspects of the program to be substantially similar to
the program upheld in Zorach v. Clauson. 172 The connection of the seminary's
bell and intercom system with the public school's system and the use of a box
provided by the school to enable seminary personnel to pick up messages
concerning school programs that may interfere with the seminary's schedule
had a secular purpose. 173 Both the box and the intercom system served the
secular purpose of facilitating a minimum amount of interference with the
public school's meetings.' 74 The court found a lack of excessive entangle-
ment. The intercom system was one-way; it only allowed the public school
to contact its students at the seminary. The boxes worked in the same man-
ner, allowing the seminary to adjust to the school's needs. 175 The seminary,
rather than the government, bore the cost of the installation and mainte-
nance of the intercom system. 1
76
The most troublesome aspect of this case was the credit that was given
165. 662 F.2d at 1347 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952)).
166. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
167. Id at 612-13.
168. 662 F.2d at 1358.
169. Id
170. d at 1359.
171. d
172. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
173. 662 F.2d at 1360.





by the school for the time a student was in seminary classes. The court ex-
amined the issue in light of the several ways the word "credit" was used.
"Credit" was employed to "measure the number of hours or units of instruc-
tion required for graduation from Logan Senior High School."' 17 7 This
practice was mandated by the Utah State Board of Education in guidelines,
limiting the number of transferable hours and the areas to which they could
be applied. More importantly, the Board stated "[nlo credit is to be given to
courses devoted mainly to denominational instruction."' 78 This limitation
on transferable hours created constitutional problems in that it required the
state, through the public schools, to examine and monitor the "content" of
the courses taught at the seminary. 179 The court of appeals found this prac-
tice to be excessive entanglement between the school authorities and the reli-
gious institution. The state may not use a "purely religious test for
determining what is not 'mainly denominational.' "180
The court recognized that this situation must be viewed differently from
the common practice of the state placing requirements upon private reli-
gious schools in order to meet its compulsory education laws. It is not un-
constitutional for the state to require a private secular school to meet certain
minimum qualifications for its teachers and a minimum numbers of hours of
instruction in the required subjects; to determine whether a course covered
the required subject matter; and to monitor the private schools' compli-
ance. 18 ' While the line may be fine at times, there is a difference between
these requirements and the situation in Lanner, where the state judges what is
or what is not religious in a private religious institution. The court found the
monitoring of the content of the courses to be excessive entanglement, offen-
sive to the establishment clause.'
82
The term "credit" was also employed to measure the time during which
minors were required to attend school. ' 83 The court termed this "custodial
credit," utilized to meet the state interest in maintaining supervision.' 84
Under this category, no evaluation of the religious or non-religious character
177. Id at 1360.
178. Id (quoting the Utah Bd. of Education's 1969 Policy Statement, Record, vol. 2, at 350-
g).
179. 662 F.2d at 1361.
180. Id at 1361 (citations omitted).
181. Id
182. d
If the extent of state supervision is only to insure, just as is permitted in the case of
church-sponsored full-time private schools, that certain courses are taught for the req-
uisite hours and that teachers meet minimum qualification standards, nothing in
either the establishment or free exercise clauses would prohibit recognizing all re-
leased-time classes or none, whether religious in content or not, in satisfaction of gradu-
ation requirements.
Id (emphasis in original). See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1972):seegenerall), Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1943); Espinosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980), ajdmem.,
102 S. Ct. 2025 (1982).
183. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-24-1 (1981) provides that: "Every . . .person having control
of any minor between six and eighteen years of age shall be required to send such minor to a
public or regularly established private school during the regularly established school year of the
district in which he resides ... "
184. 662 F.2d at 1362.
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of the classes was necessary. It did not violate the three-prong Lemon test,'8 5
and in fact was complementary to the state's interest.""t;
The term "credit" was also used to measure the school's eligibility for
state aid.187 The school's funding was based upon the number of students
who attended a minimum of four classes per day. The hour spent in the
released-time program was considered in this determination.1"1 In reversing
the district court on this point, the court noted that none of the funding
allocated to the school was given to the released-time school and held the
financial benefit the program may produce for the school constitutional.' 8 9
B. Freedom of Speech and Expression
The Tenth Circuit ruled on an interesting first amendment claim in
McGurran v. Veterans Administration. 19 A government regulation and parallel
union contract clause restricting a Veterans Administration employees'
union's right to display posters on a centrally located union bulletin board
was found to be constitutional.' 9 ' Local No. 1557 of the American Federa-
tion of Government Employees (the "Union") distributed a poster to many
of its members employed by the Veterans Administration's (VA) Regional
Office in Denver. The employees displayed the poster, which "showed a
caricature of President Carter and announced the Union's intention to pro-
test a 'pay cap' or limit on federal salary increases," on various walls, room
dividers, and filing cabinets.' 92 The assistant director for the VA office or-
dered the removal of the posters because their posting violated government
regulations and the Union's contract. The federal regulations involved pro-
hibited such posting except on the bulletin board provided by the govern-
ment for the Union's use.' 93 In the Union's contract, both parties agreed
that the government was to provide a centrally located bulletin board for the
Union's use. 1
94
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's determination that the
regulation was constitutional. The restriction was not related to the subject-
matter content of the posters, but was concerned with their placement.
195
The court stressed the basic principle that not only are first amendment
rights subject to time, place, and manner restrictions,' 96 but that the govern-
ment may "preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
185. S e supra text accompanying note 167.
186. 662 F.2d at 1362.
187. Id.
188. Id
189. Id at 1363. "If giving 'funding credit' for attendance at released-time classes in allo-
cating state subsidies has any effect, its sole effect is to increase funds available to the public
schools. While the practice may assist the public schools, it neither enhances nor inhibits the
church-sponsored released-time courses." Id
190. 665 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1981).
191. Id at 322.
192. Id.
193. Id See 41 C.F.R. §§ 101-308 (1981).
194. 665 F.2d at 323.
195. Id. at 322. "The First Amendment does not guarantee the right of expression at any
place a person may choose." Id. (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)).
196. 665 F.2d at 322 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)).
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lawfully dedicated." 19 7 Alternative means of communication were available
to the Union,1 98 and because of the nature of the areas where the posting
was prohibited, the court found no first amendment violation. The court
also balanced the government's legitimate interest in promoting the effi-
ciency and productivity of its employees with employees' freedom of expres-
sion of ideas.1 99 One major criticism of this opinion is that it could be
subject to a variety of interpretations.
This opinion fails to deal separately with the rights of speech and free
expression for the Union and for the i'dvidual employees. The individual em-
ployees could have posted the materials as an expression of their own views,
and thus, the opinion implies that the Union can contract away its individ-
ual members' first amendment rights. The opinion also does not require a
showing by the government that the employees' work would be affected in
any manner by the existence of the posters in the work area. Absent such a
showing, the employees' freedom of expression interests should have been
upheld.
3. Freedom of the Press and the Right of Access
After the 1980 census, a suit was brought to force adoption of a redis-
tricting plan prior to the 1982 election. During court-ordered compromise
negotiations held at the federal courthouse, Judge Finesilver denied a local
television station's request to allow television cameras into the hearing
rooms.2° ° In Combined Communications Corp. v. Finest'ver,20 the plaintiff televi-
sion station sought a writ of mandamus requiring Judge Finesilver to allow
television broadcast coverage of the negotiations, alleging that the restriction
violated the first amendment right of access to news of the operation and
actions of the government.
20 2
The court of appeals denied the writ, relying on several Supreme Court
decisions addressing the issue of courtroom access. The first amendment
does not grant to the media a constitutional right to televise inside a court-
house. 203 A reporter's rights within a courthouse are no greater than those of
the general public.2° 4 Furthermore, the courtroom and courthouse are
under the control of the court. 20 5 The court then balanced the competing
interests, holding that any benefit derived from the visual presentation of the
197. 665 F.2d at 323 (citing Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536 (1964)).
198. 665 F.2d at 322.
199. Id
200. Combined Communications Corp. v. Finesilver, 672 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1982). The
denial was under Rule 16, Local Rules of Practice, Federal Dist. Courts. Id at 820 n. 1.
201. 672 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1982).
202. Id at 820.
203. 672 F.2d at 821 (citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 381 (1979); Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1965)).
204. 672 F.2d at 821 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609
(1978)).
205. 672 F.2d at 821 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966)). Due to this
control "courts may impose restrictions upon media access to courtrooms and courthouse prem-
ises when necessary to protect and facilitate the proper administration of the judicial system."
672 F.2d at 821.
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meeting room was outweighed by the potential disruption of the meeting
and other judicial proceedings. The plaintiff was allowed access to the meet-




A. Military Regulations Review by the Judici'ag
Lindenau v. Alexander, 20 7 involved a divorced mother of two minor chil-
dren, who, contrary to regulations, 208 enlisted in the New Mexico Army Na-
tional Guard. When the facts came to light, she was honorably
discharged. 20 9 Soon thereafter she filed suit, challenging the constitutional-
ity of the regulation which, in effect, prohibited a single custodial parent
from enlisting in the National Guard. She alleged that the regulation vio-
lated the equal protection clause because it discriminated against her as an
unmarried parent with a minor child. She also alleged that the regulation
discriminated against all women because it affected more women than men.
In addition, she claimed that the regulation violated the constitutional right
to make private decisions in matters of marriage and family life.
210
In examining the alleged constitutional violation, the Tenth Circuit rec-
ognized the traditional judicial deference to internal military matters.
2 1t
" 'Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to
interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not
to intervene in judicial matters.' ",212 The court noted, nevertheless, that
members of the military community enjoy many of the same rights as mem-
bers of the civilian community.
2 13
Adopting the view of the Fifth Circuit,2i 4 the court determined the
proper scope of review was limited to examining whether a military official
has acted outside the scope of his powers, whether a military official violated
internal regulations, whether statutes relating to the military, executive or-
ders, or regulations are constitutional, and whether procedures followed in
court martials and selective service inductions violate the Constitution.
2i 5
The court also adopted the Fifth Circuit's test 2i 6 for examining an internal
military decision:
206. Id. at 820.
207. 663 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1981).
208. Army Nat'l Guard Reg. AR-601-210, quotd in Lindenau, 663 F.2d at 70.
209. 663 F.2d at 70.
210. Id
211. Id at 70-71. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. See also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498,
510 (1975) ("The responsibility for determining how best our Armed Forces shall attend to that
business rests with Congress."); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) ("The complex, sub-
tle, and professional decision as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a mili-
tary force is essentially professional military judgment, subject always to civilian control of the
Legislative and Executive Branches.') (emphasis in original).
212. 663 F.2d at 70 (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1952)).
213. 663 F.2d at 71 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974)).
214. Se Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
215. 663 F.2d at 71.
216. Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
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[a] court contemplating review of an internal military determina-
tion [is] first to determine whether the case involves an alleged vio-
lation of a constitutional right, applicable statute, or regulation,
and whether intra-service remedies have been exhausted. If so, the
court is then to weigh the nature and strength of the challenge to
the military determination, the potential injury to the plaintiff if
review is refused, the type and degree of anticipated interference
with the military function, and the extent to which military discre-
tion or expertise is involved in the challenged decision.
2 17
Applying this criteria, the court first examined Lindenau's constitu-
tional claims and held there is no right to enlist in the armed service.218
While Lindenau failed to prove single parents with minor children were a
suspect class, the government articulated a rational basis behind the regula-
tion. 2t 9 In response to Lindenau's claim that the regulation interfered with
her freedom with respect to family matters and marriage, the court of ap-
peals stated: " 'The regulation . . . does not affirmatively curtail marriage
or childbearing,' . but instead insures that National Guard personnel can
rapidly respond to national defense requirements and fulfill their duties
"220
Two factors of the test were in the favor of the government. The Army
National Guard had attempted to function with single custodial parents and
determined that it adversely affected the morale and the ability of the Guard
to mobilize quickly and respond to emergencies.2 2' Lindenau also failed to
prove factually that the regulation discriminates against women because it
adversely affects more women than men. The court found the regulation
was not intended to keep women out of the National Guard. The court
stated that single women parents "with minor children are excluded because
they are single parents with minor children, not because they are
women."
222
Judge McKay concurred with the result, 22 3 although he was troubled
by the majority's reliance upon the Fifth Circuit's decision in Mindes v. Sea-
man. 224 He believed that the Supreme Court's decision in PersonndAdmins-
trator v. Feeney ,225 made Mindes no longer tenable. 226  He would have
adopted the view of the Third Circuit in Dillard v. Brown,227 decided subse-
quent to Feeney.
228
217. NeSmith v. Fulton, 615 F.2d 196, 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (summarizing the requirements
of Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971)).
218. 663 F.2d at 72 (citations omitted).
219. Id at 72-73.
220. Id at 73 (quoting West v. Brown, 558 F.2d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 1977)).
221. Id at 74.
222. Id
223. Id at 74-75 (McKay, J., concurring).
224. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
225. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
226. 663 F.2d at 75.
227. 652 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1981).
228. 663 F.2d at 75.
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B. Standing and Mootness
The question of standing and mootness was addressed by the court in
the context of access for television cameras in a federal district court's hear-
ing room, in Combined Communications Corp. v. Fnesilver.229 The court ruled
that the plaintiff had standing because it suffered an injury in fact with re-
spect to an interest within the zone of protection of the Constitution: 2 30 its




Examining the mootness issue, the court applied the test set forth by the
Supreme Court in Weinstein o. Bradford.232 Although the controversy gener-
ating the case may have passed, the question is not considered moot if
"'1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated
prior to its cessation or expiration, and 2) there was a reasonable expectation
that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action
again.' ",233 Weinstein's first requirement was met due to the short duration
of the hearings. As to the second criterion, the court held that the likelihood
that the plaintiff's cameras would in the future, be barred from statutorily
open meetings conducted at the federal courthouse was "not so remote and
speculative that the controversy must be considered moot. 23 4
C. The Commerce Clause and State Sovereignty
In Oklahoma v. Federal Energy Regulatoy Commission ,235 Oklahoma, Texas,
Wyoming 236 and Louisiana challenged portions of the National Gas Policy
Act of 1979 (Act or NGPA),2 37 as unconstitutional in its application as it
applies to wholly intrastate gas. The plaintiffs contended that the NGPA
was in violation of the commerce clause2 38 because it regulated natural gas
that had not moved in interstate commerce.2 39 Plaintiffs also alleged viola-
229. 672 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes 200-206 for a discus-
sion of this case in another context.
230. 672 F.2d at 820. See also Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
231. 672 F.2d at 820.
232. 423 U.S. 147 (1975) (per curiam).
233. 672 F.2d at 820 (quoting Weinstein, 423 U.S. at 149). See also Napier v. Gertrude, 542
F.2d 825, 826 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denid, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977).
234. 672 F.2d at 821.
235. 661 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981), ceri. dented, 102 S. Ct. 2902 (1982).
236. Wyoming and Ralph L. Harvey, individually and as the president of Marlin Oil Corp.,
were allowed to intervene as parties plaintiff. The United States was allowed to intervene as a
party defendant. 661 F.2d at 833.
237. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
The relevant portions of the Act included Title I, which establishes price ceilings for
all first sales of natural gas irrespective of its interstate or intrastate character; Title II,
which provides for a pass-through of the costs incurred by interstate pipelines to indus-
trial users and which, while not applicable to intrastate pipelines, prohibits the [sltates
from enacting or enforcing any conflicting regulations; Title III B, which authorizes
sales between interstate and intrastate pipelines in accordance with certain non-dis-
criminatory contractual requirements imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission; and Title V, which provides for the administration of the Act.
661 F.2d at 834.
238. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
239. 661 F.2d at 833-34.
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tions of state sovereignty and immunity as protected under the tenth
amendment.
2 4 °
In upholding the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and its finding that the
Act was constitutional, the court recognized that the district court's analysis
paralleled Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc. 241
Under Hodel, the court's task of assessing whether Congress' exercise of its
power is within its authority under the commerce clause is "relatively nar-
row."' 2 4 2 " 'The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated
activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a
finding.' "243
Congress had determined that the intrastate sale of unregulated natural
gas affected interstate commerce. 244  Relying on Hodel,2 45 the appellate
court deferred to Congress: "[The] [s]tates' burden of establishing that the
means selected by Congress was not reasonably adapted to the end permit-
ted by the Constitution is a heavy one which [the] States have failed to
meet."
246
The court in upholding the dismissal of the state sovereignty and gov-
ernmental immunity claims under the tenth amendment again relied on Ho-
del.24 7 The court noted that the states' participation was not mandated by
the NGPA.248 Furthermore, Congress has the authority to displace or pre-
empt states' laws regulating activity that affects interstate commerce when
they conflict with federal laws.249 By merely allowing the states to partici-
pate in the program if they wished, the NGPA did not mandate state in-
volvement, and did not infringe upon their sovereignty.
2 50
240. Id at 834. U.S. CONST. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people."
241. 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of the Surface Mining and Recla-
mation Control Act of 1977).
242. 661 F.2d at 837 (quoting Hodl, 452 U.S. at 276).
243. Id SeeaLro Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
244. 661 F.2d at 835-36. The price disparity between the intrastate market and the inter-
state market prompted many producers to sell their production in the intrastate market. The
result was shortages of natural gas in nonproducing states. Id at 834.
245. Once a rational basis for a finding that the regulated activity affects interstate com-
merce is made, the only question is whether "the means chosen by [Congress] is reasonably
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution." Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276 (citations omitted).
246. 661 F.2d at 838.
247. Id. at 838-39.
248. Id at 840. For a tenth amendment challenge to prevail, there needs to be
a showing the challenged statute regulates the "States as States." Second, the federal
regulation must address matters that are indisputably "attributes of state sovereignty."
And third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law would
directly impair their ability "to structure operations in areas of traditional functions."
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833, 852, 854
(1976)).





The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question of what
constitutional rights and protections must be afforded aliens who have not
officially entered the United States in Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson.
25'
The plaintiff, a Cuban' national, arrived in the United States on the Free-
dom Flotilla on June 2, 1980. Immigration officials, acting pursuant to stat-
ute,252 allowed him to disembark and placed him in custody, pending a
determination of his eligibility for admission. He told immigration officials
that he had a criminal record and was serving a sentence at the time the
Cuban government allowed him to leave. Based upon his lack of immigra-
tion documents and his criminal record, it was determined that he was not
entitled to disembark and was detained pending an exclusion hearing.
253
He was briefly detained at a processing camp in Wisconsin and then trans-
ferred to the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas.
25 4
The plaintiff was given a formal exclusion hearing on July 21, 1980. At
that time, it was determined that he was an excludable alien and was or-
dered deported to Cuba. Attempts by the State Department to arrange for
Rodriguez-Fernandez' deportation to Cuba were unsuccessful. The plaintiff
remained in custody at the federal penitentiary in Leavenworth. In Septem-
ber, 1980, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Shortly thereafter
he was transferred to the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia.
255
The district court found that while the plaintiff has no rights to avoid
detention under the fifth or eighth amendments, the government's actions
were arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, the court found the
actions to be in violation of principles of international law which create a
right to be free from detention. 256 By order dated December 31, 1980, the
government was given ninety days to release Rodriguez-Fernandez. At a
compliance hearing on April 22, 1981, it was established that the plaintiff
had not yet been released. The government requested another sixty days to
arrange either for the deportation or the parole of Rodriguez-Fernandez.
25 7
The court denied the request, ordering his release within twenty-four
hours.
258
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding and gave the
government thirty days in which to release Rodriguez-Fernandez. 2 59 Judge
Logan, writing for the majority, based the holding on the applicable stat-
utes, but also discussed the constitutional issues presented. The court recog-
nized that as an alien, Rodriguez-Fernandez could invoke no "constitutional
251. 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
252. 8 U.S.C. § 1223(a) (1976). This section provides for the temporary removal of aliens
for examination and inspection upon their arrival at a port of the United States. Under this
section, temporary removal is not to be considered a landing.
253. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9), (20), and 1225(b).
254. 654 F.2d at 1384.
255. Id.
256. 505 F. Supp. 787, 800 (D. Kan. 1980), af'd, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
257. 654 F.2d at 1384.
258. Id at 1390.
259. Id at 1386.
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protections against his exclusion from the United States. '260 Nevertheless,
an alien accused of committing a criminal act in the United States would
have those protections found in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The
resulting consequence was that "an excludable alien in physical custody
within the United States may not be punished without being accorded the
substantive and procedural due process guarantees of the Fifth
Amendment."
26 1
The court found Rodriguez-Fernandez' imprisonment to be a "depriva-
tion of liberty in violation of the fifth amendment, except for the fiction
applied . . . that detention is only a continuation of the exclusion.
'2 62
Other federal courts have held that the custody of deportable aliens longer
than a "few months" is impermissible imprisonment, requiring release of the
alien.
263
Judge Logan distinguished Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei.2 6 In
Mezei the Supreme Court refused to require the release of an alien who had
been confined to Ellis Island for twenty-one months. His confinement was
based upon the fact that he was excluded from landing in the United States
and no other country would allow him entry.265 Mezei was distinguished on
several grounds: its concern was with an excludable alien's rights to a due
process hearing determining his right of reentry into the United States;
Mezei was considered a security risk; the Korean War was in progress; the
conditions of his confinement were not the same as imprisonment in a fed-
eral penitentiary; there were continuous efforts to deport Mezei; and unlike
Rodriguez-Fernandez, Mezei sought not only release from detention but also
entry to the United States.266 Finally, the Tenth Circuit court followed the
Supreme Court's guidance and applied a basic principle of international
law: "Human beings should be free from arbitrary imprisonment.
' 267
The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952268 provides for a six-
month detention period in deportation cases;269 however, the maximum de-
tention period for excludable aliens seeking entry is not spelled out in the
statute. "They provide for 'temporary removal' from the transportation ve-
hicle or vessel to a place of 'detention, pending a decision on the aliens' eligi-
bility to enter the United States and until they are either allowed to land or
return to the care of the transportation line or to the vessel or aircraft which
260. Id at 1387.
261. Id
262. Id
263. See Petition of Brooks, 5 F.2d 238 (D. Mass. 1925); United States ex rel. Ross v. Wallis,
279 F. 401 (2d Cir. 1922). See also Wolck v. Weedin, 58 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1932); Carancia v.
Nagle, 28 F.2d 955 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 277 U.S. 589 (1928); United States ex re. Janararis v.
Nicholls, 47 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1942).
264. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
265. Id at 209.
266. 654 F.2d at 1388.
267. Id (citing The American Convention on Human Rights, Pt. I, ch. II, art. 7, 77 Dept. of
State Bull. 28 (July 4, 1977); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Pt. I, arts. 3 & 9, U.N.
Doe. Al 801 (1948)). See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
268. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
269. Id. § 1252(d).
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brought them."'270 While the court of appeals refused to read a specific time
limit for detention into the statute, it held that "detention is permissible dur-
ing proceedings to determine eligibility to enter and, thereafter, during a
reasonable period of negotiations for their return . . . . After such time,
upon application of the incarcerated alien. . . the alien would be entitled to
release.",
27 1
The court did not require the government to release Rodriguez-Fernan-
dez into the United States. He could be returned to the vessel that brought
him to the United States, sent to another country, or paroled. 272 Because
the government did not meet its burden of proving that the detention re-
mained temporary pending exclusion 273 and not an incarceration as an al-
ternative to departure, the court of appeals required his release.
Judge McWilliams dissented, arguing that the district court's release
order should have been reversed. 274 He maintained that the determination
whether the plaintiff should be detained or released on parole, pending de-
portation, was solely within the discretion of the Attorney General. 275 Based
upon his prior criminal record, the decision to detain him in a federal peni-
tentiary was not an abuse of discretion, in Judge McWilliams' view. 2 76 He
found the majority opinion to be flawed in its attempt "to deal with all
125,000 Cuban refugees in this one case."' 277 Judge McWilliams distin-
guished those individuals who had criminal records, such as Rodriguez-Fer-
nandez, from other Cuban refugees. In his opinion, only "the indefinite
detention in a maximum security institution of a true Cuban political refu-
gee with no history of criminality, who is nonetheless determined to be an




270. 654 F.2d at 1389 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1223(b) (1976)). This provision's concern, how-
ever, is with the responsibility of expenses incurred in a temporary removal from the vessel of
entry and does not actually address the time limitations on deportation. It is conceivable that
due to the absence of a specific time period, the court used this section to infer "temporary" as
the limitation on the duration of the detention.
271. 654 F.2d at 1389-90.
272. Id. at 1390.
273. There seemed to be no negotiations with Cuba or any other country to accept Rodri-
guez-Fernandez. The court states that the fact that no country had agreed to take him was
insufficient reason for continued detention. Id
274. Id. at 1390-92 (McWilliams, J., dissenting).
275. Id at 1390-91.
276. Id at 1391. "If Rodriguez-Femandez had been serving a life sentence for murder in
Cuba at the time he got out of Cuba and came to Florida, I cannot believe that there would be
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OVERVIEW
During the period covered by this survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed a variety of issues in the area of criminal law and proce-
dure. This survey will examine only the more significant cases and will dis-




In United States v. Rucinski" the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that
residents in mountain communities have a greater expectation of privacy
than do residents in other communities. 2 The defendants operated a logging
operation on national forest land in an isolated Colorado mountain valley.
A clandestine surveillance of the logging operation was conducted by agents
of the United States Forest Service from adjacent property. Using telescopic
equipment, the agents gathered evidence which indicated that the defend-
ants were depriving the government of the value of certain timber. The ap-
pellate court refused to suppress the evidence stating, "[w]e do not believe
that those living in the mountains of Colorado have a greater right to expec-
tations of privacy than do citizens in other parts of the country."
3
The court also rejected the argument that the surveillance of the com-
mercial property in the absence of a regulatory scheme authorizing warrant-
less searches was prohibited under Donovan v. Dewey.4 Noting that Donovan
held that warrantless "inspections of commercial property may be unreason-
able if not authorized by law or are unnecessar for the furtherance of federal inter-
ests," 5 the court concluded that the Forest Service had a legitimate interest
in protecting against theft of logs from a national forest.
B. Investigatory Stop
In UnitedStates v. Hart6 the Tenth Circuit held that an investigatory stop
of a motor home was justified even though there existed sufficient probable
cause and ample time to obtain a warrant. 7 Utah police assisted the FBI in
1. 658 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982).
2. The defendants argued that one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a mountain
habitat "based on a heightened sense of privacy and a heightened respect for private property."
658 F.2d at 744.
3. Id at 746.
4. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
5. 658 F.2d at 745 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 (1981) (emphasis in
original)).
6. 656 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1981).
7. Justification for a warrantless investigatory stop requires "specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intru-
sion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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a search for Jones, a federal fugitive hiding in a remote campsite. The de-
fendant Hart was believed to be an associate of Jones. An informant indi-
cated that Hart was holding a woman against her will. Utah deputies
discovered the campsite and Jones was apprehended. Jones' father-in-law,
present at the campsite, told the deputies that Hart had driven his camper
into town accompanied by a woman. While en route to town the deputies
observed a vehicle that matched the description of Hart's camper heading
towards the campsite. After confirming the description with Jones' father-
in-law, the deputies stopped the camper. The woman was questioned and,
with Hart's consent, the camper was searched. The woman was not being
held involuntarily; however, the search revealed twelve weapons which
formed the basis of Hart's prosecution.8
The district court suppressed the seizure of the weapons, reasoning that
probable cause to search the vehicle existed for several days providing ample
time for the deputies to obtain a warrant. The Tenth Circuit reversed, char-
acterizing the police action as an investigatory stop which merely requires
articulable reasons for believing a defendant to be engaged in criminal activ-
ity.9 The district court's finding of probable cause was then interpreted to
mean, afortiori, that such articulable reasons existed. The appellate court
also stated that the fact that Hart's vehicle was in transit constituted suffi-
cient exigent circumstances to justify an immediate search of the camper
pursuant to a lawful stop. t°
In United States v. MacDonaldt' the Tenth Circuit held that observations
by a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent could constitute suffi-
cient grounds to justify an investigatory stop. The defendant MacDonald
was traveling on a commercial airliner from Fort Lauderdale to Albuquer-
que via Dallas-Fort Worth. During the flight, MacDonald sat next to a
DEA agent who soon became suspicious of him. When the plane made its
stop in Dallas-Fort Worth, the agent alerted local DEA officials who, in turn,
notified the DEA in Albuquerque. Upon arriving in Albuquerque, Mac-
Donald was placed under surveillance. When he attempted to leave the
terminal without his luggage, he was questioned by Albuquerque police.
His answers conflicted with information supplied by the DEA agent. Mac-
Donald was detained while a cocaine-detecting dog inspected his luggage.
When the dog indicated that the defendant's luggage contained drugs, a
search warrant was obtained and cocaine was discovered. The defendant
sought to suppress this evidence contending that the police lacked reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to justify the investigatory stop outside the
airport. 12
Judge Logan, writing for the Tenth Circuit, considered the confronta-
8. Hart was indicted on eleven counts of unlawful interstate transportation of firearms in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 9 2 2(g), 924(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) and two counts relating to
unlawful possession of a .45 caliber machine gun in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861, 5871 (1976).
656 F.2d at 596.
9. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981);see also su/ra note 7.
10. 656 F.2d at 600.
11. 670 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 373 (1982).
12. 670 F.2d at 911-12.
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tion outside the airport between the defendant and the police a Terry-type
stop' 3 which requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to be justified.
He stated that "[i]n assessing whether the grounds for a stop were adequate,
courts should not ignore the considerable expertise that law enforcement of-
ficers have gained from their special training and expertise."'1 4 Noting that
the DEA agent had ten years of experience in drug enforcement activity,
Judge Logan found that the correspondence between the agent's knowledge
of the behavior patterns of drug smugglers and MacDonald's behavior was
sufficient to establish the necessary reasonable grounds for an investigatory
stop. 15
C. Timely Execution of Warrants
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of permissible delay in the execu-
tion of an arrest warrant in United States v. Drake. 16 The defendant Drake was
under investigation by agents of the Fish and Wildlife Service for suspected
violations of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (Act).17 Undercover agents vis-
ited Drake's home and negotiated a sale of two flamingos in violation of the
Act. The agents arranged for delivery of the birds and payment of the bal-
ance of the purchase price to be made October 2, 1980. On October 1, 1980,
the agents swore out a complaint and obtained an arrest warrant. The fol-
lowing day the agents returned to Drake's residence. They took possession of
the flamingos and paid the balance of the purchase price. The agents then
identified themselves and made the arrest. The trial court granted Drake's
motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the agents had imper-
missibly delayed execution of the arrest warrant in order to complete the
purchase and strengthen their case.' 8
The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding the delay in the execution of the
warrant to be reasonable and the search to be incident to the arrest. The
court stated that arrest warrants need not be immediately executed and that
officers need not arrest at the first opportunity.' 9 The court noted that a
purposeful delay of execution intended to gain a tactical advantage not
otherwise attainable would be impermissible.20 The court, however, found
no such purpose to the delay.2 ' The court then observed that the arrest
could have been made without a warrant at the time of the transaction.
22
13. See supra note 7.
14. 670 F.2d at 913 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 563-64 (1980)
(Powell, J., concurring); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (1979); United States v. Lebya, 627
F.2d 1059, 1062 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980)).
15. 670 F.2d at 913.
16. 655 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1981).
17. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 707(b) (1976).
18. 655 F.2d at 1027. The defendant had also been granted a motion to dismiss the indict-
ment on grounds of improper pretrial publicity. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that there
was no showing of prejudice to the defendant. Id
19. Id (citing United States v. Joines, 258 F.2d 471, 472 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880
(1958)).
20. 655 F.2d at 1027 (citing McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950)).
21. The warrant was executed one day after issuance and served within an hour after the
agents arrived at the defendant's home. 655 F.2d at 1027.
22. Id at 1028; see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
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The Tenth Circuit reasoned that penalizing the agents for delaying execu-




In United States v. Madrid24 the Tenth Circuit was faced with the ques-
tion of whether testimony by a psychiatrist concerning statements made by
the defendant during examinations to determine his competency to stand
trial may be admitted at trial on the issue of sanity. The defendant was
arrested in connection with a bank robbery. The defense counsel requested,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244,25 that the defendant be given a psychiatric
examination. The defendant was found incompetent to stand trial and com-
mitted to a medical facility. Approximately eight months later, the trial
court granted the government's motion to order the defendant to submit to a
second psychological examination. The examiner, Dr. Dempsey, indicated
that the defendant was both competent to stand trial and sane at the time of
the alleged offense. After a hearing the trial court found the defendant com-
petent to stand trial.
2 6
At trial the defendant raised the insanity defense. The government
then moved, pursuant to rule 12.2(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure,2 7 for an examination to be conducted by the same psychiatrist who
had conducted the second competency exam for the purpose of determining
the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense. The defendant did not
object. Dr. Dempsey testified that the defendant was sane at the time of the
alleged offense. He based his opinion, in part, on statements made by the
defendant during the section 4244 competency examination concerning pre-
vious involvement in armed robberies to support a heroin addiction. The
defendant was found guilty and appealed. He contended that Dr. Demp-
sey's testimony concerning the prior criminal behavior should have been ex-
23. 655 F.2d at 1028.
24. 673 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 96 (1982).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1976) provides:
Whenever after arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence . . . the United States
Attorney has reasonable cause to believe that a person charged with an offense . . .
may be presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be unable to un-
derstand the proceedings against him or properly assist in his own defense, he shall file
a motion for a judicial determination of such mental competency of the accused ....
[T]he accused [shall] be examined as to his mental condition by at least one qualified
psychiatrist . . . . No statement made by the accused in the course of any examina-
tion into his sanity or mental competency provided for by this section, whether the
examination shall be with or without the consent of the accused, shall be admitted in
evidence against the accused on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding. A find-
ing by the judge that the accused is mentally competent to stand trial shall in no way
prejudice the accused in a plea of insanity as a defense to the crime charged; such
finding shall not be introduced in evidence on that issue nor otherwise be brought to
the notice of the jury.
26. 673 F.2d at 1117.
27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c) deals with the defense based on mental condition and pro-
vides in part: "In an appropriate case the court, may upon motion of the attorney for the
government, order the defendant to submit to a psychiatrist designated for this purpose in the
order of the court."
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cluded under both section 4244 and the fifth amendment.2 8
Section 4244 prohibits the use of any statement made during a compe-
tency examination from later being used at trial against the accused on the
issue of guilt. 29 However, the Tenth Circuit held that by failing to object to
the government's use of Dr. Dempsey as the examiner in the rule 12.2(c)
sanity examination, the defendant waived his right to exclude statements
made to Dr. Dempsey at the earlier section 4244 competency examination.
30
The court believed it would be unreasonable to expect the doctor not to
consider statements made in his earlier contact with the defendant.3 1 The
court would not go so far as to decide whether a defendant, by giving notice
of an insanity defense under rule 12.2(a), waives section 4244 protections.
Instead, the court limited its ruling to the defendant's failure to object to
undergoing the examination with the same psychiatrist.
3 2
The court then held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination did not prohibit the government from using the defendant's
statements.3 3 The court distinguished Estelle v. Smith3 4 which prevents the
use of statements made during pretrial competency examinations when the
defendant has neither been informed of his right to remain silent nor warned
of the possible adverse use which may be made of his statements. In Madrid,
however, the issues of competence and sanity were raised by the defendant.
3 5
After Madrid, it appears in the Tenth Circuit that the fifth amendment pro-
tection of Estelle is limited to cases where the pretrial examination is
involuntary.
The Tenth Circuit extended fifth amendment protection to hearings on
waiver of juvenile jurisdiction in Crisp v. Mayabb. 36 In 1971, Mayabb pled
guilty to a murder which occurred when he was seventeen years old. The
plea was entered under an Oklahoma statute37 which treated males over the
age of sixteen as adults. Under that statute, a female aged sixteen to eight-
een was treated as a juvenile unless, after a certification hearing it was deter-
mined that she should be tried as an adult. The Tenth Circuit declared the
statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.3 8 The court ruled that
male prisoners convicted under the statute were entitled to a determination
of whether they would have been certified as adults had the type of hearing
previously afforded only female defendants been held.3 9 At Mayabb's hear-
ing, a statement which he made at the time of his arrest was suppressed on
fifth amendment grounds. Without that statement the state was unable to
28. 673 F.2d at 1117-19.
29. See supra note 25.
30. 673 F.2d at 1120.
31. Id
32. Id.
33. Id at 1121.
34. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
35. 673 F.2d at 1121.
36. 668 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Fields v. Paul M., 103 S. Ct. 62 (1982).
37. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § I101(a) (Supp. 1969).
38. 668 F.2d at 1129 (citing Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972)).
39. 668 F.2d at 1130-31 (citing Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1977), cert.
denid, 435 U.S. 908 (1978)).
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show that adult certification would have occurred. 4°
The Tenth Circuit upheld the suppression of the statement. The court
noted that the Supreme Court had applied the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to juveniles41 and had recognized the importance
of such certification hearings.4 2 The court then held that "a confession or
admission of a juvenile is not admissible in a hearing on waiver of juvenile
jurisdiction unless the statement was made voluntarily and with knowledge
of constitutional rights.43
The court ruled that Mayabb could not have knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his rights at the time of the arrest. Although his mother was
present and a Miranda warning was read, both Mayabb and his mother were
unable to read or write and were incapable of comprehending the oral state-
ment of rights. The Tenth Circuit decided that Mayabb's confession was
properly suppressed 44 and affirmed the trial court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus directing the release of Mayabb.
4 5
B. Double Jeopardy
In Wilkett o. United Slates4 6 the court addressed the issues of whether
jeopardy attaches in a dismissal for lack of venue and the time at which
jeopardy attached in conspiracy prosecutions. Wilkett, Hoover, and Conklin
were charged with participating in a statewide conspiracy to distribute a
controlled substance and tried in the Western District of Oklahoma. Conk-
lin and Hoover moved to dismiss the indictments against them for lack of
venue. The government failed to prove their involvement in a conspiracy in
the Western District and the trial court granted the motions.
47
Wilkett, however, was convicted. The government then filed charges
against all three defendants in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. These
charges were essentially identical to those brought in the Western District.
The defendants interposed double jeopardy contentions, claiming the previ-
ous Western District prosecution barred further prosecution.48
Hoover and Conklin urged that the "same evidence test" of United States
v. Martinez49 barred the action in the Eastern District because the Western
District had already heard evidence of the same activities for which they had
been re-indicted. 50 Judge Doyle, writing for the Tenth Circuit, rejected that
argument. He reasoned that the dismissal for lack of venue, though based
on evidence presented at trial, was a procedural matter as opposed to a deci-
40. 668 F.2d at 1134.
41. Id (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
42. 668 F.2d at 1134 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 41 (1966)).
43. 668 F.2d at 1134.
44. Id at 1135.
45. Id at 1136.
46. 655 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
47. 655 F.2d at 1009.
48. Id
49. 562 F.2d 633 (10th Cir. 1977).
50. 655 F.2d at 1011. The test for determining whether the offenses charged in two indict-
ments are identical is whether the facts alleged in one, if offered in support of the other, would
sustain a conviction. See Bartlett v. United States, 166 F.2d 928, 931 (10th Cir. 1948).
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sion on the merits. Judge Doyle noted that the motions to dismiss were
brought by the defendants, who could have chosen to waive venue and pro-
ceed with an adjudication on the merits. Thus, the court held that jeopardy
does not attach when a motion to dismiss is granted for lack of venue. 5 '
The court then turned to the conspiracy charge against Wilkett. The
court acknowledged that the "same evidence test" may be somewhat inade-
quate in the area of conspiracy because conspiracies often involve numerous
acts committed over an extended period of time, and it is sometimes possible
to show the same conspiracy through proof of more than one set of facts.
5 2
The "same evidence test" must be supplemented to insure that a defendant
is not prosecuted twice for participating in a single conspiracy. Therefore,
the court examined both the indictments and the evidence to be presented.
Wilkett was indicted for conspiracy in the Eastern District for essentially the
same activities which served as the basis for his previous indictment and,
because the government proffered no new evidence in the second action, the
court ordered the indictment dismissed.
53
In United States v. Martinez,54 a case involving allegations of prosecutorial
and judicial misconduct, Judges Lay, Gibson, and Bright of the Eighth Cir-
cuit sat by designation in what had become a politically charged case. The
defendant, Martinez, had been indicted on several counts relating to posses-
sion of unregistered explosives and sending explosives through the United
States mails. Before trial, four counts were severed and Martinez was tried
on the remaining counts before Chief Judge Winner of the District of Colo-
rado. The trial was conducted in an extremely tense atmosphere. Two ju-
rors openly complained about the conduct and apparel worn by spectators
and members of the defense team.
55
After the third day of trial, Judge Winner met secretly with the prosecu-
tion to discuss the atmosphere of intimidation which he felt pervaded the
courtroom. The defense counsel was neither invited to attend nor informed
of the meeting. As justification for this action, Judge Winner suggested the
possibility of the defense counsel's involvement in a conspiracy to intimidate
the jury. The judge offered to grant a mistrial to the prosecution and pro-
posed that such a motion be delayed until after the defense had presented its
case so that hidden cameras could be installed to record the alleged intimi-
dation. The judge offered to provoke a mistrial if necessary.
56
The following morning, however, the government was willing to accede
to a mistrial motion, citing publicity about the jurors' complaints. The de-
fense joined the motion which was then granted.
5 7
At retrial, Martinez filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of double
jeopardy. Judge Kane of the United States District Court, District of Colo-
rado, presiding over the retrial, denied the motion. On appeal, the case was
51. 655 F.2d at 1012.
52. Id. at 1013-14.
53. Id at 1015.
54. 667 F.2d 886 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2301 (1982).
55. 667 F.2d at 887-88.




partially remanded to Judge Eubanks, United States District Court Judge
for the Western District of Oklahoma, for further evidentiary hearings. At
these hearings the nature and substance of Judge Winner's secret meeting
was revealed.
58
The defense moved to dismiss all seven of the original counts. Judge
Eubanks found that "the defendant was induced or lead [sic] into confessing,
stipulating to, or agreeing to a mistrial motion without the benefit of all the
facts" 59 and held that the defense did not knowingly consent to the motion
for mistrial. The judge dismissed the three severed counts on double jeop-
ardy grounds but refused to dismiss the remaining four counts. Both sides
appealed. 6°
The double jeopardy clause bars retrial if bad faith conduct by the pros-
ecutor or judge provokes the defendant into requesting a mistrial.6 1 The
appellate panel found that the prosecutorial and judicial misconduct was
more than sufficient to bar retrial. Jeopardy attached, but only to three of
the seven counts.
62
The defendant sought dismissal of the four remaining counts based on
prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, citing the collateral order doctrine of
Cohen v. Benefial Industrial Loan Corp. 6 3 and Abney v. United States.64 The Co-
hen doctrine permits review of certain interlocutory orders drawn from "that
small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and col-
lateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review
and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate considera-
tion be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."'65 Three factors are
used to determine whether a decision is "final" for review. First, the order
must fully dispose of the matter, not leaving it "open, unfinished or inconclu-
sive." 66 Second, the order must resolve an issue completely collateral to the
cause of action and not be simply a "step toward final disposition of the
merits of the case."' 67 Third, the decision must involve an important right
which would be irreparably damaged if review were postponed until after
judgment. 68
The Tenth Circuit held that the order failed two of the three prerequi-
sites. It found that "[t]he issues--primarily the question of prejudice-are
not 'completely collateral' to a decision on the merits and [the] defendant's
right will not be irreparably infringed if review has to await a final judg-
ment."'69  Thus, the court refused to extend Cohen to cases involving
58. Id
59. Id at 889.
60. Id
61. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470, 485 n.12 (1971).
62. 667 F.2d at 890.
63. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
64. 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (applying the doctrine to a denial of a motion to dismiss based on
double jeopardy).




69. 667 F.2d at 890.
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prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, reserving it for "exceptional cases."70
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Right to Confront Witnesses
In United States v. Rothbart7" the Tenth Circuit held that the sixth
amendment's assurance of the right to confront witnesses requires that the
government make an affirmative effort to ensure that its witnesses are avail-
able for trial. Rothbart was indicted for failing to file employment tax re-
turns. The government's case required the testimony of Mitchell, a former
employee, who was subpoenaed to appear at trial. Mitchell's employment
required him to be out of the country during that time. As a result, the
prosecution arranged to take his deposition even though a court order was
never issued permitting it. The defense counsel attended the deposition and
cross-examined Mitchell.
72
At trial before a magistrate, the defense objected to the admission of the
deposition as a violation of both rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure7 3 and the sixth amendment. On appeal to the district court,
Judge Finesilver of the District of Colorado ruled that although rule 15 was
not strictly complied with, "compliance [was] within the spirit and tenor" of
the rule.
74
The Tenth Circuit, unpersuaded by Judge Finesilver's reasoning, held
that the government's failure to retain a present witness deprived Rothbart
of his sixth amendment right of confrontation.7 5 The court applied the two-
pronged test of Ohio v. Roberts 76 which requires the prosecution first to
demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant and then show the statement
to be trustworthy. 77 Focusing on the availability of the witness, the court
followed Barber v. Page78 which holds that the previous testimony of a wit-
ness, whether or not subjected to cross-examination, is admissible only if "the
prosecutorial authorities have made a good faith effort to obtain his presence
at trial."'79 The court found that, rather than making a good faith effort to
obtain Mitchell's presence, the government assisted in releasing him from
the subpoena.80
In Valenzuela v. Griffin8l the defendant was tried for burglary. The gov-
ernment's witness was subpoenaed and a bench warrant was issued. The
only other evidence of the state's effort to produce the witness was the prose-
cutor's statement that the state "had been looking for her."'8 2 The defendant
70. Id
71. 653 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1981).
72. Id at 463.
73. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15.
74. 653 F.2d at 464.
75. Id at 465.
76. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
77. Id. at 65.
78. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
79. Id at 725.
80. 653 F.2d at 466.
81. 654 F.2d 707 (10th Cir. 1981).
82. Id at 710.
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was convicted and sought habeas corpus relief, contending that the trial
court violated the sixth amendment by allowing the introduction of the wit-
ness' tape recorded testimony which had been made at a preliminary
hearing.
8 3
The Tenth Circuit again applied the "good faith" standard8 4 of Ohio .
Roberts and Barber v. Page and found the prosecution's effort to be inade-
quate. Noting a three-month time span between the issuance of the sub-
poena and the trial date, the court held that "good faith" required evidence
of additional steps by the government to secure the presence of the witness at
trial.
8 5
B. Efective Assistance of Counsel
The Tenth Circuit held that adequate time to prepare a defense is a
right of the accused under the sixth amendment in United States v. King86 and
United States v. Cronzc.3 7 In King the defendant was indicted for income tax
evasion following a three-year investigation. He was arraigned on December
11, 1979 and trial was set for January 7, 1980. The defendant's motions for a
continuance were denied even though his attorney was forced to withdraw
and new counsel was not appointed until December 26, 1979. After an
eight-day trial involving approximately 200 witnesses and 5,000 exhibits,
King was convicted. 88
Judge Seymour, writing for the court, recognized that a criminal de-
fendant's right to effective assistance of counsel may be jeopardized by inad-
equate trial preparation. 9 In determining whether the court-induced lack
of preparation time deprived the defendant of his sixth amendment rights,9°
the court applied the factors articulated by the Eighth Circuit in Woos v.
Britton9 ' and adopted by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Golub. 92 These
factors include: " '(1) the time afforded for investigation and preparation;
(2) the experience of counsel; (3) the gravity of the charge; (4) the complexity
of possible defenses; and (5) the accessibility of witnesses to counsel.' -93 Ap-
plying the facts, the court in King found that the defendant had only twenty-
seven days to prepare a defense to charges that were three years in the mak-
ing; that the case was sophisticated and required extensive pretrial prepara-
tion; that the defendant faced a prison term of up to five years; and that the
defendant had only fifteen days to meet with his new counsel before the
trial.94 The court held that these factors combined to violate the defendant's
83. Id at 708-09.
84. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
85. 654 F.2d at 710-11.
86. 664 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1981).
87. 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982),cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983) (No.
82-660).
88. 664 F.2d at 1172.
89. Id at 1172-73 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
90. See Rastrom v. Robbins, 440 F.2d 1251 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
91. 509 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1975).
92. 638 F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1980).
93. King, 664 F.2d at 1173 (quoting Golub v. United States, 638 F.2d 185, 189 (10th Cir.
1980)).
94. 664 F.2d at 1173.
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sixth amendment rights. 9 5
In United States v. Cronic96 the defendant was indicted on mail fraud
charges. The government's case involved seventeen witnesses and over fifty
exhibits. The defendant had twenty-five days to prepare for trial and was
represented by a court-appointed attorney with virtually no experience in
federal criminal matters. The appellate court applied the Golub9 7 test and
concluded that inadequate preparation time denied the defendant effective
assistance of counsel.98
C. Speedy Trial
The defendants in United States v. Torres99 were arrested by local police
in connection with a bank robbery. They consented to a search of their
vehicle by local authorities.10° A small caliber weapon was found in the
door pouch. 10 1 Weapons were also found on the persons of both defend-
ants. 10 2  While in custody, one of the defendants consented to a further
search of the vehicle.l0 3 That search revealed stolen cash and the wallet of a
robbery victim. 10 4 F.B.I. agents participated in the interrogation of the de-
fendants and the search of the automobile while the defendants were in state
custody. 10 5 Five days after the arrest, federal charges were filed and the
defendants were taken before a magistrate the following day.'0 6 They ap-
pealed their subsequent convictions contending that there was undue delay
between the time of their arrest and an appearance before a magistrate.
10 7
Arguing that the evidence seized from the automobile during that delay
should be suppressed, the defendants cited McNabb v. United States 108 and
Mallory v. United States 109 which require federal courts to exclude confessions
obtained during such a period of undue delay. The principle was adopted in
rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. " 10 Rule 5(a) applies
95. Id
96. 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982),cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983) (No.
82-660).
97. United States v. Golub, 638 F,2d 185 (10th Cir. 1980). See supra text accompanying
notes 92-93.
98. 675 F.2d at 1129.
99. 663 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1981), cer. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2237 (1982).








108. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
109. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
110. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) provides:
(a) In General. An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a com-
plaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person
without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate or, in the
event that a federal magistrate is not reasonably available, before a state or local judi-
cial officer authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3041. If a person arrested without a warrant is
brought before a magistrate, a complaint shall be filed forthwith which shall comply
with the requirements of Rule 4(a) with respect to the showing of probable cause.
When a person, arrested with or without a warrant or given a summons, appears ini-
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when the accused is taken into federal custody. The challenged search, how-
ever, occurred while the defendants were in state custody. The court, there-
fore, required the defendants to show that a "working arrangement"
'
existed between the F.B.I. and the police in order to tack the period of state
custody to that of the federal government. The defendants were also re-
quired to show that such state custody was used to circumvent rule 5(a).'
1 2
The court found no evidence of such a collusive arrangement. It noted that
it is neither "suspicious [n]or irregular for both state and federal officials to
investigate the same suspect, and to cooperate in the solution of a crime."
'1 13
As an alternative basis for its decision, the court held that the defend-
ants failed to show that the discovery of the evidence resulted from the delay.
The defendants were interrogated and consented to the search of their vehi-
cle on the same day as the arrest. Although the evidence was found three
days later, it was not based on consent given under duress caused by the
delay. 14
In United States v. Guerrero115 the defendant was charged with assaulting
a member of Congress after throwing eggs at John Anderson during his pres-
idential campaign. The attack occurred on August 14, 1980 and trial was
scheduled for September 29. On September 26, the trial judge granted the
government's motion for a forty-five day continuance due to the unavailabil-
ity of Congressman Anderson as a witness until the conclusion of the Presi-
dential campaign. On October 6, the judge postponed the trial until
December 8.116 The defendant was subsequently convicted. He appealed,
contending that the 101 day span between the arraignment and trial vio-
lated the seventy-day time limit of the Speedy Trial Act. 17 The defendant
argued that the initial order postponing the trial did not adequately specify
the reasons for granting the continuance as required by the Act." 8
Judge Doyle, writing for the Tenth Circuit, conceded that the order was
"cryptic."" 9 Nevertheless, he found that the facts were presented in the
government's motion for a continuance and, because they were so obvious, it
was not necessary under the circumstances for the judge to repeat them in
his order. 12
0
In a forceful dissent Judge McKay stressed the importance of enforcing
the Speedy Trial Act. He observed that Congress realized that the Act
tially before the magistrate, the magistrate shall proceed in accordance with the appli-
cable subdivisions of this rule.
111. 663 F.2d at 1024. For an example of a working arrangement between federal and state
officials, see Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943).
112. 663 F.2d at 1024. See United States v. Rose, 415 F.2d 742 (6th Cir.), cert. dented, 396
U.S. 971 (1969); Barnett v. United States, 384 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1967).
113. 663 F.2d at 1025.
114. Id In Part III of its opinion, the court rejected the defendant's contention that his
consent to a "complete" search of the vehicle did not contemplate the extensive search that was
undertaken. The court stated that "permission to search contemplates a thorough search." Id
at 1026-27.
115. 667 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dented, 102 S. Ct. 2044 (1982).
116. 667 F.2d at 866.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
118. 667 F.2d at 865.
119. Id at 866.
120. Id at 867.
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places a heavy burden on trial judges and prosecutors and stated that "[o]nly
vigilance by Courts of Appeals can prevent the erosion of the congressional
mandate without Congress' consent."' 12 He concluded with the "hope that
this case will be confined to its peculiar facts and will not be the harbinger of
an eventual erosion of this important statute rooted in constitutional
imperatives."'
22
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Conspiracy
In United States v. Radeker' 23 the Tenth Circuit examined an exception to
the hearsay rule which allows statements made in the course of and in fur-
therance of a conspiracy to be admitted into evidence. At trial, after estab-
lishing that Radeker helped manage a fence company, the prosecutor asked
a witness how Radeker planned to replace one of the head men in the com-
pany. The defense objected to the response as hearsay. 24 The prosecutor
argued that the testimony was admissible under the hearsay exception be-
cause it was made in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy. The
judge permitted the testimony; however, he made no determination that a
conspiracy existed or that the statement was made during the course of and
in furtherance of a conspiracy.
125
The Tenth Circuit reversed, ruling that the testimony should not have
been permitted. The court relied on its previous interpretations of rule 104
of the Federal Rules of Evidence 126 in United States v. Andrews 1 27 and United
States v. Petersen. 128 Andrews held that such hearsay statements are inadmissi-
ble "unless the existence of the conspiracy is established by independent evi-
dence."i 29 Petersen held that the testimony is inadmissible unless the trial
judge determines that the prosecution has established that a conspiracy ex-
isted, that the declarant and the defendant participated in it, and that the
statement was made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 1
30
In Radeker, the Tenth Circuit held that when a defendant properly objects to
hearsay testimony, the trial court must determine whether the prosecution
has met the burden of proof required in Andrews regardless of whether the
defendant has requested that such a finding be made.
13 1
Chief Judge Seth dissented, arguing that the defendant should not be
permitted to base an appeal on the trial court's failure to make a specific
finding of conspiracy when a ruling on the hearsay objection was all that was
121. Id at 869 (McKay, J., dissenting).
122. Id at 870.
123. 664 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1981).
124. Id at 246.
125. Id
126. FED. R. EVID. 104(a), (b).
127. 585 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1978). For a brief review of Andrews, see Criminal Law and
Procedure, Sixth Annual Tenth Circuit Suvey, 57 DEN. L.J. 229, 260 (1980).
128. 611 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1979),cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980).
129. 585 F.2d at 966.
130. 611 F.2d at 1327.
131. 664 F.2d at 244.
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necessary.' 32 He noted that the defendant had the responsibility to request
the specific finding either before or after the objection or after the trial judge
had made his ruling. 133 Citing the Tenth Circuit opinion in United States v.
Brewer,134 Chief Judge Seth stated that the issue of whether the court must
make a specific finding should be raised at trial, not on appeal. 135
B. Armed Robbegy and Assault
In United States v. Crouthers ' 36 the defendant, Crouthers, planned to rob
the Aurora National Bank in Aurora, Colorado.' 37 He convinced Trimm,
his former student, to pretend to hold him up at gun point on the night he
planned to be with Salski, a friend who was employed by the Wells Fargo
Security Co. and whom Crouthers knew had access to the bank keys. Prior
to the encounter, Crouthers gave Trimm a loaded gun and instructed him to
keep it aimed at him during the holdup so that Salski would not become
suspicious of his involvement. 3 Trimm cooperated and threatened the men
with the gun which, unknown to Crouthers, was unloaded. Crouthers told
Salski that there was a gun in his back. Trimm told Salski that if he cooper-
ated and helped break into the bank no one would get hurt. Salski obeyed
and the plan was carried out.
139
After interviewing Salski and Crouthers, the F.B.I. searched Crouthers'
apartment. Evidence was found linking Crouthers to the robbery. Trimm
was subsequently arrested and his testimony led to Crouthers' conviction for
armed bank robbery. 140
On appeal, Crouthers argued that the evidence did not support a con-
viction for assault with a dangerous weapon because Salski never saw the
gun and the gun was not loaded. The Tenth Circuit adopted the test estab-
lished in United States v. Beasley. 14 ' The Beasley test as applied to Crouthers
was "whether Salski perceived the situation as involving a dangerous
weapon and, if so, whether the perception was reasonable."' 142 The court
found that Salski reasonably perceived his life to be in danger based on his
132. Id. at 248 (Seth, C.J., dissenting). The dissent stated, "[i]t seems apparent that had the
defendant really wanted anything more than a bare ruling on his hearsay objection as he now
urges he would have asked for it." Id.
133. Id
134. 630 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1980). This case held that when a defendant fails to object to
procedural omissions at the trial or on appeal, reversal is unwarranted unless a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice" would result. Id. at 801 (quoting United States v. Morris, 623 F.2d 145,
150 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1065 (1980)).
135. 664 F.2d at 248.
136. 669 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1982).
137. Id at 638.
138. Id
139. Id at 639.
140. Id at 638.
141. 438 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971). Beasl requires that the
evidence show the defendant "(a) to have created an apparently dangerous situation,
(b) intended to intimidate his victim to a degree greater than the mere use of language,
(c) which does, in fact, place his victim in reasonable expectation of death or serious bodily
injury . 438 F.2d at 1282. In applying this test, the Beastey court held that regardless of
the robber's ability to actually inflict harm on the victim, if the victim is in fact shown to be
apprehensive of the circumstances an assault conviction is warranted. Id. at 1283.
142. 669 F.2d at 639.
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belief that Trimm possessed a loaded gun.14 3
C. Illegal Gambling
In United States v. Boss ,144 the defendant was tried for conducting illegal
dice games at a private club in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955.14 5 The evi-
dence showed that the defendant and another man managed the club. In
addition to the managers, the club employed two croupiers, one of whom
participated in managing the gambling business, and three cocktail wait-
resses. 146 The defendant moved for a directed verdict contending that the
government failed to prove that five or more persons were involved in the
management of the operation as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1955(c). 14 7 The
motion was denied and the defendant was convicted.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the prosecution had indeed
failed to satisfy the requirements of section 1955(c). The court rejected the
prosecution's argument that the cocktail waitresses should be included in the
count, stating that the evidence was insufficient to establish that they "per-
formed functions necessary to the illegal gambling business."' 148 The court
found that their relationship to the business was too attenuated to fall under
the provisions of section 1955 and was not in accordance with congressional
intent. 1
49
The Tenth Circuit thus narrowed the scope of section 1955 to include
only those persons necessary to the gambling business. It refused to allow
the statute to encompass those merely helpful to the operations because to do
so would exceed congressional intent.
150
D. Transmission of Radio Sgnals
In United States o. Brown , 1 5 1 Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) agents intercepted powerful radio signals which were being transmit-
ted from Brown's home in Colorado. After obtaining a warrant to search the
residence, the agents confiscated a radio transmitter, amplifiers, and miscel-
laneous equipment capable of transmitting signals over one hundred miles.
143. Id
144. 671 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1982).
145. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (1976) provides that "[w]hoever conducts, finances, manages, su-
pervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than
$20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." Id § 1955(c) provides that:
If five or more persons conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part
of a gambling business and such business operates for two or more successive days,
then, for the purpose of obtaining warrants for arrests, interceptions, and other
searches and seizures, probable cause that the business receives gross revenue in excess
of $2,000 in any single day shall be deemed to have been established.
146. 671 F.2d at 401.
147. &e supra note 145.
148. 671 F.2d at 402.
149. Id
150. For the same reasons the waitresses were not included as conductors of illegal gambling
business, the court held that the bartender, back-up bartender, doorwoman, and band members
could not be counted. The owners of the building who had leased the club could not be
counted without proof of their actual participation or actual financial contributions to the oper-
ations. Id
151. 661 F.2d 855 (10th Cir.),cert dmied, 454 U.S. 1127 (1981).
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Brown was charged with making radio transmissions that "did extend" be-
yond the state line in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 301(d). 15 2 At trial, the agents
testified that the transmission wattage on Brown's citizen's band transmitter
was greater than that permitted by the FCC and that the transmissions
"could have crossed state borders or interfered with interstate radio sig-
nals."' 153 No evidence was presented that the signals actually interfered with
interstate transmissions or crossed the state line. The jury was instructed
that the defendant could be convicted if the effects of the radio transmission
"extend or could extend beyond the borders of the state of Colorado.' 54
Based on this evidence, Brown was convicted.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the conviction, holding that evidence which
shows that radio signals are "powerful enough" to cross state borders is suffi-
cient to satisfy the effects test of 47 U.S.C. § 301(d).' 5 5 The court reasoned
that, because the intent of the statute is to provide the government with
plenary power over all channels of interstate radio transmissions, the govern-
ment need not prove that the signals "actually" extend beyond the state
border. '
56
Judge McKay dissented, distinguishing between broadcasts that "did
extend" across the state line and those that did not.' 5 7 Looking at the plain
meaning of subsection 301(d), Judge McKay found that Congress did not
intend to regulate those broadcasts which "could extend" past state bor-
ders.' 58 He concluded that, although the defendant was properly charged
under the "effects test," the addition of the words "or could extend" to the
jury instructions was reversible error.' 59 In Judge McKay's view, the major-
ity's affirmance of the conviction "greatly expand[s] criminal jurisdiction in
the face of a contrary congressional intent and [is] counter to the obvious
purposes apparent in the general structure of the statutory scheme."' 16
E. Malicious Damage
The defendant in United States v. Pouwos161 was charged with the destruc-
tion of a building and personal property with explosives in violation of 18
152. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976) provides in part:
No person shall use or operate any apparatus for the transmission of energy or commu-
nications or signals by radio . . . (d) within any State when the effects of such use
extend beyond the borders of said State, or when interference is caused by such use or
operation with the transmission of such energy, communications, or signals from
within said State to any place beyond its borders, or from any place beyond its borders
153. 661 F.2d at 855.
154. Id. at 857.
155. d. at 856; see supra note 152. The appellate court determined that an onerous burden
would be imposed upon the government if, in order to prove that every signal actually extended
across the border, it was required to monitor the signals from outside the state.
156. 661 F.2d at 856.
157. Id. at 857 (McKay, J., dissenting).
158. d. The dissent cited Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1966) as incor-
rectly interpreting the language of subsection 301 (d) to allow Congress to regulate all broadcasts
by citizen's band radios whether intra- or interstate. 661 F.2d at 857 n.2 (McKay, J.,
dissenting).
159. Id at 857.
160. Id
161. 667 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1982).
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U.S.C. § 844(i).' 62 At trial, the defendant contended that 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(j), 16 3 which defines "explosives," is void for vagueness. He argued that
the statute fails to warn potential defendants of the criminal nature of their
conduct and that reasonable men would have to "guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application."1 6 4 The defendant stated that the building was
not destroyed by an explosive, as defined in the statute, but rather by a
device consisting of two glass bottles filled with styrofoam and gasoline. 165
Furthermore, the gasoline was ignited by sparks from the pilot light of a
water heater in the building, not by an explosive igniting device. The trial
court refused to grant the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal or to
strike the indictment, and the defendant was convicted. 166
The Tenth Circuit upheld the conviction, ruling that section 8440)
must be broadly construed to include all types of explosives, even those not
specified.16 7 The court stated that it is common knowledge that gasoline is a
highly combustible substance that fits within the meaning of "explosives."'68
F. Sentencing
1. Concurrent Sentence Doctrine
In United States v. Montoya16 9 the trial court determined the defendant
should serve concurrent sentences on the four counts of his conviction. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions for assaulting a federal
law enforcement agent with a dangerous weapon 170 and possessing an unre-
gistered firearm.' 
7'
The prosecution asked the Tenth Circuit to affirm the remaining two
convictions 172 by applying the concurrent sentence doctrine.' 73 The prose-
cution argued that even if a ruling on the remaining two convictions would
162. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1976). This section penalizes anyone who "maliciously damages or
destroys or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of an explosive, any building. . . or other
real or personal property used in interstate commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or
foreign commerce." Id
163. Id § 844(j) (1976). An "explosive" is defined as:
gunpowders, powders used for blasting, all forms of high explosives, blasting materials,
fuses (other than electric circuit breakers), detonators, and other explosive or incendi-
ary devices within the meaning of paragraph (5) of section 232 of this title, and any
chemical compounds, mechanical mixture, or device that contains any oxidizing and
combustible units, or other ingredients, in such proportions, quantities, or packing
that ignition by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of the
compound, mixture, or device or any part thereof may cause an explosion.
164. 667 F.2d at 941.
165. Id at 940-41.
166. Id at 941.
167. Id at 942.
168. Id
169. 676 F.2d 428 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 124 (1982).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1976). This section provides "[w]hoever forcibly assaults, resists, op-
poses, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title
while engaged in or on account of the performance of his official duties shall be fined."
171. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1976). This statute section prohibits any person "to receive or
possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and
transfer record .. "
172. The defendant was convicted under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i) (1976) which prohibits one
from receiving or possessing "a firearm which is not identified by a serial number as required by
this chapter. ... The defendant was also convicted under the Omnibus Crime Control and
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be in the defendant's favor, the sentences under the first two convictions
would not change. The court refused to apply the doctrine, stating that the
issues on the remaining counts were "uncomplicated."' 1 74 The court cited
Benton v. Maryland'75 to support its conclusion that application of the doc-
trine is a discretionary matter.
The court noted that strong criticism has been directed toward applica-
tion of the doctrine due to the chance of "adverse collateral conse-
quences."' 76 It further noted that different approaches to this question have
arisen in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits and in the District of Columbia and
Fifth Circuits.' 77 The Tenth Circuit rejected the District of Columbia and
Fifth Circuit approach which would have vacated the convictions on the
remaining counts. Instead, the court reaffirmed its discretionary authority
not to apply the doctrine.1
78
2. Youth Corrections Act
In Watts v. Hadden 179 the Tenth Circuit issued a two-part opinion con-
cerning the requirements of the Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA). 180
Eleven inmates of the Federal Correctional Institution in Colorado com-
plained that the United States Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) and the United
States Parole Commission (Commission) failed to follow the provisions of the
YCA. They argued that inmates sentenced under the YCA should be segre-
gated from non-YCA offenders and placed in a facility designed and oper-
ated under the provisions of the YCA.' 8 ' The district court determined that
the petitioners were being held at the institution in violation of the YCA and
ordered the Bureau to draft a plan in compliance with the YCA
provisions. '
8 2
The Bureau's plan provided the YCA offenders with separate living
Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 1202(a), Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 236 (1968) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 922 (1976)).
173. The concurrent sentence doctrine states that "if any one of the counts is good and
warrants the judgment, in the absence of anything in the record to show the contrary, the
presumption of the law is that the court awarded sentence on the good count only." United
States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976).
174. 676 F.2d at 433.
175. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
176. 676 F.2d at 432. See also United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 933-34 n.17 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972) ("[Tihe vitality of the concurrent sentence doctrine is
rapidly waning.").
177. 676 F.2 at 432-33. The Seventh Circuit considers the validity of all challenged counts
rather than applying the concurrent sentence doctrine. See United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d
128, 140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972). The Sixth Circuit assumes the existence of
adverse consequences in its refusal to apply the doctrine. See, e.g., Gentry v. United States, 533
F.2d 998, 1001 (6th Cir. 1976). The Fifth Circuit appears to have adopted the D.C. Circuit's
practice of vacating the conviction on the additional counts where the concurrent sentence doc-
trine is applied. See United States v. Warren, 612 F.2d 887, 891-96 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Hooper, 432 F.2d 604, 605-06 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
178. 676 F.2d at 433. See, e.g., United States v. Masters, 484 F.2d 1251 (10th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir.), vacatedon otherground sub noa. Schreiner
v. United States, 404 U.S. 67 (1971).
179. 651 F.2d 1354 (10th Cir. 1981).
180. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005 to 5026 (1976).
181. 651 F.2d at 1362.
182. 469 F. Supp. 223, 235 (D. Colo. 1979), aftd, 651 F.2d 1354 (10th Cir. 1981).
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quarters and special treatment programs.' 8 3 At all other times the YCA
inmates would associate with the other inmates. The district court found the
Bureau's plan inadequate and ordered that the YCA inmates be completely
segregated.'8 4  The Bureau appealed, arguing that section 5011 of the
YCA18 5 gives them discretionary authority to permit integration of inmates
"insofar as practicable."'
18 6
The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding such an interpretation of the YCA
contrary to both the statutory language and legislative history. It stated that
the Bureau's discretion to integrate inmates is limited and that section 5011
does not allow the abandonment of all efforts to maintain separate YCA
facilities.18V The court held that as Congress had not expressed an intent to
alter the YCA, the Bureau could not arbitrarily determine that the YCA
approach should be discarded. Any deviation from this approach must
come within the "context of a comprehensive system of institutions and
agencies devoted to youth offenders"' 8 8 and "within the context of substan-
tial compliance with the segregation requirements of the YCA. ... "'89
In the second part of the opinion, the Tenth Circuit considered whether
the Commission lawfully held the YCA inmates after failing to comply with
the YCA provisions relating to parole eligibility of youth offenders' 9° and
unconditional release.' 9 ' The Commission contended that the 1976 Parole
Commission Reorganization Act 192 repealed the parole provisions of the
YCA, permitting it to apply its own parole criteria to all prisoners. The
Commission required each prisoner to serve at least one-third of his term
prior to parole or release.19 3 All youth offenders sentenced to an indetermi-
nate term of six years were, therefore, required to complete at least two years
before being eligible for release or parole.
The Tenth Circuit held that the Commission's procedure disregarded
183. 651 F.2d at 1360-62.
184. Id at 1356.
185. 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976). This section pertains to treatment of youth offenders under
the YCA and provides in part that:
[tihe Director shall from time to time designate, set aside, and adapt institutions and
agencies under the control of the Department of Justice for treatment. Insofar as prac-
tical, such institutions and agencies shall be used only for treatment of committed
youth offenders, and such youth offenders shall be segregated from other offenders,
and classes of committed youth offenders shall be segregated according to their needs
for treatment.
186. The Tenth Circuit went through a lengthy discussion of § 5011 and, in particular, the
construction of the phrase "insofar as practical." It concluded that the phrase modifies all four
of the clauses preceding it which allows the Bureau a limited discretion in granting exceptions
to the norm of segregation. 651 F.2d at 1362-65.
187. Id at 1364.
188. Id
189. Id
190. 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (1976) lists the criteria that are to be considered by the Parole Com-
mission when determining when to release a prisoner on parole. The issue addressed by the
appellate court was whether the YCA required the Commission to consider a youth offender's
rehabilitation under the specific treatment program. 651 F.2d at 1369.
191. 18 U.S.C. § 5017(b) (1976). This section allows the commission to release uncondition-
ally a committed youth offender "at the expiration of one year from the date of conditional
release." Id
192. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201 to 4218 (1976).
193. Id § 4205(a).
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the indeterminate sentencing procedure required by the YCA 194 and was
contrary to the law in Dorszynski v. United States. 195 D vrszynski recognized
that the YCA was promulgated in accord with the existing sentencing au-
thority vested in the trial court and was intended to provide the courts with
more sentencing alternatives.19 6 The court found that the Commission had
usurped the sentencing function of the trial courts and, therefore, did not
comply with the purposes and policies of the YCA.
197
The court also noted that, under the YCA and United States v. Ad-
donizio, 198 the Commission has discretionary authority to consider when an
unconditional release may be granted.199 The court held, however, that a
unilateral decision that an inmate is not eligible for parole until serving two




In Runnels v. Hess20 1 the defendant was tried in state court for rape.
2 0 2
In his closing argument, the prosecutor commented on the defendant's fail-
ure to testify on his own behalf. The defense failed to object and the defend-
ant, Runnels, was convicted. After exhausting his state remedies, Runnels
petitioned for habeas corpus relief on the ground that his fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination had been violated. The petition was granted
and the state appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
20 3
Judge Barrett, writing for the court, decided the case by applying Wain-
wright v. .Sykes.204 Sykes held that failure to make a timely objection at a trial
in a state with a contemporaneous objection rule precludes federal habeas
corpus proceedings unless cause can be shown for noncompliance and that
prejudice to the defendant would result. Judge Barrett reasoned that review
based on an inferred fundamental error exception to the rule would invite
"'sand-bagging,' on the part of defense lawyers, 'who may take their chances
on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial court with the intent to raise their
constitutional claims in a federal habeas court if their gamble does not pay
off.' ",205 He stated that Sykes was intended to prevent such sand-bagging
and that "carving out fundamental error exceptions to Sykes would seriously
undermine its force."'20 6 The court remanded the case to determine whether
194. See 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1976).
195. 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
196. Id at 440.
197. 651 F.2d at 1377.
198. 442 U.S. 178 (1979).
199. 651 F.2d at 1378.
200. Id at 1378-79. The court concluded that the Commission's failure to consider the
youth offender's rehabilitative progress and failure to determine "good cause" to release offend-
ers is contrary to the purpose of the YCA and § 4206(a).
201. 653 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1981).
202. See Runnels v. State, 562 P.2d 932 (Okla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 893 (1977).
203. 653 F.2d at 1361.
204. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
205. 653 F.2d at 1363 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977)).
206. 653 F.2d at 1363.
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cause existed for the defendant's failure to timely object.
20 7
Judge Logan dissented, arguing against such a strict application of
Sykes.208 He stated that Sykes must be considered with Heng v. Missisipi
209
which held that procedural defaults in state proceedings do not prevent vin-
dication of federal rights unless the procedural rule serves a legitimate state
interest. He noted that the Sykes Court implicitly recognized this principle
by applying Hen;y to determine whether a legitimate state interest existed
before applying the "cause and prejudice" analysis.
2 10
Judge Logan argued that, in Runnel's case, the contemporaneous objec-
tion rule would not serve a legitimate state interest. 21 ' He stated that the
state's interest in finality and efficiency in the administration of justice are
not served by requiring contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor's clos-
ing argument because an objection would have resulted in a mistrial. 2 12 He
then noted that, based on the circumstances of the case, sand-bagging was
unlikely.2 13 Finally, Judge Logan argued that if prevention of sand-bagging
is considered to be a sufficient state interest, then the requirements of Henry
would always be met and rendered meaningless.
2 14
H. Trial Matters
1. Reviewing a Judgment of Acquittal
In United States v. Whtle21 5 the defendant, White, was found guilty of
mail fraud 2 16 and interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained
money.2 1 7 The trial judge set aside the verdict and granted White's motion
for a judgment of acquittal.2 18 The prosecution appealed, contending that
the judge erred by applying the standard of review established in Curlg v.
United States21 9 which, it argued, conflicts with the Tenth Circuit's position
207. Id. at 1364. The court in Part A of its opinion agreed with the district court that the
prosecutor's remarks during closing argument had violated Runnel's fifth amendment rights.
Thus, the prejudice element of the exception had already been shown. The court suggested that
the cause element might be met by a showing of" 'ineffective counsel short of that necessary to
make out Sixth Amendment claim .... . Id (quoting Tyler v. Phelps, 622 F.2d 172, 177 (5th
Cir. 1980)).
208. 653 F.2d at 1365 (Logan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
210. 653 F.2d at 1366 (Logan, J., dissenting).
211. Id
212. Id. at 1367.
213. Id. at 1367-68.
214. Id. at 1367.
215. 673 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1982).
216. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) prohibits one from developing and sending through the mail
system "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false
pretenses, [or] representations . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or at-
tempting so to do .... "
217. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) prohibits transporting "in interstate.., commerce any goods,
wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to
have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud .
218. 673 F.2d at 301.
219. 160 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947). In Curle the court held that,
in ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court must weigh the evidence in light
of the jury's determination of credibility and draw justifiable inferences which would result in a
reasonable person finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 160 F.2d at 232.
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on judicial review of evidence.220 The Tenth Circuit held that the trial
court had used the appropriate standard of review; however, it found that
the stapdard was erroneously applied.
2 2 1
By viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the
court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict
on both counts of the indictment. 222 It reversed the judgment of acquittal
which was based on the failure to establish the first element of mail fraud.
2 23
The court found that sufficient evidence existed to justify a verdict that
White participated in a "scheme or artifice to defraud investors by use of
false representations or promises.
'224
The evidence revealed that White solicited investments in a partnership
to drill and rework oil wells. White represented that he held drilling and
reworking rights to oil leases on three separate properties and that he had
experience in the steam method of oil recovery. The evidence, however, in-
dicated that White had assigned his interest in these properties prior to the
formation of the partnership. 22 5 It was also revealed that White had never
actually used the steam method of recovery but had merely observed its
use.
226
Based upon White's representations, five investors contributed funds to
the partnership. After the partnership was formed, White spent several
months constructing a trailer near the wells to hold the steam recovery unit.
White then withdrew a substantial sum of money from the partnership ac-
count, converted it into cashier's checks, and cashed them in another state.
The partners heard nothing from White until his arrest ten months later.
227
The trial judge believed that White's efforts to construct the trailer were
sufficient to cause a reasonable doubt about his intent to devise a fraudulent
scheme. However, the Tenth Circuit held that such a belief "would not jus-
tify false or baseless representations"2 28 and found that the jury could rea-
sonably have inferred from the evidence that White falsely misrepresented
material facts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.229
2. Judicial Grant of Witness Immunity
In United States v. Hunter23 ° the defendant called a witness to testify in
220. The standard applied in the Tenth Circuit for judicial consideration of a motion for
acquittal is to review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, allowing a
jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 673 F.2d at 301 (citing Maguire v.
United States, 358 F.2d 442, 444 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 870 (1966); Cartwright v.
United States, 335 F.2d 919, 921 (10th Cir. 1964)).
221. 673 F.2d at 301.
222. Id at 304.
223. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
224. 673 F.2d at 304.
225. Id at 302-04.
226. Id at 304.
227. Id
228. Id at 305.
229. Id; 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to
support the conviction for transporting more than $5,000 in interstate commerce with knowl-
edge that the money had been fraudulently appropriated. 673 F.2d at 305.
230. 672 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1982).
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support of his duress defense. The witness invoked her fifth amendment
right to remain silent after the prosecution refused to grant her immunity.
Hunter contended that this denied him the opportunity to develop his
defense.
23 t
In conflict with the weight of authority, the defense urged the court to
adopt the standard in Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith.232 In Smith the
Third Circuit held, based on United States v. Herman,233 that when the prose-
cution refuses to grant immunity, the court may grant it under two circum-
stances. First, the court could force the prosecution to grant immunity or
face an acquittal if it deliberately denies immunity in an attempt to distort
the evidentiary conclusions. 23 The court could also grant immunity based
on its "inherent authority" to promote the defendant's due process rights. 235
The Tenth Circuit rejected the notion that a court has inherent author-
ity to grant immunity "under the guise of due process."'2 36 Instead, it ap-
plied the law in United States v. Graham237 in which it was held that the
granting of witness immunity is confined to the United States Attorney and
his superior officers. The court did not comment on the other circumstance
mentioned in Smith,238 therefore, it is unclear whether the Tenth Circuit
would accept a judicial grant of witness immunity in the circumstance of
prosecutorial misconduct.
3. Grand Juries
In another immunity case, Sutton v. United States239 the defendant was
the controlling officer of a company which was under investigation by a fed-
eral grand jury. Certain documents held by the company's attorney were
subpoenaed; however, the grand jury's term expired before the documents
could be reviewed. The trial court ordered the evidence transferred to a
newly empaneled grand jury which never issued a subpoena for the docu-
ments. The defendant challenged the transfer.
240
Writing for the Tenth Circuit, Judge Kerr of the District of Wyoming
compared the facts of Sutton to those in United States v. E.H. Koester Bakery
Co. ,24I where the transfer of documents between grand juries was permitted
despite the absence of both a subpoena and a court order. Judge Kerr stated
that to require the issuance of a second subpoena "would simply result in a
complete waste of judicial time." 242 He agreed with the statement in United
231. Id. at 818.
232. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980).
233. 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). In Heman the court
reviewed the circumstances in which a defendant may request that use immunity be applied
and recognized the two situations promoted in Smith. 589 F.2d at 1204.
234. Smith, 615 F.2d at 968.
235. Id. at 969-70.
236. Hunter, 672 F.2d at 818.
237. 548 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1977).
238. Hunter, 672 F.2d at 818.
239. 658 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1981).
240. Id at 783.
241. 334 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1971).
242. 658 F.2d at 784.
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States v. Kleen Laundry and Cleaners, Inc. :243 "That a different grand jury from
the one which subpoenas the evidence is presented with that evidence is of
little import. This procedure is common."244
4. Selective Prosecution
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of selective prosecution of tax
protesters in United States v. Amon. 24 5 The defendants were convicted of filing
false withholding allowance certificates. They appealed, contending that
they were singled out for prosecution because they were "outspoken" 246 in
their opposition to the tax system and that such selection violated their first
amendment rights.
Judge Holloway, writing for the court, ruled against the defendants.
2 4 7
He agreed with the trial court that the standards articulated by the Second
Circuit in United States v. Berrios,248 applied to tax cases in United States v.
Johnson249 and endorsed by the Tenth Circuit in Barton v. Malley, 250 should
be applied. These standards require that the defendant prove that he had
been singled out for prosecution while others similarly situated had not gen-
erally been proceeded against for the type of conduct forming the basis of
the charge against him. He must also prove that the government's discrimi-
natory selection of him for prosecution has been invidious or in bad faith
and has been based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, or
the desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights. 251 Judge Holloway
held that the infringement on the defendants' first amendment rights was
insufficient to show an impermissible purpose in the prosecution. Thus, the
second prong of the Berrios test had not been met.
252
In a vigorous dissent, Judge McKay argued that singling out the de-
fendants because of their protest activities constituted an impermissible pur-
pose for prosecution. 25 3 He stated that the trial court's findings showed that
the second prong of the test had indeed been met and warned that "[t]he net
[effects] of the majority's handling of this issue are. . . the establishment of
a rule which permits government through selective prosecution to chill the





243. 381 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
244. Id. at 523.
245. 669 F.2d 1351 (1Oth Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982).
246. 669 F.2d at 1355.
247. Id at 1359. Judge Logan concurred in a separate opinion. Id at 1359-61.
248. 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
249. 577 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1978).
250. 626 F.2d 151 (10th Cir. 1980).
251. Amon, 669 F.2d at 1356 n.6.
252. The appellate court did not reach the question of whether the first prong of the Berrmes
test, requiring a showing that others similarly situated were not prosecuted, had been met. Id.
at 1357 n.7.
253. Id. at 1361-64 (McKay, J., dissenting).
254. Id at 1362.
[Vol. 60:2
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
This survey of the large number of cases handed down by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in the area of federal practice and procedure exam-
ines some of the more significant opinions including decisions on the discre-
tionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, abstention under
the ullman doctrine, and failure to join an indispensable party.
I. JURISDICTION
A. Subject Matter Jurisidiction
1. Waiver of Governmental Immunity under the Federal Tort
Claims Act
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with the question of
whether the issuance of an allegedly misleading aeronautical chart by a gov-
ernment agency fell within the discretionary function exception' of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act. 2 In Baird v. United States,3 the pilot of a small aircraft
used a government-approved aeronautical chart to make a night landing at
the Greenburg, Kansas airport. The symbols on the chart accurately indi-
cated the length of the longest runway and the availability of runway lights
from sunset to sunrise. There was no system, however, for symbolically in-
forming the pilot that the lit runway was not the longest runway, and that it
was not lit for its entire length. The plane overran the lit runway and
crashed, killing two passengers and severely injuring a third passenger and
the pilot.
4
In a split decision, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
claim on the ground that the design and approval of the chart specifications
by the government fell within the discretionary function exception and,
therefore, sovereign immunity barred the suit.5 The majority, per Judge
Seymour, relied upon Dalehite v. United States6 which broadly defined discre-
tionary judgment as "determinations made by executives or administrators
in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2860(a) (1976):
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to--
(a) any claim . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or employee
of the government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976) (waiving governmental immunity from tort claims); 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) (granting jurisdiction for such claims).
3. 653 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
4. 653 F.2d at 438.
5. Id. at 441.
6. 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (explosion of fertilizer produced according to specifications of a
government fertilizer export program held not actionable because negligent decisions were
made at a planning rather than an operational level).
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is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion."' 7 Applying this
standard to the federal agency responsible for the map's symbols, the Inter-
Agency Air Cartographic Committee (IACC),8 the court found that the
IACC's determination of the extent of detail to be included in aeronautical
charts was a discretionary design judgment. 9
By challenging the IACC's judgmental activities in formulating and ap-
proving the substantive design of the chart, the plaintiffs challenged the de-
sign of all sectional charts. The court distinguished Baird from three
categories of cases where the government's negligence has not been held to
be protected by the discretionary function exception:' 0 where negligence
has occurred in the mechanical preparation of the chart, not in the substan-
tive design;"' where the wrong symbol was used on the chart;' 2 and where
the negligence involved an activity in which only governments engage.
13
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Doyle argued that the breach of duty in-
volved was more related to a governmental operational activity than it was
to the planning function and thus, was not immune under the discretionary
function exception.' 4 Relying upon the reasoning of Indian Towing Co. v.
United States,15 Judge Doyle furthermore maintained that once the govern-
ment undertook the responsibility of publishing aeronautical charts to mini-
mize the danger of a hazardous activity, landing airplanes, it had a duty to
depict fully and accurately those features which it had chosen to portray. '
6
Judge Doyle argued this duty exists independently of any discretionary
decision. 17
7. Id. at 35-36.
8. The Inter-Agency Air Cartographic Committee is a committee formed by agreement of
the Departments of Defense and Commerce and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to
develop the final detailed and authoritative specifications for flight information in textual and
chart form. 653 F.2d at 438-39.
9. Id. at 441.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Reminga v. United States, 631 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (televison tower's
ground location inaccurately depicted on chart); Allnutt v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 832
(W.D. Mo. 1980) (aeronautical chart failed to comply with IACC standards).
12. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1971), a 'd, 463 F.2d 208
(10th Cir. 1972) (chart erroneously depicted availability of night lighting); Sullivan v. United
States, 299 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ala. 1968), affd, 411 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1969).
13. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (government held suable
for negligent operation of a lighthouse); see also Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir.
1976) (negligent failure to warn of thermal pools in undeveloped portion of Yellowstone Na-
tional Park); Yates v. United States, 497 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1974) (negligent failure of FAA air
controller to allow sufficient separation of air traffic actionable).
14. 653 F.2d at 444 (Doyle, J., dissenting). The impact of Judge Doyle's argument is di-
luted by his insistence that negligent acts by definition must be excluded from "policy deci-
sions." Id. at 443-44. His definition of an "operational activity" as any activity performed
negligently circumvents the Dalehie layering of protection for decisions made at the planning
level. Judge Doyle avoids the possibility that a discretionary-function policy decision might be
made negligently, or might negligently authorize acts which, if examined independently at the
field or "operational" level, would be considered negligent. Such policy decisions, according to
the majority in Baird, are protected by sovereign immunity.
15. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
16. 653 F.2d at 445 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 444-45. Cf. Allen v. United States, 527 F. Supp. 476, 486-87 (D. Utah 1981).
Allen was a preliminary action in a suit brought by nearly 1,000 persons against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries sustained as a result of open-air nuclear
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2. Waiver of Governmental Immunity under the Tucker Act
The Tucker Act'" waives the government's sovereign immunity for cer-
tain claims for money damages by conferring jurisdiction on the Court of
Claims, and in certain circumstances on the district courts. In the consoli-
dated case Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. Bergland,'9 the Secretary of Agriculture
appealed a summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff sugar companies.
The trial court had granted injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to
the eligibility of sugar as collateral for loans made as part of the price sup-
port program of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977.20 Prior to the entry
of summary judgment, however, the companies repaid the loans the govern-
ment had sought to recall.
2 1
The court of appeals held that because the loans had been repaid prior
to judgment, the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
22
The court employed two rationales. First, jurisdiction over a federal ques-
tion 23 must involve a case or controversy. 24 After the loans were repaid, the
only question remaining between the companies and the Department of Ag-
riculture was the potential storage payments claim, a claim not presented by
the plaintiffs. 25 Second, the Tucker Act grants concurrent jurisdiction of
claims under $10,000 to the district courts and the Court of Claims, but gives
jurisdiction of claims over $10,000 exclusively to the Court of Claims. 2 6 The
potential storage payments claim exceeded $10,000 and, therefore, jurisdic-
testing in Nevada during 1951-62. The district court declined to allow the discretionary func-
tion exception to prevent trial on the merits because of lack of jurisdiction. The court character-
ized the issue of the scope of the discretionary function exception as a substantive issue of duty
under tort analysis, as Judge Doyle did in his dissent in Baird. Allen, 527 F. Supp. at 487. On
this basis, the court deemed the jurisdictional issues "inextricable" from the substantive claims,
and ruled that jurisdictional defenses would be determined upon a complete record. Id. at 488.
Accord Irving v. United States, 532 F. Supp. 840 (D. N.H. 1982) (personal injury suit alleging
negligent performance of compliance enforcement inspection by government officers); Barnson
v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 614 (D. Utah 1982) (Federal Tort Claims Act suits arising from
cancer deaths of uranium mine workers).
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
19. 664 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1981).
20. 7 U.S.C. § 1446(0 (Supp. IV 1980). Prior to the 1977 Act, sugar prices were supported
by a payment program which permitted the recipient processors to choose between the "last-in
first-out" (LIFO) or "first-in first-out" (FIFO) inventory accounting methods, but then required
them to adhere to their choice. The 1977 Act changed price supports to a loan program, utiliz-
ing processed sugar as collateral and guaranteeing government purchase if sugar prices fell be-
low set levels. The plaintiff sugar companies participated in the payment program under the
LIFO method, but changed to the FIFO method in fixing the amounts of sugar used as collat-
eral and thus determining the amount of the loans under the loan program. The United States
Department of Agriculture claimed that this interprogram switch in inventory methods ren-
dered the sugar ineligible as collateral for the loans and thus called for pre-maturity loan repay-
ment. 664 F.2d at 821.
21. Id. at 821-22. Repayment was made pursuant to stipulations that: a) but for the
switch in accounting methods, the sugar was eligible as collateral for the price support program;
and b) if the sugar companies won the subject litigation they would receive the benefits of the
price support programs and program extensions. Id. at 822 n.5.
22. Id. at 824.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
24. U.S. CONST. art. III.
25. 664 F.2d at 823.
26. 23 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1976).
1983]
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tion was vested in the Court of Claims. 27 "fJ]urisdiction of the Court of
Claims cannot be evaded by framing a complaint to seek only injunctive,
mandatory, or declaratory relief against governmental officials."
28
3. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Barred by Statute
In Cities Service Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission ,29 the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of a challenge by nine pipeline companies to the con-
stitutionality of the Oklahoma Conservation Excise Tax,
30 as related to the
[Oklahoma] Tax Credit Act.3 1 The court based its dismissal on the jurisdic-
tional bar of the Tax Injunction Act of 1937.32
In claiming that the federal court should maintain jurisdiction of the
suit, the appellants argued that they were precluded from obtaining relief in
the Oklahoma state courts because the Oklahoma Supreme Court had previ-
ously declared the challenged tax law constitutional. 33 They relied upon
Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 34 asserting that if there is uncertainty surrounding
the adequacy of the state remedy, a federal court should maintain jurisdic-
tion over the claim.
35
The court rejected this argument, holding that the likelihood of success
in state courts is not a factor in determining whether uncertainty surrounds
the adequacy of a state remedy. 36 The Tenth Circuit court relied upon the
Rosewell test, 3 7 which focuses on the procedural adequacy of the remedy,
rather than its substantive adequacy. Because the taxpayers in this case had
a right to a full hearing before the Oklahoma Tax Commission with direct
appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the Rosewell test of the opportunity
for full hearing and judicial determination of the plaintiffs' claim was met.
38
Consequently, although the taxpayers were bound to lose under Oklahoma
precedent, they were precluded from federal jurisdiction because Oklahoma
provides an adequate procedural system for adjudicating challenges to its
tax laws.
B. Abstention under the Pullman Doctrine
The Pullman doctrine39 permits a federal court to abstain from ruling in
those instances where: a) a federal constitutional claim is premised on an
unsettled question of state law; b) determination by a state court might
27. 664 F.2d at 823-24.
28. Id. at 824.
29. 656 F.2d 584 (10th Cir.), cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981).
30. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 1107-1111 (West Supp. 1981-82).
31. Id. § 2357 D.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
33. Post Oak Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 575 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1978).
34. 326 U.S. 620 (1946).
35. 656 F.2d at 586.
36. Id. The court adopted the reasoning of the Third Circuit's opinion in Non-Resident
Taxpayers Ass'n v. Municipality of Philadelphia, 478 F.2d 456 (3d Cir. 1973).
37. Rosewell v. La Salle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503 (1981).
38. 656 F.2d at 587.
39. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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avoid or modify the constitutional issue; or c) important state policies might
be disrupted by an erroneous decision of the federal court.40 This abstention
doctrine is an extraordinary exception to a court's duty to adjudicate cases
before it, and as such, must be construed narrowly.
41
In Vrnyard v. King 4 2 the trial court abstained from hearing a case in
which the plaintiff claimed that the termination of her employment at an
Oklahoma state hospital violated her due process rights. The trial court
found Oklahoma law unclear with respect to the existence of a property in-
terest in continued employment. 43 The appellate court reversed, based upon
its determination of the clarity of Oklahoma state law.44 The court thereby
declined to broaden the Pullman doctrine.
45
Utilizing the Third Circuit's three-pronged test, 46 the court found
Oklahoma law settled on the question of when a property interest is cre-
ated,4 7 although difficult to apply to the instant facts. 48 The court also
found that no interference with important state programs would be caused
by an erroneous federal adjudication.
4 9
In University of Oklahoma Gay People's Union v. Board of Regents,5° the Tenth
Circuit reiterated earlier guidance to the lower courts 5 1 concerning the ap-
propriate application of the Pullman doctrine. The suit challenged the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma Board of Regents' non-recognition of a homosexual
group as a student organization. The trial court dismissed the federal action
in view of a parallel action pending in the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
5 2
The appellate court agreed that there were grounds for abstention, stat-
ing that state court resolution "in a particular way"'5 3 would leave no re-
maining constitutional issues. Nevertheless, it reversed the lower court's
dismissal, stating that the proper action would be to reinstate the case on the
docket and defer further action until state law issues were resolved in the
40. See D'Iorio v. County of Delaware, 592 F.2d 681, 686 (3d Cir. 1978). See generally Field,
Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
1071 (1974).
41. See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959).
42. 655 F.2d 1016 (10th Cir. 1981).
43. The sufficiency of a property interest triggering constitutional due process considera-
tions is determined by state law. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976).
44. 655 F.2d at 1019.
45. Id. at 1021.
46. The court relied upon the test set forth in D'Iorio v. County of Delaware, 592 F.2d 681,
686 (3d Cir. 1978).
47. Singh v. City Serv. Oil Co., 554 P.2d 1367 (Okla. 1976) (circumstances under which
employment contracts are terminable at will); Nation v. Chism, 154 Okla. 50, 6 P.2d 766 (1931)
(general property right in employment not recognized).
48. The case involved a claimed implied contract between a coordinator of volunteer serv-
ices and a hospital.
49. 655 F.2d at 1020. The court distinguished the non-renewal of non-tenured teacher
contract cases on the basis that education is primarily a function of the state. Id. at 1020 n.7.
50. 661 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1981).
51. E.g., Arrow v. Dow, 636 F.2d 287 (10th Cir. 1980); Western Food Plan, Inc. v. MacFar-
lane, 588 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1978). See also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 244 n.4 (1967).
52. The federal court parties stipulated that the state court action had identical circum-
stances and issues and that the purposes of the plaintiff organizations in the federal and state
cases were identical although the membership lists were different. 661 F.2d at 859.
53. Id. at 860.
19831
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
state court. 54 The court noted that caveats for deferral of federal court ac-
tion are: a) unfair added expense to the litigants (not an issue in this case);
or b) extended delay (to which the court directed the lower court's
attention) .55
C. Jurisdiction over Interlocutory Appeal
The collateral order doctrine56 provides a narrow exception to the gen-
eral requirement of a final judgment as a prerequisite to appellate review.
57
Coopers &Lybrandv. L'vesay58 provides a three-pronged test of the appealabil-
ity of orders: a) the order must conclusively determine the issue in question;
b) it must resolve an important issue completely separable from the merits of
the action; and c) it must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final
judgment. 59
The Tenth Circuit faced a difficult issue in applying the collateral order
doctrine in Cotner v. Mason.6° The appellant sought review of a district court
order denying his motion for appointment of counsel in a civil action. The
Tenth Circuit followed its own precedent 61 and dismissed the appeal based
on lack of jurisdiction of a non-final order. The court reasoned that if the
appellant were unsuccessfulpro se at the trial court level, he could appeal the
lack of appointed counsel as part of the final judgment. Post-judgment re-
versal and a new trial could remedy any injury to his asserted right. Thus,
the third prong of the test of the appealability of an interlocutory order was
not satisfied. 62 The appellant did not suffer irreparable injuries or lose a
crucial collateral claim because of the court's denial of an immediate review
of the order.
63
The Tenth Circuit's holding on this issue places it in disagreement with
five other circuits.64 The court used a practical approach, finding that the
appointment of counsel was similar to numerous other pretrial orders which
eventually can be remedied by a full appellate review. 65 The court noted
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. This exception was first articulated in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
58. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
59. Id. at 468.
60. 657 F.2d 1390 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
61. May v. Jones, No. 79-1774 (10th Cir. June 23, 1980); Kennedy v. Burk, No. 79-1616
(10th Cir. Nov. 16, 1979); Nevarez v. Shaw, No. 76-1424 (10th Cir. Nov. 16, 1976) (absent
extraordinary circumstances, orders denying appointment of counsel in civil cases are not imme-
diately appealable as of right).
62. 657 F.2d at 1391.
63. Set Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981). See also Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.ll (1976).
64. "[A] decision on appellant's need for counsel must be made before the trial if it is to be
of any practical effect to him." Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981). See Jones v.
WFYR Radio/RKO Gen., 626 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1980); Hudak v. Curators of the Univ. of
Mo., 586 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 556 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 964 (1962).
65. 657 F.2d at 1392.
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the strong judicial policy against "piecemeal appellate disposition of what is,
in practical consequence, but a single controversy."6 6
II. VENUE
In Hospah Coal Co. v. Chaco Energ Co. ,67 the court settled a dispute in-
volving pre-trial procedural maneuvering by the defendants. Chaco Energy
Co. and Texas Utilities Co. sued Santa Fe Industries (SFI) and several of its
subsidiaries in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas for conspiracy, violation of antitrust laws, and common law fraud in
the inducement, requesting declaratory judgment, rescission of contracts, in-
junctive relief, and treble damages. 68 SFI and the other defendants re-
sponded by filing an action in the United States District Court of New
Mexico seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting the
plaintiffs from proceeding further in the Texas action. The defendants
based their request on a venue selection clause in a lease between the parties
that provided for venue in New Mexico.6 9 Finding that the Texas action
was vexatious, the district court granted the defendants' injunction. SFI
then went to Texas and entered a motion to stay or, in the alternative, to
dismiss the Texas action.70 Because the New Mexico injunction prevented
Chaco from a Texas court-ordered response to the defendants' motion to
stay, Chaco went to New Mexico and requested suspension of the injunction.
The New Mexico District Court refused, 71 and Chaco appealed to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Tenth Circuit court stayed the New Mexico injunction pending
appeal and expedited the hearing. 72 It found the ultimate issue to be:
which district court (Northern Texas or New MeXico) shall make a determi-
nation on the issue of venue?
73
The general rule is that when two courts have concurrent jurisdiction,
the first court in which jurisdiction attaches has priority to consider the
case, 74 except in cases involving a misuse of litigation through vexatious and
oppressive foreign suits. 75 SFI claimed that jurisdiction first attached in
New Mexico because service of process was achieved for the New Mexico
action first. The court, however, followed Tenth Circuit precedent 76 and
ruled that jurisdiction relates back to the filing of the complaint, and thus it
66. Id. (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974)).
67. 673 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2299 (1982).
68. 673 F.2d at 1162.
69. Id. Apparently, SF1 feared being "home-towned" in a Texas federal court because the
outcome of the litigation would affect Texas consumers. The Tenth Ciruit dismissed this argu-
ment, thus deferring to the ability of the district court to decide if it should accept venue. Id. at
1164 n.3.
70. Id. at 1162.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1163.
73. Id.
74. O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Lambert, 459 F.2d 328, 331 (10th Cir. 1972).
75. Id.




attached first in the Texas district court. 77 The court found that the Texas
litigation was not vexatious, but involved a question of fact as to the applica-
bility of the venue selection clause.
78
The appellate court ruled that "the court which first obtains jurisdic-
tion should first decide issues of venue."'79 It supported its holding with one
of the cases relied upon by SFI, Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v. C-O- Two Co. 
80
Kerotest warns against mechanical solution of multiple litigation problems.8 t
The appellate court agreed with the principle of flexibility in determining
which court has jurisdiction over the merits. Nevertheless, it found that the
Kerotest Court paid deference to the district court's ability to determine the
proper venue.
8 2
Judge Barrett, writing for the court, admonished the defendants that
rule 12(b) provides a procedure for objecting to improper venue,8 3 and 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides a procedure for requesting a change of venue.
8 4
He stated that it was improper to object to venue by filing suit for injunctive
relief in a separate forum: declaratory judgments cannot be used as "yet
another weapon in a game of procedural warfare."8 5 The court remanded
the case to the New Mexico District Court with instructions to dismiss the
preliminary injunction which restrained the plaintiffs from proceeding in the
Northern Texas District Court.
III. CLAIMS AND CLAIMANTS
A. Failure to Join an Indispensable Party
1. Interpretation of a Workmen's Compensation Statute
In Miller v. .Leavenworth-Jefferson Electric Cooperative, Inc. ,86 the plaintiff
was awarded damages for injuries suffered when the boom on the truck he
was operating touched one of the defendant's high-voltage power lines.8 7 In
a post-trial motion, the defendant claimed that the plaintiffs employer was
an indispensable party whose Kansas citizenship destroyed complete diver-
sity between the California plaintiff and itself, a Kansas electric cooperative,
thus defeating federal court jurisdiction.8 The plaintiff cross-moved to dis-
miss the employer as an unnecessary party under rule 2189 and the district
court ruled in favor of this motion.
On appeal, the defendant pointed out that the plaintiffs employer was
77. 673 F.2d at 1163.
78. Id. The court also gave the district court guidance in settling those questions of fact.
Id. at 1163 n.2. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (enforceability of
venue selection clauses).
79. 673 F.2d at 1164.
80. 342 U.S. 180 (1952).
81. Id. at 183.
82. 673 F.2d at 1164.
83. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
85. 673 F.2d at 1164-65.
86. 653 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1981).
87. Id. at 1379.
88. Id. at 1380.
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 21.
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named in the pleadings as a party bringing the action, pursuant to the Kan-
sas workmen's compensation statute.90 Had the employer not been named,
the plaintiff, who filed the lawsuit more than one year after the accident
occurred, would have been precluded from bringing his action because of
the statute of limitations.9 1 The workmen's compensation statute allows an
employer to bring an action within two years of the accident if the employee
fails to do so.92 The defendant argued that if the employer was required to
be named as a party in order to bring the action, it was an indispensable
party.
93
The appellate court disagreed, finding the employer was not a necessary
party under rule 19.9 4 It held there was no abuse of discretion by the district
court in dismissing the employer under rule 21.95
2. Status of Producers under an Oil and Gas Field Unit Agreement
In Francis Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Exxon Corp. ,96 the court also faced the issue of
failure to join indispensable parties who would destroy diversity jurisdiction.
The plaintiff was one of 194 producers in a unit oil production field in Texas.
Under the unit agreement, his percentage of cost and production was allo-
cated based on tract size, but his actual output of high-priced stripper oil
was a much greater percentage than that of the unit as a whole. The unit
had been formed among large producers, with the plaintiff as a small pro-
ducer subsequently joining under protest. Exxon had separate purchasing
contracts with each of the unit's producers, including the plaintiff.9 7 Plain-
tiff brought suit against Exxon for the difference between the value of his
actual output of stripper oil and the amount paid by Exxon under the
formula imposed by the unit.
Exxon moved for summary judgment based on failure to join all the
working interests of the unit as indispensable parties.98 The district court
dismissed the case for failure to join indispensable parties who would destroy
diversity jurisdiction otherwise enjoyed by the plaintiffs.
The appellate court reversed, directing that a hearing9 9 be held to ac-
cept evidence which would aid resolution of rule 19 issues. The court found
that because of the dearth of facts on the record, it was impossible to deter-
mine whether all 194 members of the unit were indispensable parties. 10°
Among the matters to be ascertained by the trial court on remand was
90. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-504 (1963 & Supp. 1981).
91. Id § 44-504(b).
92. Id. § 44-504(c).
93. 653 F.2d at 1381.
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
95. "Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of
its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just." FED. R. Civ. P. 21.
Se. also Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Roussel, 528 F. Supp. 391, 403 (D. Kan. 1981)
(non-diverse defendants may be dismissed from a case under rule 21 for the preservation of
diversity jurisdiction).
96. 661 F.2d 873 (10th Cir. 1981).
97. Id. at 874-75.
98. Id. at 875.
99. Id. at 879-80.
100. Id. at 880.
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whether some of the interests were so small that they should not be forced to
litigate. 0 '
B. Class Actions
1. Class Certification to Avoid Mootness
In Quintana v. Harris,'0 2 the plaintiff brought an action to compel the
Department of Health and Human Services to rule on Supplemental Secur-
ity Income benefit applications within sixty days. Although the plaintiff had
requested class certification in an effort to avoid mootness problems, the trial
court dismissed the suit as moot. 103 The Tenth Circuit remanded for consid-
eration of plaintiff's requested class certification.' 0 4 On remand, the trial
court then found that there existed a potential conflict of interest among the
proposed class, denied class certification, and again dismissed plaintiff's indi-
vidual claim as moot.
0 5
Plaintiff filed a timely rule 59(e)106 motion to alter or amend the judg-
ment denying class certification, proposing a subclass which would avoid the
conflict of interest existing in the original class. The district court denied the
motion without comment, 10 7 and plaintiff appealed.
The Tenth Circuit again remanded the case for the district court to
consider the merits of plaintiff's proposed subclasses. It relied upon the re-
cent Supreme Court case of United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty,'0 8
which approved an appellate court order requiring a district court to consid-
er sua sponte the possibility of certifying subclasses, thus permitting class pro-
ponents an opportunity to bear the burden of constructing proposed
subclasses. 10 9 Because the plaintiff had actually requested certification of
subclasses in the case before it, the Tenth Circuit held under Geraghty that
the trial court's unexplained denial of the plaintiff's motion was "afortiori an
abuse of the discretion enjoyed by the District Court under 59(e). '" 10
Chief Judge Seth dissented, urging the case be remanded for the limited
purpose of permitting the trial court to make findings or express specific
reasons why the subclass certification was denied by the order entered in
response to the rule 59(e) motion."' He declined to assume that the district
court had not considered the proposed subclasses, but preferred to character-
101. Id.
102. 663 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1981).
103. Id. at 79.
104. Quintana v. Califano, 623 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1979). The Tenth Circuit also re-
manded the suit for determination of when mootness arose for purposes of the relation back
doctrine of Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 n.l 1 (1975).
105. The trial court believed that some members might not wish to compel early adjudica-
tion because of its possible adverse effect on the quality of the Secretary's deliberations.
Quintana v. Harris, 88 F.R.D. 132, 133-34 (D.N.M. 1980).
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
107. 663 F.2d at 79.
108. 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
109. Id. at 408.
110. 663 F.2d at 80.
Ill. Id. at 81 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
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ize the problem as the omission of an explanation or rationale for the court's
action.
2. Intervention as a Class Member into Pending Litigation
The dismissal of a proposed class action against the Board of Education
of Topeka for failure to comply with the desegregation order of Brown v.
Board of Education 1 2 was considered by the Tenth Circuit in Miller v. Board of
Education. 113 The trial court followed its own precedent'" 4 in holding that
because the original Brown v. Board of Education case" 15 was still pending, in-
tervention was the proper procedure for presenting a claim that the Supreme
Court's desegregation order had not been followed.
The appellate court agreed that because the district court still had juris-
diction of the original case, intervention was the proper procedure for the
plaintiffs to use. The court quoted with approval the trial court's Memoran-
dum and Order which stated that judicial economy and the risk of inconsis-
tent judgments were policy reasons underlying its dismissal of the proposed
class action." ,
6
C. Petition under Fictitious Name
In Coe v. United States District Court,' ' 7 the petitioner brought a manda-
mus action in which he alleged that the district court had abused its discre-
tion in denying his request for anonymity. He also appealed the court's
denial of his motion for amended complaint, in which he requested that, if
his true name were used, the complaint and other pleadings be placed under
seal.' 8 The petitioner was a physician who was investigated by the State
Board of Medical Examiners (Board) for professional misconduct." 19 The
Board refused to withhold publicizing the formal complaint against the doc-
tor.' 20 Thereafter, the physician filed a section 1983 action seeking a declar-
atory judgment and injunctive relief against the Board to prevent it from
conducting the public proceeding.'
2'
The district court held that the public interest in knowing the identity
of the physician outweighed his individual privacy interest. 122 In his man-
112. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1) (racial discrimination in public education is unconstitu-
tional); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I) (directives for implementation of the original decision).
113. 667 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
114. Brown v. Board of Educ., 84 F.R.D. 383 (D. Kan. 1979).
115. Brown v. Board of Educ., 139 F. Supp. 468 (D. Kan. 1955).
116. 667 F.2d at 948.
117. 676 F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1982).
118. Id. at 413.
119. The formal complaint prepared by the Attorney General included charges of sexual or
immoral improprieties. Id. at 412.
120. The Board had offered to conduct a non-public hearing on the condition the doctor
suspend his practice of medicine until after the Board had heard and decided the case. The
doctor refused, claiming that his practice would be irreparably harmed during the estimated 90
days that the process takes. Id. at 413 (quoting District Court Order of Mar. 4, 1982).
121. The plaintiff alleged deprivation of his fourteenth amendment due process rights, spe-
cifically irreparable harm to himself, his reputation, and his property interests. 676 F.2d at 412.
122. Id. at 414. The district court also expressed reservations concerning federal court juris-
diction. It suggested that the proper form for the plaintiff to challenge a state board's action
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damus action before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the physician
claimed that by refusing to allow him to bring the suit anonymously, the
district court had foreclosed his right to a fair or meaningful opportunity to
present his federal constitutional claims in a federal court.'
23
The Tenth Circuit denied the writ of mandamus, finding that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the petitioner to
proceed under a pseudonym. The court relied upon its decision in Lindsey v.
Dayton-Hudson Corp. ,124 which concluded that the use of pseudonyms is "an
unusual procedure, to be allowed only where there is an important private
interest to be recognized." 1 25 Rule 10(a) expressly requires the names of all
parties to appear in the complaint.
126
In weighing the public interest in disclosure against the physician's pri-
vate interest in anonymity, the court examined the statutory purpose of the
legislation which created the Board. This statute declares that the regula-
tion of the practice of medicine is intended so "that the people shall be prop-
erly protected against unauthorized, unqualified, and improper practice of
the healing arts in this state."' 2 7 In view of this legislative purpose and the
absence of any abuse of discretion on the part of the Board, the court found
that the public proceedings against Dr. Coe did not violate any due process
rights.' 2 8 Further, the court ruled that because the public interest was para-
mount, the plaintiff did not have a right to have his pleadings placed under
seal. 129
IV. DISCOVERY AND PRETRIAL
A. Preiminary Injunctions
Whether the denial of a preliminary injunction was sufficient basis for
granting summary judgment was one of the issues in Thompson v. Kerr-McGee
Refmig Co. 130 The plaintiff, a service station operator, sued under the Pe-
troleum Marketing Practices Act 13 1 (the Act) for the unlawful nonrenewal of
his franchise by Kerr-McGee. Under this Act, a court must issue a prelimi-
nary injunction if the franchisee shows: 1) the franchise has been termi-
nated; 2) the existence of "sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to
make such questions a fair ground for litigation;" and 3) the issuance of a
preliminary injunction would impose less hardship on the franchisor than on
was in state court. Id. (quoting District Court Order of Mar. 4, 1982). Judge Barrett and Judge
Logan shared this concern. 676 F.2d at 418 n.2. Judge McKay did not concur in this footnote,
but dismissed it as dicta. Id. at 418 (McKay, J., concurring).
123. 676 F.2d at 413.
124. 592 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1979).
125. Id. at 1125.
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
127. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-102 (1973).
128. 676 F.2d at 417.
129. Id. at 418. The court distinguished Coe from its opinion in Crystal Grower's Corp. v.
Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1980), on the basis that Crystal Grower's involved "non-disclo-
sure, secrecy considerations arising from invocation of the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine, when there were no competing public interests." 676 F.2d at 418.
130. 660 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 2801 (Supp. IV 1980).
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the franchisee without it. 13 2 Without elaboration, the trial court dissolved
the temporary injunction against the franchisor.133 After a trial on the mer-
its, a jury awarded damages to the franchisee.
134
On appeal, Kerr-McGee argued that the district court, by dissolving the
temporary injunction, had implicitly determined that there were no material
issues of fact.1 35 Kerr-McGee submitted to the appellate panel that the basis
for the lower court's denial of the preliminary injunction must have been the
nonexistence of "sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make
such questions a fair ground for litigation."' 136 In such circumstances, it ar-
gued summary judgment was appropriate. Kerr-McGee also contended that
its rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should have
been granted.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. Although emphasizing
that the situation was unusual, the court ruled the district court did not err
in denying the appellant's motions for summary judgment and failure to
state a claim. 137 The court distinguished the plaintiffs burden of proof at a
hearing for a preliminary injunction from the burden of proof required at a
trial on the merits. 138 At a preliminary injunction hearing a plaintiff must
only establish that success on the merits is probable. Thus, a plaintiff may
not present all of the evidence at the hearing, perhaps because of litigation
strategy or because the case is not yet fully developed. 139 It would be unfair
to the plaintiff to transform a hearing for a preliminary injunction into a




1. Payment of the Discovery Costs of a Subpoenaed Non-party
Florida v. Kerr-McGee' 4' involved a protective order in a multi-district anti-
trust action against several large oil companies, which alleged price fixing,
creation of artificial scarcity, and monopoly of the petroleum industry.
142
The suit was consolidated with similar suits brought by other states in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California for coordi-
nated pretrial proceedings.1
43
Discovery against non-parties to the antitrust action was authorized by
order of the California judge supervising the coordinated pretrial proceed-
132. 15 U.S.C. § 2805(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
133. 660 F.2d at 1387.
134. d. at 1382.
135. Id. at 1386.
136. Id. at 1387 (quoting the second prong of the standard set forth in 15 U.S.C.
§ 2805(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980)).
137. 660 F.2d at 1388.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see 7 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.04 (4) (2d ed.
1982).
140. 660 F.2d at 1388. See Penn v. San Juan Hosp., Inc., 528 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1978).
141. 669 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1982).




ings. 144 The State of Florida served Kerr-McGee, a non-party to the suit,
with notice of deposition and a subpoena duces tecum for production of cer-
tain documents relating to the purchase, refining, and marketing of crude oil
and petroleum products by Kerr-McGee and its subsidiaries. 145 The sub-
poena was eighteen pages long and contained thirteen categories of docu-
ments. 146 It cost Kerr-McGee almost $8,800 to produce the requested
materials.'
4 7
Prior to delivering the requested documents, Kerr-McGee moved for a
protective order conditioning the production of the documents upon the
payment by Florida of the discovery costs. The District Court for the West-
ern District of Oklahoma granted the motion and Florida appealed.148
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, per Judge McWilliams, affirmed
the trial court's order, finding that there was no abuse of discretion.' 49 The
court made three points in its analysis of the case. First, because Kerr-Mc-
Gee was not attempting to quash the subpoena, but merely requesting lim-
ited protection, its burden as movant was less stringent. 150 Second, the court
noted that Florida's argument that these costs were relatively insignificant to
a corporation the size of Kerr-McGee cut both ways since Florida was not
"penniless" either.' 5 1
Most importantly, the court held that because Kerr-McGee was not a
party to the underlying antitrust action, its response to the subpoena would
not inure to its benefit. 152 The court reasoned that although the discovery
rules do not distinguish between parties to the action and non-parties, 153 a
district court, using the discretion granted to it under rule 26(c), "should
[not] be reluctant to place the costs of discovery upon the party deriving
benefit therefrom."' 154 The court found that in this situation, the burdens
flowed to Kerr-McGee, while the benefits flowed to Florida.155
2. Attorney's Lien after Withdrawal from Representation
The adjudication of a fee dispute between a lawyer and his clients was
at issue inJenkins v. Weznshzenk. '5 6 The lawyer, Jenkins, had gathered impor-
tant information for his clients' defense in a civil action pending before Dis-
trict Judge Weinshienk, Woodworth v. Stanley Vacation Club, Inc. 157 His clients




147. Id. at 622-23.
148. Id. at 622.
149. Id. at 624.




154. Id. at 624 n.3; see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). In its footnote, the court noted the Ninth
Circuit's agreement with this position. See Dart Indus. Co. v. Westwood Chem. Co., 649 F.2d
646, 649 (9th Cir. 1980).
155. 669 F.2d at 624.
156. 670 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1982).
157. No. 81-818 (D. Colo. filed May 22, 1981) (default judgment entered Nov. 5, 1982).
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to force his clients to pay their legal bills, Jenkins petitioned the trial court to
withdraw from the Woodworth case. He refused, however, to hand over the
files containing the essential information for his clients' pending litigation
until they paid him his fees, including approximately $3,500 for work on the
Woodworth case. 1 58
Judge Weinshienk conditioned the withdrawal order on Jenkins either
delivering the files to the substituted counsel or permitting the substituted
counsel to photocopy the files. The judge later amended her order to require
the clients to post a bond for $3,500 as security for the attorney's lien on the
unpaid fees in the Woodworth case.' 59
The attorney petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for manda-
mus relief.160 He claimed that under Colorado law, an attorney has a re-
taining lien' 6' on all of his clients' papers until he is paid in full for his legal
work, including amounts owed for matters unrelated to the litigation before
the court. He argued that the trial court's refusal to recognize the full extent
of the lien deprived him of a property right without due process of law.'
62
The appellate court determined that with limited exceptions, a trial
court has ancillary jurisdiction163 over the legal fees owed to an attorney
only "with respect to work done in the suit being litigated."' 64 The court noted
that to hold otherwise would open the federal courts to fee litigation.'
6 5
Finding the trial court had limited jurisdiction over the fee dispute, the
court held that under Colorado law, Jenkins had a retaining lien for the
Woodworth fees.1 66 The court refused to emasculate the "power and bite" of
the attorney's lien because of its inconvenience to the clients. 167 Thus, the
court directed the trial court to permit the lawyer to withhold the papers or
to require the clients to post a bond sufficient to protect Jenkins' lien.' 68
158. Jenkins, 670 F.2d at 917.
159. Id.
160. Id. The court found that this was an appropriate case for mandamus. The court drew
an analogy to cases where a party claims a privilege not to disclose information. In such cases,
waiting to appeal until a final decision is rendered provides an inadequate remedy. Id.
161. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 12-5-120 (1973).
162. 670 F.2d at 917.
163. Id. at 918. The court relied upon the test for ancillary jurisdiction articulated in Mor-
row v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1969):
[AIncillary jurisdiction should attach where: (1) the ancillary matter arises from the
same transaction which was the basis of the main proceeding, or arises during the
course of the main matter; (2) the ancillary matter can be determined without a sub-
stantive new fact-finding proceeding; (3) determination of the ancillary matter
through an ancillary order would not deprive a party of a substantive procedural or
substantive right, and (4) the ancillary matter must be settled to protect the integrity
of the main proceeding or to insure that the disposition in the main proceeding will
not be frustrated.
164. 670 F.2d at 918 (emphasis in original). Cf. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Mercury
Typesetting Co., 323 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1963); see Note, Attorney's Retaining Lien over Former
Chent's Papers, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 296 (1965).
165. 670 F.2d at 919.
166. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 12-5-120 (1973). See also Collins v. Thuringer, 92 Colo. 433, 21
P.2d 709 (1933).




C. Dismissal with Prejudice
Injoph'n v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. ,169 the appellate court found
the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing with prejudice the cause of
action of apro se claimant because of lack of prosecution. The plaintiff had
failed to file a pretrial memorandum with the court, despite the district
court's warning that this would constitute sufficient grounds for dismissal of
the suit. 1 70 The trial court dismissed the action, but failed to set forth its
factual findings, judicial considerations, and legal reasoning in its order of
dismissal.' 17 In considering the severity of the sanction of dismissal with
prejudice, the appellate court examined the United States Supreme Court's
definition of "discretion:" "[J]udicial action . . . exercised not arbitrarily or
willfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circum-
stances and the law, and directed by reason and the conscience of the judge
to a just result.' 1 72 Using this standard, the Tenth Circuit court found the
trial court had abused its discretion.
V. APPEALS
A. Standards of Review
1. Interpretation of State Law
The standard of review for federal district court interpretation of state
law in diversity cases received careful attention by Judge Logan, joined by
Judge McKay in Evans v. C.E. Lumus Co.
1 73
An employee of an indemnified sub-contractor working on construction
of the processing plant of a Wyoming trona mine was injured. The district
court in Wyoming, in a case of first impression, applied a state statute invali-
dating indemnity contracts for personal injury or death or property loss or
damage due to negligence or accident at mining operations, 174 and ruled the
indemnity agreement void and unenforceable as against public policy.
The court articulated its standard of appellate review: "When a case in
diversity involves the interpretation of a state statute, and there exist no au-
thorities on point, the views of the federal district judge who is a resident of
the state where the controversy arose carry extraordinary persuasive force,
and will not be overturned unless 'clearly erroneous.' ,,175
Judge Logan's criticism of the "clearly erroneous" standard distin-
guished between review of the trial court's findings of fact, in which the
"clearly erroneous" standard is suitable,' 76 from its statements of law, in
which it is not. He cited criticism of the Tenth Circuit position on this mat-
169. 671 F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1982).
170. Id. at 1275.
171. Id. at 1276.
172. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931).
173. -No. 80-1455 (10th Cir. Nov. 16, 1981) (Logan and McKay, JJ., concurring.)
174. WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-1-131 to -132 (1977).
175. No. 80-1455, slip op. at 4.
176. Id at I (Logan, J., concurring). He added that rule 54(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure does not limit review of a trial court's conclusions of law to a "clearly erroneous"
standard. I. at I n. 1.
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ter by leading commentators 177 and cases in which the United States
Supreme Court intimated the appropriateness of a lesser standard.178 He
reminded the court that it had applied the "clearly erroneous" standard in-
consistently in the past, sometimes substituting other language.1
79
Judge Logan's fundamental concern is that by adopting a "clearly erro-
neous" standard, the court of appeals precludes itself from independent re-
view of the district court's interpretation of the state law in diversity cases,
however capable that interpretation may be, thus foreclosing the litigant's
right of appeal on that issue. 180
2. Rulings on 60(b) Motions to Set Aside a Default Judgment
In Thompson v. Kerr-McGee, the appellate court referred to rule 60(b) as
giving a court "a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a partic-
ular case," and urged liberal construction to serve "substantial justice."' 8 '
Nevertheless, in Barla v. Long,' 82 the court found the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the defendant's rule 60(b) motion to set aside a
default judgment.
Over a period of ten months, the defendant-appellants did not respond
to repeated court notices, letters, and orders for response to interrogatories in
a suit alleging common law fraud and securities fraud arising from an oil
well venture.183 Defendants changed attorneys but were at all times repre-
sented by counsel. 18 4 The plaintiffs moved for a default judgment, and after
a hearing, the district court entered a default judgment for $234,360 com-
pensatory damages and $50,000 punitive damages.
185
Defendants filed a rule 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment on the
ground of excusable neglect and a motion to permit answers and counter-
claims to be filed. These motions were denied. Two and a half months after
judgment, the defendants appealed the default judgment and the denial of
the rule 60(b) motion.1
86
The appellate court first ruled that filing a rule 60(b) motion with the
trial court does not toll the time in which an appeal from judgment may be
177. Id. at 2. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2588,
at 752 (1971); IA J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 0.309 (2) n.28 (2d ed. 1982).
178. No. 80-1455, slip op. at 3 (Logan, J., concurring). Such Supreme Court cases using
lesser standards include: Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 204 (1956) ("special
weight"); Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 630 (1946) ("great deference");
Retiz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 39 (1941) ("great weight"). Set also Thompson v. Consol. Gas
Util. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 74-75 (1937).
179. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has used such standards as "carry extraordinary
force;" "substantial or great weight;" "some weight;" and even "deference." No. 80-1455, slip
op. at 2, (Logan, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 3-4.
181. 660 F.2d 1380, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981). See FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b). The court also cau-
tioned that the motion to vacate should not serve as a substitute for appeal on the merits or a
means of extending the time in which an appeal may be taken. 1d.
182. 670 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1982).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 909.
185. d. at 908-09.
186. Id. at 909.
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taken, and therefore, the appeal was not timely.'8 7 In its examination of the
trial court's denial of the defendants' request to set aside the default judg-
ment, the court stated three requirements for the movant to set aside a de-
fault judgment under rule 60(b): 1) diligent effort to seek relief under rule
60(b) by filing the motion within a reasonable time; 2) demonstration that
there was a good or acceptable reason for the default; and 3) a showing of a
meritorious defense by more than bare conclusory statements unsupported
by facts.' 88
The court ruled that the defendants' failures to comply with the orders
of the court were deliberate. 8 9 The court summarily dismissed the defend-
ants' contentions that the withdrawal of their counsel and their resulting
confusion were sufficient excuses for their failure to answer the interrogato-
ries. The court noted that such contentions overlooked the several orders,
notices, and letters they received before the motion for sanctions was filed.
The record showed that the defendants were represented at all times by
counsel. Most revealing was the evidence that the individual defendants
were experienced in litigation, and were concomitantly trying to set aside a
similar default in another jurisdiction.t°9
Jeanne E Herrick-Stare
187. Id. The early case of United States v. Schlotfeldt, 136 F.2d 935 (7th Cir. 1943) was
specifically discounted as authority for this issue, based on 7 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.29 (2d ed. 1982). See also II C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2871 (1973).
188. Barla, 670 F.2d at 909. See In Re Stone, 588 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1978); Gomes v.
Williams, 420 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1970).
189. 670 F.2d at 909.
190. Id.
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SILKWOOD V KERR-McGEE CORP.:
WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND FEDERAL
PREEMPTION RESCUE THE NUCLEAR
TORTFEASOR
INTRODUCTION
One of the most widely publicized and controversial cases in recent his-
tory, S//kwood v. Kerr-McGe Corp. ,I came before the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1981.2 Karen Silkwood, a Kerr-McGee employee, had suffered
from plutonium contamination. 3 An action brought by her estate in the
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma resulted in a significant
award for compensatory and punitive damages.
4
The lower court ruling was reversed on appeal. In a split decision, the
Tenth Circuit court determined Silkwood's exposure to plutonium was job-
related, and compensatory damages for personal injuries were therefore lim-
ited to amounts recoverable under Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation
Act. 5 The appellate court also ruled punitive, damages could not be
awarded because such an award constituted an intrusion into the federally
controlled nuclear regulatory scheme.6
This comment will focus on two issues: applicability of workers' com-
pensation law and the extent of federal occupation in nuclear incident dis-
putes. A review of the factual and legal background of the case, an
examination of the Tenth Circuit court's reasoning, and a discussion of legal
and social implications of the decision will follow.
I. 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983).
2. This was the second time the parties had been before the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The original petition had alleged a conspiracy by Kerr-McGee to prevent Silkwood and
others from organizing a labor union and asserted first amendment, due process, and equal
protection violations by Kerr-McGee. The Tenth Circuit court affirmed the trial court's dismis-
sal of these claims in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 637 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 833 (1981).
3. 667 F.2d at 913.
4. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979), rev'd, 667 F.2d
908 (10th Cir. 1981),cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983). Thejury awarded $500,000 for personal
injuries, $5,000 for property damages, and $10 million in punitive damages. For a discussion of
the district court decision, see Note, Federal Preemption.- State Law Principles of Strita Liabihy in a
Nuclear Accident-A Preemption Problem in Light of the Price-Anderson Act.'-Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979), 6 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279 (1981).
5. 667 F.2d at 920. The Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act is found at OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 85, §§ 1-180 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981-82).
6. 667 F.2d at 923. In addition to the workers' compensation and preemption issues,
Kerr-McGee argued the verdict was excessive and contrary to the weight of the evidence, the
trial court had erred in rulings and instructions on strict liability and negligence, and it was
denied a fair trial because of prejudicial publicity, misconduct of opposing counsel, and errors
in the court's rulings on evidence and instructions to the jury. Brief of Appellants at 20-30,
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 721
(1983).
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I. THE FACTUAL SETTING AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION
Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation 7 operated a nuclear fuels processing
plant in Cimmaron, Oklahoma where plutonium was processed for reactor
fuel.8 Karen Silkwood, a laboratory analyst at the Cimmaron plant, be-
longed to the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union (OCAW) and was a
member of the union negotiating team. 9 In September of 1974, Silkwood
and other union members presented charges to the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion (AEC), ° alleging health and safety violations by Kerr-McGee. The
task of gathering required documentation of the charges was assigned to
Silkwood. ' I
On November 5, 6, and 7, 1974, Silkwood was contaminated by pluto-
nium,t 2 but little direct evidence of the contaminations was produced. The
inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence, however, were pivotal to
the conclusions of both the district court and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals with respect to whether Silkwood's injuries arose out of her
employment.
While at work on November 5, Silkwood monitored herself with pluto-
nium detecting devices before and after a break, but found no contamina-
tion.t 3 Shortly thereafter, she began working in two glove boxes14 which
contained plutonium, and about three hours later she detected contamina-
tion. 15 Further checks of the laboratory revealed contamination inside the
gloves and in the glove boxes where Silkwood had been working. Silkwood's
left hand, right wrist, upper arm, neck, face, hair, and nostrils registered
contamination. 6 She was immediately decontaminated and required to
submit five days' urine and fecal samples which were to be sent to the
7. Suit was brought against both Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. and its parent, Kerr-McGee
Corp. The jury found Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. to be a mere instrumentality of the parent
corporation, thus making Kerr-McGee Corp. liable. See Silkwood, 485 F. Supp. at 601 app.
8. Plutonium is a man-made radioactive element used in nuclear weapons and fuels. It
emits alpha particles which, although dependent on the size and amount of energy in the radia-
tion, constitute the major hazard associated with plutonium. Damage may occur when alpha
particles strike living cells; however, the particles cannot penetrate human skin, and small quan-
tities of plutonium on skin or clothing are not dangerous. It is the internal deposition of pluto-
nium which might occur, for example, by inhalation that makes plutonium one of the most
carcinogenic substances known. When internally deposited, alpha particles can damage bone
and internal organs. Brief of Appellants at 5-6, Silkwood. See Note, Nuclear Torts. The Price-
Anderson Act and the Potentialfor Uncompensated Injug, 11 NEW ENG. L. REV. 11I, 113 (1975).
9. Silkwood was elected to this position and was responsible for health and safety matters.
Brief of Appellee at 8, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983).
10. The AEC is now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but it will be referred to
throughout this comment as the AEC.
11. Silkwood's investigative role spawned media speculation after her death on whether
the contamination was intentionally inflicted by Kerr-McGee. Plaintiff contended at trial that
Silkwood's evidence-gathering activities provided a motive for an intentional contamination by
Kerr-McGee operatives. See Brief of Appellee at 42 n.21, Silkwood.
12. 667 F.2d at 913.
13. Id
14. "A glove box is an impervious box surrounding the plutonium and processing equip-
ment; it has glove holes so a worker can operate the equipment or manipulate the material from
outside the box." Brief of Appellants at 7, Silkwood.
15. 667 F.2d at 913.
16. Id.
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United States Testing Laboratory for analysis.' 7  Later AEC tests did not
find any leaks inside the glove boxes, nor any significant airborne contami-
nation in the laboratory.'
8
On November 6, Silkwood did not work with plutonium, but did
paperwork for a short time before she left for a union meeting. 19 Upon
leaving, she detected contamination on her hands and fixed contamination
on her right forearm. 20 Her hands were decontaminated, and since the fore-
arm contamination was fixed, she was permitted to attend the meeting.
2 '
Later that day, a survey showed external contamination on her right fore-
arm, neck, and face which was not fixed, 22 and a nasal smear also indicated
contamination. 23 At her request, Silkwood's car and locker were tested, but
no contamination was found.
24
When Silkwood reported to the health-physics office on the morning of
November 7, contamination was again found on various parts of her body,25
and the nasal smear taken that morning was again positive. 26 The urine and
fecal samples that Silkwood brought were also contaminated, however, the
urine samples had been "spiked," i.e., they contained plutonium which was
not naturally excreted. 27 Plutonium contamination was also found in
Silkwood's apartment, making it necessary for Kerr-McGee to decontami-
nate the apartment and dispose of many of Silkwood's possessions. 28 The
highest concentrations of plutonium were found in the bathroom and on a
bologna package in the refrigerator.
29
Very little direct evidence was presented at trial to support inferences of
the location or method of Silkwood's contamination. Certain hearsay evi-
dence was admitted which purportedly indicated her state of mind, which
was relevant to the issue of whether she had intentionally removed pluto-
nium from the plant.30 Silkwood was reported to have stated that she spilled
her urine sample in her bathroom early in the morning on November 7 and
that at the time, a package of bologna was on top of the toilet where she had
placed it before preparing her lunch.
3 '
17. Id
18. Id. at 913-14.
19. Id at 914.
20. Id Contamination that is "fixed" is not eliminated by scrubbing with soap and water.
Brief of Appellee at 11, Silkwood.
21. 667 F.2d at 914.
22. Id
23. Brief of Appellee at 12, Silkwood.
24. 667 F.2d at 914.
25. d
26. Brief of Appellee at 13, Silkwood.
27. 667 F.2d at 914.
28. Id
29. Id
30. Id See infta note 41.
31. 667 F.2d at 914. Silkwood's roommate was also a Kerr-McGee employee. Contamina-
tion was found on her hands and buttocks after she had used the bathroom at home, but no
contamination was detected on her body at work, in her automobile, or in the refrigerator
where she kept her lunch at the plant. Id
Contamination was not found on Silkwood's boyfriend who had spent the night of Novem-
ber 6 in her apartment, nor was contamination found in his car or residence. Id
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Three days later, Silkwood was sent to the Los Alamos Scientific Labo-
ratory in New Mexico where she underwent whole body and chest count
procedures. 32 She returned to work on November 13 and was assigned to a
job not involving plutonium. 33 On that day, she met with AEC inspectors
concerning her contamination and later with other union members in a
strategy session.3' 4 That evening while on her way to meet with a New York
Tines reporter and an OCAW leader regarding the information she had
been gathering, Silkwood was killed in an automobile accident. 35 At the
time of her death, Silkwood's body contailned twenty-five to fifty percent of
the AEC allowable lifetime body burden for plutonium workers.
36
Both Kerr-McGee and the AEC investigated Silkwood's contaminations
of November 5 and 6, but neither identified the exact manner by which she
became contaminated. 37 Evidence surrounding the apartment contamina-
tion of November 7 indicated that it probably occurred in the bathroom,
3 8
but how Silkwood's urine sample kits became spiked is not known.
Over the course of the eleven-week trial, the jury was presented with
conflicting theories regarding the nature and extent of Silkwood's injuries,
and the inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence surrounding
the contaminations.3 9 Kerr-McGee claimed that Silkwood had intentionally
removed plutonium from the plant, 40 but alternatively argued that the con-
taminations were work-related, and thus subject to Oklahoma's workers'
compensation law and the exclusive jurisdiction of the industrial court.
4 1
32. Brief of Appellee at 16-17, Silkwood.
33. Id. at 17.
34. Evidence was introduced at trial that at the union meeting, Silkwood had shown an-
other OCAW member "a special notebook and brown manila folder and said she had proof of
falsification of records and samples of bad fuel welds which had been shipped." Brief of Appel-
lee at 18, Silkwood (citations to transcripts omitted). These documents, however, were never
recovered. Id
35. Silkwood died as a result of injuries she sustained when her car ran off the road and hit
a culvert. Brief of Appellants at 16, Silkwood.
36. Expert testimony concerning the level of Silkwood's plutonium contamination was dis-
crepant. Kerr-McGee and AEC consultants who investigated the contaminations estimated the
level to be near the low end of the allowable range, while Silkwood's experts cited reasons and
data suggesting that the actual levels were higher. Brief of Appellee at 75 n.44, Silkwood.
The "allowable lifetime body burden" does not represent a tolerance level below which
injury never occurs; instead, it is a risk-balancing effort between industrial participation and the
level which would probably produce harmful affects. See L. Taylor, Radiation Exposure as a Reason-
able Calculated Risk, reprinted in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Research and Development of the Joint
Comm. on Atomic Energy on Employee Radiation Hazards and Workmens' Compensation, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 21 (1959); Hallmark, Radation Protection Standards and the Administrative Decisionmaking Process,
8 ENVTL. L. 785 (1978).
37. Brief of Appellant at 8 n. 1, Silkwood.
38. 667 F.2d at 914.
39. Kerr-McGee contended that physical injury would not result if contamination levels
were below those established by the AEC as the allowable burden. Further, it contended that
damages could not be awarded for mental anguish absent evidence of a substantial physical
injury. Brief of Appellants at 73-76, Silkwood. Plaintiff contended that Silkwood had sustained
physical injuries, even if only at the cellular level, and mental anguish resulted from Silkwood's
knowledge of such injuries. Id. at 75-79.
40. The argument was that Silkwood had removed plutonium in an effort to discredit and
embarrass Kerr-McGee. Id. at 72.
41. A finding that Silkwood had intentionally removed plutonium would have absolved
Kerr-McGee from common law and workers' compensation liability. 667 F.2d at 919.
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The jury found that Silkwood had not intentionally removed plutonium
from the plant,4 2 although a formal instruction on whether the injuries were
sustained in the course of employment was not submitted for jury considera-
tion.4 3 The district court did instruct the jury that if it found that Silkwood
had not intentionally removed plutonium, Kerr-McGee's participation in an
ultrahazardous activity made it strictly liable for any injuries or damage
which the activity caused. 4 4 The jury returned a verdict for compensatory
damages totaling $505,000, of which $500,000 was awarded for Silkwood's
personal injuries and $5,000 for the damage to her property from the No-
vember 7 contamination.
The district court also allowed the jury to determine whether Kerr-Mc-
Gee had behaved in an intentional or reckless manner toward Silkwood,
thereby making possible a verdict for punitive damages. 45 Kerr-McGee ar-
gued that since it had not violated any AEC regulation, it could not have
behaved recklessly.46 Nevertheless, the court instructed the jury that sub-
stantial compliance with regulations, although probative, was not necessarily
conclusive on the issue of due care.47 The jury returned an unprecedented
$10,000,000 punitive damages verdict and the district court entered judg-




At common law, an employee was required to prove negligence on the
part of his employer in order to recover damages for personal injuries suf-
fered on the job.49 Even if he were able to show negligence, the employee
might be faced with the employer's defenses of assumption of risk, contribu-
tory negligence, and the fellow-servant rule.5 ° Consequently, recovery by
injured employees was rare, often inadequate, and only available after pro-
longed and costly litigation.
5 1
42. 485 F. Supp. at 576.
43. It was the Court's determination that a formal workmen's compensation issue
could not be presented to the jury without an involved dissertation on the nature and
purpose of compensation laws, their difference from traditional common law tort
claims, and the real possibility such an instruction would confuse the jury and thwart
the process of justice. Actual submission was made to the jury by submission of the
specific factual issue of whether Silkwood intentionally took plutonium to her apart-
ment. . . . The evidence that Silkwood might have accidentally taken the plutonium
home on her person or clothing was weak, speculative, and contradicted by virtually
all defendants' own evidence. The Court could not properly submit a question with
no evidentiary foundation to the jury. Nothing more was required to avoid the de-
fense that compensation laws barred the instant claim.
Id. at 588.
44. Id at 597 app.
45. Id at 603 app.
46. Id at 587.
47. Id at 606-07 app.
48. Id. at 589-91.
49. W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1179 (6th




The dismal failure of the common law to protect the injured worker
prompted legislatures throughout the United States to enact workers' com-
pensation laws.5 2 Based on the theory that the cost of the employer's prod-
uct should reflect the financial risk of employee injuries, 53 the hallmark of all
workers' compensation laws is employer liability for work-related injury, re-
gardless of fault. 54 The compromise achieved by workers' compensation
statutes is that the employee is relieved of the burden of proving negligence
and assured of compensation, while the employer is protected against unlim-
ited common law liability by the statutorily prescribed compensation
limits. 55
Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act (Act) is typical of the legisla-
tion enacted in most states. 56 It requires an employer to pay compensation
according to the schedules provided by statute for an employee's work-re-
lated disability or death, regardless of fault. 5 7 Exclusive employer liability is
established under the Act, thereby barring any common law action for per-
sonal injury.5 8 Even where statutory compensation in a particular case is
grossly inadequate, the employee may not bring a common law suit for re-
covery of damages in excess of the compensation limits. 59
The Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act includes a provision which
creates a rebuttable presumption that an injured employee is covered by the
Act.60 In construing this provision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court estab-
lished that an injured employee can meet his burden of proof to show that
the injury was work-related by presenting circumstantial evidence.
6 t
In Silkwood, the question of whether this presumption of coverage by the
Act may also be used to the advantage of the employer was presented.
62
Kerr-McGee argued that in asserting workers' compensation as a defense to
the plaintiff's common law claim, it was entitled to the presumption of cov-
erage by the Act.
63
B. Federal Preempizon
The doctrine of preemption is based on the supremacy clause of the
52. Riesenfeld, Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation, 35 MINN. L. REv. 525, 527
(1951).
53. See TORTS, supra note 49, at 1180.
54. See I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10 (1972).
55. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 531 (4th ed. 1971).
56. See A. LARSON, supra note 54, at § 1.10.
57. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § II (West 1970 & Supp. 1981-82).
58. Id. § 12.
59. See, e.g., Smith v. Baker, 157 Okla. 155, 11 P.2d 132 (1932). See also 2A A. LARSON,
THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.20 (1972); W. PROSSER, supra note 55, at 531-
32.
60. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 27 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981-82).
61. In re May, 586 P.2d 738, 740-41 (Okla. 1978). Seegeneralo Wilcox Oil Co. v. Fuqua,
203 Okla. 391, 224 P.2d 255 (1950) (holding that even an unexplained or unwitnessed injury is
compensable under the statute if there is a "strong possibility" that the injury is work-related).
62. Related issues were addressed in Harter Concrete Prod., Inc. v. Harris, 592 P.2d 526,
528 (Okla. 1979) (noting reciprocity of not requiring employee to prove negligence and limiting
liability of employer) and Fox v. Dunning, 124 Okla. 228, 255 P. 582 (1927) (stating that the
Act was reciprocal in eliminating common law right).
63. Brief of Appellants at 38-41, Silkwood.
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United States Constitution.6 4 Under the doctrine, in order to effectuate to-
tal congressional control over a particular field, state regulation that conflicts
with federal legislation is rendered void. 65 Federal intent to occupy a field is
strictly scrutinized. 66 Federal supremacy is upheld where Congress has ex-
plicitly prohibited state regulation or where intent to preempt can be in-
ferred from either the nature or subject matter of the federal regulatory
scheme. State interests are otherwise protected by a presumption of validity
of state law.
6 7
Tort remedies represent a field historically left to state authority; there-
fore, congressional intent to preempt state tort law is not readily inferred.
6 8
Prior to the enactment of federal legislation governing nuclear accidents, all
questions of tort liability for radiation injuries were determined according to
the common law of the state. In 1957, Congress adopted the Price-Anderson
Act (Act),69 a response to the finding of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy that "the problem of possible liability in connection with the opera-
tion of reactors [was] a major deterrent to further industrial participation in
the [development of nuclear power]."
'70
One of the purposes of the Act was to assure that compensation would
be made to claimants injured in a "nuclear incident."' 7 1 The Act required
all licensees of the AEC to purchase the maximum amount of privately
available insurance. It also established a governmental indemnity fund to
provide compensation in the event that claims exceeded the amount of the
private insurance maximum liability. 72 Federal interference, according to
64. The supremacy clause states that "[tihe Laws of the United States . . .shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI,
§ 2.
65. See generally H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 435 (1953); Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489
(1954).
A determination of preemption is not a matter governed by clear-cut rules. "The fact that
Congress has spoken in an area of state regulation does not necessarily preclude all state regula-
tion; and the fact that there is no explicit federal-state conflict or no explicit congressional state-
ment of intent to bar state authority does not bar a finding of preemption." G. GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 344 (10th ed. 1980).
66. Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shi?zg Perspectves on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 623, 624 (1975).
67. "[T]he presumption operates in favor of the validity of the state law; courts are not to
seek out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exist." Pacific Legal
Found. v. State Energy Resources Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903, 919 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 2959 (1982).
68. C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 50 (1969).
69. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
70. S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprthed in 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1803.
71. A "nuclear incident" is defined as:
[a]ny occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, within the United
States causing . . .bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to
property, or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive,
toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct
material.
42 U.S.C. § 2 014(q) (1976). "Extraordinary nuclear occurrence" is defined inhfa at note 74.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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the Senate Report, would be limited to situations where claims exceeded
private insurance coverage. Payments would then be prorated at the federal
level with proceeds available in the indemnity fund rather than issued
through state courts. 73 The original Price-Anderson Act apparently contem-
plated that the liability standard (i.e., negligence or strict liability) for all
nuclear incidents was to be determined by the individual state.
The Act was amended in 1966 to provide for the imposition of strict
liability in cases involving an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" (ENO).
7 4
In the event of an ENO, Congress explicitly stated that a strict liability stan-
dard should apply, thus relieving ENO victims of the burden of proving
negligence in those states adhering to a negligence standard.
75 In those cata-
strophic situations, recovery may be limited to compensatory damages.
76
The 1966 amendment left intact the authority of the individual states to
set liability standards for nuclear incidents below the ENO level. 7 7 How-
ever, it is not specified in the Price-Anderson Act, nor is it apparent in its
legislative history, that recovery in suits involving incidents below the ENO
level is limited to compensatory damages. A congressional intention for state
statutory and common law decision-making may thus be inferred except in
catastrophic cases where liability would exceed the amount of available pri-
vate insurance funds.
Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have dealt with
the preemption issue in the context of express state regulation of nuclear
facilities. 78 In those cases, specific state provisions regulating nuclear power
plants were challenged as being in conflict with federal regulations. In North-
73. [T]here is no interference with State law until there is a likelihood that the dam-
ages exceed the amount of financial responsibility required together with the amount
of the indemnity. At that point the Federal interference is limited to the prohibition
of making payments through that state's courts and to prorating the proceeds
available.
S. REP. No. 296, supra note 70 at 1810.
74. Act of Oct. 13, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 20140) (1976)).
The term "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" means any event causing a discharge or
dispersal of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material from its intended place of
confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radiation levels offsite, which the [AEC]
determines to be substantial, and which . . . will probably result in substantial dam-
ages to persons offsite or property offsite.
42 U.S.C. § 22100) (1976).
75. "The question whether courts should apply legal principles akin to those of strict liabil-
ity in the event of a serious nuclear incident seems to the committee to be free from dispute." S.
REP. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3209.
76. During the 1965 hearings, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy recommended that,
at the point where public liability exceeds the limit of liability, the federal judiciary prorate the
proceeds available. Presumably, this would limit recovery to compensatory damages. See id at
3216-17.
77. See S. REP. No. 1605, supra note 75, at 3201. See generaly Keyes & Howarth, Approaches
to Liability for Remote Causes. The Low-Level Radiation Example, 56 IowA L. REV. 531 (1971); Note,
The "Extraordinay Nuclear Occurrence" Threshold and Uncompensated Injury Under the Price-Anderson
Act, 6 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 360 (1974); Comment, The Irradiated Plaintff Tort Recovery Outside
Price-Andrson, 6 ENVTL. L. REV. 859 (1976).
78. See Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659
F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2959 (1982); Northern States Power Co. v.
Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), af'dmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
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ern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,79 the Eighth Circuit held that a Minnesota
statute which intended to regulate levels of radioactive effluents was pre-
empted by a federal statute. The AEC was found to have exclusive author-
ity to regulate construction and operation of nuclear power plants including
authority to impose standards for radioactive discharge.80
In Pacifw Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Develop-
ment Commiss'on,8 ' a more recent decision, the Ninth Circuit noted that al-
though a state law must be held invalid to the extent that it actually conflicts
with federal law, the presumption operates in favor of the validity of state
law.8 2 Neither of the two California statutes at issue regulated an area ex-
plicitly reserved to the AEC, and neither impeded congressional goals; there-
fore, those state laws were not preempted.
8 3
The Tenth Circuit was faced with a different question of preemption in
Si'lkwood. State tort law rather than specific legislation was the arena of the
asserted conflict. There was no statutory provision which conflicted with
federal nuclear regulations, but the court found the common law interfered.
III. THE TENTH CIRCUIT DECISION
A. The Presumption of Coverage by Workers' Compensation Is Reciprocal
The Tenth Circuit majority in SiZkwood adopted what the district court
stated "would constitute a new horizon in the traditional field of tort litiga-
tion,"84 i.e., that an employer asserting workers' compensation as a defense
to an employee's common law action is entitled to the protection of the pre-
sumption that the employee's injury occurred on the job.85 Traditionally,
the presumption ofjob-relatedness has been asserted by the employee so that
he would be assured of at least a limited compensation for personal injuries
without the requisite proof of employer fault. 8 6 The Tenth Circuit ruling
allows an employer to assert the presumption defensively to limit its poten-
tial liability. To recover more than the limited compensation under the Act,
an employee must rebut the presumption with sufficient evidence that the
injuries were not sustained on the job.8 7 Writing for the majority, Judge
Logan reasoned that the purpose of a liberal construction which supports
jurisdiction of the industrial court is both to ensure the injured employee's
protection under the Act and to protect the employer from excessive
judgments.
8 8
Citing Oklahoma Steel Casting Co. v. Banks,8 9 the court acknowledged that
79. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 197 1), afdmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
80. 447 F.2d at 1154.
81. 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2959 (1982).
82. 659 F.2d at 919.
83. Id. at 928.
84. 485 F. Supp. at 588.
85. 667 F.2d at 917.
86. See, e.g., In re May, 586 P.2d 738, 740 (Okla. 1978); City of Nichols Hills v. Hill, 534
P.2d 931, 934 (Okla. 1975). See A. LARSON, supra note 54 and accompanying text.
87. See Silkwood, 667 F.2d at 918-19.
88. Id at 916.
89. 181 Okla. 503, 74 P.2d 1168 (1937).
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workers' compensation is an affirmative defense which the employer has the
burden of proving.90 The majority determined, however, that the method
for proving that an injury arose out of employment would be the same
whether offered by an employee or employer.9 1 Therefore, circumstantial
evidence which supports a reasonable inference of coverage is sufficient to
sustain the burden of an employee attempting to prove a claim or an em-
ployer seeking to bar an action at common law.
92
Admitting that the circumstantial evidence as to the time, place, and
manner of Silkwood's contaminations was "thin at best," 93 Judge Logan em-
phasized that a finding other than that the exposures were job-related was
not supported by the evidence. The majority inferred that the contamina-
tions occurred within the course of employment and found the plaintiff had
not produced substantial evidence to rebut that inference. 94 Kerr-McGee
thus established a prima facie case that the injury was within the protection
of the workers' compensation law. 95 The Tenth Circuit therefore reversed
the $500,000 personal injury judgment and remanded the case for determi-
nation under the Workers' Compensation Act.
B. Strict Liabihty for Property Damages
Because the Oklahoma workers' compensation statute applies only to
personal injuries, the issue of compensation for the destruction of Silkwood's
contaminated property was given separate consideration. 96 The court con-
sidered whether the federal regulatory scheme for the nuclear industry pre-
empted the application of state tort law for Silkwood's property damage.
97
The court determined that, in this case, the imposition of the state standard
of strict liability for the property damage would not constitute a significant
interference with federal control of the Kerr-McGee plant.98 Noting that
provisions in the Price-Anderson Act for victim compensation only apply to
extraordinary nuclear occurrences, the court concluded that liability for nu-
clear incidents below the ENO level is to be determined by state tort law. 99
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit court found that Oklahoma's law of
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities was applicable to off-site
plutonium contamination. 100 Thus, the court affirmed the $5,000 judgment
for Silkwood's property damage.
90. 667 F.2d at 917.
91. Id
92. Id
93. 1d. at 918.
94. Id at 918-19.
95. Id at 919.
96. Id at 920; see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § I1 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981-82).
97. 667 F.2d at 920.
98. Id.
99. Id at 921.
100. Id (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 comment (e) (1977) (strict liabil-
ity applies to "harm that is within the scope of the abnormal risk that is the basis of the
liability")).
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C. Punitive Damages Prohibited
The court acknowledged that the Price-Anderson Act and its legislative
history are silent as to the types of damages a state may impose for injuries
below the ENO level.' 0 ' The court reasoned, however, that the deterrent or
regulatory effect of punitive damages would compete substantially with fed-
eral control over the nuclear industry. 10 2 Judge Logan acknowledged that
where a state's laws affect interests as vital to its citizens as those in Sl7kwood,
a strong presumption against preemption would seem to be warranted.
10 3
Nevertheless, the court found that federal law preempted the imposition of
punitive damages because the nuclear industry was initially developed by
the federal government, is closely linked with national security, and is exten-
sively regulated by a federal agency.' 0 g A judicial award of punitive dam-
ages, Judge Logan concluded, is no less intrusive to the federal scheme than
direct legislative acts of the state. 105
The Tenth Circuit consequently reversed the $10,000,000 punitive
damages judgment. Judge Logan emphasized that a violation of AEC regu-
lations by Kerr-McGee would not have resulted in a different decision: fed-
eral preemption prohibits punitive damage awards regardless of a finding of
an actual violation of AEC regulations.' 0 6 The court reasoned that the
power of the AEC to license, investigate, enjoin, and seek civil and criminal
sanctions where it regards practices as improper, precluds judicial imposi-
tion of punishment.'
0 7
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S RATIONALE
A. Apphlcabth'ty of Workers' Compensation Law
1. The Reciprocal Presumption
The majority determined that since a statutory presumption operates in
favor of workers' compensation coverage when an employee makes a claim
for workers' compensation, a reciprocal presumption operates in favor of the
employer asserting workers' compensation coverage as a defense to an em-
ployee's common law suit.' 08 This reciprocal presumption thus requires an
employee bringing a common law claim to rebut by "substantial evidence"
the existence of his employer's affirmative defense of compensation cover-
age.' 0 9 A question which the court failed to answer, however, is what consti-
101. Id. at 922.
102. The court noted that "punitive damages are 'awarded against a person to punish him
for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.'" Id (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(l) (1979)). See also W. PROS-
SER, supra note 55, at 9.
103. 667 F.2d at 923.
104. Id. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aJfd
mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); see also Note, A Framework for Preemptiwn Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363,
379-81 (1978).
105. 667 F.2d at 923.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id at 917.
109. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 27 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981-82).
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tutes "substantial evidence." Interpreted from a traditional perspective, this
requirement means evidence from which reasonable men could infer that the
injury was not job-related. Arguably, the plaintiff in Silkwood did produce
such circumstantial evidence.1 10 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the plaintiff had failed to rebut the defense of compensation cover-
age.tII This conclusion suggests that an employee must produce direct evi-
dence to rebut the presumption of job-relatedness.
2. Existence of a Jury Question
The court's analysis results in legal symmetry in that the presumption of
compensation coverage is available to both the employer and the employee.
However, where inferences to be drawn from facts may lead to reasonable
differences of opinion, the issue of the applicability of workers' compensation
is a jury question. 112 As Judge Doyle pointed out in his dissent,' 1 3 investiga-
tions by Kerr-McGee and the AEC, expert testimony, and circumstantial
evidence were all essentially inconclusive and susceptible of reasonable di-
vergent inferences.'1 4 The question of whether Silkwood's injuries arose out
of and in the course of her employment therefore was a factual issue which
should have been submitted to the jury for resolution in accordance with
prior Oklahoma law.
Another weakness of the court's decision is the possibility that the
Silkwood jury awarded punitive damages based on a finding of intentional
conduct on the part of Kerr-McGee, thus rendering workers' compensation
inapplicable. Previous Oklahoma cases have held that where an employee is
intentionally or willfully injured by his employer, he may sue the employer
as if the workers' compensation law did not exist.' 15 The district court's
instruction in Silkwood that punitive damages could be awarded on the basis
of either actual malice or inferred malice allowed the jury to award punitive
damages on a finding of either intentional or reckless conduct." 16 If the jury
did base its award on a finding of intentional conduct, the workers' compen-
sation statute would not apply. Because of this possibility, the question of
reckless or intentional conduct on the part of Kerr-McGee should have been
remanded for a jury determination.
3. Legislative Intent
The holding that presumption of workers' compensation coverage is re-
ciprocal may confound legislative intent. In cases where there is no question
110. As Judge Doyle noted, not only was there "substantial evidence showing that contami-
nation occurred off the premises. . . . [but a] good deal of evidence was offered which was
designed to show that Kerr-McGee had a motive for intentionally exposing [Silkwood] to con-
tamination." 667 F.2d at 925 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
111. 667 F.2d at 919.
112. This issue was previously determined by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Flick v.
Crouch, 434 P.2d 256, 260-61 (Okla. 1967).
113. 667 F.2d at 923-25 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
114. Id at 925.
115. Ste, e.g., Hull v. Wolfe, 393 P.2d 491, 493 (Okla. 1964); Roberts v. Barclay, 369 P.2d
808, 809 (Okla. 1962).
116. 485 F. Supp. at 603 app.
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whether an employee's injuries were job-related and no extenuating circum-
stances (e.g., intentional act of employer), it is consistent with the intent of
workers' compensation law to limit the employer's liability to the statutory
maximum. In cases such as Si/kwood, however, where there is a reasonable
doubt that the injuries were job-related, a court's denial of the plaintiff's
right to common law damages is inconsistent with the purpose of workers'
compensation laws. The overriding legislative intent of such laws is to pro-




The Tenth Circuit's disposition of the Si/kwood case creates new law on
the issue of federal preemption in the nuclear regulatory field. The court
determined that in this case the state law which allowed awards for property
damage did not constitute an unreasonable intrusion into the federal nuclear
regulatory scheme."' The opinion suggests that in determining awards for
property damages in the nuclear tort area, courts must consider the issue of
federal preemption on a case-by-case basis, even where the nuclear incident
is below the ENO level. Such a position seems contrary to the apparent
congressional intent to leave the liability determination to the states. By
requiring courts to decide on an ad hoc basis whether imposition of compen-
satory property damages conflicts with federal control, the state's authority
to develop its own tort law in this area is rendered virtually impotent.
2. Punitive Damages
The court determined that in all cases a punitive damages award
against a federally regulated nuclear facility constituted an unacceptable in-
trusion and thus was prohibited." 19 This interpretation imposes an unneces-
sary infringement on state decision-making for injuries below the ENO level.
More importantly, the holding carves out an unwarranted, indeed danger-
ous, exception to the preemption doctrine for the nuclear industry.
The court referred to an assumption implicit in the Price-Anderson Act
that only compensatory damages will be awarded in ENO cases. 120 The
court failed, however, to distinguish the Skwood situation, where one indi-
vidual was contaminated, from a catastrophic incident. The Price-Anderson
Act's implicit limitation in ENO cases represents a congressional intention to
provide the maximum recovery for the maximum number of people in the
event of a nuclear catastrophe. In a major nuclear accident, awarding puni-
tive damages to very few people could preclude others from any recovery
whatsoever. Awarding reasonable punitive damages to an individual plain-
tiff in an isolated case, however, would probably not prevent subsequent re-
117. Baldwin v. Big X Drilling Co., 322 P.2d 647, 649 (Okla. 1958). Set also Riesenfeld,
supra note 52, at 527 and accompanying text.
118. 667 F.2d at 920.
119. Id. at 923.
120. Id at 922. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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covery by other plaintiffs nor would it impede compliance with federal
regulations.
The court reasoned that imposition of punitive damages indirectly regu-
lates the industry and must be prohibited in deference to federal occupation
of the field.121 Such indirect regulation of the industry ostensibly sets a stan-
dard which conflicts with federal standards. Under such an assumption,
states that require proof of negligence for recovery in below-ENO-level cases
may be compelled to adopt the federal regulations as a standard of care in
order to avoid interfering with federal control. Only if the federal regula-
tions were violated, could the defendant be found to have breached the stan-
dard of care. This result is contrary to legislative intent. Congress explicitly
provided that states could adopt a strict liability standard for cases below the
ENO level. 122 No proof of negligence or violation of a federal regulation is
required for recovery under a strict liability standard. By allowing states to
adopt either a strict liability or a negligence standard, Congress presumably
intended that states would determine their own standards of care for noncat-
astrophic cases. State imposition of punitive damages should not be prohib-
ited because of a concern for the possible regulatory or standard-setting
effect of the damages. Indeed, Congress appears to have contemplated state
involvement in the area by allowing states to choose their own liability
standard.
The Tenth Circuit's preemption holding in Skwood does not follow log-
ically from the holdings in Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota 123 and Pacifx
Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commis-
sion 124 In both Northern States and Pacifi Legal Foundation the federal appel-
late courts were examining state laws which directly regulated the nuclear
industry. In Northern States the Eighth Circuit found that the AEC's author-
ity to regulate construction and operation included authority to impose dis-
charge standards and thus preempted the state law.' 25 In Paific Legal
Foundation, however, the Ninth Circuit refused to find preemption where the
specific state laws at issue did not conflict with specific sections of the federal
statute.' 26 In Silkwood, the Tenth Circuit was not dealing with a specific
state statute and yet the court found preemption even though 1) tort law is
traditionally a state-occupied field, 12 7 2) there is a presumption of validity of
state law,' 2 8 and 3) punitive damages awards only speculatively regulate the
industry. 129
The court's willingness to abdicate the states' authority to punish the
nuclear tortfeasor to the AEC seems especially unjust in a case such as
Silkwood. Because no regulations were shown to have been violated, AEC
121. 667 F.2d at 922-23.
122. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
123. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), af dmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
124. 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2959 (1982).
125. 447 F.2d at 1154.
126. 659 F.2d at 928.
127. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
128. Paific Legal Found , 659 F.2d at 919.
129. Such an award may not have the contemplated deterrent effect. In the absence of a
deterrent effect, there is no resulting regulation of the industry, and preemption is inapplicable.
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"punishment" was not forthcoming; yet an individual suffered irreparable
injuries and personal property was totally destroyed. Moreover, the court's
prohibition of punitive damages regardless of compliance or non-compliance
with AEC regulations" 0 may produce some unexpected results. Under such
a prohibition, even if a regulation were purposely and maliciously violated,
punitive damages would not be allowed. In the case of an obvious violation,
the AEC would intervene and impose sanctions. However, if no regulation
were shown to have been violated, yet the defendant's behavior was willful
and malicious, punitive damages would be unavailable. Such a result seems
contrary to well-established expectations of social policy.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's resolution of the workers' compensation issue
presented in Si/kwood may have far-reaching implications for future em-
ployee-litigants asserting common law claims against their employers. Un-
less the employee is able to produce evidence sufficient to rebut the
presumption that his injury was not job-related, his employer is likely to
escape all but statutory liability. Where only circumstantial evidence exists,
the employee will have difficulty sustaining the burden of proof; indeed, a
lack of direct evidence may preclude success in a common law action. Since
this result seems to recreate the rather oppressive aspects of the common law
scheme in which the plaintiffs recovery was inadequate and rare,""1 state
legislatures may want to restructure their current workers' compensation sys-
tems to ameliorate this effect. Such reform should entitle the plaintiff to a
jury determination of whether an injury was sustained in the course of
employment.
Implications of the court's preemption holding may likewise be far-
reaching. In an era of profound anti-nuclear sentiment and resistance to
federal interference in local concerns, one could expect the Si/kwood decision
to be a catalyst for congressional reaction. It is likely that states would wel-
come explicit congressional reassurance that nuclear accidents below the
ENO level are subject to state law. Indeed, the lack of that assurance may
be a disincentive to the nuclear industry to exercise greater care than the
minimum standards prescribed by federal regulations.
Cheryl Scott
130. 667 F.2d at 923.




During the period covered by this survey, most of the cases considered
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals were actions arising under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. In one of its more notable decisions, the Tenth
Circuit court ruled that appropriate bargaining units in the health care in-
dustry may no longer be determined by the National Labor Relations
Board's traditional community of interests test, but must be based upon the
disparity of interests between employee groups. This survey will discuss
twenty-six of the more significant and interesting cases decided by the court
of appeals.
I. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT1
A. Jurisdction
The jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (Board or
NLRB) was challenged on two grounds in R. W. Harmon & Sons, Inc. v.
NLRB. 2 Harmon, a provider of school bus transportation services to public
school districts in nine states, first claimed that its activities were essentially
local and did not affect interstate commerce. 3 Second, Harmon contended it
shared the school district's governmental exemption from NLRB jurisdic-
tion.4 In asserting this claim, Harmon argued that it was prevented from
participating meaningfully in collective bargaining with its employees be-
cause the school district had authority to reject job applicants and recom-
mend dismissal of Harmon's employees. 5  The Board rejected these
arguments and ordered a representation election, which was won by the
union. When Harmon refused to bargain,6 the union filed charges and the
Board found Harmon in violation of subsections 8(a)(1) and 8a(5) of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act).
7
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-169, 171-188 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2. 664 F.2d 248 (10th Cir. 1981).
3. Id. at 250. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976) provides that: "The Board is empowered . . . to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce."
4. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976) provides, intrr aha, that "any State or political subdivision
thereof," is not subject to the Board's jurisdiction.
5. 664 F.2d at 250. "Courts have interpreted section [152(2)] to prohibit the Board from
asserting jurisdiction over private employers that perform services for exempt governmental
entities if the employer does not 'retain sufficient control over the employment relationship to
engage in meaningful collective bargaining.'" Id. at 251 (citing Board of Trustees of Memorial
Hosp. v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 177, 185 (10th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Pope Maintenance Corp., 573
F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1978)).
6. An employer seeking judicial review of Board representation election decisions must
refuse to bargain with the union after the election in order to precipitate an unfair labor prac-
tice proceeding which will be reviewable in the federal courts. Magnesium Casting Co. v.
NLRB, 401 U.S. 137, 139 (1971). Se generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW,
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 43, 60 (1976).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1976). Section 158(a)(1) prohibits acts of interference, re-
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On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Harmon's contention that the essen-
tially local nature of its business precluded Board jurisdiction was rejected.
The court pointed out that the Board's jurisdiction encompasses even a local
business if interstate commerce is affected. 8 With respect to Harmon's sec-
ond argument that it lacked sufficient control over the employment relation-
ship to bargain meaningfully, the court ruled that Harmon's control over
wages and benefits was sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional test.9 An em-
ployer is not required "to control all terms and conditions of employment,
but only enough . . . to bargain effectively."' 0 The court, therefore, en-
forced the Board's order.
Harmon also argued that the Board abused its discretion by aban-
doning part of its earlier jurisdictional test for school bus operators without
following the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.1 1
Prior to National Transportation Services, Inc. ,12 the Board refused to exercise
jurisdiction over private school bus transportation companies because they
were intimately connected with a statutorily exempt governmental unit. In
National Transportation, however, the Board rejected the "intimately con-
nected" test and decided to assert jurisdiction over school bus companies so
long as they retain sufficient control over employment conditions to bargain
meaningfully. 13 The Tenth Circuit court refused to address this issue of in-
formal rulemaking because it had not been raised in the court below.'
4
B. Federal Preemption and Exclusivity of Remedies
One issue considered by the Tenth Circuit court in Peabody Ga/ion v. Dol-
lar 15 was whether an Oklahoma statute 16 prohibiting discharge of employees
for filing workers' compensation claims was preempted by the NLRA. The
collective bargaining agreement between the company and the union pro-
vided that employees who became disabled due to an occupational injury or
illness could be placed on workmen's compensation leave until suitable low-
risk jobs became available. Pursuant to this provision, thirty-four employees
who had filed workers' compensation claims were laid off in a two-month
period because Peabody claimed no suitable positions were vacant. The em-
ployees felt they were, in effect, wrongfully discharged and filed grievances
straint, or coercion by an employer with the rights of employees (guaranteed in § 157) to organ-
ize, form, join, or assist a labor organization, to bargain collectively, or to refrain from any of
these activities. Section 158(a)(5) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.
8. 664 F.2d at 250.
9. Id. at 251.
10. Id. -
11. Id. at 251-52. The Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking provision is codified at 5
•U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
12. 240 N.L.R.B. 565 (1979).
13. Id. at 566.
14. 664 F.2d at 252. The Board's reluctance to use formal rulemaking procedures has been
criticized, but its policy of announcing rules in adjudicatory proceedings has been upheld.
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759
(1969). See generaly Bernstein, The NLRB's Adj) dication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Admnzztra-
tive Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970).
15. 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981).
16. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, §§ 5-7 (Supp. 1980).
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seeking binding arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. Two
cases reaching arbitration resulted in awards for the company, so the em-
ployees filed a diversity action in federal court seeking a remedy under
Oklahoma law. The trial court rejected Peabody's contention that the statu-
tory cause of action was barred by federal labor policy and denied its motion
for summary judgment.17
On interlocutory appeal, the Tenth Circuit court asserted that "the pre-
emption doctrine is not turned on by simply shouting preemption or by
pressing a button." 18 The court noted the following two rationales that ap-
ply to the invocation of the preemption doctrine: the supremacy clause and
the theory of primary jurisdiction. t9 According to the court in Peabody, these
rationales have been utilized in the formulation of three preemption tests in
the area of labor relations. The first of these tests, enunciated in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Carton,20 requires preemption of state regulation
when the activity regulated is protected by section 721 or prohibited by sec-
tion 8 of the NLRA. 22 When the activity is only arguably subject to those
sections "the states as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive
competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state
interference with national policy is to be averted."'23 Supplementing Carnon,
the second test, based on the supremacy clause, requires that where the ac-
tivity is not arguably subject to the NLRA, preemption may still be justified
if "the absence of federal regulation is indicative of a congressional determi-
nation to leave the challenged conduct available" and if state regulation
would upset "the balance of power between labor and management ex-
pressed in national labor policy."'2 4 The third test, known as the frustration
test, demands preemption of a state law if it would frustrate the Act's effec-
tive implementation.
25
In applying the Carton test, the appellate court in Peabody determined
that discharging employees for claiming workers' compensation was not con-
duct subject to the Act since it was not related in any way to union organiza-
tion or collective bargaining.26 Furthermore, the activity provoking the
disputed discharges did not have a tendency to conflict with federal labor
17. 666 F.2d at 1312.
18. Id. at 1314.
19. Id.
The supremacy clause focuses on the extent to which Congress has occupied the field
of labor relations by extending protection to certain conduct. The primary jurisdic-
tion theory requires preemption where the conduct at issue is subject to the unfair
labor practice jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
Id. (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 198-200 (1978)).
20. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) provides that employees have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively, to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to
refrain from any or all of such activities.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976) prohibits certain unfair labor practices of employers and labor
organizations, including interference with § 157 rights.
23. Peabody, 666 F.2d at 1314.
24. Id. at 1315 (citing Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964)).
25. 666 F.2d at 1315 (citing The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REV. 60,270 & n.46
(1979)).
26. 666 F.2d at 1316. The court futher noted that the Garmon test does not require preemp-
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law.2 7 Regarding the second test, the court concluded that preemption was
not justified because the absence of federal regulation did not indicate a
congressional intention to leave the challenged conduct available; Congress
has never considered workers' compensation related discharges. 2  The
Peabody court also noted that permitting state regulation in the area would
not upset the balance of power between labor and management because the
objective of such regulation is unrelated to the goals of organized labor.
29
The frustration test also failed to convince the court that the preemption
doctrine should be applied. Since workers' compensation is primarily a state
concern, "enforcement of the Oklahoma statute does not create any hazard
of interference with federally protected activity."' 30 Moreover, the statute
applies to all Oklahoma employees, not just unin members, and hence, it is
more difficult to find a congressional intent to preempt than if it applied
specifically to concerted union activity.
31
Finally, the court reasoned that even if the Oklahoma statute did not
withstand the preemption tests, it would nevertheless qualify as a "state con-
cern" exception to the preemption requirement. 32 Therefore, the Tenth Cir-
cuit court upheld the trial court's assertion of jurisdiction.
Another issue considered in Peabody was whether the binding arbitration
provision in the collective bargaining agreement precluded the employees
from seeking other remedies. Peabody maintained that even if the
Oklahoma statute was not preempted by federal labor law, the employees
did not have a statutory cause of action because arbitration was the exclusive
remedy for disputes arising under the collective bargaining agreement. The
court of appeals agreed that the issue of whether Peabody's conduct violated
the agreement's guidelines for placing workers on workers' compensation
leave was arbitrable.33 However, the dispute over Peabody's motive for plac-
ing the workers on leave was not arbitrable because it arose under the
Oklahoma statute, not the collective bargaining agreement. 34 Since one
"cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute which he did not contract to
arbitrate,"3 5 the court found the exclusivity rule inapplicable.
A significant aspect of the Peabody opinion was the court's recognition
that federal policy favors binding arbitration, but that important exceptions
apply to its exclusivity as a remedy. One of these exceptions, reviewed by
the Peabody court, arose in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 36 and was extended
in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc..37 In Gardner-Denver the




29. Id. at 1316-17.




34. Id. at 1320.
35. Id.
36. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
37. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
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Supreme Court ruled that arbitration did not provide an adequate remedy
for enforcement of Title VII38 rights and, thus, the statutory right to trial
could not be precluded by the initiation of arbitration procedures. 39 The
Court expanded this ruling in Barrentine to include substantive rights arising
under the Fair Labor Standards Act,4° reasoning that such rights were indi-
vidual, not collective.4 1 Applying the Supreme Court's rationale in Gardner-
Denver and Barrentine, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Peabody ac-
knowledged that the alternative remedy arose under state rather than fed-
eral law, but held that such difference did not constitute a distinguishing
factor.42 Accordingly, the court rejected Peabody's claim that the arbitra-
tion remedy barred the statutory action.
C. Interference With Employee Rights
Husky Oil, NP.R. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB 4 3 dealt with the question of an
employer's right under the NLRA to deny non-employee union organizers
access to a worksite for the purpose of encouraging employees to vote for
union representation. Husky refused to give the union permission to visit
personally its remote Alaskan worksite, and the union filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the Board. The company contended that other reason-
able means of communicating with the employees were available to the
union. The Board rejected this contention and ordered Husky to allow the
union to visit the worksite.
44
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit applied NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. ,45
which held that nonemployee union organizers may be excluded from com-
pany property if two conditions are met. First, other means of communica-
tion must be available which permit the union, through reasonable efforts, to
reach the employees. 46 Second, the no-access rule must not be applied dis-
criminatorily against the union.4 7 Relying on the Third Circuit's interpreta-
tion of Babcock in NLRB v. Tamiment, Inc. ,48 Husky maintained that the
Board erred in evaluating the available channels of communication when
the union had not shown that it made reasonable efforts to reach the em-
ployees. The Tenth Circuit court declined to follow the Third Circuit, de-
claring that the Board could evaluate the available channels without the
union first having demonstrated its efforts to communicate with the
employees.
49
The court affirmed the importance of face-to-face contact between
38. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1976) &
Supp. IV 1980).
39. 415 U.S. at 51-52.
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
41. 450 U.S. at 737-44.
42. 666 F.2d at 1321.
43. 669 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1982).
44. Id. at 645.
45. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
46. Id. at 112.
47. Id.
48. 451 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1012 (1972).
49. 669 F.2d at 645.
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union representatives and Husky employees, observing that such contact was
possible only at the Anchorage airport or at the employee's homes when they
were periodically on leave. 50 Finding substantial evidence on the record to
support the Board's conclusion that these and other means of contact were
unsatisfactory, the court of appeals enforced the Board's order.5 ' Neverthe-
less, the Tenth Circuit did so with some reluctance, remarking that "this is a
close case, especially because the employer was willing to give the union the
names, home addresses, and telephone numbers of the employees."
'52
In an unpublished opinion, Frank Paxton Lumber Co. v. NLRB,5 3 the
Tenth Circuit court reviewed a Board finding that Paxton had violated sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act 54 by discharging Kirk for engaging in concerted activ-
ities protected by section 7 of the Act. 55 The company argued that
Crownover, the manager who actually terminated Kirk, was not motivated
by animus but by Kirk's excessive absenteeism and his failure to report his
absences in a timely fashion after being warned that such conduct would no
longer be tolerated. 56 Accepting the Board's finding that Sanchez, Kirk's
immediate supervisor, had lied to Crownover about giving the warning, the
court held that "even if the person actually making the termination decision
acted in good faith, [section] 8(a)(1) is violated if the decision was based on
conduct by a discriminatorily motivated supervisor."
'5 7
Paxton maintained that Sanchez's failure to give the warning could not
have been discriminatorily motivated since Sanchez's neglect and subse-
quent lie occurred before he knew of Kirk's concerted activity.58 The Board,
however, found that prior to Sanchez's neglected warning, Kirk and other
employees had begun discussing various job related safety problems and the
lack of meaningful job classifications, and that Kirk had suggested to
Sanchez that operations would be improved by assigning specific job duties
to specific employees. 59 Curiously, the court suggested this was not con-
certed activity because it "was not clearly shown to have been a presentation
of a group viewpoint, although it concerned all the employees of the ware-
house .. ."60 Nevertheless, the court found other support in the record for
the Board's conclusion that the discharge was discriminatorily motivated
and, therefore, enforced the order.
6 '
50. Id. at 647.
51. Id. at 648.
52. Id.
53. No. 78-1607 (10th Cir. June 29, 1981).
54. See supra note 7.
55. See supra note 21. The NLRA does not define the term "concerted activity," but for a
general discussion of case law in this area, see R. GORMAN, supra note 6, at 296-325.
56. No. 78-1607, slip op. at 9.
57. Id. at 11 (citing Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 312 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.
1962)).
58. No. 78-1607, slip op. at 9.
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id. at 11. The statement that Kirk and other employees had been "discussing among
themselves . . . the lack of meaningful job classifications," id. at 3, would seem to suggest that
Kirk was indeed presenting "a group viewpoint."
61. Id. at 11-12. The Tenth Circuit supported its holding, inter a/ia, by noting that Kirk
did engage in protected concerted activity after Sanchez's neglected warning and Kirk was
discharged shortly thereafter. Id.
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NLRB v. American Can Co. 62 arose from an NLRB order holding that
application of a superseniority clause63 to a union guard and trustee violated
the NLRA by interfering with the rights of other employees and by encour-
aging participation in union activities.64 The company decided to cease op-
erations, and among the employees retained or recalled to assist in closing
the plant were Schneider, a union guard, and Howard, a union trustee.
These union officers were given preference over more senior employees solely
due to the application of the superseniority clause. Charges were filed with
the Board against the union and the employer by two former employees of
the defunct company.
The Tenth Circuit court analyzed the application of the superseniority
clause in the light of Supreme Court standards set forth in NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc. 65 Under Great Dane, an action which encourages or dis-
courages union membership or activity is unlawful without proof of anti-
union motivation, if it is inherently destructive of important employee
rights.66 When the adverse impact on these important employee rights is,
however, comparatively slight, then proof of anti-union motivation is re-
quired if the employer has come forward with evidence that the conduct was
motivated by legitimate and substantial business considerations. 67 The
Tenth Circuit court held the superseniority clause was not inherently de-
structive of important employee rights, but did to some extent have an ad-
verse impact on those rights. Thus, there was a burden on the employer and
union to come forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business
justifications. 68 Since no justification was established, the appellate court
affirmed the Board's conclusion that the superseniority clause violated the
Act.
69
The court in American Can also observed that Board decisions have held
superseniority clauses are presumptively valid if they do not go beyond layoff
and recall of union stewards. 70 This presumption rests on the belief that the
steward's key role in the grievance procedure requires their continued pres-
ence on the job.7 1 The court did not pass directly on this presumption. The
62. 658 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1981).
63. The clause in the collective bargaining agreement provided that up to 10 union officers
would have preference in case of layoff or recall, regardless of their seniority. Id. at 749. Con-
cerning superseniority, see generally Note, Superseniort'y: Post-Dairylea Developments, 29 CASE
W. RES. 499 (1979); Note, Superseniority: Latitudes and Limitations, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 832 (1980).
64. The Board charged the union with violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A), (b)(2) (1976)
which provide, inter alia, that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to
interfere with employees' rights to refrain from union activities or to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee in an attempt to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization. In addition, the employer was charged with violation of 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1), (3) (1976). Section 158(a)(1) is summarized in supra note 7. Section 158(a)(3) pro-
vides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in hiring, tenure,
or any other condition of employment in order to encourage or discourage union membership.
65. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
66. Id. at 34.
67. Id.
68. Amenan Can, 658 F.2d at 756-57.
69. Id. at 757.
70. Id. at 755.




Tenth Circuit court did, however, agree with the Board's holding that super-
seniority for union officers other than stewards requires the union to prove
that such officers have "duties which relate directly to the effective and effi-
cient functioning of the bargaining unit."'72 The exact proof needed de-
pends on the circumstances and should be left to the NLRB, but the court
suggested as a minimum requirement that the union officer receiving super-
seniority benefits should be one who "help[s] to implement the collective
bargaining agreement in a meaningful way."
73
The Tenth Circuit court in NLRB v. Wilhow Corp. 74 considered the ap-
propriateness of a Board bargaining order 75 as a remedy for an employer's
refusal to bargain when notified of majority union support 76 and the em-
ployer's subsequent unfair labor practices. The court agreed that Wilhow
violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act 7 7 by interrogating employees about the
attempted unionizing 78 and also found substantial evidentiary support for
the determination that section 8(a)(3)79 was violated by discriminatory dis-
charge of two union supporters.8 0 Conceding that the employer's evidence
of a nondiscriminatory motive for the firings shifted the burden of proof to
the Board, the court of appeals nevertheless held that circumstantial evi-
dence is sufficient to meet that burden where "the record in its entirety al-
lows a fair inference of discriminatory motivation." 8'
Accepting the administrative law judge's determination that prior to
the unfair labor practices a majority of the Wilhow employees supported the
union, the court proceeded to consider the propriety of the bargaining order
under the guidelines of NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. ,82 the leading Supreme
Court decision on the issue. The Gzssel Court held that the Board could use
a bargaining order if the union at one point had majority support and the
employer's unfair practices made a fair election unlikely if only the tradi-
tional remedies were used.8 3 The court in Whow upheld the Board's bar-
gaining order because of the following factors: the smallness of the plant, the
employer's inflexible attitude toward bargaining, and the residual effect of
terminations due to union activity.84 Wilhow claimed that the rights of its
72. 658 F.2d at 757.
73. Id.
74. 666 F.2d 1294 (10th Cir. 1981).
75. The Supreme Court has affirmed the authority of the Board to go beyond the statutory
cease-and-desist order and require the employer to bargain with a union as a remedy for unfair
labor practices. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See generally Lankford,
Nonmajorty Bargaining Orders: A Study in lndeciston, 46 ALB. L. REv. 363 (1982); Wortman &
Jones, Remedial Actions of the ?'LRB in Representation Cases: An Analysis of the Gissel Bargaining
Order, 30 LAB. L.J. 281 (1979).
76. Out of 17 eligible employees, 12 signed cards authorizing the union to represent them
for purposes of collective bargaining. 666 F.2d at 1298-99.
77. See supra note 7.
78. 666 F.2d at 1300 (interrogations found to be coercive, threatening, and a restraint on
unionizing activity).
79. See supra note 64.
80. 666 F.2d at 1301.
81. Id.
82. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
83. Id. at 614.
84. 666 F.2d at 1305.
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current employees would be violated by a bargaining order since only one of
the twelve employees who signed authorization cards was still employed.
The court, however, rejected this argument stating that employee turnover
does not justify withholding a bargaining order since "the validity of such an
order depends on evaluating the situation as of the time of the unfair labor
practices."
'8 5
At issue in NLRB v. Carbonex Coal Co. 86 was whether the company had a
duty to bargain over certain unilateral actions following a representation
election that the union won.8 7 In a three-week period immediately after the
election, the company laid off eighteen employees and subcontracted its
truck hauling operations. Carbonex contended that these actions were ne-
cessitated by economic conditions88 and that it had no legal duty to bargain
with the union concerning these decisions since they had occurred before the
union's certification by the Board.89
Even if the actions were motivated by economic conditions, the Tenth
Circuit court concluded that the company, nevertheless, had a duty to notify
the union before making changes so the union could have a meaningful op-
portunity to suggest alternatives and make counter-arguments. 9° Relying on
King Radio Corp. v. NLRB 9 ' and cases from other circuits, 9 2 the court stated:
"It is well settled that unilateral action affecting working conditions taken by
an employer following a union victory at a representation election violates
section 8(a)(5), even if such unilateral action occurs prior to the union's certi-
fication as the collective bargaining agent."
93
In addition to making unilateral changes in working conditions, the
company also discharged three employees for refusing to cross a picket line
during a strike. Carbonex maintained that the discharges did not violate the
Act because the strike was unlawful. The court, however, found substantial
support for the NLRB's determination that the strike was a lawful unfair
labor practice strike and, therefore, the discharges violated the employees
rights.94
The court of appeals also declined to follow the company's suggestion
that the case should be re-evaluated under the NLRB's new standard set
forth in Wright Line. 95 First, the court refused to apply a new test to a case
85. Id. at 1304 (citing Highland Plastics, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (1981)).
86. 679 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1982).
87. The Board also found that the company had committed numerous unfair labor prac-
ticesprtor to the election, but these findings were not challenged on appeal. Id. at 202.
88. Id. at 203.
89. Id. at 205. After an election is held the Board evaluates any challenges to the validity
of the election. If these challenges are found to be groundless, the Board certifies the results of
the election. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976). See also R. GORMAN, supra note 6, at 46-49.
90. 679 F.2d at 204.
91. 398 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1968).
92. Accord NLRB v. Allied Prod. Corp., 629 F.2d 1167, 1171 (6th Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
McCann Steel Co., 448 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse
Co., 369 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966).
93. 679 F.2d at 205.
94. Id. at 204.
95. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (lst Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
989 (1982). The Wright Line standard for allocating the burden of proof involves dual motive
discharges in which an employer arguably has both an illegal and a legitimate business reason
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decided by the NLRB prior to the change, but heard on appeal after the
change.9 6 Second, the Carbonex case, unlike Wright Litne, did not involve a
dual motive for the discharge since the Board found Carbonex's claim of a
legitimate business motive to be not only pretextual, but also fabricated.
9 7
D. Appropriate Bargaining Units
In Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB 98 the Tenth Circuit
court announced an important decision affecting the health care industry.
The case resulted from a medical center challenge of the appropriateness of a
bargaining unit99 limited to registered nurses at one facility. The medical
center claimed that the bargaining unit should include all professionals, ex-
cept physicians, at all three of its facilities. The appeal was based on the
Center's allegation that the Board had refused to consider the congressional
admonition that "[d]ue consideration should be given by the Board to
preventing proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry."' 0 0
This warning was issued during the passage of the 1974 Health Care
Amendments010 which brought non-profit hospitals under the coverage of
the NLRA.
The Tenth Circuit relied on the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in
deciding that the NLRB's determination of the bargaining unit's scope and
composition was not in conformity with the intent of Congress. ' 0 2 In regard
to unit scope, the Board has continued to apply a rebuttable presumption
that single facility units are appropriate. The Board defends this presump-
tion by arguing that the congressional admonition is concerned only with
for the discharge of one of its employees. Once the general counsel for the Board has established
a prima facie case that protected conduct was a motivating or substantial factor in the dis-
charge, the burden of production shifts to the employer to show that the discharge would have
occurred in the absence of the protected conduct. See generally Note, Wright Line: The NLRB
Adopts the Mt. Healthy Test for Dual Motive Discharge Cases Under the LMRA, 32 MERCER L. REV.
933 (1981).
96. 679 F.2d at 203.
97. Id. at 204. Although declining to apply the Wright Line rule, the court suggested that
there may be problems with the Board's new rule. Id. at 203. See also Lewis & Fisher, Wright
Line-An End to the Kaleidoscope in Dual Motive Cases?, 48 TENN. L. REV. 879 (1981).
98. 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981), modified, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. dis-
missed, 103 S. Ct. 433 (1982).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976) provides that "the Board shall decide in each case whether,
in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this
subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining .... "
100. 653 F.2d at 453 (quoting S. CON. REP. No. 988, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3946, 3950).
101. Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). See
generally Note, The 1974 Health Care Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act.- Jurisdictional
Standards and Appropriate Bargaining Units, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 351 (1977); Comment, Labor
Relations in the Health Care Indust.-the Impact ofthe 1974 Health Care Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act, 54 TUL. L. REV. 416 (1980).
. 102. 653 F.2d at 455 (quoting NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir.
1978)); St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588, 592 (3d Cir. 1977); 653 F.2d at 457 (quoting
Mary Thompson Hosp. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980)); NLRB v. St. Francis
Hosp., 601 F.2d 404, 419 (9th Cir. 1979). For a discussion of congressional intent concerning
health care institution bargaining units, see Bumpass, Appropriate Bargaining Units in Health Care
lnstiutions." An Analysis of Congressional Intent and Its Implementation by the National Labor Relations
Board, 20 B.C.L. REV. 867 (1979).
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unit composition within a particular facility, not with whether a unit's scope
should include one facility or several.' 0 3 Although concurring with the
Board's literal reading of the legislative history, the court nevertheless per-
ceived strong congressional concern for reducing unit fragmentation regard-
less of whether the source be from composition or scope.10 4 Therefore, the
court held that the Board's "traditional factors used in scope determinations
'must be put in balance against the public interest in preventing fragmenta-
tion in the health care field.' "105 Moreover, the Board must specify "'the
manner in which its unit determination[s] . ..implement[] or reflect[] that
admonition.' "106
In regard to unit composition, the NLRB's ruling that a unit restricted
to registered nurses is presumptively appropriate was rejected by the court
for two reasons. First, because the rebuttable presumption shifted both the
burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion, the court rea-
soned that it violated Federal Rule of Evidence 301107 and impermissibly
relieved the Board of the burden to prove the occurrence of an unfair labor
practice by a preponderance of the evidence. 108 Second, the court held that
any use of a presumption which requires health care industry employers to
produce evidence of the inappropriateness of a limited bargaining unit is
contrary to the congressional admonition against proliferation of bargaining
units. 109
The Tenth Circuit court agreed with the Ninth Circuit court that to
give effect to the congressional intent requires the Board to "focus on the
'disparity of interests between employee groups which would prohibit or in-
hibit fair representation of employee interests.' "'1o In other words, appro-
priate unit determinations in the health care industry should no longer be
based on the Board's traditional community of interests test.1 I Instead,
focusing on the disparity of interests requires determining whether the inter-
103. 653 F.2d at 454 (citing Memorial Medical, 230 N.L.R.B. 976, 978 n.5 (1977)). See
generally Zimmerman, Trendr in NLRB Health Care IndustV Decistons, 32 LAB. L.J. 3 (1981).
104. 653 F.2d at 455.
105. Id. (quoting St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588, 592 (3d Cir. 1977)).
106. 653 F.2d at 455 (quoting NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir.
1978)).
107. This reasoning was modified in Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.
1982). "On the question of which unit is appropriate for bargaining purposes, the NLRB has
no burden of persuasion that might be shifted by use of a presumption." Id. at 699. Rather
than a burden of persuasion, the court held that the NLRB relies on its expertise and experience
in making such determinations. Id. Furthermore, the court stated, "in the face of congressional
silence, we do not infer that Congress intended the NLRB to follow the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence at the informal, nonadversarial representation proceedings." Id. at 700.
108. 653 F.2d at 456. Note, however, that this was modified in Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB,
688 F.2d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 1982), which held that in unfair labor practice proceedings, the
NLRB's general counsel does not have to prove that the unit chosen at the representation hear-
ing was appropriate by a preponderance of the evidence.
109. 653 F.2d at 457.
110. Id. (quoting NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404, 419 (9th Cir. 1979)). For an
examination of the St. Francis Hospital case, see Note, Registered Nurse Bargaining Units: Undue
Proiferatzon?, 45 Mo. L. REv. 348 (1980).
111. Under the community of interests test, the Board considers such factors as similarity of
earnings, benefits, hours, training, qualifications, and kind of work performed; also important
are contact among employees, common supervision, bargaining history, employee preference,
and extent of union organization. R. GORMAN, supra note 6, at 69.
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ests of the registered nurses are sufficiently different from other professionals
to justify a separate unit. Applying this approach, the court ruled that an all
professional unit without physicians was an appropriate unit and remanded
the case to the Board for reconsideration.'
1 2
The Tenth Circuit also expressed its disagreement with the Board's po-
sition that the community of interests and disparity of interests tests are es-
sentially the same.'" 3 According to the court, the Board should start with a
broad unit and eliminate employees with disparate interests, rather than be-
gin with a narrow unit and add employees with similar interests.
1 14
The differences between the respective tests espoused by the NLRB and
the Tenth Circuit court appear to be primarily a question of semantics. In
applying its community of interests test, the Board attempts to identify a
group which neither includes employees with significant conflicting eco-
nomic interests nor excludes employees with common economic interests. 115
Whether the Board begins with a narrow unit and adds employees or begins
with a broad unit and deletes employees, the result should be approximately
the same."t 6 The court's approach favors the larger of two possible units
and gives controlling significance to the public interest in non-proliferation
of units. This is more than Congress was willing to do and gives the appear-
ance of usurping the function of the Board. Perhaps a better approach
would be to require employees in a proposed limited unit to possess a greater
degree of community of interest when the unit is composed of health care
employees. 117
Following its holding in Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center, the court
denied enforcement of Board'orders in two other cases with similar facts. In
Beth Israel Hospital and Geriatric Center v. NLRB" 8 t the Board approved a bar-
gaining unit limited to registered nurses employed at only one of the em-
ployer's facilities. Beth Israel urged that a unit including all professionals
with whom the registered nurses worked would be more appropriate in view
of the congressional mandate to avoid undue proliferation of bargaining
units in the health care industry. The court decreed that a unit limited to
registered nurses should no longer be considered presumptively appropri-
ate" 9 and remanded the case for further proceedings.
In St. Anthony Hospital Systems . NLRB'2 ° the primary issue was again
whether the Board erred in approving a bargaining unit composed exclu-
112. 653 F.2d at 456.
113. Id. at 457-58 n.6. The Board's position was announced in Newton-Wellesley Hosp.,
250 N.L.R.B. 409 (1980).
114. 653 F.2d at 457-58 n.6.
115. See R. GORMAN, supra note 6, at 69.
116. It is often possible that the factors considered in determining a community of interest
point to several units, any one of which could be an appropriate unit. See Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 825 (1964); see generall, Note, Appropriate Bargaining Units in Non-Profit Hospi-
tals, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1221 (1980).
117. See Allegheny General Hosp., 239 N.L.R.B. 872, 884 (1978) (Penello, M., dissenting),
enforcement denied, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979).
118. 677 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1981), modifed, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1982).
119. 677 F.2d at 1345.
120. 655 F.2d 1028 (10th Cir. 1981), modified, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. dis-
missed, 103 S. Ct. 433 (1982).
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sively of all nonsupervisory registered nurses at one of two facilities. Finding
the case identical to Presbyterian/St. Luke's, the Tenth Circuit court ruled that
the Board's application of a rebuttable presumption that the nurse unit was
appropriate improperly relieved the NLRB's general counsel of the burden
of proving the occurrence of an unfair labor practice. Thus, the Board's
order was unenforceable and the case was remanded for further
proceedings. 12'
Crane Sheet Metal, Inc. v. NLRB' 22 presented the issue of whether two
employers had delegated apparent authority to a multi-employer bargaining
unit 1 2 3 for purposes of negotiating a binding agreement. The Tenth Circuit
court applied the Board test for determining apparent authority. This test
considers whether an employer clearly indicated an intention to be bound by
group action, whether the union had notice of the group's existence and the
delegation of bargaining authority to it, and whether the union agreed to
and actually began negotiations with the representative of the group.
124
Agreeing with the Board that the last two elements of the test were satisfied,
the appellate court nevertheless failed to find evidence on the record to indi-
cate the employer intended to be bound by group action. 25 Despite associa-
tion bylaws granting full authority to bind members, 126 the union was aware
that at the time the two employers joined the association, they retained the
right to disapprove any negotiated contract. 27 Stressing the clear evidence
of an intention not to be bound, the court rejected the Board's apparent
conclusion that the payment of membership fees to the association should be
determinative of the employers' intent.' 28 Consequently, the court in Crane
Sheet Metal held that the contract was not binding on the two employers.
After negotiations have begun, withdrawal from a multi-employer unit
is not permitted without consent of the opposing party unless unusual cir-
cumstances prevail. 129 Extreme financial hardship threatening the com-
pany's existence is one situation constituting an unusual circumstance.130 In
NLRB v. Custom Sheet Metal &Service Co. ,13' the court reviewed a Board de-
termination that the threatened loss of the company's major customer did
not justify withdrawal from a multi-employer bargaining unit. Disagreeing
with the Board, the appellate court ruled that the threat of immediate loss of
a customer purchasing three-fourths of the company's production and the
121. Id. at 1031. For modifications of this decision, see supra notes 107 and 108.
122. 675 F.2d 256 (10th Cir. 1982).
123. A multi-employer bargaining unit exists where several employers within a single indus-
try or area join together to bargain as a gro up wih a union representing employees at all of the
companies. Although the NLRA does not specifically authorize multi-employer units, the
Supreme Court has concluded that the practice has congressional approval. NLRB v. Truck
Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
124. 675 F.2d at 259.
125. Id.
126. The employers were not aware of the bylaws until after the contract had been signed.
Id.
127. Id. at 258.
128. Id. at 259 n.9.
129. NLRB v. Tulsa Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 367 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1966); Retail Assoc.,
Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388 (1958).
130. Spun-Jee Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 557 (1968).
131. 666 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1981).
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actual loss of several smaller customers did jeopardize Custom Sheet Metal's
very existence.' 3 2 The court also emphasized that the employer's with-
drawal was apparently motivated solely by economic considerations.1
33
In a case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit in Harding Glass Industries
v. NLRB 134 ruled that an impasse 1 35 in negotiations, by itself, is not an unu-
sual circumstance justifying withdrawal by an employer from a multi-em-
ployer bargaining unit.' 36 After numerous negotiating sessions had failed to
produce an agreement, a union representative ended one session by angrily
suggesting that Harding Glass was preventing agreement and that separate
negotiations with that company might be better. At the next meeting, Har-
ding withdrew because of the alleged impasse and the union's suggestion of
separate negotiations. This attempted withdrawal was not consented to by
the union and the court held that the angry remarks made at a bargaining
session, and later modified, did not constitute consent; the court further held
that these remarks could not be treated as a binding offer, even if accepted
before withdrawn.'
37
In the absence of consent, Harding's withdrawal could be permitted
only if unusual circumstances were present.' 3 8 The appellate court carefully
considered the decisions of other circuits 139 holding that impasse alone con-
stitutes an unusual circumstance justifying withdrawal. The court in Harding
Glass, however, declared that the better view is that withdrawal on impasse
should be prohibited so long as continued membership would not be unfair
because of other circumstances.140 Agreeing with recent First and Fifth Cir-
cuit opinions, 14 1 the Tenth Circuit court noted that most of the concerns
labelled by other courts as being connected with impasse are actually related
to the issues of separate contracts and selective strikes.142 Therefore, impasse
alone should not trigger the right to withdraw especially since an impasse
may be intentionally created by a party eager to withdraw. The court in
Harding Glass also stated that insisting on continued participation after im-
passe is not futile because changed circumstances may result in eventual
132. Id. at 458.
133. Id. at 459.
134. 672 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1982).
135. An impasse, or deadlock, exists when the parties no longer have any prospects of reach-
ing an agreement and further discussion would be unproductive. See R. GORMAN, supra note 6,
at 448.
136. 672 F.2d at 1335.
137. Id. at 1334.
138. Id.
139. H & D, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1980) (withdrawn from publication);
NLRB v. Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, 582 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1130 (1979); NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1975); Fairmont Foods
Co. v. NLRB, 471 F.2d 1170 (8th Cir. 1972).
140. 672 F.2d at 1335.
141. NLRB v. Marine Machine Works, Inc., 635 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Charles
D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 630 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980), afl'd, 454 U.S. 404 (1982). While
relying on the First Circuit court's decision in Bonnano, the court in Harding Glass held publica-
tion of its opinion in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's ruling in Bonanno. After the
Supreme Court in Bonanno held that impasse did not justify withdrawal in support of the deci-
sion in Hardng Class, the Tenth Circuit court published its opinion. 672 F.2d at 1339-40 n.4.
142. Id. at 1336.
[Vol. 60:2
LABOR LAW
agreement.143 Accordingly, the court upheld the Board's finding that Har-
ding committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to be bound by the
collective bargaining agreement negotiated after it withdrew.
144
The court also weighed a related issue arising from the remedy provided
by the Board. Harding argued that the economic strike that was in progress
at the time it withdrew from the bargaining unit did not become an unfair
labor practice strike' 45 merely because the withdrawal violated the NLRA.
Therefore, Harding maintained, the strikers were not entitled to the Board's
remedy of reinstatement and backpay because permanent replacements had
been hired.146 In upholding the Board's remedy, the court found that Har-
ding's unlawful refusal to bargain became at least as important to the strik-
ers as their effort to obtain economic goals. Therefore, the court in Hardng
Glass held that the Board could reasonably conclude that the refusal to bar-
gain became a motivation for the strike,147 thus converting the economic
strike into an unfair labor practice strike and entitling the strikers to rein-
statement and back pay.
148
E. Representation Elections. Conduct and Review
The employer in Crown Cork &Seal Co. v. NLRB' 49 asserted it did not
have to bargain with the newly certified union because of improper conduct
surrounding the election.' 50 Noting that public policy favors exparte resolu-
tion of election objections, 15 the court of appeals rejected the employer's
demand for an evidentiary hearing because such factual disputes as existed
would not require setting aside the union's victory even if resolved in the
employer's favor. Regarding the first election objection' 52 that a union cam-
paign brochure containing a portion of an NLRB publication suggested
Board endorsement of the union, the court found no disputed factual issue
143. Id. at 1337.
144. Id. at 1338.
145. A strike to obtain higher wages, better working conditions, or improvements in benefits
is called an economic strike. An unfair labor practice strike is one precipitated or prolonged by
an employer's unfair labor practices. An economic strike may be converted into an unfair labor
practice strike by the intervening commission of an unfair labor practice. Economic strikers are
not entitled to reinstatement if replacements are hired before the strikers unconditionally offer
to return to work; unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to reinstatement regardless of
whether replacements have been hired. See general/y R. GORMAN, supra note 6, at 339-43.
146. 672 F.2d at 1338.
147. Id. at 1339.
148. Id.
149. 659 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150 (1982).
150. The refusal to bargain was resorted to as a means of contesting alleged election irregu-
larities and the validity of the Board's certification of the union as the bargaining representative
for the employees. See supra note 6. Either party may move, within five days of an election, to
set aside the results on grounds that conduct attributed to the other party prevented a fair
election. These objections are usually resolved by the regional director without an evidentiary
hearing. See generaly J. ATLESON, R. ROBIN, G. SCHATZKI, H. SHERMAN, E. SILVERSTEIN,
LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PRIVATE EMPLOY-
MENT 153 (1978). See also Voegler, Employer Objections to the Conduct of NLRB Elections, 4 GLEN-
DALE L. REV. 1 (1982).
151. 659 F.2d at 129.
152. Of Crown Cork's 60 objections, the court discussed only the four that were actually
briefed. Id. at 128.
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and no abuse of discretion in the Board's inference that employees could not
have been misled since union authorship of the brochure was clearly identi-
fied. 1 53 The company also argued that the balloting was conducted in such
a manner that the voters' choices could be seen. The court decided this
claim did not warrant a hearing because there was no evidence that voters
actually had reason to believe their votes were observable. 1
54
Crown Cork argued that the union's promise that employees would re-
ceive the same benefits as employees at other company plants already cov-
ered by a master contract distorted the election results. The court of appeals
refused to analogize this admittedly truthful promise to an employer's im-
proper pre-election promise of benefits if the union is defeated. The court
reasoned that the union, unlike the employer, would have no opportunity to
retaliate if defeated. 155 Likewise, the court declined to set aside the election
on grounds that a union campaign poster materially misrepresented facts
concerning hourly wages payable if the union was certified. The union's
evidence that cost-of-living raises under the master contract would bring
wages to the level stated in the poster was uncontested. Therefore, the court
concluded that the regional director did not abuse his discretion in deter-
mining that the poster was not misleading.'
56
In Bokum Resources Corp. v. NLRB 15 7 the employer also refused to bar-
gain with the Board certified union and defended against the resulting un-
fair labor practice charges' 5 8 on the ground of election irregularities. The
court of appeals denied the demand for an evidentiary hearing and summa-
rily disposed of Bokum's other complaints. Bokum's contention that an in-
complete election notice frustrated the purpose of the election was dismissed
because a complete notice was posted twelve hours before the election.
159
Furthermore, Bokum failed to establish that the union or its representatives
posted the incomplete election notice. 16 Concerning the company's allega-
tion that campaign literature was misleading because it omitted certain im-
portant facts, the court pointed out that the Board does not require
affirmative disclosure in campaign propaganda. 16 1 Finally, no merit was
found in Bokum's assertion that the union violated Board rules 16 2 by dis-
counting membership fees to supporters since this reduction was available to
employees both before and after the election.'
63
The employer in NLRB v. Slagle Manufacturing Co. '64 attacked the valid-
153. Id. at 130.
154. Id. at 131.
155. Id. at 130.
156. Id. at 130-31.
157. 655 F.2d 1021 (10th Cir. 1981).
158. The employer was charged with violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(5) (1976). See
supra note 7.
159. 655 F.2d at 1024.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973) (union's offer to waive initiation fees
for all employees who signed union authorization cards before certification election interfered
with employees' statutory right to refrain from union activities).
163. 655 F.2d at 1024.
164. 658 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1981).
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ity of an election on the basis of two theories of misconduct. First, the com-
pany alleged violation of the strict rule of Mlchem, Inc. 165 prohibiting
prolonged conversations between employees waiting to vote and representa-
tives of parties to an election. The court found ample support for the
Board's determination that Gann, the individual accused of misconduct, did
not become a representative of the union merely by attending a pre-election
conference and inspecting the polling area prior to the election.' 66 Second,
the company argued that even if Gann was not a union representative, his
presence and conduct disrupted the election because of the pending charge
that Gann's recent dismissal was an unfair labor practice.' 6 7 Acknowledg-
ing that Gann's presence at the election carried the potential for affecting
voter choice, the Tenth Circuit court nevertheless concluded that his con-
duct was not so clearly disruptive as to outweigh his right to be present at
and vote in the election.' 68 The court, therefore, refused to set aside the
election.
In an unpublished opinion, A.S Homer, Inc. v. NLRB,' 69 the court con-
sidered issues of alleged election campaign misrepresentations and denial of
due process by the Board's refusal to hear certain post-election objections.
Horner maintained that its failure prior to the election to request review of
both the bargaining unit determination and voter eligibility formula did not
amount to a waiver. Furthermore, the company claimed the Board's failure
to consider its objections constituted a denial of due process. The court of
appeals recognized the harshness of the waiver rule, but found it consistent
with the Board's legitimate need to prevent prolonged post-election bargain-
ing delays. The court, therefore, declared that the Board's refusal to con-
sider Homer's objections did not amount to a denial of due process.
1 70
Concerning the misrepresentation issue, the company claimed that a new
election was warranted because the union misled employees into believing
they would be allowed to join other craft unions. 171 The court affirmed the
Board's ruling that the union's representations did not substantially misrep-
resent Board processes 172 and that they also did not have a material impact
on the election.'
73
165. 170 N.L.R.B. 362 (1968).
166. 658 F.2d at 787.
167. Id. at 786.
168. Id. at 787.
169. No. 79-2185 (10th Cir. May 26, 1982), cert. denid, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22,
1983) (No. 82-696).
170. No. 79-2185, slip op. at 6-8.
171. Id. at II.
172. Id. at 15. The regional director applied the standard of review announced in Shopping
Kart Food Mkts., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977) (an election would not be set aside unless the
misrepresentation involved the Board or its processes).
173. No. 79-2185, slip op. at 15. Subsequent to the regional director's decision, the Board
announced in General Knit of Calif., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978), the abandonment of the
Shopping Kart standard and the reinstatement of the standard set forth in Hollywood Ceramics
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). In Holywood Ceramics the Board held that elections would be set
aside where the misrepresentation had an impact on the election, the employees lacked knowl-
edge to make their own determination, and there was no opportunity for rebuttal. See generally
R. GORMAN, supra note 6, at 156. This vacillation in the Board's policy created a plethora of
law review articles. Eg., Cole, Misrepresenlations in Union Eletlion Camnpains-What is the
NL.R.B. 's Rule. Hollywood Ceramics or Shopping Kart?, 40 ALA. LAw. 414 (1979); Note, Gen-
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F. Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements
The issue involved in Trustees of Teamsters Construction Workers Local No. 13
v. Hawg N Action, Inc. 174 was whether the employer breached its contract
with the union by failing to make contributions to various trust funds in
connection with its use of independent contractors and subcontractors.
Hawg N Action admitted that its subcontracts did not require the subcon-
tractor to make contributions to the trust funds as provided in its agreement
with the union. Hawg N Action, however, argued that it did not agree with
the union to make such contributions if the subcontractor failed to do so.'
75
The court of appeals dismissed this argument reasoning that acceptance of
the argument would deny the trustees a remedy for an undisputed breach of
contract.' 76 Further, the employer could not avoid liability merely because
the trust fund payments would not actually benefit the subcontractor's
employees. 1
77
The company leased equipment, which was operated by the lessor, to
perform part of its work. In an attempt to circumvent liability under the
agreement, the company characterized these lessors as independent contrac-
tors. The court, however, failed to find such characterization determinative
under the terms of the agreement 178 and rejected this defense.' 79 The em-
ployer's final argument was that it had repudiated the agreement by ceasing
to make payments for its own employees and that recovery was therefore
barred on the grounds of estoppel and laches. This claim was not resolved
by the Tenth Circuit court because the employer raised it for the first time
on appeal. Nevertheless, the court was careful to note that such disposition
did not indicate any merit in the argument. 8 0
In United Food Workers International v. Gold Star Sausage Co. ,181 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed an arbitrator's award in an enforcement
action under section 301 of the NLRA. 18 2 The grievance submitted to arbi-
tration as provided in the collective bargaining agreement arose after an em-
ployee was summarily discharged for violating the company's unilaterally
promulgated no-fighting rule.183 Arbitrator Linn decided that the termina-
eral Knit Revives Hollywood Ceramics; The NLRB Again Aohibits Campaign Misrepresentations, 7
PEPPERDINE L. REv. 185 (1979); Comment, The Hollywood Ceramics-Shopping Kart Meryy-Go-
Round- Where Willt Stop?, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 157 (1980).
174. 651 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982).
175. 651 F.2d at 1387.
176. Id.
177. Id. Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401 (1977), held that such payments could be based on
the hours worked by the subcontractor's employees and need not be for the benefit of such
employees.
178. 651 F.2d at 1389. Article 25 of the agreement between the defendant company and the
union, in pertinent part, states: "When a Contractor [defendant company] rents or leases from
one Owner not more than two units of equipment, fully manned and operated . . . the follow-
ing shall apply . . . [tihe Contractor shall pay all applicable contributions . Id.
179. Id. at 1388.
180. Id.
181. No. 80-1479 (10th Cir. July 13, 1981).
182. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976) provides, in pertinent part, that suits for breach of contract
between an employer and a union may be brought in any district court having jurisdiction of
the parties, without regard to the amount in controversy.
183. No. 80-1479, slip op. at 2.
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tion violated an implied provision of the contract requiring just cause for
discharge. Linn reasoned that since the employee fought only in self-defense,
she was not at fault. A rule that punishes an employee who is not guilty of
misconduct cannot be said to be necessary for the conduct of the employer's
business.1 84 Under this reasoning, the rule was invalid under the agreement
and the discharge was without just cause. Consequently, the arbitrator
awarded reinstatement with back pay.
On appeal, Gold Star argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority
by finding an implied just cause provision in the contract.1 85 The Tenth
Circuit court disagreed with the company, emphasizing that courts are re-
luctant to interfere with an arbitrator's decision where the contract contains
a broad arbitration provision. The court of appeals also found that an arbi-
trator is clearly permitted to go beyond the express provisions of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement and rely on the "industrial common law," so long
as the award is not antagonistic to the express language of the agreement
and has rational support.1
8 6
In another action arising under section 301 of the NLRA,187 New Mexico
District Council of Carpenters v. Mayhew Co. ,188 both parties appealed the dis-
trict court's decision that the employer had breached the collective bargain-
ing agreement and that damages should be limited to those amounts payable
directly to the union. The company claimed the agreement was invalid be-
cause the union had not represented a majority of employees when the
agreement was signed. The Tenth Circuit court rejected this defense be-
cause the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction to hear unfair labor practice
charges.' 8 9 Thus, this defense did not constitute a ground on which the
court could find an agreement unenforceable in a section 301 action.' 9°
The union objected to the trial court's holding that damages should not
include wages due the employee covered by the agreement because such
amounts are not paid directly to the union. The appellate court found merit
in this objection. Citing UAWv. Hoosier Cardinal Corp. ,19' the Mayhew court
ruled that a union may recover wages and vacation pay due its members
under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
192
The court of appeals also addressed, in dicta, the issue of whether
"prehire" agreements with a union, permitted under section 8(f) of the
Act,' 9 3 can be enforced against the employer before the union has actually
184. Id. at 5.
185. Id. at 3.
186. Id. at 4.
187. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976); see supra note 182.
188. 664 F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1981).
189. Id. at 217. The recognition of a minority union constitutes a violation of § 158(a)(1),
(2) by the employer and § 158(b)(1) by the union. International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
190. 664 F.2d at 217.
191. 383 U.S. 696, 699 (1966).
192. 664 F.2d at 218-19.
193. 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1976) allows employers engaged primarily in the building and con-
struction industry to make an agreement with a labor organization before its majority status has
been established. See generaly Gaal, Pre-Hire Agreements and Their Current Legal Status, 32 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 581 (1982); Note, Prehire Agreements in the Construction Industq." Empty Promises or
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established majority status in the bargaining unit. Mayhew contended that
the agreement was covered by section 8(o and could not be enforced against
it because of the ruling in NLRB v. Local 103, International Association of Bridge
Workers (Higdon) .194 In Higdon, the Supreme Court held that a union may
not picket to enforce a prehire agreement when it does not represent a ma-
jority of the employees.' 95 The Tenth Circuit court, following Contractors
Health & Welfare Plan v. Associated Wrecking Co. ,196 distinguished Htgdon and
observed that an "employer who subjects himself to a § 8(o agreement reaps
the benefits of industrial peace at his worksite and should not complain
when he is asked to honor the agreement that made such benefits
possible." '
9 7
II. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
The question before the court in Marshall v. Regis Educational Corp. 198
was whether student resident-hall assistants at Regis College were "employ-
ees" within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). 99
The student assistants resided in the dormitory where they assisted the resi-
dence director by performing various administrative tasks, maintaining dis-
cipline and order, and encouraging involvement in campus activities. They
were required to maintain a certain grade point average to retain their posi-
tion and received compensation in the form of reduced room rates and a
tuition credit. The Secretary of Labor, relying on Walling v. Portland Terminal
Co. ,200 urged that these resident assistants were employees under the FLSA
because of the "immediate economic impact" their services had on the busi-
ness of the college.
20 1
The Tenth Circuit court endorsed the district court's preference for the
"economic reality" test set forth in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,202 a case
decided subsequent to Portland Terminal. McComb held that employee status
under the FLSA should depend upon the totality of circumstances, not on
isolated factors. 20 3 The court in Regis stated that the government's view
failed to consider the totality of the circumstances and, in particular, ignored
the educational objectives of the resident assistant program.20 4 These educa-
tional benefits were found to outweigh the mere fact that the college received
Enforceable Righs?, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1702 (1981); Note, Pre-Hire Agreements and Section 80 of
the NLRA. Striking a Proper Balance Between Employee Freedom of Choice and Construction Industiy Sta-
bility, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 1014 (1982).
194. 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
195. 664 F.2d at 219 (citing NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 434 U.S.
335, 349 (1978)).
196. 638 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1981) (benefit provisions of the prehire agreement could be
enforced despite the labor organization's lack of majority status).
197. 664 F.2d at 220.
198. 666 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1981).
199. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
200. 330 U.S. 148 (1947) (railroad trainees were not employees under the FLSA because the
railroad company received no "immediate advantage" from any work done by the trainees).
201. 666 F.2d at 1327.
202. 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
203. Id. at 730, cited with approval in Regis, 666 F.2d at 1326-27.
204. Id. at 1327.
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some economic value from the program.2 °5 Finally, the court of appeals
dismissed, as an unreasonable alternative, the government's argument that
these services could have been provided by non-student 20 6 and concluded
that the resident assistants should be treated the same as athletes and other
financial aid recipients.
2 0 7
Marshall o. Quzk- Tnp Corp. 208 primarily addressed the issue of whether
an employer, under an obligation to pay back wages for FLSA violations,
may retain those wages offered but refused by the employees. An investiga-
tion of Quik-Trip's wage practices led to a settlement agreement in which
the company promised to pay back wages for overtime worked by certain
employees. Six of the employees either tore up or refused to cash their back
pay checks, under allegedly coercive circumstances. 20 9 The Tenth Circuit
court found support 2 10 for the Secretary of Labor's position that regardless
of whether the employees refused the payments voluntarily or involuntarily,
the company had not satisfied its statutory obligation to pay the back
wages.2 t ' The court stressed that the purpose of the FLSA would be nulli-
fied if employers were permitted to retain back wages that were refused by
employees. 2 t 2 Such sums should be deposited with the United States Treas-
urer to be retained subject to claims of the employees.
2 13
The payment of back wages for overtime work was also an issue in Sel-
man v. Chaval Upholstery Supply Co. .214 This was an interesting case in which
the trial court found no FLSA violation because the employee's gross weekly
wage exceeded minimum wage plus time and a half minimum wage for the
overtime hours worked. Selman asserted section 7 of the FLSA 215 was vio-
lated when he was not paid overtime compensation for working nine hours a
day, five days a week. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that over-
time wages were due even though Selman's compensation was above the
minimum wage.2 16 Relying on Overmight Motor Co. v. Missel,2 17 the court ob-
served that "the statutory requirement for overtime pay is not satisfied
merely because the salary exceeds minimum wage plus time and a half mini-




207. Id. at 1328.
208. 672 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1982).
209. Id. at 804. The division manager allegedly applied verbal pressure to some employees
in an attempt to persuade them to tear up their checks. Id.
210. Id. at 807 (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740
(1981)).
211. 672 F.2d at 806.
212. Id. at 807.
213. Id. The court adds a caveat that the funds should be so deposited "unless exceptional
circumstances are demonstrated to the court justifying reversion of the funds to the employer."
Id. at 808. The court found no exceptional circumstances in this case.
214. No. 78-1521 (10th Cir. Oct. 14, 1981).
215. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1976) provides that overtime rates of at least one and one-half
times regular rates must be paid for hours worked in excess of 40 per week.
216. No. 78-1521, slip op. at 3.
217. 316 U.S. 572 (1942) (the FLSA was designed to require payment for overtime at 150%
the regular pay where that pay is above the minimum as well as where the regular pay is at the
minimum).
218. No. 78-1521, slip op. at 3.
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III. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
An Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC or
Commission) decision upholding a citation of the employer for violating the
general duty clause2 19 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA)2 20 was reviewed in Baroid Division of NL Industries v. OSHRC.22 ' Ba-
roid sells drilling mud used in the drilling of oil and gas wells. As part of the
cost of the mud, Baroid also provides the consultation services of an on-site
sales representative known as a "mud man." The citation in question arose
when a mud man was injured at a drilling site by an explosion of gas that
had accumulated near the drilling rig. Baroid argued that the Commission's
decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record and that it
rested on theories not at issue at the administrative hearing.
222
The court of appeals tested the validity of the OSHA citation against
rigorous standards 223 for upholding a finding that the general duty clause
has been violated. First, the court concluded that a substantial accumula-
tion of gas around a drilling rig is a hazard since it increases the risk that
employees will be killed or seriously injured.224 Also, the court found that
such hazard existed at a citable workplace; the injured mud man remained an
employee of the cited employer because he was subject to Baroid's authority
to remove him from the workplace. 225 The Tenth Circuit court also found
Brennan v. Butler Lime and Cement Co. 226 persuasive in its holding that even
where an employer does not control the worksite where a recognized hazard
exists, the employer will remain liable if the employee could feasibly have
been trained to avoid the hazard.
227
Second, the court of appeals found substantial evidence to suppopt the
Commission's finding that the hazards of gas accumulation, fire, and explo-
sion were "recognized hazards," either by the cited employer or generally
within the industry.228 The implication that the absence of a gas
separator 229 is a recognized hazard, however, was not supported by evidence
in the record.
2 30
219. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1976) imposes a general duty on employers to abate recognized
hazards at the job site if they are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees.
220. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
221. 660 F.2d 439 (10th Cir. 1981).
222. Id. at 444.
223. These standards required that:
[Tihe Secretary must show (1) that a hazard likely to cause death or serious bodily
harm existed at a citable workplace; (2) that that hazard was recognized as such either
by the cited employer or generally within the industry; and (3) that there was a feasi-
ble method by which the cited employer could have abated the "recognized hazard."
Id. (citations omitted).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 444-45.
226. 520 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1975).
227. 660 F.2d at 445-46. The Seventh Circuit in Butler Lime stated that an employer would
be held liable where the employee's conduct (causing the accident) "might have been precluded
through feasible precautions concerning the hiring, training, and sanctioning of employees."
Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1975).
228. 660 F.2d at 446.
229. A gas separator would have vented the gas away from the drilling rig, substantially
reducing the hazard. Id. at 442, 444.
230 Id- at 446.
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Finally, the appellate court found some evidence to support the finding
that Baroid had a feasible means of abating the recognized hazard. The
mud men could possibly have been trained to monitor gas accumulations
and instructed to evacuate if they smelled gas. 23 ' The case was, therefore,
remanded to develop the record on the limited issue of whether it is techno-
logically feasible to train employees to measure hazardous gas accumulation
levels by sense of smell.
23 2
In response to Baroid's contention that it did not receive adequate no-
tice of the theories of recognized hazard and feasible abatement relied upon
by the Commission, the court agreed that "[a]n OSHA citation must give
reasonably particular notice so that the cited employer will understand the
charge being made and will have a full and fair opportunity to prepare and
present a defense. ' ' 233 Nevertheless, since citations are prepared by non-legal
personnel required to act with dispatch, they should not be held to the same
strict standards as other pleadings. 234 The court found that the citation
could reasonably be construed to state that gas accumulation was one of the
recognized hazards present. 235 The court, however, was not persuaded that
Baroid received adequate notice of what abatement steps should have been
taken. This inadequate notice, the court held, was further justification for
remanding the case.
2 3 6
IV. RAILWAY LABOR ACT
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in St. Louis Southwestern Railway v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen,237 reversed the district court's holding that
the controversy between the railroad and union was a minor dispute suitable
for compulsory arbitration and, therefore, not one over which the union
could lawfully strike. The dispute arose when the railroad contracted out
work because it was unable to hire enough signalmen to complete the reha-
bilitation of a newly acquired line. The union's threatened strike over the
contracting out was enjoined by the trial court on the grounds that the dis-
pute was a minor one since such contracting out had been permitted during
World War II and because the collective bargaining agreement did not ex-
pressly prohibit such contracting out.
238
The union argued that the dispute was a major one because contracting
out involved an indirect attempt to introduce an employment practice not
recognized by the agreement or past practices. 239 The Tenth Circuit court
231. Id. at 447.
232. Id. at 448.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 449.
236. Id. at 450.
237. 665 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2011 (1982).
238. 655 F.2d at 990. A minor dispute is one which involves either the meaning or applica-
tion of a particular provision of an agreement and, therefore, the issue is whether an existing
agreement controls the controversy. If minor, the controversy must be submitted to compulsory
arbitration and a strike over the issue is unlawful. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago
River & I.R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 35-39 (1957).
239. 665 F.2d at 990. A major dispute involves an attempt to create new rights by creating
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agreed with the union and found an "almost complete dearth of evidence in
support of the trial court's determination. . . that the case involves a minor
and not a major dispute . ... "240 The court found unjustified the rail-
road's reliance on World War II precedent to establish an implied right to
contract out employment, noting that the union had consistently rejected
the railroad's attempts to include amendments authorizing contracting
Out.
2 4 1
Further support for the union's position was found in the Railway La-
bor Act (RLA)242 and a Supreme Court decision. 24 3 The court concluded
that certain provisions of the RLA244 left no room for contracting out since
contractor's employees would not be able to comply with the statutory re-
quirements.2 45 Citing Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Railroad v. United Transporta-
tion Union,2 46 the Tenth Circuit court accepted the union's position that the
railroad's attempt to change the existing contractual obligations by asserting
an implied right to contract out employment constituted a major dispute.
2 4 7
The judgment of the district court was reversed and the case was remanded
for further proceedings.
V. FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT
2 4 8
In Director, Oftce of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Gurule249 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed an order of the Benefits Review Board
(Board) establishing a black lung benefits onset date different from that de-
termined by the Department of Labor's hearing officer. The Board had con-
cluded that benefits for claimant Gurule should begin the month his claim
was filed, not the month medical evidence of total disability was first estab-
lished. 2 5  On appeal, the Director of the Office of Worker's Compensation
Programs contended that the Board had made the factual determination for
the benefit onset date by relating back results of medical tests to the date of
filing and, therefore, had exceeded its scope of review.
2 5 '
The Tenth Circuit court determined that the Board had not made a
factual determination in arriving at the onset date, but, instead, had reached
that date by correctly applying the Secretary of Labor's regulations.2 52 Fol-
lowing Begly v. Mathews253 and Paluso v. Mathews,254 the Board found the
or changing an agreement. Compulsory arbitration is not required and the right to strike re-
mains. Id. See 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1976).
240. 665 F.2d at 998.
241. Id. at 991.
242. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
243. 665 F.2d at 995 (citing Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v. United Transp.
Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969)).
244. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
245. 665 F.2d at 995.
246. 396 U.S. 142 (1969).
247. 665 F.2d at 998.
248. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
249. 653 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1981).
250. Id. at 1371.
251. Id. at 1370.
252. Id. at 1372.
253. 544 F.2d 1345 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977) (because black lung
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hearing officer's onset date was not supported by substantial evidence since a
single blood study was insufficient to establish such a date in view of the
latent and progressive nature of the disease. 255 Accordingly, where the date
of total disability cannot be determined, the regulations provide that bene-
fits should begin with the month the claim was filed. 256 After careful review
the court of appeals affirmed the Board's decision stating that "the Board
correctly and cogently applied the entangled morass of regulations promul-
gated by the Secretary of Labor.
257
Mt'chael T Penn'ngton
disease is of a slow and progressive nature, medical evidence subsequent to the cut-off date is
relevant to the determination of whether the miner had the disease as of the cut-off date).
254. 573 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1978) (medical evidence obtained after the cut-off date is relevant
in ascertaining when black lung disease commenced, given the progressive nature of the disease
and the difficulty in making accurate diagnosis).
255. 653 F.2d at 1371-72.
256. 20 C.F.R. § 725.503(b) (1982).
257. 653 F.2d at 1372.
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INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a wide variety of cases
dealing with public lands and natural resources during the period covered
by this survey. The decisions reflect a changing environment for the natural
resource practitioner, for it is clear that public land and natural resource law
is no longer relegated to the confines of property law. Nearly all of the
Tenth Circuit decisions involve statutory and regulatory schemes embodying
both economic and social significance. Perhaps no other opinion highlighted
the significance of these policies as well as the court's consideration of fa-
vored nations clauses in natural gas sales contracts.
I. OIL AND GAS
A. Favored Nations Clauses
Among the common features of natural gas sale and purchase contracts
are escalation clauses, which provide for increases in the price of gas
purchased and sold upon the happening of a specified event.I Escalation
clauses generally fall within the category of two-party favored nations
clauses, in which the buyer agrees to increase the price paid to the seller to
match any higher price paid by the buyer to other sellers in the same field or
area, 2 or third-party favored nations clauses, in which the buyer agrees to
increase the price paid to the seller to match any higher price paid by any
other buyer in the same field or area. 3 The Tenth Circuit, in a diversity
1. 4 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 726, at 748.4 (1981).
2. Examples of two-party favored nations clauses may be found in Arkansas Louisiana
Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571 (1981); Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 604 F.2d 1281
(10th Cir. 1979); Eastern Petroleum Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 447 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1971);
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Howard Corp., 556 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977),errorretf'dn.r.e., 568
S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1978).
3. The difference between a two-party and third-party favored nations clause is explained
in Lone Star Gas Co. v. Howard Corp., 556 S.W.2d 372 ('ex. Civ. App. 1977): "A three-party
favored nations clause enables a vendor to receive the benefit of a higher than contract price
paid by any purchaser. A two-party favored nations clause restricts the vendor to the benefit of
higher than contract price paid by his contract purchaser." Id. at 374 (emphasis in original).
An example of a third-party favored nations clause may be found in Louisiana-Nevada
Transit Co. v. Woods, 393 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ark. 1975). Favored nations clauses that are
triggered by price increases initiated by government agencies may also be a form of third-party
favored nations clauses. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 505 F. Supp. 628 (D.
Kan. 1980); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1980); see Energy
Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 230 Kan. 176, 630 P.2d 1142 (1981) a 'd, 103 S.
Ct. 697 (1983); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 229 Kan. 631, 629 P.2d 190
(1981), cert. denited, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Tuthill v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 614 S.W.2d 205
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
Clauses that tie price increases to the highest price allowed by government regulation are
also referred to as area rate clauses:
An area rate clause is a price escalation provision in a natural gas purchase and
sales contract between a producer and interstate pipeline. It authorizes an escalation
in the contract price whenever there is an increase in the applicable just and reason-
able wellhead ceiling price for the category of gas involved.
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action arising in Wyoming, upheld such a third-party favored nations clause
in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc. 4 against a three-pronged attack in
which the clause was asserted to be contrary to federal policy under the Nat-
ural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA),5 violative of Wyoming law regarding
public policy, and unconscionable. Challenges to favored nations clauses in
gas sales contracts are not new; however, the challenge in Kerr-McGee Corp. is
among the first of its kind in many years. Although restricted to Wyoming
law,6 the Tenth Circuit's diversity holding suggests that favored nations
clauses may be ripe for similar challenges in other states.
In 1957 and 1958 Northern Utilities, Inc. entered into agreements with
Kerr-McGee Corporation, Phillips Petroleum Co., and a predecessor in in-
terest of Amoco Production Co. to purchase natural gas from the Beaver
Creek Field in Fremont County, Wyoming. The contracts obligated North-
ern Utilities, an intrastate public utility regulated by the Wyoming Public
Service Commission, to purchase natural gas from the three producers for a
period of twenty years. Each of the original contracts contained a two-party
favored nations clause whereby Northern Utilities agreed to pay the three
producers as high a price as Northern Utilities paid other producers in Wyo-
ming for gas.
7
In April 1970, Amoco, acting as unit operator of the Beaver Creek
Field,8 notified Northern Utilities of the availability of excess gas from the
Beaver Creek Field. On October 1, 1970, Amoco and Northern Utilities en-
tered into a supplemental agreement extending the original 1957 contract to
December 31, 1990. The supplemental agreement, while retaining the origi-
nal two-party favored nations clause, added a new paragraph, 6(b), which
called for an increase in the contract price whenever any producer in Wyo-
ming received a higher price for the sale of interstate gas.9 Phillips and Kerr-
Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 365 n.l (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
A number of other escalation clauses may be found in 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND
GAS LAW MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 242 (1981).
4. 673 F.2d 323 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 344 (1982).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. IV 1980).
6. 673 F.2d at 325.
7. The favored nations clause stated that:
If, at any time during the term of this agreement, Northern pays a producer of gas
in the State of Wyoming a price per one thousand (1,000) cubic feet that is higher
than the price being paid or otherwise payable under this contract, due consideration
being given to the quality of the gas, bases of measurement and conditions of sale,
Northern shall, commencing on the date of delivery of such gas at such higher price,
and continuing so long as such price is in excess of the price otherwise payable under
this contract, increase the price being paid or otherwise payable to Pan American
[predecessor in interest] hereunder to equal such higher price. It is the intention
hereof that the price to be paid Pan American hereunder shall at all times be equal to
the higher of the following: (a) the price payable under Article 5 of this contract, as
such price may have been changed by Article 7, or (b) the highest price paid by North-
ern to a producer of gas in the State of Wyoming.
Id at 324 n.2.
8. As unit operator, Amoco collected all payments for Beaver Creek Field gas from North-
ern Utilities and distributed shares respectively to Phillips and Kerr-McGee. Kerr-McGee
Corp. v. Northern Util., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 624, 627 (D. Wyo. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d 323 (10th
Cir.), cert. dented, 103 S. Ct. 344 (1982).
9. The paragraph stated that:
(b) From and after January 1, 1976, when the price to be paid by Northern to
Pan American [predecessor in interest] pursuant to the other provisions hereof is less
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McGee entered into similar supplemental agreements in 1973.
Prices received by other producers in the area were expected to exceed
the contract price beginning January 1, 1976, thereby triggering the provi-
sions of the new clause. The price increases were the result of actions by the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) and Congress.' 0 Amoco agreed to phase
in the new higher prices until July 1, 1978, when the clause would be fully
enforced. Kerr-McGee refused a phased installment of new prices and filed
suit against Northern Utilities; Northern Utilities, in turn, sued Amoco and
Phillips to enforce the price-triggering provisions of the contract." I
The district court determined that the provisions of paragraph 6(b) pro-
moted "an inequitable result, causing rate payers buying gas at retail to be
charged exorbitant prices for the natural gas involved in this case grossly
beyond any reasonable expectation of Northern as one of the contracting
parties."' 2 Neither Northern Utilities nor the three producers had contem-
plated at the time the supplemental agreement was executed that regulatory
and legislative actions would substantially change the terms of the contract
and obligate Northern Utilities to pay rates "greatly different or exorbitant
in comparison to rates incorporated in the contract between the parties.' 13
The new rate paid by Northern Utilities increased the contract price tenfold
in slightly more than four years, causing consumer monthly gas bills to rise
from $30 to $250.14
Summoning its equitable powers in a vitriolic tone, the district court
held paragraph 6(b) unconscionable under Wyoming statutory law 1 5 and
void as against public policy. The long-term nature of the contract and the
than the sum of the price received for gas being sold in interstate commerce, by any
producer within the State of Wyoming, except in the counties of Uinta and Lincoln,
plus three cents per one thousand cubic feet (3[cents]/Mcf), then Northern shall in-
crease the price to be paid Pan American hereunder to a price equal to the price being
received by such producer plus three cents per Mcf.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 673 F.2d at 325 n.4. Testimony from Amoco indicated that this clause was
not commonly used in the industry. Kerr-McGee Corp., 500 F. Supp. at 628.
10. In 1974, the Federal Power Commission began issuing a series of opinions affecting the
price of natural gas sold in interstate commerce. See Opinion No. 699-H, 52 F.P.C. 1604 (1974)
(maximum base rate established for gas sold in interstate commerce for wells spudded on or
after Jan. 1, 1973); Opinion No. 742, 54 F.P.C. 853 (1975) (maximum rate for sales by small
producers established at 130% of the applicable base ceiling rate for large producers as an incen-
tive for additional gas development by small producers); Opinion No. 770, 56 F.P.C. 509, modi-
fied, No. 770-A, 56 F.P.C. 2698 (1976) (amended Opinion No. 770, continued vintage
distinctions between old and new gas and added vintage distinctions within the new gas cate-
gory). None of the producers selling to Northern Utilities would have qualified for the increased
prices for gas set by Opinion No. 669-H, 52 F.P.C. 1604 (1974) and Opinion No. 742, 54 F.P.C.
853 (1975) had they been selling their gas within the interstate market. Kerr-McGee Corp., 500 F.
Supp. at 630. Only paragraph 6(b) allowed the producers to benefit by the price increases.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 673 F.2d at 325-26 n.7.
Under § 105 of the NGPA, maximum lawful prices for gas sales under intrastate contracts
existing at the passage of the Act were established at the lower of the contract price or the
maximum price as computed under § 102 of the NGPA. 15 U.S.C. § 3315 (Supp. IV 1980).
The NGPA also provided for the price decontrol of certain categories of the natural gas by Jan.
1, 1985. Id § 3331.
11. 673 F.2d at 325.
12. Kerr-McGee Corp., 500 F. Supp. at 632.
13. Id.
14. Id at 633.
15. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-219 (1977) provides:
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inability of Northern Utilities to reduce the impact of the price increase by
selling surplus gas on the interstate market placed Northern Utilities in a
position from which no relief could be obtained. Also, paragraph 6(b) re-
moved all price restraints from the contract, providing windfalls to the pro-
ducers and "unjustly burdensome and harsh results to the consumers."'
6
Finally, the court ruled that because the price escalation clause operated to
increase prices without reference to the economics and circumstances of the
particular gas field, it could not be upheld.
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Seymour, upheld paragraph 6(b) as com-
patible with federal policy as set forth in the NGPA, and not unconscionable
or violative of Wyoming public policy. 17 The court found the price increases
triggered under the escalator clause to be within the confines of maximum
rates established by the NGPA. These rates, although high, were consistent
with federal policy to promote energy conservation; Congress had weighed
the benefits of such rates against the effect on consumers when enacting the
legislation. 18
Relying on an earlier Wyoming decision upholding a favored nations
clause,' 9 and the Wyoming legislature's decision not to restrict the operation
of indefinite price escalator clauses as permitted under the NGPA,20 the ap-
pellate court held indefinite price escalator provisions to be in accord with
Wyoming public policy. Using a four-part test not relied on by the trial
court, the Tenth Circuit concluded that paragraph 6(b) was conscionable
under Wyoming law. The court considered: 1) the protesting party's depri-
(a) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconsciona-
ble clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid
any unconscionable result.
(b) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
making the determination.
16. Kerr-McGee Corp., 500 F. Supp. at 635.
17. Kerr-McGee Corp., 673 F.2d at 325.
18. Id at 326.
19. The court focused its attention on Amoco Prod. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 612 P.2d
463 (Wyo. 1980), where the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether vintaging
was to be taken into account in triggering a favored nations clause operational on ceiling prices
set higher than the contract price by regulatory agencies. The district court in Kerr-McGee con-
cluded that because no argument was made in Stauffer that the clause involved was unconscion-
able or void as against public policy, the decision was not controlling. 500 F. Supp. at 636. The
Tenth Circuit noted that regardless of the absence of public policy argument in the Stauffer
briefs, the Stauffer court had upheld the clause as a well-recognized contractual provision. 673
F.2d at 327-28.
The term "vintage" is used to indicate the period during which a gas sale contract was
made. See 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS
811 (1981).
20. The NGPA provided that states may establish price restrictions on the sale of natural
gas produced within the state below the maximum price levels established by the NGPA:
"Nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of any State to establish or enforce any maxi-
mum lawful price for the first sale of natural gas produced in such state which does not exceed
the applicable maximum lawful price, if any, under subchapter I of this chapter." 15 U.S.C.
§ 3432 (Supp. IV 1980). See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 230
Kan. 176, 630 P.2d 1142 (1981),aJt'd, 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983) where the effect of such a restriction
was at issue.
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vation of a meaningful choice in deciding whether to enter into the contract;
2) the party's compulsion to accept the terms; 3) the existence of an opportu-
nity for meaningful negotiation; and 4) the existence of a gross inequality of
bargaining power.2' Citing evidence of lengthy negotiations engaged in by
all parties to the contract, statements made to the Wyoming Public Service
Commission by Northern Utilities regarding the difficulty in obtaining long-
term gas commitments, and the advantages of entering into the subject con-
tracts, the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence failed to demonstrate uncon-
scionability under Wyoming law. Furthermore, the court held that
unconscionability is determined at the making of the contract; a subsequent
increase in value or price will not serve to render a contract unconscionable
under Wyoming law.
22
Because the Tenth Circuit's reasoning promises to raise serious conflicts
in the future regarding operation of indefinite price escalation clauses in gas
sales contracts, a brief history of legal challenges in this area will be helpful.
The purpose of favored nations clauses in gas sales contracts is to induce
producers to commit supplies to long-term contracts by assuring that they
will be able to take advantage of current prices. 23 While most challenges to
favored nations clauses dispute whether the clause has been triggered, giving
rise to higher prices,24 a few early cases questioned whether price escalation
21. Kerr-McGee Corp., 673 F.2d at 329.
22. Id at 329. The court relied upon Bernina Distrib., Inc. v. Bernina Sewing Mach., 646
F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1981) and In re Estate of Frederick, 599 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1979).
23. As stated in Louisiana-Nevada Transit Co. v. Woods, 393 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ark.
1975):
The Favored Nations Clause obviously is not a buyer's clause since it can only have
the effect of increasing the buyer's cost of gas ...
Obviously, a seller has no interest in committing his gas to long term contracts at
a fixed price in the face of such rapidly increasing prices. The Favored Nations Clause
is a tool to enable a buyer to induce a seller to commit gas reserves to the buyer for a
long period of time. It is the buyer's assurance to the seller that the seller will always
be receiving a price for his gas equal to the current price.
Id at 184.
In Hall v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 359 So. 2d 255 (La. Ct. App. 1978), amended and
remanded, 368 So. 2d 984 (La. 1979), a27'd in part, vacated in part, 453 U.S. 571 (1981), the court
stated that "[tihe basic purpose of a price adjustment or Favored Nations clause is to protect a
seller from discrimination by the pipe-line purchaser of gas under a long-term contract." 359
So. 2d at 262. Finally, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in Amoco Prod. Co. v. Stauffer Chem.
Co., 612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1980) noted that "It]he nature of the product and its questionable
availability engenders reluctance on the part of producers to enter into long term contracts at
the price prevailing at the time of the contract. Yet purchasers require long term commitments
to insure an adequate supply of gas." Id at 468.
24. See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 604 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1979)
(vintaging not included within clause, so buyer required to pay higher price even though lower
vintage price applied to gas at issue); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 505 F.
Supp. 628 (D. Kan. 1980) (clause triggered by establishment of maximum prices by FPC); Loui-
siana-Nevada Transit v. Woods, 393 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ark. 1975) (gas involved in other sales
was comparable enough to trigger clause); Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light
Co., 230 Kan. 176, 630 P.2d 1142 (1981), affid, 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983); Mesa Petroleum Co. v.
Kansas Power & Light Co., 230 Kan. 166, 630 P.2d 1129 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 927 (1982)
(clause not triggered by enactment of NGPA); Hall v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 359 So. 2d
255 (La. Ct. App. 1978), amended and remanded, 368 So. 2d 984 (La. 1979), a.'d in par, vacated in
part, 453 U.S. 571 (1981) (favored nations clause triggered by increased payment of royalty);
Tuthill v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 614 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (clause not
triggered by FPC opinions because gas was not within the classifications affected by opinions);
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Howard Corp., 556 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), error ej/dn.r e., 568
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clauses violated public policy.2 5 These challenges generally were of little
significance.
Then, in 1961 the FPC issued Order No. 232 proscribing the use of
indefinite price escalation clauses in gas sales contracts within its jurisdic-
tion.2 6 The order declared all indefinite price escalation clauses, including
favored-nation, redetermination, and spiral escalation clauses,2 7 to be "un-
desirable, unnecessary, and incompatible with the public interest," having
"contributed to instability and uncertainty concerning prices of gas."'28 The
order went on to provide all such clauses in new contracts within the Com-
mission's jurisdiction to be inoperative and of no effect at law.
29
Order No. 232 was accompanied by a FPC decision in Pure Oil Co. ,30 in
which the Commission discussed the reasoning behind its determination that
indefinite price escalation clauses were contrary to the public interest. Al-
though the Commission recognized the necessity of long-term contractual
relations for the sale of natural gas and the need to maintain investment
values for producers in the face of rising costs, it deemed indefinite price
escalation clauses to result in price increases unrelated to factors bearing on
the value of gas, such as cost of production. The clauses were found to result
in gas price increases without economic or other substantial justification. 3 1
S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1978) (gas involved in other sales was comparable enough to trigger clause);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1980) (vintaging not a factor in
triggering clause).
25. Set In re Lexia Buchanan, 14 FPC 831 (1955), where the Brooklyn Union Gas Co. and
Long Island Lighting Co. sought to intervene in FPC proceedings concerning a certificate of
public convenience and necessity to strike price escalation clauses as being against the public
interest.
26. 25 F.P.C. 379, amended, 25 F.P.C. 609 (1961).
27. See supra note 3.
28. 25 F.P.C. at 380.
29. Commissioner Kline, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated that although he
believed indefinite price escalation clauses to be contrary to the public interest, he did not think
all such clauses as defined within the FPC order should be proscribed. In particular, Kline said
clauses allowing price renegotiation strike a proper balance between the interests of producers
and purchasers:
[A] producer should have a contractual right to renegotiate his contract price at some
time in the future in order to protect himself against inflation or other unforeseen
contingencies. He should not be compelled to agree at the beginning of his contract to
a fixed price for the gas twenty or fifty years in the future, when conditions may be
wholly different.
A contract providing for renegotiation of the price at some future date, and for
arbitration in event the parties fail to agree, merely gives the producer the right to file
for such price. The Commission will, of course, disallow it in event it is not a just and
reasonable price. Since the gas is already committed to the pipeline, the producer will
not have any distinct bargaining advantage.
Id. at 381 (Kline, Comm'r, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
30. 25 F.P.C. 383 (1961), aJ'd, 299 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1962). The decision involved an
interpretation of a two-party favored nations clause between Pure Oil Co. and El Paso Natural
Gas Co. The Commission extended its decision to apply to all indefinite price escalation
clauses.
31. The Commission concluded:
[U]nder Pure's provisions, the company's prices are subject to triggering if El Paso
pays any other producer within the specified area a higher price. There need be no
economic or other substantial justification for the increase; the mere fact that a higher
price is paid to some other producer would be sufficient to activate the increase. In
our view, such an artificial ground for a proposed increase, operating in such a
mechanical and arbitrary manner, and lacking any substantial relationship to the fac-
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Finally, the Commission found that indefinite price escalation clauses had
simply outlived their usefulness:
Assuming that indefinite escalation clauses in producer contracts
had some justification years ago, when a lack of purchaser outlets
and lack of consumer demand forced prices to abnormally low
levels, this justification no longer exists today, when purchasers of
gas are numerous, consumer demand is strong, and buyers are
competing eagerly for available supplies of gas. In our judgment,
in the light of continuing increases in the price of gas in recent
years and the present high level of prices, escalation clauses such as
Pure's have by now outlived whatever economic function they may
have had.
32
Order No. 232 was amended within a month to allow for limited price-rede-
termination provisions within contracts subject to FPC jurisdiction.
33
In 1962 the FPC ordered that contracts within its jurisdiction contain-
ing indefinite price escalation clauses be rejected.34 Then, in 1966, the FPC
issued Order No. 329,35 allowing for area rate escalations to operate. Thus,
escalation clauses were permissible if they did not exceed the applicable ceil-
ing rate established by the Commission. Escalations below the ceiling rate
prescribed by the FPC were deemed to be within the public interest because
the ceiling rate was based on a cost-based methodology having economic
tors which bear on the value of gas or on a determination of a reasonable level of rates
for it, does not constitute a proper basis for filing proposed increased rates ....
Id. at 389. The Commission also rejected arguments by Pure Oil Co. that indefinite price esca-
lation clauses further the free market system:
[I]t is fallacious to assume that the price for only one or a few sales, which is all that is
needed to activate a large number of producer prices under escalation provisions, is
representative of market conditions generally. In fact, escalation provisions such as
Pure's are the opposite of giving effect to prevailing market prices; instead, the prices
for sales of one or a few particular producers apply to and increase the level of market
prices generally.
Id at 391. The basis of FPC producer rate regulation was the cost-based methodology for
utility rate regulation. Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1142 (1982).
32. 25 F.P.C. at 391. The Commission also dismissed comparisons and benefits occurring
from indefinite price escalation clauses used in other industries, such as cotton, as having little
relationship to natural gas contracts:
[P]ricing practices appropriate to such commodities and businesses, which are either
unregulated or are subject to a type of regulation wholly unlike the regulation pro-
vided for by the [Natural Gas] Act, have little applicability in determining proper
pricing practices for the regulated producer segment of the natural gas industry.
Id
33. FPC Order No. 232-A, 25 F.P.C. 609 (1961), amending, 25 F.P.C. 379 (1961). The order
allowed gas prices to be redetermined at no more than five-year intervals within the life of a gas
sale contract. All other indefinite price escalation clauses remained barred. The Commission
thereby partially adopted Commissioner Kline's recommendation in Order No. 232. See supra
note 29.
34. FPC Order No. 242, 27 F.P.C. 339 (1962). The Commission adopted this restriction to
protect "the public against waves of [price] increases which have no defensible basis" and to
ease the regulatory burden of considering rate increase filings whenever such clauses were trig-
gered. Id at 340. The Commission derived its power to reject contracts from § 7 of the Natural
Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1976), which required producers selling gas on the interstate market
to receive Commission permission in the form of a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity. Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denid, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
Order No. 242 was upheld in FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964). See In re Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 782-83 (1968).
35. 36 F.P.C. 927 (1966).
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significance to the gas in question. 36
Essentially, the same reasoning was employed in 1979 after the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) took over the duties of the FPC
37
and the NGPA38 established new gas ceiling rates. FERC ruled in Order
2339 that indefinite price escalation clauses could operate within the confines
of the ceiling rates established by the NGPA, since those rates had been
deemed just and reasonable by Congress.
40
Challenges to indefinite price escalation clauses based on the issues of
public policy and unconscionability resurfaced shortly after passage of the
NGPA, despite the FPC and FERC's position that the clauses could operate
within rate ceilings. The first judicial expression on the matter was in Supe-
rior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co. ,4i where Tenth Circuit Judge Barrett, in a
concurring opinion, reiterated earlier rejections of such clauses as being
against public policy because they bore no relationship to production costs
or other economic justification.
42
In Amoco Production Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. ,43 the District Court
of the United States District of Kansas considered whether a windfall price
increase triggered by a favored nations clause was unconscionable and void
for public policy reasons, even though the price remained below the highest
ceiling rate. The subject favored nations clause was tied to FPC and FERC
pricing activities, which triggered the clause, permitting Amoco to recognize
a 263% increase in the price of its gas.
4 4
The district court, relying on Superior Oil Co., concluded that such
clauses are not per se unconscionable and against public policy, and upheld
the clause by distinguishing the circumstances surrounding the Amoco-Kan-
sas Power & Light Co. favored nations clause from those before the district
court in Kerr-AiMcGee Corp. Kansas Power & Light Co.'s participation in draft-
ing the contract and knowledge that the clause could cause sizeable price
increases weighed against the unconscionability arguments. 45 Furthermore,
no inequality in bargaining power that would evidence unconscionability
36. Pennzoil v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
See Watson, The Natural Gas Pohy Act of 1978 and Gas Purchase Contracts, 27B ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 1407, 1418-19 (1982) (where an area rate was by definition just and reasonable, the
Commission was prevented from asserting that the collection of area rates was against public
policy). Until 1974, the FPC prescribed rates for gas within particular areas based on locational
values. The FPC then adopted nationwide rates of general applicability. 51 F.P.C. 2212
(1974).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. IV 1980).
39. 44 Fed. Reg. 16,895 (1979). The order reserved to state law the determination of
whether such clauses operate in intrastate contracts.
40. For a discussion on the limitations placed upon indefinite price escalation clauses by
the NGPA, see Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 376-78 (5th Cir. 1981),cert. dented, 454 U.S.
1142 (1982).
41. 604 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1979).
42. Id at 1295-96 (Barrett, J., concurring). Apparently, Judge Barrett would have de-
clared such clauses void against public policy regardless of whether they operated within legisla-
tively defined price ceilings.
43. 505 F. Supp. 628 (D. Kan. 1980).
44. Id at 636.
45. Id at 639.
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was established. The court stressed that supply and demand, not production
costs, should determine the price of gas."6
Finally, Energy Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Lighl Co. "7 considered the
validity of a state law that limited the effect of favored nations clauses by
graduating the introduction of higher natural gas prices into the Kansas
economy. 4 8 The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the restrictions imposed on
such clauses. Quoting the trial court, the opinion noted that states have "a
bona fide interest in addressing, and hopefully controlling, the serious eco-
nomic dislocations that a sudden introduction of significantly higher energy
costs would produce."'4 9
The foregoing decisions, although not fully applicable to Kerr-McGee
Corp. and the intrastate contract involved, demonstrate the nature and vigor
of the challenges to favored nations clauses based on arguments of public
policy and unconscionability. Similar challenges are certain to arise in the
future, particularly as conflicting interests between producers and consumers
continue to intensify.
Several issues merit further consideration. The first concerns the uncon-
scionability argument. In determining the conscionability of the favored na-
tions clause in Kerr-McGee Corp., one factor the Tenth Circuit examined was
the expertise of the negotiators for both parties to the contract, 50 thus weigh-
46. Id. The court recognized that the price increases would be borne by Kansas Power &
Light Co.'s customers, some of whom lack the resources to pay the higher costs, but found that a
low-income energy assistance program operated by the State of Kansas and funded by the
Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 17, 19, 26, 31, 42 U.S.C.), mitigated the impact of the favored nations clause
upon the public. 505 F. Supp. at 639-40.
47. 230 Kan. 176, 630 P.2d 1142 (1981), afad, 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983).
48. The NGPA grants states the authority to establish price restrictions on the sale of natu-
ral gas produced within a particular state below the maximum price levels established by the
NGPA. 15 U.S.C. § 3432 (Supp. IV 1980); see supra note 20.
49. 230 Kan. at 188, 630 P.2d at 1152. The court relied heavily upon legislative intent and
the evils sought to be regulated:
Proponents believe that as a result of this legislation, many producers of natural gas,
especially those whose contracts contain indefinite price escalator clauses, will reap
unanticipated, windfall financial benefits. These benefits bear no real relationship to
the cost of production of new gas, and are not even remotely related to old gas produc-
tion costs. They accrue solely because of the reversal of federal policy.
The producers wil benefit beyond any expectations that they miht have had only afew
years ago and the consumers, already buffeted by rapidly increasing inflation, including
spiraling utility costs, will pay.
... . [T]he majority of the Committee is strongly convinced that the single issue
of the benefits to be derived by the affected Kansas consumers of natural gas clearly
outweighs any adverse effects the gas producers or royalty owners said the bill might
have.
Id. at 187-88, 630 P.2d 1151-52 (emphasis in original).
The United States Supreme Court agreed, stating that the state could reasonably have
found that higher gas prices attributable to the escalation clauses would mean hardship on
persons with fixed incomes who use gas heat. Moreover, the Court said, the state had a legiti-
mate interest in eliminating unforeseen windfall profits. Finally, the Court found significant the
fact that the parties were already operating in a heavily regulated industry and did not expect
the advent of deregulated prices at the execution of the contracts in holding that the state had
not impaired any contract by restricting the escalator clauses. Energy Group, Inc., 103 S. Ct. at
706-09.
50. 673 F.2d at 330.
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ing the parties' bargaining power. 51 While consideration of equality of the
parties at the bargaining table is appropriate to determine unconscionabil-
ity, it ignores the power of producers who command great control over di-
minishing natural resources, such as natural gas. 52 Since gas is a basic
commodity, with limited supplies and substitutes, assertions that size and
experience of bargaining parties are conclusive -as to the equitable nature of
the contract ignores the economic realities of the industry.
Also, the unconscionability issue can be restated: should a heightened
demand by one consumer be allowed to trigger gas prices for consumers
whose demand is less great?5 3 Favored nations clauses may actually distort
the concept that demand determines value.
The second area of consideration is public policy. Recent cases dealing
with favored nations clauses and public policy demonstrate that administra-
tive and legislative acceptance of such clauses does not automatically shield
favored nations clauses from challenges based upon public policy. 54 These
challenges are certain to resurface with renewed vigor following the deregu-
lation of certain natural gas pricing in 1985,55 when conflicting interests of
producers and consumers are certain to reach a zenith.
The Tenth Circuit in Kerr-McGee Corp. suggests that because Congress
took these interests into account in enacting the NGPA with its deregulation
provisions, Congress also acted in the public interest by allowing indefinite
price escalation clauses to operate once deregulation occurs.5 6 The court's
suggestion comports with earlier decisions which recognize Congress as act-
51. Gross inequality of bargaining power is a characteristic of an unconscionable bargain.
See In re Estate of Frederick, 599 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1979), cited in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern
Util., Inc., 673 F.2d 323, 328-29 (10th Cir. 1982); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Kansas Power &
Light Co., 505 F. Supp. 628, 639 (D. Kan. 1980) where the court considered the bargaining
power of the parties in determining whether the favored nations clause involved was
unconscionable.
52. Northern Utilities relied upon the Beaver Creek Field for 85% of its total supply of gas.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 673 F.2d at 324. The Tenth Circuit stressed the difficulties expressed by
Northern Utilities in obtaining long-term gas commitments and the advantages it would derive
from the amended contract, as evidence of an equitable bargain. d. at 329-30. The same
circumstances may, however, be evidence of a contract entered into out of fear of diminishing
supplies and competition with larger utilities.
53. See supra note 31.
54. Judge Barrett's concurring opinion in Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 604
F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1979) suggests that favored nations clauses should be void against public
policy regardless of whether they operate within the confines of maximum lawful rates which
have been deemed reasonable through the regulatory process. Also, the court in Amoco Prod.
Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 505 F. Supp. 628, 636 (D. Kan. 1980), considered the ques-
tion of whether a 283% increase in the price of gas, triggered by a favored nations clause, was
enough in itself to render the clause void as unconscionable and against public policy, regardless
of the fact that the increase fell below maximum rates.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 3331 (Supp. IV 1980). See Zimmer & McEvoy, Petitions for Generic Rulemak-
ing: Passthrough of Gs Costs and Associated Contract Policies, NAT. RESOURCEs L. NEWSLETTER,
spring 1982, at 1, col. 2, for a discussion on petitions to FERC requesting a reconsideration of
policy regarding indefinite price escalator clauses for deregulated natural gas.
56. The court stated:
One of the primary purposes of the NGPA is to promote energy conservation. Con-
gress believed that allowing producers to recover high prices for their gas helps imple-
ment this goal. "High energy prices provide one motivation to conserve energy.
Because of these prices, an enormous range of energy conserving improvements are
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ing in the public interest in deregulating natural gas prices.
57
As a result of the court's decision, indefinite price escalation clauses,
once allowed to operate only within the confines of ceiling rates founded on
justness and reasonableness, will be allowed to operate in a free market sys-
tem because that system has been deemed to be in the public interest. The
holding, however, will not preclude challenges that the operation of favored
nations clauses within the system must also be in the public interest.
B. Federal Leases
.t
In Kirkpatrick Oil &Gas Co. v. United States ,58 the Tenth Circuit held that
a state communitization order may not bind federally-owned land or extend
leases of federally-owned land within the unit absent consent from the Secre-
tary of the Interior. Kirkpatrick Oil & Gas Co. had acquired oil and gas
leases on federally-owned land in Oklahoma for a primary term of ten years,
extendible upon production in paying quantities. When Kirkpatrick failed
to drill on the leases within the primary term, the United States sought to
terminate the leases. Kirkpatrick resisted, claiming that the leases had been
extended by virtue of a state drilling and spacing order that placed the fed-
eral lands and nearby non-federal lands in the same unit. The company
asserted that its oil and gas production on the non-federal land served to
extend the federal leases in the same unit. The government contended that
state communitization orders are binding upon federal lands only when ap-
proved by the Secretary of Interior.
59
The court agreed with the government, relying upon the test articulated
in Wal/is v. Pan American Petroleum Corp. 60 to determine whether application
of state law to federal mineral lease issues poses a "significant threat to any
identifiable federal policy or interest. '6 1 The court found that state-imposed
acreage requirements and unit boundaries could conflict with the Secretary
of Interior's judgment regarding acreage and boundary standards for conser-
vation under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.62 The court also held
that federal lessees should not be able to circumvent the requirement for the
cost effective." S. Rep. No. 409, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 8800, 8806.
.... Congress was well aware of the economic impact on consumers that would
result from the operation of indefinite price escalator clauses.
673 F.2d at 326-27; see Pennzoil Co. v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360, 378-79 (5th Cir. 1981),cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
57. The court in Amoco Prod. Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 505 F. Supp. 628, 639 (D.
Kan. 1980) stated:
[I]n the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-621), Congress expressed a
policy of eventually allowing prices to go unregulated by the year 1985. . . . By 1985,
the price of deregulated natural gas will assuredly seem exorbitant, and since it is such
an essential commodity for most of the public, hardship will result. Nevertheless, this
Court must be cognizant of these developments in public policy. The price of deregu-
lated gas will be determined by supply and demand rather than the cost of
production.
58. 675 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1982).
59. Id. at 1124; see 30 U.S.C. § 2260) (1976).
60. 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966).
61. Kirkpatrick, 675 F.2d at 1126 (1966).
62. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1976).
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Secretary's approval by securing a state pooling order.
63
In another oil and gas decision, True Oil Co. o. FERC,64 the Tenth Cir-
cuit construed the clause, "produced in commercial quantities," as requiring
either a capability to market, or a means of transportation of the product
from the producer to the consumer."5 The interpretation was adopted in a
determination of whether natural gas qualified as "new natural gas" under a
provision of the NGPA.
66
II. MINING LAW
A. Stock-Razsing Homestead Act
The Tenth Circuit, in Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus,6 7 addressed the
question of whether gravel is a mineral reserved to the United States in pat-
ents granted under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 (Act).6 8 In a
decision with the potential of affecting 70,362,406 acres of land, 69 the court
held that gravel is not a reserved mineral under the Act and consequently,
passed to the patentee.
In 1926, the United States conveyed a tract of land in Wyoming to
Western Nuclear's predecessor-in-interest by patent issued under the Act.
The patent, in accordance with the Act, reserved all coal and other minerals
to the United States. 70 After Western Nuclear purchased a portion of the
patented land in 1975, it sought a permit from the Wyoming Department of
Environmental Quality for a gravel pit. The department notified the Bu-
reau of Land Management of Western Nuclear's intentions and then
granted the permit. Western Nuclear removed some gravel before being
served with a Notice of Trespass under the Materials Act of 1947 and the
Surface Resources Act of 1955.71
The Interior Board of Land Appeals of the Department of Interior up-
held the Bureau of Land Management, finding that gravel was reserved to
the United States as a mineral under the Act, and any disposition of the
gravel other than through the Surface Resources Act of 1955 constituted
63. 675 F.2d at 1126.
64. 663 F.2d 75 (10th Cir. 1981).
65. Id at 78.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 3312(c)(1)(C)(ii) (Supp. IV 1980).
67. 664 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. grantedsub nom. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 102
S. Ct. 2266 (1982).
68. 43 U.S.C. § 291 (1976).
69. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D. Wyo. 1979), rev'd, 664 F.2d
234 (10th Cir. 198 1),cert. grantedsub noma. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2266 (1982).
70. 664 F.2d at 235. The patent reserved the following: "Excepting and reserving, how-
ever, to the United States all the coal and other minerals in the lands so entered and patented,
together with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same pursuant to the provisions
and limitations of the Act of December 29, 1916." Id
71. Materials Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 291, 61 Stat. 681 (1947), amended by the Surface
Resources Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. § 601 (1976). These Acts authorize the Secretaries of the
Interior and Agriculture to dispose of common varieties of gravel and other minerals on public
lands for adequate compensation. Id. Common varieties of sand and gravel are no longer
deemed valuable minerals subject to location under the mining laws, unless they possess a "dis-
tinct and special value." Id § 611.
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trespass. 72 Reviewing legislative intent and contemporaneous history, the
trial court determined that even though the term "mineral" had no definite
meaning in 1916, gravel is a reserved mineral under the Act. 73 The court
then reaffirmed the construction rule that mineral reservations are to be de-
cided in favor of the government when a. question exits. 74 In so holding,
Judge Kerr noted: "The mineral estate is a flexible entity which expands
with the development of the arts and sciences to include more minerals."' 75
The Tenth Circuit addressed both the Bureau of Land Management's
jurisdiction to issue the trespass notice and the definition of mineral within
the Act. Western Nuclear had argued that because the Surface Resources
Act of 1955 authorized disposition of gravel from public lands only, the Bu-
reau of Land Management had no jurisdiction over the subject lands, which
passed to private ownership by patent. Judge McWilliams, writing for the
court, rejected Western Nuclear's argument, saying that although the land
itself passed into private hands by patent, under the Act, the minerals re-
served to the United States remain subject to disposal in accordance with the
coal and mineral laws in force at the time of the disposal. 76 The disposal
provisions contemplate that the Department of Interior maintain continuing
jurisdiction over reserved minerals.
77
Turning to the definitional issue, the Tenth Circuit examined congres-
sional intent. Central to the court's holding was the 1910 decision, Zimmer-
man v. Brunson,78 in which the Department of Interior, "in the absence of
specific legislation by Congress," 79 refused to classify gravel as a mineral be-
cause standard authorities had failed to recognize such deposits as miner-
als.80 The court found the Zimmerman decision to be the keystone of
congressional intent at the time the Act was enacted,8i and regarded the
Department of Interior's subsequent overruling of Zimmerman as inconse-
72. Western Nuclear, Inc., 85 Interior Dec. 129, 139 (1978), affd, 475 F. Supp. 654 (D.
Wyo. 1979), rev'd, 664 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, sub noa. Watt v. Western Nuclear,
Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2266 (1982).
73. 475 F. Supp. at 656-60.
74. Id at 662.
75. Id at 663.
76. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1976).
77. 664 F.2d at 237.
78. 39 Pub. Lands Dec. 310 (1910). Zimmerman was specifically overruled by Layman v.
Ellis, 52 Pub. Lands Dec. 714 (1929).
79. 39 Pub. Lands at 313.
80. Id at 312. The department said:
A search of the standard American authorities has failed to disclose a single one
which classifies a deposit [of gravel] as mineral, nor is the Department aware of any
application to purchase such a deposit under the mining laws. This, taken into consid-
eration with the further fact that deposits of sand and gravel occur with considerable
frequency in the public domain, points rather to a general understanding that such
deposits, unless they possess a peculiar property or characteristic giving them a special
value, were not to be regarded as mineral.
d
81. As the Tenth Circuit noted, "[wihen enacting the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of
1916, we presume that Congress was aware of the fact that the Department of the Interior had
determined that gravel was not a mineral for the purposes of either the mining laws or previous
homestead laws." 664 F.2d at 240.
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quential to determining congressional intent in 1916.82
The court then reviewed judicial opinions on the issue of gravel as a
mineral, arising after passage of the Act. Particularly revealing to the court
was the case of Bumpus v. United States ,83 in which the government had taken
the position that gravel was not a mineral because it was so much a part of
the surface that it should be considered part of the surface estate.84 Also of
significance was State ex rel. State Highway Commiss'on v. Trujiwlo ,85 in which the
New Mexico Supreme Court held that gravel was included within the min-
eral reservation of the Act. 86 The court found the reasoning in State Land
Board v. State Department of Fish & Game, 87 to be persuasive on the issue of
whether gravel is to be construed as a mineral. In State Land Board, the State
of Utah had conveyed property to its Fish and Game Department, reserving
all coal and other minerals. The Utah Supreme Court held that sand and
gravel deposits are so common in the Rocky Mountain region that a reserva-
tion of such deposits as minerals would nullify a grant of the surface estate.88
The Tenth Circuit adopted this reasoning from State Land Board as support
that gravel is not a reserved mineral under the Act.
8 9
Although the court relied on Zimmerman and State Land Board in deter-
mining that gravel was passed to all patentees under the Stock-Raising
Homestead Act, the opinion in Western Nuclear, Inc. fails to reconcile these
earlier cases' assertions that in some circumstances, gravel may have the req-
uisite special value to be classified as a mineral.90 Indeed, the court in Zm-
merman simply held that the close proximity of a gravel deposit to a town or
82. The Department of Interior held gravel to be a locatable mineral in ILayman v. Ellis,
52 Pub. Lands Dec. 714 (1929).
83. 325 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1963).
84. Unlike reservations under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, the reservation in
Burnpus involved condemnation proceedings by the United States in which "all oil, gas and
other minerals" were reserved to the private landowners, who subsequently sought to remove
gravel pursuant to their reservation. Id at 265-66.
85. 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d 122 (1971).
86. The court noted that although the New Mexico Supreme Court disagreed with earlier
Tenth Circuit interpretations of the Act, the discrepancies were not essential to the definitional
issue. Western Muclear, Inc., 664 F.2d at 241.
87. 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965).
88. Id at 239, 408 P.2d at 708. The Utah Supreme Court recognized, however, that gravel
may be so scarce in some areas as to have extraordinary value within the area. In such circum-
stances, gravel may properly be considered a mineral subject to reservation. Id at 240, 408 P.2d
at 709.
89. [Tihe gravel lying under and upon appellant's land is so closely related to the
surface estate, that it is a part and parcel of it. If such common substances were con-
sidered to be included within the mineral reservation, then under all the many patents
issued pursuant to the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, the patentees would own only
the dirt, and little or nothing more. Such would be at odds with the nature of the
terrain in the Rocky Mountain region, where rocks abound. And if ordinary rocks are
not reserved minerals, it follows that gravel, a form of fragmented rock, also is not a
reserved mineral.
664 F.2d at 242. In so holding, the court distinguished United States v. 1,253.14 Acres of Land,
455 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1972), in which the court, relying upon extrinsic evidence relating to a
reservation of "all mineral, including oil and gas," held gravel to be included within the reserva-
tion. The Tenth Circuit also distinguished United States v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d 1271 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977), where the Act was held to pass to patentees only that part
of the public domain sufficient to support homesteaders by raising livestock. Hence, the deci-
sion held geothermal steam was reserved to the United States under the Act.
90. See supra notes 80 and 88 and accompanying text.
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city, and whose sole use is for building, does not qualify gravel as a min-
eral.9 1 Subsequent decisions, such as State Land Board, suggest the determina-
tion must be made according to the facts of the case.92 Western Nuclear, Inc.,
however, suggests no such ad hoc consideration. Thus, patentees may now be
entitled to full development of gravel under their patent, without accounting
to the federal government.
B. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1970
In two decisions, Rosebud Coal Sales Co., Inc. v. Andus,9 3 and California
Portland Cement Co. v. Andrus, 94 the Tenth Circuit strictly enforced the time
period under which the Department of Interior can readjust the terms of a
lease under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.95 This Act allows the
federal government to readjust the royalty terms and other terms of leases
issued under the Act at the end of every twenty-year period.96
Rosebud Coal Sales, Inc. and California Portland Cement Co. were is-
sued coal leases in 1935 providing for readjustment at the end of 1975.
97
Neither lessee received notice of the government's intent to readjust the
terms of its lease until 1977, although the Bureau of Land Management be-
gan considering readjusting Rosebud's coal lease seven months prior to the
readjustment date.98
The Tenth Circuit, per Chief Judge Seth, rejected the government's ar-
gument that it was too preoccupied with basic coal leasing policy to give
notice before the end of the lease period. The court held that the govern-
ment must act to readjust terms of its leases before the end of the twenty-
year period established under the Act, unless the government can demon-





United States v. Mller' ° ° presented the Tenth Circuit with the unusual
situation of the use of criminal prosecution to settle a property dispute. The
court, recognizing the circumstances as involving merely a question of right
to possession, held the prosecution to be an abuse of process.
91. 39 Pub. Lands Dec. at 313.
92. [W]e note that the holding herein is not intended to exclude the possibility that
there might be some area where sand and gravel are so scarce and difficult to obtain
that a deposit of those materials would have such an extraordinary value within that
area that they could properly be considered as coming within the definition of "min-
eral" as we have hereinabove set out ....
17 Utah 2d at 239-40, 408 P.2d at 709.
93. 667 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1982).
94. 667 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1982).
95. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976).
96. Id. § 207(a).
97. Rosebud Coal, 667 F.2d at 950; California Portland, 667 F.2d at 954.
98. Rosebud Coat, 667 F.2d at 953; Calornia Portland, 667 F.2d at 954.
99. Rosebud Coal, 667 F.2d at 953.
100. 659 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir. 1981).
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In 1905, the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes, now known as the Wind
River tribes, ceded about half of the Wind River Indian Reservation in Wy-
oming to the United States for homestead entry. Non-Indians, including the
Miller family, were issued patents to land within the reservation boundaries
until 1939, when the remaining unsold land was given back to the tribes.' 0 1
The Millers homesteaded within the reservation in the early 1900's, and in
1929 purchased several other homesteads not far from their homesite, adja-
cent to and outside the western boundary of the reservation. Access to the
outer property is limited to two routes: a three-quarter-of-a-mile drive across
reservation property, and a drive across private property. 10 2 The private
property is barred to travelers; as a result, the Miller family crossed the reser-
vation for fifty years to gain access to their land.1
0 3
In September 1978, defendant Larry Miller received a notice from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs that further trespass on tribal lands would be sub-
ject to prosecution under the Wyoming criminal trespass statute. 10 4 The
government argued that as trustee of the Indians, it had a duty to establish
Indian sovereignty over the property. The government decided to file the
action pursuant to the criminal trespass statute, believing that a civil remedy
was unnecessary where a statute provided an express remedy. 105 The de-
fendant took the position that he had a colorable claim of right to use the
road for access to his property. The trial court, chastising the Bureau of
Indian Affairs for its "administrative ineptitude" 0 6 and failure to arrive at a
compromise by which Miller could reach his property, nonetheless sentenced
Miller under the statute.1
0 7
The Tenth Circuit, noting that both parties and the trial court recog-
nized the issue to be whether Miller was entitled to cross the reservation to
reach his land, distinguished between acts of trespass with an intent to re-
main upon the property of another without lawful authority and those acts
of entry made in good faith under a claim of right.' 0 8 The court held that to
apply a criminal trespass statute to the latter act is an abuse of process in
which "a legal procedure is perverted to accomplish an ulterior purpose for
which it was not designed."' 1 9 In so holding, the court relied on the same
101. Id at 1030.
102. Id
103. Indian regulations required that a one-day permit be obtained before the Millers could
drive cattle across the reservation; the defendant sought an annual permit to avoid traveling
fifty miles one way to obtain a daily permit, but was told that annual permits were against
Indian regulations. Id at 1031. The Tenth Circuit mentioned in passing that the daily permit
requirements should be abolished as a possible infringement upon a landowner's due process
rights not to be denied access to his property without an opportunity to be heard. Id ; see Dry
Creek Lodge v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).
104. WYo. STAT. § 6-10-102 (1977) was assimilated through 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) and
made applicable to the Wind River Indian Reservation under 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1976). 659 F.2d at
1030.
105. Id. at 1031-32.
106. Id at 1032.
107. Id as 1030. The trial court fully recognized that the dispute did not involve a criminal
law question. The government claimed that civil proceedings would delay the outcome. Id at
1031.
108. Id. at 1033.
109. Id.
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distinction made in People v. Johnson, 10 in which the court held that the
requisite criminal intent to remain on the lands of another without lawful
authority is lacking where a claim of right is asserted. The Tenth Circuit
regarded as irrelevant the government's emphasis upon the fact that owner-
ship of the property was undisputed; appropriate governmental action was a
civil proceeding.
In another trespass action, Uni'tedStates v. Osterlund,t 't the Tenth Circuit
held that courts cannot award damages as an alternative to issuing orders
enjoining continued occupancy of government land by a trespasser. The
United States had sought to enjoin Osterlund's occupancy on federal land
when it discovered that his residence was located within the boundaries of
the Arapahoe-Roosevelt National Forest. The trial court found for the gov-
ernment as a matter of law and ordered Osterlund to vacate the property.' 12
In his appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Osterlund argued that the trial
court, in its equitable discretion, should have awarded the government dam-
ages and permitted continued occupancy. The Tenth Circuit rejected Os-
terlund's argument, holding that courts have no power to adjust equities
against the federal government in title disputes involving federal lands be-
cause Congress' trust powers over the public land are unlimited; courts can-
not infringe upon the trust powers by saying how the trust is to be
administered. If the court had granted relief in the form of damages, it
essentially would have forced the sale of a portion of the national forest and
prescribed conditions for the continued occupancy of the land, actions that




Two decisions reinforced tribal authority over non-Indians within reser-
vation boundaries. The first decision upholds the sovereign powers of tribes
to enforce tribal zoning ordinances against non-Indian fee owners of land
within a reservation. The second decision upholds the power of tribes to
prevent states from enforcing state game laws against non-Indians within a
reservation.
In Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes,' 14 defendants James and
Karen Knight, both non-Indian fee owners of land within the Wind River
Indian Reservation in west-central Wyoming, sought to develop two subdivi-
sions on their land. After the Knights discussed their plans with Bureau of
Indian Affairs officials, the tribal government enacted a zoning code that
expressly applied to all lands within the reservation boundaries, including
110. 16 Mich. App. 745, 168 N.W.2d 913 (1969). See People v. Miller, 344 Ill. App. 574, 101
N.E.2d 874 (1951) (penal statute cannot be used to try title rights disputes); Steele v. State, 191
Ind. 350, 132 N.E. 739 (1921) (abuse of criminal trespass statute to try disputed rights in real
property); State v. Larason, 143 N.E.2d 502 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1956) (abuse of criminal
trespass statute to use in real property right disputes).
111. 671 F.2d 1267 (10th Cir. 1982).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1268.
114. 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1982).
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those held in fee by non-Indians.t1 5 The code was neither recorded in
Fremont County records where the land is located, nor published in the Fed-
eral Register. The Fremont County Planning Commission approved the
subdivision plats in early 1979, and the Knights proceeded to plat, subdi-
vide, and sell lots. When the tribes sought to enjoin development in Septem-
ber 1977, a number of residential sites were near completion.' 16
The trial court addressed two issues: 1) whether the tribes had the au-
thority to regulate land held in fee by non-Indians within reservation bound-
aries, and, if so, 2) whether the zoning code was a proper exercise of that
power. The trial court held in favor of the tribes on both issues.
1 17
Affirming the trial court, the Tenth Circuit followed recently enun-
ciated Supreme Court principles in Mern'on v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, t 8 and
Montana v. United States,' 19 and recognized that Indians have inherent sover-
eign power over their territory and tribal members. This power allows them
to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee lands
within the reservation.12 0 One valid exercise of the power may be to restrict
"conduct [which] threatens or has some direct effect on the political integ-
rity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."' 2 ' In
Knight, the court determined that the tribes' interest in preservation of their
homeland,' 2 2 and the code's protective purpose, t 23 was sufficient, absent the
exercise of land use controls by other authoritative bodies, ' 24 for the tribes to
invoke their "inherent sovereign rights of self-government and territorial
management" 125 and enact the zoning ordinance. The court further recog-
nized the zoning code's purpose of preserving the rural character of the reser-
vation as a legitimate objective, commonly recognized under the police
power. In addition, the court held that the code could be enforced against
all persons whose land use activities affected tribal lands; therefore, even
non-Indians who cannot participate in tribal government could be subjected
115. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribal Ordinance 38 applied to: "[A]II lands within the exte-
rior boundaries of the Wind River Reservation, whether held in trust by the U.S. for the benefit
of individual Indians, or for the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes, or held in fee by Indians or
non-Indians." 670 F.2d at 901.
116. Id at 902.
117. Id.
118. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
119. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
120. 670 F.2d at 902.
121. Id (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).
122. Among the factors cited as demonstrating significant interest in the subject land was
the proximity of traditional tribal ceremonial grounds, two major pow wow sites, two predomi-
nantly Indian schools, two Indian cemeteries, an Indian activity hall, and 241 Indian-occupied
dwellings. 670 F.2d at 903.
123. The purpose of the zoning code was expressed as follows:
Uncontrolled use and development of land within the Wind River Reservation poses a
threat to the use of the Reservation as a homeland for the Shoshone and Arapahoe
Tribes for whom the Reservation was established and jeopardizes the value of the land
and water, impairs the economic benefits of the natural resources and damages the
environment. All residents of the Reservation are affected. To protect the interests of
the Tribes and all persons on the Reservation this Code is adopted.
Id (quoting Art. 1, Tribal Zoning Code).
124. 670 F.2d at 903.
125. Id
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to the tribe's zoning authority.'
26
The Tenth Circuit's decision forecasts continued testing of the scope of
tribal authority to regulate non-Indian activities on fee lands within a reser-
vation under the principles in Montana. The Supreme Court held in Montana
that the general principles of retained inherent sovereignty, as defined in
United States v. Wheeler,' 27 apply only where the activity sought to be regu-
lated bears a clear relationship to tribal self-government or internal rela-
tions. 128 Applying this test, the Court held that the Crow Tribe of Montana
was without authority to enforce its hunting and fishing regulations against
non-Indians on fee lands within the Crow Reservation because hunting and
fishing did not bear the requisite relationship to tribal self-government or
internal relations. 129
However, the Montana Court noted that "Indian Tribes retain inherent
sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians
on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands."' 30 Thus, the Court
recognized limited sovereign control for activities that do not bear a clear
relationship to self-government and internal relations.
Among the activities a tribe may regulate under this retained inherent
power are those undertaken by non-Indians who enter into consensual rela-
tionships with the tribe or its members through commercial dealings, con-
tracts, leases, or other arrangements.' 3 ' The Court asserted such power may
be exercised over non-Indians on fee lands within a reservation when the
activity sought to be regulated "threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe." 132 This exception to the general principle of retained inherent sover-
eignty was specifically relied on by the Tenth Circuit in upholding the au-
thority of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes to enforce their zoning codes
against non-Indians owning land in fee within the Wind River Indian
Reservation.
Knight illustrates the potential discrepancies that may arise under the
Montana clear relationship test, and suggests that the exception to the gen-
eral principle of retained inherent sovereignty formulated by the Montana
Court may eventually dilute the test. To enforce tribal regulations over non-
Indians on fee lands, Montana requires a clear relationship to tribal self-gov-
ernment or internal relations. The Tenth Circuit circumvented this test in
Knight by finding that the tribal regulation fell within the broad exception
articulated in Montana for protection of the economic security and welfare of
126. Id at 903.
127. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). The court in Wheeler held that, in general, the ability of Indian
tribes to exercise sovereignty over the relations between the tribe and non-members has been
divested, while the inherent power of self-government in regulating the relations of members of
a tribe has been retained. Id at 326.
128. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-65.
129. Id at 557. See Lands and Natural Resources, Eghth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 59 DEN. L.J.
335, 357 (1982).
130. 450 U.S. at 565.
131. Id




The breadth of this exception may undermine the Montana clear rela-
tionship test. For example, it is possible to imagine circumstances where
hunting and fishing activities could "so threaten the tribe's political and eco-
nomic security as to justify tribal regulation, thereby creating an exception
to the Montana holding."' 3 4 Hunting regulations might be enacted for the
purpose of preserving game whose habitat is on Indian lands within reserva-
tion boundaries but whose migratory routes cross non-Indian fee land.
Under these circumstances, the "clear relationship" test provides little gui-
dance, in light of the economic and welfare arguments that could be made in
support of regulation, and the substantial interests of tribes in preserving
reservation wildlife.
Finally, Knight's acceptance of zoning as a legitimate exercise of police
power' 35 suggests that any regulatory activity justifiable under tribal police
power may meet the welfare exception of Montana. Under the broad defini-
tion of police power, retained tribal sovereignty over non-Indian owners of
fee land within reservations will be greatly expanded.
The issue of tribal inherent sovereignty also arose in Mescalero Apache
Tribe o. New Mexi'co. 136 The question was whether a state may enforce its
game laws against non-Indians hunting and fishing on reservation land held
by the tribe. The Tenth Circuit held that where state game laws interfere
with tribal self-governance, Indian game laws prevail. Read in conjunction
with Montana's denial of Indian sovereignty over non-Indian hunting and
fishing on fee land within the reservation boundaries, Mescalero suggests that
Indian game laws prevail on reservation lands, and state laws prevail over
non-Indians on fee land.
Mescalero involved a challenge to New Mexico's attempt to enforce its
game laws within the boundaries of the Mescalero Apache Reservation. The
Tenth Circuit first considered the issue in 1980137 when the court deter-
mined that state attempts to exercise regulatory powers within an Indian
reservation are "precluded if the subject matter has been preempted by fed-
eral law or if the state regulations infringe on the Tribe's rights of self-gov-
ernment."' 138 The court, reviewing sources of tribal sovereignty and statutory
grants of power, found six sources of preemption: 1) the treaty with the
Apaches, 139 2) the Enabling Act for New Mexico, 140 3) the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act of 1934 (IRA),14 1 4) the tribal constitution and ordinances en-
133. 670 F.2d at 903.
134. 450 U.S. at 566.
135. Knikht, 670 F.2d at 903.
136. 677 F.2d 55 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 371 (1982).
137. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated and
remanded, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981); see Lands and Natural Resources, Ehth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey,
59 DEN. L.J. 335, 353 (1982).
138. 630 F.2d at 728.
139. 10 Stat. 979 (1852).
140. Ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (1910) (amended 1942).
141. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976).
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acted pursuant to the IRA, 142 5) extensive federal development assistance,
and 6) the negative inferences from Public Law 280,143 under which New
Mexico had the option until 1968 of unilaterally asserting civil and criminal
jurisdiction over the Mescalero Apache Reservation, but failed to do so. The
court further determined that state attempts to enforce its game laws within
the reservation would infringe upon the tribe's significant interest in gov-
erning game within the reservation and deprive the tribe of game revenues
from its own conservation system. 144 As a result, the state was precluded
from attempting to regulate game within the boundaries of the Mescalero
Apache Reservation.
The United States Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judg-
ment and remanded the case 145 for further consideration in light of Aontana
v. United States.146 On remand, the Tenth Circuit determined the issue to be
whether a state has the authority to regulate non-Indian hunting on Indian-
owned land within a reservation. The court distinguished Montana as involv-
ing tribal authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on landheld in
fee within a reservation. 14 7 The court instead relied upon the Supreme
Court's holding in Mernon v. Jicari'lla Apache Tribe 148 that an Indian tribe has
the authority to impose a severence tax on non-Indian mining activities on
reservation land as an inherent power necessary to tribal self-government
and territorial management. The Tenth Circuit then reaffirmed its earlier
finding that the tribe's management of wildlife resources on reservation
lands for economic return constituted a matter involving self-government
and internal relations, with which state game regulations would interfere.1
49
Tribes have preemptive authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fish-
ing within reservation boundaries except for non-Indian hunting and fishing
on fee land.
B. Oil and Gas Leasees
Kenai Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Department of lnterior 15 involved the scope of the
Secretary of Interior's discretion to approve or disapprove communitization
plans for oil and gas leases from Indians within a reservation and the review-
ability of the Secretary's decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the Secretary
or his designate may refuse communitization agreements if they do not serve
the best economic interests of Indian lessors, and that this decision is subject
to judicial review. ' 5'
In 1971, Kenai Oil and Gas entered into several oil and gas leases with
142. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 630 F.2d at 731 (citing MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE REVISED
CONST., art. 11, § 1(c)).
143. Pub. L. No. 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28
U.S.C.).
144. 630 F.2d at 733-34.
145. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981).
146. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
147. 677 F.2d at 56.
148. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
149. 677 F.2d at 57.
150. 671 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1982).
151. Id. at 388.
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Ute Indians on lands in the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation in Utah.
The leases, approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, were to expire in ten
years unless the wells on each lease were producing oil or gas in paying
quantities. Shortly before the leases expired the lessee had drilled producing
wells on only some sections of its tribal leases and had one producing well on
non-tribal land within a proposed communitized area.1 5
2  Kenai Oil and
Gas sought to include their non-producing leases on Indian land in a com-
munitized area with at least one producing well, -thereby extending the non-
productive leases beyond the primary term. The Superintendent of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, acting as the Secretary of Interior's designate, exer-
cised his discretionary authority and refused to approve the plan on the
ground it did not serve the best economic interests of the Indians.'
5 3
The district court held that the discretion authorized in the statutory
and regulatory provision rendered the Secretary and his designates immune
from judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).15 4 The
court further held that, if reviewable, the actions were not an abuse of the
Secretary's discretion, nor arbitrary or capricious.
155
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that the
refusal to approve the proposed communitization plans was within the Su-
perintendent's discretion, but held his action to be subject to judicial review.
Citing Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe" 16 for preclusion of judi-
cial review only "in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such
broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply,' 157 the court
recognized a presumption ofjudicial review. The court found the exercise of
the Secretary of Interior's discretion to be governed by the fiduciary respon-
sibilities vested in the United States as trustee of Indian lands.' 58 As such,
the Secretary and his designate are charged with the duty of administering
and supervising oil and gas leases on Indian lands in a manner to return a
152. As described by the court: "Under a communitization agreement, operations con-
ducted anywhere within the unit area are deemed to occur on each lease within the communi-
tized area and production anywhere within the unit is deemed to be produced from each tract
within the unit." Id at 384.
153. Communitization approval is required under 25 U.S.C. § 396(d) (1976):
All operations under any oil, gas, or other mineral lease issued pursuant to the
terms of sections 396a to 396g of this title or any other Act affecting restricted Indian
rands shall be subject to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the
Interior. In the discretion of the said Secretary, any lease for oil or gas issued under
the provisions of sections 396a to 396g of this title shall be made subject to the terms of
any reasonable cooperative unit or other plan approved or prescribed by said Secre-
tary prior or subsequent to the issuance of any such lease which involves the develop-
ment or production of oil or gas from land covered by such lease.
The regulations are contained in 25 C.F.R. § 211.21(b) (1982):
All such leases shall be subject to any cooperative or unit development plan af-
fecting the leased lands that may be required by the Secretary of the Interior, but no
lease shall be included in any cooperative or unit plan without prior approval of the
Secretary of the Interior and consent of the Indian tribe affected.
154. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976). The judicial review procedures of the Act do not apply to
action committed to agency discretion by law.
155. Kenai Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Department of Interior, 522 F. Supp. 521, 535 (D. Utah
1981), a/I'd, 671 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1982).
156. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
157. Id. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)).
158. 671 F.2d at 386.
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profit to the Indians, and in a fiduciary capacity, to provide for the economic
interests of Indian lessors by maximizing lease revenues. S'-" The court held
that these standards of conduct provide the requisite guidelines necessary for
judicial review.
The Tenth Circuit also held that the regulatory provisions under which
communitization plan review is made are broad enough to encompass con-
siderations of the Indians' economic interests. Thus, the Superintendent ac-
ted within his discretion when he rejected the communitization plan for
higher royalty payments and bonuses. Kenai Oil and Gas had argued that
the Secretary could consider only matters involving production and conser-
vation of tribal resources, and was bound to approve those plans that fur-
thered the protection and preservation of tribal natural resources." ' ° The
court emphasized that any such limitation upon the Secretary's deliberations
would be inconsistent with his trust responsibilities, which require broad dis-
cretion to consider all factors affecting the Indians' interests.,'"
The court rejected arguments that the Superintendent's decision was
procedurally defective because he failed to base his decision on relevant fac-
tors and did not undertake additional factfinding. Noting that the Superin-
tendent had consulted with Department of Interior experts and that Kenai
Oil and Gas had presented its communitization proposal only two days prior
to expiration, the court commented that Kenai Oil and Gas could not "ex-
pect greater consultation and deliberation."
16 2
Judge Barrett, concurring, also noted the short period in which the Su-
perintendent was forced to make his decision and suggested a more favorable
result to lessee if communitization proposals were presented in a timely fash-
ion. When there is adequate time to hold hearings on the conservation-
develpment characteristics of the proposed plan, a Superintendent's refusal
to approve a communitization plan having the possibility of realizing a sub-
stantial bonus payment and increased royalty from another lessee would be
contrary to the public interest. Lessees are entitled to rely on the pooling
covenant in a lease when they have expended large sums in completing pro-
ducing wells, and the development of additional wells is feasible. Judge Bar-
rett concluded that Indian interests would be adequately protected by
implied covenants requiring lessee-operators reasonably to develop the
pooled leases and to exercise reasonable diligence in exploration and produc-




In a lengthy, detailed opinion, the Tenth Circuit concluded in Kerr-Mc-
159. Id.
160. Id at 387.
161. Id
162. Id.
163. Id. at 388-89 (Barrett, J., concurring).
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Gee Nuclear Corp. V. NRC 6 4 that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
acted within its authority in promulgating uranium mill tailing regulations
under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978
(UMTRCA) 165 prior to the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) issu-
ance of general radiation standards. The court also concluded that the NRC
had made a reasonable showing of significant risk sufficient to sustain the
regulations.
At issue in Kerr-McGee Nuclear were the NRC's regulations establishing
standards for licensing active uranium mill tailings sites.' 66 The regulations
required mill operators to provide wind protection for tailings; to reduce
toxic material seepage into groundwater; to cover tailings with at least three
meters of earth, reducing radon emanation to a minimal level; to reduce all
airborne effluent releases to levels as low as reasonably achievable during
milling operations; and to establish surety arrangements to ensure continued
compliance with NRC requirements.' 67 Total costs imposed on existing
mills by the regulations were estimated to range from $760,000,000 to
$2,000,000,000.1 68
A health threat posed by tailings used in building materials in Grand
Junction, Colorado, had awakened the public and government agencies to
the dangers of radon produced from tailings. 169 A generic environmental
impact statement (GEIS) undertaken by the NRC in 1975 at the request of
the Natural Resource Defense Council prompted new NRC regulations
which were the predecessors to those under challenge in Kerr-McGee Nuclear.
The early regulations essentially were license conditions imposed by the
NRC, and represented a new approach to controlling uranium mill tailings
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.170 Like the regulations under chal-
lenge, the early 1977 license conditions required mill operators to reduce
wind dispersion of tailings and seepage into groundwater, and to cover tail-
164. Nos. 80-2043, 80-229, 80-2269, 80-2271 (10th Cir. Mar. 23, 1982),reh graned, (Oct. 6,
1982).
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7942 (Supp. IV 1980) (as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
166. 10 C.F.R. § 40 (1982). Among those challenging the regulations were Kerr-McGee
Nuclear Corp., operator of a uranium mill in New Mexico's Grants mineral belt; the American
Mining Congress, a trade association representing nearly all domestic uranium producers;
United Nuclear Corp., operator of a New Mexico mill, and partner in a Grants mineral belt
mill; Western Nuclear, Inc., operator of mills in Wyoming and Washington; Energy Fuels Nu-
clear, Inc., and Phillips Uranium Corp.
167. Id
168. Kerr-AIcGee Nuclear Corp., slip. op. at 43. NRC estimates indicated that the measures
would cost from two percent to four percent of the total uranium mill product price, or from
$760,000,000 to $1,521,000,000. Plaintiffs argued that the regulations would cost more than
7.5% of the product price because of a decline in the product price, or from $880,000,000 to
$2,000,000,000.
169. Congress appropriated funds to the state of Colorado to limit radon exposure from
tailings used in building materials. 86 Stat. 226 (1972).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976). Under the Act, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was
responsible for regulating and licensing the use, possession, and transfer of source material, by-
product material, and special nuclear material. The NRC took over many of the AEC's func-
tions in 1974. Prior to 1978, the NRC's authority over uranium mill tailings was limited to
provisions for mill source material licensing. Because tailings did not fall within one of the three
categories of radioactive material, the NRC's control over tailings ceased upon removal from a
licensed mill or termination of a mill license. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., slip op. at 3-4.
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ings with earth to reduce radon emissions.1 7 1
NRC's regulatory scheme for uranium mill tailings was based on the
GEIS estimate that radon, emanating from uncontrolled tailings, would ac-
count for six thousand additional cancer deaths over the next one thousand
years.' 72 The National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Biological
Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR Committee) determined that although
direct experimental evidence did not show that low-dose radiation, such as
radon emissions, does or does not cause cancer, radon radiation had the po-
tential for causing cancer and genetic mutations. Recognizing that high-
dose radiation has been shown to cause cancer, the BEIR Committee hy-
pothesized that radiation exposure is harmful regardless of its dosage level.
The NRC consequently adopted the view that radiation from uranium mill
tailings should be reduced to a level as low as reasonably achievable.'
73
Plaintiffs challenged the NRC regulations on several grounds. Two sali-
ent assertions were that the NRC had usurped authority vested in the EPA,
and that the NRC had failed to find that the regulations were necessary to
address a significant risk.1
74
1. NRC Authority
Under section 206 of the UMTRCA, 175 the EPA is required to issue
standards of general application to protect the public health and safety, and
the environment from radiological and non-radiological hazards associated
with uranium mill tailings at active sites. 176 The NRC's authority also arises
from the UMTRCA. Under section 206(d), 177 the NRC is required to im-
plement and enforce the EPA standards of general applicability during its
licensing of byproduct materials.' 78 The NRC's licensing authority is set
171. Id. at 6.
172. Id.
173. Id at 5. The BEIR Committee used a linear nonthreshold hypothesis for calculating
deaths attributable to low-dose radiation. That hypothesis, adopted by the NRC, involved cal-
culating extrapolations based upon the known deaths from specific levels of high-dose radiation
and inferring downward to estimate the number of deaths attributable to specific levels of low-
dose radiation. Id.
174. Other challenges included: 1) the NRC exceeded its authority in requiring disposal of
tailings to eliminate the need for active maintenance once mills were decommissioned, 2) the
NRC denied access to and comment on nineteen reports used by the NRC to support the regu-
lations, 3) the NRC's technical criteria were arbitrary and capricious, 4) regulatory costs im-
posed on mill owners and operators failed to bear a reasonable relationship to the risks
addressed, 5) the regulations were tailored to a hypothetical "model mill," and 6) the radiation
standard, ground cover requirement, bar on groundwater degradation, and refusal to allow self-
insurance were deficient for various reasons. Id at 7-8. These challenges were addressed sum-
marily by the court and will not be reviewed here.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2022(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
176. Congress enacted the UMTRCA in November 1978. The EPA regulations were to be
issued within eighteen months after passage of the Act. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., slip op. at 14.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2022(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
178. Id. § 2014(e) defines "byproduct material" as:
(1) any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or made radi-
oactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing
special nuclear material, and (2) the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or




forth in sections 202179 and 205180 of the UMTRCA. Under section 202,
byproduct material licenses issued or renewed by the NRC must contain
site-specific terms to assure that prior to termination of the license, the licen-
see will have complied with NRC standards for uranium mill tailing sites
regarding decontamination, decommissioning, and reclamation. Under sec-
tion 205(a)(1), the NRC is charged with the general duty of ensuring that
uranium tailings are managed in a manner appropriate to protect the public
health and safety and the environment from radiological and non-radiologi-
cal hazards associated with tailings. However, section 205(a)(2)' 8 ' suggests
that the general duty imposed under section 205(a)(1) is limited by the EPA
standards of general applicability since the NRC's management of by-
product material is to be carried out in a manner that "conforms with appli-
cable general standards promulgated by the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency . ...
When the EPA failed to issue standards of general applicability within
the prescribed time, the NRC took the initiative to promulgate the regula-
tions at issue in Kerr-McGee Nuclear. Plaintiffs argued that the statutory
scheme established by section 206 of the Act required the EPA to act first.
Plaintiffs argued that section 205(a)(2) supports the scheme in section 206 by
requiring the NRC's management of uranium mill tailings sites to conform
with the standards of general applicability issued by the EPA; therefore,
Congress intended the EPA to issue its standards before the NRC tailored
site-specific standards for individual licensees. The plaintiff argued the NRC
exceeded its authority by promulgating its regulations prior to the EPA's
issuance of general standards.'8 3 Plaintiffs further supported their position
by attempting to show that historically the NRC has undertaken the licens-
ing role, while the EPA's role has been to promulgate generalized standards.
The NRC argued that its regulations were promulgated under section
202 of the Act, which grants the NRC authority to establish site-specific
standards for licensees, and under the section 205(a)(1) grant of general au-
thority to manage tailings to protect the public health and safety and the
environment.' 8 4 The NRC also noted that langauge in section 108(a) of the
Act,' 8 5 authorizing the Department of Energy to conduct remedial action at
inactive sites but not before promulgation of the EPA standards, was omitted
from those sections specifying the NRC's authority. The NRC also pointed
to legislative history in which Congress stressed the urgency of regulating
active uranium mill sites by November 1981. Congress indicated that the
NRC was to perform a distinct regulatory task in establishing its mill site
licensing standards, not a secondary role to the EPA's issuance of general
standards. Finally, the NRC argued that by waiting for the EPA to issue its
standards, the Commission would have failed to comply with the dictate of
179. Id. § 2113.
180. Id. § 2114(a)(1).
181. Id. § 2114(a)(2).
182. Id.
183. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., slip op. at 16.
184. Id at 19.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 7918 (Supp. IV 1980).
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section 205(a)(1) of the Act, that it ensure proper management of tailings. 186
The Tenth Circuit, briefly reviewing the legislative history of the
UMTRCA, concluded that Congress had been aware of the probability of
the EPA's delay in issuing general standards. Nonetheless, Congress directed
the EPA to promulgate standards for active sites within eighteen months
after enactment. The legislative history indicated Congress' intention that
the problem of active uranium mill tailing sites be addressed quickly. As a
result, the court held that the NRC was compelled to undertake its manage-
rial responsibilities under section 205(a)(1) and its licensing responsibilities
under section 202 without waiting for the EPA to act, for to delay "would
have been at odds with [the NRC's] affirmative duty. '"'8 7
In its holding, the court did not address those statutory provisions of the
UMTRCA which would act to limit the NRC's ability to promulgate tail-
ings standards until the EPA so acted. Furthermore, the court disregarded a
recent congressional enactment' 88 which prohibits the NRC from imple-
menting the challenged regulations with funds appropriated by the subse-
quent legislation.' 89 The court commented that the subsequent legislation,
accompanied by numerous expressions of congressional sentiment that the
NRC had acted too hastily in promulgating its regulations before the EPA
issued its standards, provided little weight in interpreting the intent behind
the earlier enacted UMTRCA. Thus, the court opined, "[w]here there is a
clear expression of legislative intent upon enactment, subsequent statements
by individual members of Congress or its committees are not entitled to be
given overriding significance."' 190 The court found that the UMTRCA
clearly expressed congressional intent that the NRC act before the EPA if
necessary.
The Tenth Circuit's decision is suspect in two respects: the court failed
to address the provisions of the UMTRCA that limit the NRC's authority to
the legislative history and the EPA regulatory scheme, and the dissent con-
vincingly asserted that subsequent legislation on the issue should be given
more weight.' 9' Failure to consider all of the Act's provisions is demon-
strated by the court's reliance on section 205(a)(1) as a general grant of au-
thority to manage tailings sites in a manner appropriate to protect the public
health and safety and the environment. This exclusive reliance ignores the
language of section 205(a)(2), which, contrary to the decision, appears to
186. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., slip op. at 21.
187. Id at 24.
188. Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of 1982, 95 Stat. 1135.
189. Id at 1147 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5801):
Providedfurther, That no funds appropriated to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in
this Act may be used to implement or enforce any portion of the Uranium Mill Licens-
ing Requirements published as the final rules at 45 Federal Register 65521 to 65538 on
October 3, 1980, or to require any State to adopt such requirements in order for the
State to continue to exercise authority under State law for uranium mill and mill
tailings licensing or to exercise any regulatory authority for uranium mill and mill
tailings licensing in any State that has acted to exercise such authority under State
law.
The Act also provided, however, that appropriated funds could be used to regulate by-
product material in the manner and extent permitted prior to Oct. 3, 1980.
190. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., slip op. at 26.
191. Id (Barrett, J., dissenting).
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modify the NRC's affirmative duty by requiring conformity with the EPA
standards. This scheme is consistent with the limiting provisions of section
206(d). Although the court noted that the NRC had given its assurance that
its regulations would conform to later adopted EPA standards, 192 adminis-
trative agency agreements should be given little or no weight in determining
the scope of legislative authority.
Judge Barrett's dissent emphasized that subsequent legislation "is a
clear expression of legislative intent" 193 directed to the UMTRCA, and that
" '[s]ubsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled
to great weight in statutory construction.' ',194 Unlike the majority's por-
trayal of the legislative history of the subsequent legislation as expressing the
sentiments of individual congressmen, thus deserving little weight, passage of
the legislation would seem to be a clear and unified expression by Congress
as a decision-making body that the NRC had exceeded its authority.
2. Significant Risk
In the second prong of its challenge, Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. as-
serted that the NRC had failed to make a finding of significant risk to justify
its regulations. Plaintiffs argued that under Industrial Union Department v.
American Petroleum Institute,' 95 the NRC could impose its regulations only
upon a finding of the necessity to address a significant risk; the Atomic En-
ergy Act does not permit the NRC to address all conceivable risks. 196
Industrial Union Department involved regulations promulgated by the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) that reduced the per-
missible exposure limit to benzene, a common industrial solvent having a
causal connection to cancer, from the standard of ten parts per million to
one part per million. The regulations were promulgated pursuant to
OSHA's authority to protect workers from toxic materials. 19 7 Like the regu-
lations in Kerr-McGee Nuclear, the OSHA regulations were not based on
specific findings that low doses of benzene were carcinogenic. OSHA had
promulgated its low-level exposure standards on the assumption that absent
definite proof of a safe level, "any level above zero presents some increased
risk of cancer."' 9 The Supreme Court, however, interpreted the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970'99 as requiring a showing of significant




194. Id (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969)).
195. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
196. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., slip op. at 8.
197. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976):
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no em-
ployee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the pe-
riod of his working life . ...
198. 448 U.S. at 635-36 (emphasis in original).
199. 29 US.C. § 651 (1976).
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In so holding, the Court relied on the Act's definition of standard as
requiring practices "reasonably necessary" for health and safety. 200 The
Supreme Court then applied the significant-risk-of-harm test to determine if
the regulations were reasonably necessary. 20' A finding of significant harm
must be supported by substantial evidence.
20 2
In Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. the Tenth Circuit concluded that the signifi-
cant risk doctrine is confined to OSHA, or at least to those statutes contain-
ing language of the "reasonably necessary" nature found within the Act; the
doctrine does not apply to the UMTRCA. 20 3 The court also concluded that
the UMTRCA's legislative history regarding significant hazards to the pub-
lic by uranium mill tailings appears "tantamount to a Congressional deter-
mination of 'significant risk' and thus may obviate the need for an
equivalent determination by the NRC."'20 4 The court further held that the
NRC findings as to the risks posed by uranium mill tailings probably would
satisfy the significant risk requirement if it were applicable. 20 5
The determination of a significant risk of harm involves a two-step pro-
cess. First, the agency establishes a specific level of risk of harm as being
significant. The level need only be a reasonable one, or between one in one
thousand and one in one billion. 20 6 Second, the agency determines whether
the risk posed by the conduct to be regulated exceeds that level. Those find-
ings are subject to the "substantial evidence" or "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of review. 20 7 The court held that the NRC probably met the signif-
icant risk test upon its findings that radon released from uncontrolled ura-
nium tailings piles would cause about one additional cancer death in fifty
million, or 5.4 deaths, and one genetic defect in one hundred fifty million, or
two genetic defects, in the United States each year between 1979 and the
year 3000, based upon an estimated population of 293 million. 20 8 Although
the court characterized the risks as seemingly small,20 9 other characteristics




Glover River Organizations v. Department of Interior 2 "t presented the Tenth
200. Id. § 652(8) provides: "The term 'occupational safety and health standard' means a
standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means,
methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or health-
ful employment and places of employment."
201. 448 U.S. at 641.
202. Id at 652-53.
203. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., slip op. at 30.
204. Id at 31.
205. Id. at 32.
206. Id.
207. Id at 35.
208. Id. at 33-34.
209. Natural background radiation may pose a one in twenty thousand risk of cancer. Id at
34.
210. Among the associated hazards contributing to tailings risks are the higher risks faced
by those living near tailings piles and chemical and heavy metal seepage into groundwater. Id
211. 675 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1982).
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Circuit with a challenge to the Secretary of Interior's failure to prepare an
environmental impact statement (EIS) pursuant to the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA)21 2 before listing the leopard darter as a
threatened species and designating its critical habitat under the Endangered
Species Act. 21 3 The challenge was brought by the Glover River Organiza-
tion, a nonprofit Oklahoma corporation devoted to promoting flood control
projects in the Little River Basin of southeastern Oklahoma. Plaintiffs ar-
gued that prior to the government's designations, an EIS should have been
prepared to determine the impact of such action on federal funding for flood
control projects and other federal industry and farm programs in southeast-
ern Oklahoma. 2 14 The organization alleged that the listing would eliminate
appropriations for dams and soil conservation watershed projects for flood
prevention along the Glover Creek and Little River. Many of the organiza-
tion's members had been victims of severe flood damage.
2t 5
The Tenth Circuit applied a two-step test to determine Glover River's
standing. A plaintiff must allege that he has sustained " 'a distinct and pal-
pable injury to himself,' " and that " 'the asserted injury was the conse-
quence of the defendants' actions, or that prospective relief will remove the
harm.' ",216 Applying this test, the court concluded that the first step of the
test was satisfied by plaintiff's allegation of future flooding if dams were not
built. The injury was concrete, not simply speculative or hypothetical.
However, the court held that the second part of the test could be met only by
a substantial showing that the relief requested would redress the injury
claimed. The organization failed to demonstrate by a substantial showing
that a causal link existed between the listing of the leopard darter and the
loss of federal funding to build dams. The court summarized: "Even if the
preparation of an EIS should lead to removal of the leopard darter from the
threatened species list, this would not ensure the funding or construction of
the projects Glover desires. Such relief must come from Congress and the
President, not the Secretary of the Interior. ' ' 21 7 The organization failed to
establish standing.
The challenge in Glover River Organization is certain to provoke reap-
praisals of the scope of NEPA and the future role of the EIS. In essence,
plaintiffs in Glover River Organization employed a "reverse" EIS strategy. Tra-
ditionally, the EIS is used to delay dam construction by demonstrating in-
jury to endangered species and critical habitat. In this case an EIS was
sought to prevent impediment to dam construction by showing injury to
landowners. If future plaintiffs overcome the standing hurdle, the tactic em-
ployed in Clover River Organization may become a popular means of coun-
tering similar delaying strategies used by environmentalists.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
213. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
214. 675 F.2d at 253.
215. Id. at 254.
216. Id. at 253 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 505 (1975)).
217. 675 F.2d at 255.
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VI. WATER LAW
A. Dredge-and-Fill Pennits
Conditions imposed on a nationwide dredge-and-fill permit under sec-
tion 404 of the Clean Water Act 2 18 occasioned a challenge to the Army
Corps of Engineers' authority to control water releases from a dam in River-
side Ir'gation District v. Stipo. 21 9 Riverside Irrigation District and the Public
Service Company of Colorado (PSC) were engaged in a joint project to con-
struct a dam and reservoir on Wildcat Creek, a tributary of the South Platte
River in Colorado. The reservoir water, acquired under state law, was to be
used for irrigation and as a coolant for a coal-fired power plant. Construc-
tion was to proceed under a nationwide dredge-and-fill permit, which autho-
rizes the discharge of dredged or fill material, causing minimal adverse effect
on the environment, into certain waters of the United States.2 20 A nation-
wide permit is automatic for those who qualify; therefore, no individual ap-
plication is necessary for qualified applicants.
After examining the potential impact of the project, the Fish and Wild-
life Service determined that operation of Wildcat Reservoir would likely
jeopardize the existence of the whooping crane, an endangered species, and
adversely modify a fifty-three mile stretch of the crane's critical habitat 300
miles downstream, on the Platte River. 22' The Corps of Engineers notified
Riverside Irrigation District and PSC that the project would not qualify for
a nationwide permit unless steps were taken to mitigate its impact on the
whooping crane and its habitat. Mitigating measures included either replac-
ing the amount of water consumed by Wildcat Reservoir or improving the
whooping crane's habitat along the Platte River in Nebraska.222 Both meas-
ures required a modification of water releases from the reservoir. Failure to
comply with the measures would require Riverside Irrigation District and
218. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
219. 658 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1981).
220. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
221. 658 F.2d at 764.
222. Id at 766. The alternatives were listed by the Fish and Wildlife Service Regional
Director as follows:
The first alternative is for the Corps to condition the Section 404 permit to require
replacement of the additional consumptive use due to the Wildcat Resevoir. Replace-
ment must be done in a manner that closely approximates the flow that would occur if
the reservoir were not constructed. It would be beneficial if the applicant were to
obtain and release this water from a source closer to the critical habitat than the Wild-
cat Reservoir, thereby making the water less vulnerable to diversion upstream from
this habitat; however, this would be left to the applicant's discretion. The volume to
be released might be reduced and the timing altered after conclusion of Department of
Interior studies of the Platte River system ....
The second alternative is for the Corps to require the applicant to improve or
maintain whooping crane habitat along the Platte River. This alternative probably
would include water releases (of a lesser volume than the reservoir would deplete)
combined with land acquisition and habitat manipulation and management. Exam-
ples of habitat practices include clearing and leveling of islands, burning or spraying
of vegetation, and flow regulation designed to increase scouring.
Id (quoting letter from Donald W. Minnich, Regional Director of the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, to Col. D.V. Stipo, District Engineer of the United States Army Corp of Engi-
neers (Dec. 20, 1979)).
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PSC to seek an individual permit, with a full public interest review.
2 23
Riverside Irrigation District and PSC challenged the Corps of Engi-
neers' exercise of authority in district court, asserting that they were entitled
to a nationwide permit and were not required to comply with the mitigation
measures or seek an individual permit. The Corps responded with a motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative reme-
dies.224 The Corps sought to require the irrigation district and PSC to begin
administrative proceedings to seek an individual permit before testing the
nationwide permit issue in court.225 The district court upheld jurisdiction to
review the Corps' action.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the construction per-
mit issue could be tested in a judicial rather than an administrative proceed-
ing. The court concluded that jurisdiction was proper for two reasons. First,
the court noted that the Corps had clearly decided that plaintiffs did not
qualify for a nationwide permit.226 Thus, the official action represented a
final determination on the matter, thereby subjecting the action to judicial
review. Second, the court determined that for plaintiffs to proceed with con-
struction and potentially incur severe criminal and civil penalties was an
unrealistic course of action.22 7 Therefore, plaintiffs were entitled to judicial
review in their search of a remedy.
The Tenth Circuit then narrowed the issue to whether the Corps of
Engineers had exceeded its statutory authority in requiring compliance with
mitigating measures that modified reservoir releases prior to issuing a nation-
wide dredge-and-fill permit. Although the court remanded the issue for de-
termination, it noted that "[n]o one in these proceedings asserts that the
construction work on the dam nor the placement of fill material will in any way
affect the crane habitat. ' ' 22 8 An assessment of the impact of the Wildcat
project on whooping cranes and their habitat was made by the Corps of
Engineers and the Fish and Wildlife Service. The court noted that the agen-
cies' concerns focused on the operation of the Wildcat Reservoir after con-
struction. Thus, the court concluded that the issue was whether the Corps of
Engineers may, pursuant to its authority to issue dredge-and-fill permits, im-
pose conditions on the operational phase of the dam.
229
The resolution of this question on remand will influence the degree of
control that may be exercised pursuant to section 404 of the Clean Water
Act over water rights acquired under state law. Storage rightholders, now
subject to state in-stream flow maintenance restrictions could become subject
to further flow restrictions imposed by the Corps of Engineers. Furthermore,
the Corps' modifications of stream flow conditions could encompass purposes
other than the state's maintenance of priority water rights.
223. 658 F.2d at 766. See 33 C.F.R. § 325 (1981).
224. 658 F.2d at 764.
225. Id at 765.
226. Id at 767.
227. Id.
228. Id (emphasis in original).
229. Id at 768.
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B. Beneficial Use
InJicart'la Apache Tribe v. United States ,230 the Tenth Circuit considered
the validity of an agreement between the Water and Resources Services (for-
merly the Bureau of Reclamation) and the city of Albuquerque. The agree-
ment granted the city permission to store its share of the San Juan-Chama
Project water in Elephant Butte Reservoir. 23 ' The issue was whether the
proposed uses for the stored water constituted a beneficial use under New
Mexico's permit system of prior appropriation. The uses proposed by the
city included present sales to beneficial users, exchanges with other beneficial
users, power generation, municipal use, and recreation.
232
The city contracted for 48,200 acre feet of water per year beginning in
1982. As a result, the city was obligated to repay the federal government its
portion of project construction costs attributable to the city's water supply,
plus interest, and annual operation and maintenance charges. Payment was
required whether or not the city used its allocated water supply. To offset its
costs, Albuquerque sought to put its supply to immediate use even though
the city will not need its full allocation until the year 2025. By that date the
difference between its needs and its accumulated water allocation would to-
tal an estimated 1,121,900 acre feet. It is this "excess" water the city sought
to store and place in use. If the excess water were stored for forty years until
full use by the city, ninety-three percent of the water would be lost to
evaporation.
233
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the city's plans to sell a portion of its water
for present beneficial use and to exchange a portion for other water at a
future time. The court regarded both uses as too speculative to qualify as a
beneficial use because no showing of specific sale or exchange agreements
had been made; a mere hope of sales in the future is not sufficient to estab-
lish a beneficial use. 234 Albuquerque's plans to use the stored water to gen-
erate additional power were also speculative because the city lacked firm
commitments from buyers. 235 Thus, while the court recognized resale, ex-
change, and power generation as beneficial uses under state law, the applica-
tion of the stored water to those uses was too remote or speculative to
constitute a beneficial use.
2 36
The Tenth Circuit then turned its attention to whether recreational use
qualifies as a beneficial use under state or federal law. The court, finding the
issue had not been resolved under state law,23 7 concluded that federal law
230. 657 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1981).
231. Id at 1132-33. The San Juan-Chama Project diverts water from the Navajo River in
Colorado to Elephant Butte Reservoir in New Mexico, about 150 miles downstream from Albu-
querque on the Rio Grande. The project was authorized in 1966 to meet the needs of Albu-
querque and Rio Grande Valley irrigation for "municipal, domestic and industrial uses, and for
providing recreation and fish and wildlife benefits." 43 U.S.C. § 615 (1976).
232. 657 F.2d at 1133.
233. Id Of the 1,121,900 acre feet of water claimed by the city, only 78,811 acre feet would
remain as a result of evaporation during storage. Id. at 1134.
234. Id at 1135.
235. Id at 1136.
236. Id at 1137-38.
237. Id at 1136.
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prohibits water storage for solely recreational purposes. Relying on the au-
thorizing legislation and contemporaneous history of the San Juan-Chama
Project, 238 the court ruled that while recreation and wildlife were among
those activities and resources to be benefited by the project, they constituted
merely incidental uses. Congress intended that water storage serve the pri-
mary purposes of municipal, domestic, and industrial uses in order to qualify
as a beneficial use.
2 39
Ronald L. Wilcox
238. 43 U.S.C. § 615 (1976).




Beginning October 1, 1982, as a result of the Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act of 1982,1 jurisdiction over patent appeals was transferred from the
traditional federal circuit courts of appeals to the newly established United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.2 Although this reorganiza-
tion does not necessarily assure protection for the inventor or the infringer, it
may impose more uniformity and predictability on the patent appeals pro-
cess. As one commentator noted, the present system, with the Second Cir-
cuit upholding only 4.8% of challenged patents and the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits forty percent, encourages forum-shopping.3 Furthermore, this dis-
parity in judgments suggests that either Fourth and Fifth Circuit inventors
are eight times more adept at developing noninfringable patents than those
in the Second Circuit, or that judges are injecting their own philosophical
biases into the age-old controversy of whether creativity should be en-
couraged 4 or whether monopolies should be discouraged.
The loss of patent appeal jurisdiction will have little impact on the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, because in recent years the court adjudi-
cated few infringement cases. During the recent term, for instance, the court
decided only three patent appeals, and one of those5 related only tangen-
tially to the subject. In the other two cases, Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp. 6
and Swift Agricultural Chemicals Corp. v. Farmland Industries, Inc. ,7 the appellate
court did not establish any new standards for judging patentability, but
rather adhered to established criteria. Indeed, Johns-Manville is a veritable
compendium of the current state of patent law.
1. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
2. Section 1295 of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 provides in part:
(a) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive
jurisdiction-
(1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States
• . . I if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section
1338 of this title [28 U.S.C. § 13381 ....
28 U.S.C.A. § 1295(a)(1) (West Supp. 1982). 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976) referred to in this section
authorizes original jurisdiction in the district courts of the United States over patent matters.
3. P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES
449-50 (2d ed. 1981).
4. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides that "[tlhe Congress shall have power .... To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
5. Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer & Assocs., 665 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1981), in
which the plaintiff sought to force a third party, Cybernetic Systems, Inc., to divulge the techni-
cal details of a secret computer program as evidence in an infringement suit. The federal d;s-
trict court judge ordered disclosure and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, noting that the right to an
industrial secret is outweighed by the need for evidence in the infringement suit. Id at 326.
6. 668 F.2d 462 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2298 (1982).
7. 674 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cer. dened, 103 S. Ct. 132 (1982).
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I. THE JOHNS-MANVILLE CASE
A. Facts
Lam, Inc., the plaintiff-appellee injohns-Manville, in 1973 patented a
lighting fixture which permits the use of a high intensity discharge (HID)
lamp without objectionable glare in rooms with average ceiling height. First
developed in the 1930s, the HID lamp uses only one-eighth the energy of
incandescent or fluorescent lights with equivalent luminosity, but because of
objectionable glare its use had been restricted to outdoors or to buildings
with extremely high ceilings. Lam's invention, an elliptical-shaped optical
refractor which projects radiation upwards, then horizontally, essentially
turns the whole ceiling into a large lighting fixture with no glare.8
For several years, Johns-Manville researchers had tried unsuccessfully to
develop an HID lamp equivalent to Lam's. In 1976 Johns-Manville person-
nel acquired a blueprint and a brochure (containing patent right warnings)
of the plaintiff's invention. Within days, Johns-Manville researchers copied
Lam's design, constructed a prototype, and used it to underbid the plaintiff
for a large lighting contract. 9 Before the sale was consummated, Lam noti-
fied Johns-Manville of its infringement, but Johns-Manville "stonewalled,"
threatening the plaintiff with litigation expenses of at least $150,000.10 In
the subsequent suit, the United States District Court for the District of Colo-
rado ruled that Lam's patent was valid, and that Johns-Manville willfully
infringed, awarding treble damages and attorneys' fees, and enjoining Johns-
Manville from further infringement.I Johns-Manville's contentions on ap-
peal, which the Tenth Circuit characterized as only "plausible,"' 2 represent
virtually the entire gamut of infringement defenses. Singularly unimpressed
with the defense's arguments, the court affirmed the district court's
decision. 13
B. The Decision
1. Validity of the Patent
Attacking the validity of the patent, Johns-Manville contended on ap-
peal that the invention was anticipated by prior art "4 the most relevant of
which the patent examiner failed to consider, that the invention was unpat-
8. 668 F.2d at 466-67.
9. Id at 467-68.
10. Id at 475.
11. Id at 465.
12. Id at 475.
13. Id at 476.
14. Id at 468. Sections 102(a) & (b) of the Patent Act of 1952 provide:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless--
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or de-
scribed in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to
the date of the application for patent in the United States ....
35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1976).
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entable because of obviousness,' 5 and that the lighting fixture had been in
public use or for sale for more than a year prior to the patent application.'
6
The Tenth Circuit court rejected all three claims.
17
Although the court agreed that the Patent Act' 8 denies entitlement to a
patent if the invention is anticipated by prior art, 19 it nevertheless upheld
the trial court's finding that the lighting devices cited by the defendant
Johns-Manville were not relevant in the case because they distributed light
differently and were "much less desirable."'20 Satisfied that prior art had not
anticipated the Lam invention, the court analyzed the obviousness claim by
applying the secondary tests specified by the United States Supreme Court
in Graham v. John Deere.2 ' These tests include considerations such as "com-
mercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others .... -22 The
court determined that the Lam invention was not obvious, citing "Lam's, J-
M's Ujohns-Manville's], and McGraw-Edison's difficulty in developing a
[lamp] that would allow use of an HID unit in low-ceilinged rooms, and the
commercial need for the unit, as evidenced by J-M's immediate design of the
CLASSPAK product line, the obvious efficiencies of the unit, and its early
sales success."
23
In response to the defendant's final claim that the plaintiffis lamp had
been in public use for over a year, the court noted that the only exposure of
his invention was to a lighting engineer who evaluated the device.24 Apply-
ing the experimental use doctrine stated in McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys,
Inc. ,25 the court rejected the defense: "It is well settled that '[t]he good faith
use of the device . . . for experimental purposes is not a public use within
the intent and meaning of the statute.' "26
2. Enforceability
Johns-Manville contended Lam's patent was unenforceable because the
15. 688 F.2d at 468. Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 states:
[a] patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not
be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
16. 688 F.2d at 470. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
17. 688 F.2d at 476.
18. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976).
19. Id. § 102(a), (b).
20. 668 F.2d at 469.
21. 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
22. Id It should be noted that there is no particular limit to these so-called tests. One
observer stated that "[t]o characterize these points as 'subtests' tends to obscure the fact that
they are not tests at all, only inferential bases, and that any evidence should be admissible if it
can support the inference of non-obviousness." P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 452.
23. 668 F.2d at 470.
24. Id
25. 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1966).
26. 668 F.2d at 470 (quoting McCullough Tool Co., 343 F.2d at 394). See also Elizabeth v.




inventor failed to reveal relevant prior art and because he misrepresented his
lamp as being utilized in rooms with ceilings as low as eight to nine feet,
when in fact it required a room with a ceiling at least ten feet high. 2 7 The
court, citing its decision in True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp. ,28 agreed
that a patent is unenforceable if it is obtained through fraud or bad faith.
2 9
The court ruled, however, that the prior art the plaintiff failed to reveal was
justifiably considered irrelevant by both Lam's engineer and the patent ex-
aminer.3 0  In addition, the court stated that the only evidence indicating
that the lamp could not be used in rooms with ceilings under ten feet was
sufficiently ambiguous that it would not support a claim of intentional mis-




Johns-Manville claimed that file wrapper estoppel3 3 precluded any
charge that it had infringed3 4 the patent either literally or under the
equivalents doctrine.3 5 The Tenth Circuit ruled that "[w]hether a device
literally infringes or is the equivalent, and whether the patent holder is sub-
ject to file wrapper estoppel are questions of fact. We will not set aside the
trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous."'3 6 Because the court
found that the Johns-Manville device was the equivalent of Lam's invention,
it did not address the question of literal infringement, although it found the
two lamps extremely similar. Johns-Manville emphasized that it character-
ized its reflector bowl's surface as approximating a parabola rather than an
ellipse as claimed in Lam's file wrapper,3 7 but the trial court said the two
surfaces were so similar that "a sharp pencil can hardly differentiate between
the lines of the two bowls." 3 The Tenth Circuit found the evidence sup-
ported the trial court's conclusion that the patent had been infringed, and
27. 668 F.2d at 470-71.
28. 601 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1979).




33. File wrapper estoppel precludes a person in an infringement suit from claiming for his
invention characteristics which he failed to claim in his patent application, or which he surren-
dered to gain approval of his patent by the examiner. Additionally he may not recapture any of
the claims he surrendered by claiming the doctrine of equivalents. See generally Straussler v.
United States, 290 F.2d 827 (Ct. Cl. 1961). See also Note, The Interplay of the Doctn'zes of
Eqwannts and File Wrapper Estoppel, 29 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 917 (1961), for a good discussion
on the relationship between these two concepts.
34. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976) states in part, "whoever without authority makes, uses or sells
any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, in-
fringes the patent."
35. For a thorough discussion of the equivalents doctrine, see generally Graver Tank v.
Linde Air, 339 U.S. 605 (1950). "The theory on which it [equivalentsdoctrine] is founded is
that 'if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substan-
tially the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, form or shape.'" Id
at 608 (quoting Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1878)).
36. 668 F.2d at 472 (citing Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Business Communications, Inc.,
623 F.2d 645, 656 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1066 (1980)).
37. 668 F.2d at 472.






Finally, the Tenth Circuit court held that treble damages were appro-
priate because the infringement was intentional. 4° Observing that Johns-
Manville did not even acquire a copy of Lam's patent before it duplicated
his lamp, the court noted, "for all J-M [Johns-Manville] knew, Lam's surface
may have 'approximated a parabola.' Later, when Lam claimed infringe-
ment, J-M was able to develop plausible arguments for no infringement.
4 1
The court further suggested that the defendant may have evidenced bad
faith by threatening the plaintiff with $150,000 litigation expenses if it pur-
sued its claim. The court said, "[wihile we hesitate to attribute too much to
statements made during heated discussions, like the trial court we find offen-
sive such threats by a large company to a small one."
'42
II. THE SWIFT CASE
In Swi Agricultural Chemicals Corp. v. Farmland Industries, Inc. ,'43 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court decision a a declaring the pat-
ent holder's patent invalid for obviousness and anticipation, and ruling that
even if the patent had been valid, there was no infringement because of file
wrapper estoppel. Previously the patent holder had prevailed in an infringe-
ment action involving the same patent.
4 5
Swift's patent involved a process for making ammonium polyphosphate
(APP), a fertilizer, from phosphoric acid. The defendant's process used
superphosphoric acid. Because Swift, in its patent application specifically
designated its process as using ordinary phosphoric acid rather than
superphosphoric acid, the court determined that the patent, even if it were
valid, was not infringed because of file wrapper estoppel.A
In affirming the invalidity of the Swift patent for producing APP, the
appeals court cited five patented processes extant at the time the appellant
developed his method.4 7 All involved procedures for reacting the same
39. Id at 474.
40. Id at 476. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate
to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for
the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed
by the court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either
event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or
assessed.
41. Id
42. Id at 475.
43. 674 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), ceri. denied, 103 S. Ct. 132 (1982).
44. Swift Agricultural Chem. Corp. v. Farmland Indus. Corp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 1295 (D.
Kan. 1980), afd, 674 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1982).
45. Swift Chem. Co. v. Usamex Fertilizers, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 10 (E.D. La. 1977) (Usamex
1); Swift Chem. Co. v. Usamex Fertilizers, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. La. 1980) (Usamex II),
aed, 646 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1981).
46. 674 F.2d at 1353. For a discussion of file wrapper estoppel, see supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
47. Id at 1353-55.
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chemicals in very similar manners to produce APP. Thus, the court ruled
Swift's patent invalid because it was anticipated by prior art, or with differ-








During the period covered by this survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals was presented with five cases to review under the Securities Act of
1933 (1933 Act)1 and the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 1934
(1934 Act). 2 In four published opinions, 3 the court followed established
precedents and clarified its position on scienter, statutes of limitations, and
damages. Specifically, the court found reckless behavior sufficient to satisfy
the scienter requirement of Rule lOb-5; 4 required scienter to be pleaded and
proved in an SEC injunction action;5 delineated the nature of due diligence
required to toll the statute of limitations;6 and clarified the extent to which a
benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages is appropriate in Rule lOb-5
violations.
7
I. RECKLESS BEHAVIOR SATISFIES SCIENTER
REQUIREMENT OF RULE 10B-5
In Hackbart v. Holmes' the most notable decision of the past year, the
court found reckless conduct sufficient to establish the necessary element of
scienter required by Rule 10b-5. 9 Hackbart, the plaintiff, in alleging securi-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
3. Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Mick Stack Assoc., 675
F.2d 1148 (10th Cir. 1982); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Has-
well, 654 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1981).
In an unpublished opinion, Hyden v. Baxter, Nos. 79-1670, 79-1671 (10th Cir. Sept. 30,
1981), the Tenth Circuit court affirmed the district court's finding of a violation of the registra-
tion provisions of the 1933 Act. The defendant, an owner of a working interest in certain oil
and gas leases, sold fractional interests in the operation to numerous investors who previously
had participated in an uncompleted project on the same properties. The court upheld the trial
court's findings that the defendant had entered into a new agreement with the previous opera-
tors, and had not merely succeeded to an assignment.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the interest sold was not a security. However, be-
cause the interests sold were fractional undivided interests in oil and gas, they were specifically
covered by the 1933 Act's definition of a security. The court held that the interests would also
qualify as an investment contract, subject to registration requirements. Id. slip op. at 7. Be-
cause defendant had entered into a new agreement with the former operators, he had sold
rather than exchanged securities with existing holders. This sale brought his actions within the
definition of "issuer" under 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1), (4) (1976). Hydmn, slip op. at 6. The transaction
was not exempt from registration because the court characterized the transaction as a sale and
not an exchange. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (Supp. V 1981) (providing an exemption for an
issuer who merely exchanges securities with its existing security holders). Cross-appeals alleging
error for dismissing claims against a third party and for failure to award attorneys' fees and
costs were rejected. Hyden, slip op. at 8, 11.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1982); see Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1148 (10th Cir. 1982).
5. Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Mick Stack Assoc., 675
F.2d 1148 (10th Cir. 1982).
6. Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1982); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d
1114 (10th Cir. 1982).
7. Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982).
8. Id
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982) provides:
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ties fraud under Rule lOb-5 sought to recover "his share" of a tire wholesal-
ing company in which he had invested. Hackbart was a friend and former
football teammate of the defendant Holmes. In late 1971, knowing that
Hackbart's football career was nearly over, Holmes presented him with the
possibility of forming a partnership to operate a Denver tire dealership. Ini-
tially, an equal partnership was agreed upon, but Holmes later insisted on
fifty-one percent ownership to maintain control.10 The defendant agreed
with his attorney's proposal to issue Hackbart preferred stock. This pre-
ferred stock was void of any preferences that would allow Hackbart to share
in corporate growth. Once Hackbart proved his business acumen, the board
of directors, controlled by the defendant, would convert the preferred stock
to common stock. Neither the defendant nor his attorney adequately ex-
plained the significance of this change to the plaintiff. I I
The business prospered, evidenced by the addition of new stores. In
1977, the two had a "falling out," and they decided that Hackbart would
not remain with the corporation. ' 2 The plaintiff requested "his share" of the
corporate growth, but discovered that he was entitled only to his original
contribution. t3
The trial court held that the defendant's failure to explain clearly the
rights of the preferred stock was a "manipulative or deceptive device" pro-
scribed by Rule lOb-5.t 4 The court also concluded that recklessness satisfied
Rule lOb-5's scienter requirements, and that the defendant acted recklessly
in not assuring the plaintiff's understanding of the new terms of the deal.' 5
The recognition of an implied private right of action for damages under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in 194616 began a trend toward a liberal inter-
pretation of the proscription found in the federal securities laws. This liberal
interpretation resulted from the perception that the securities laws are reme-
dial and are to be construed flexibly in order to protect investors.' 7 Never-
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
10. 675 F.2d at 1118.
11. Id The defendant relied upon his attorney to explain the effect of the issuance of pre-
ferred stock, instead of the common stock originally agreed upon. The trial court found the
attorney's explanation inadequate. Id




16. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme
Court has never directly ruled on this issue. It has, however, recognized the existence of the
implied right on several occasions. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Tcher-
epnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
17. See Note,Juat:al Retrenchment Under Rule 10b-5 An End to the Rule as Law?, 1976 DUKE
L. J. 789, 792-94 [hereinafter Juat;'cil Retrenchment]; Note, Recklessness and the Rule /0b-5 Scienter
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theless, beginning with the 1975 term, the Supreme Court has been
retrenching from its position. '8 In a number of successive decisions the Court
has made it clear that the previous expansion of the class of plaintiffs who
may sue under Rule lOb-5 will no longer be countenanced.' 9
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
20
three circuits had adopted a negligence standard for Rule lob-5 private
damage actions. 2 1 Although not specifically rejecting a negligence standard,
the Hochfelder Court avoided an approach that would allow for flexible con-
struction of Rule lOb-5. The Court relied entirely on statutory construction
and congressional intent to establish that a finding of scienter 22 was a neces-
sary prerequisite to liability under Rule lOb-5. 23 The Court concluded that
negligence did not satisfy the standard, but specifically reserved the question
whether recklessness was sufficient conduct to fall under Rule lob-5. 24 Sub-
sequent to Hochfelder, the federal appellate courts addressing the issue have
overwhelmingly agreed that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement.
25
Until Hackbart, the Tenth Circuit court never directly addressed the is-
sue of whether reckless conduct was sufficient to meet the scienter require-
ment of Rule l0b-5. In affirming the trial court's decision in Hackbart, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that proof of reckless behavior
Standard After Hochfelder, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 817, 817 n. 1 (1980) [hereinafter Recklessness and
Rule /0b-5]. See also Spence, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5. The Supreme Court Acts to Curb a
Burgeoning Source of Liability, 52 L.A.B.J. 326 (1977).
18. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Supreme Court
held that only actual purchasers or sellers of securities could maintain a private damages action
under Rule lOb-5.
19. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hocifelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See generally
Kaler, Seenter After Hochfelder: Recklessness as a Standard in Rule 10b-5 Private Damage Actions, 6 J.
CORP. L. 337 (1981); NoteJudicial Retrenchment, supra note 17, at 794-800.
20. 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976).
21. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), reu'd, 425 U.S. 185 (1976);
White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970). These decisions relied on the "remedial nature" rationale
of earlier Supreme Court decisions. See Kaler, supra note 19, at 339. The tendency for defini-
tions of recklessness to merge into that of mere negligence also has been cited as a reason for the
departure from the requirements of common law fraud. See Newton, The Limits of Liability.
RecentJudicial Restrictions on Rule /0b-5, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 63, 90 (1978) and supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
22. The term scienter derives from the common law tort of deceit. Scienter in this context
is the "intent to deceive, to mislead, to convey a false impression." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 700 (4th ed. 1971). It was this element that was stressed in the
seminal English stock fraud case of Derry v. Peek, 14 A.C. 337 (1889). There, scienter was held
to be satisfied by knowledge that the representation was false or a reckless disregard for its truth
or falsity. Id at 374 (per Lord Herschell).
23. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12. The Hochfelder Court defined scienter as it is applicable to
actions under the federal securities laws as a "mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipu-
late, or defraud." Id.
24. Id
25. Se G. A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1981); McLean v.
Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017
(6th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978);
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978);
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp. 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875
(1977).
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was sufficient. 26 The court adopted the recklessness standard for the same
reasons given by other circuits: 27 the securities acts require broad construc-
tion to achieve their remedial goals; 28 the burden of proving intent would be
onerous;29 the securities acts were intended to proscribe actions akin to com-
mon law fraud;30 and proof of reckless behavior satisfies the scienter require-
ment of common law fraud.3 1  The court's adoption of the recklessness
standard is hardly surprising. Although confusion exists over the proper in-
terpretation of some early cases, the Tenth Circuit court's adoption of this
standard follows logically from a long trend that has required culpability
greater than negligence, 32 but less than outright intent. 33 The question re-
26. 675 F.2d at 1117.
27. Id at 1117-18.
28. Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 (6th Cir. 1979) (citing Affil-
iated Ute Citizens v. United States, 408 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)). In light of the recent change in
Supreme Court policy, the continued validity of this rationale is to be questioned. See supra text
accompanying notes 19-20, 22-23.
29. G. A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1981).
30. See Ernst &Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212 n.32 (legislative history shows SEC believed the rule
would proscribe fraudulent behavior); see also supra note 21.
31. Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1024.
32. Early Tenth Circuit cases often are interpreted as holding that negligence was suffi-
cient. See generally Note, Evolving Standards of Personal Liability and Scienter Under Rule lOb-5, 16
WASHBURN L.J. 344, 357-58 (1977). Later cases implicitly adopted a reckless standard.
In Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965), the court held that "[ilt is not neces-
sary to allege or prove common law fraud to make out a case under the statute and rule. It is
only necessary to prove one of the prohibited actions such as the material misstatement of fact
or the omission to state a material fact." Id. at 379.
Several years later, the court opined:
One is not to be held liable, however, because of his misleading misrepresentation or
omission of material fact, the truth of the matter being unknown to the purchaser, if
the party responsible for the misrepresentation or omission sustains the burden of
proving that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known that
it was a misrepresentation or ommstsion. (Emphasis added).
Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 (10th Cir. 1970). Although the court mentioned scienter,
the language definitely sounds like negligence. In fairness, Gilbert was confusing because of the
court's attempt to reconcile § 12(2) of the 1933 Act with the requirements of Rule lOb-5. Id. at
356-57. However, in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971), the court specifically adopted the language of Gilbert as applied to Rule
lOb-5 actions. 446 F.2d at 102. The court prefaced its holding with the statement that some
degree of scienter was required. (Mitchell also rejected application of the State Blue Sky Law
statute of limitations in favor of the applicable state limitation period for fraud, because fraud
required scienter. Id at 103-04).
In Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. dented, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975), the
Tenth Circuit court attempted to explain and harmonize the earlier cases. This opinion recog-
nized and explicitly rejected the negligence interpretations of the earlier cases. The analysis
largely limited the broad language of each case to that case's specific facts. 507 F.2d at 1355-61.
This clarification of the Tenth Circuit's did not solve the entire problem. It remained for the
court to embrace recklessness as sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement.
Recklessness was implicitly recognized by the court as sufficient on four separate occasions
prior to Hackbart. In Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977), the court stated that "[w]illful or intentional misconduct or the
equivalent thereof [are] essential to recovery" in a Rule lOb-5 action. 549 F.2d at 169 (emphasis
added).
In Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1979), a case involving SEC
suspension of a broker-dealer for violations of the 1933 Act, the court noted that a finding of
recklessness in an action under that Act was in accordance with the Hochfelder decision. Id at
596-97.
In Wertheim & Co. v. Codding Embryological Sciences, Inc., 620 F.2d 764 (10th Cir.
1980), the court acknowledged that other circuits had recognized recklessness as equivalent to
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mained, however, of how to define recklessness.
The definitions of recklessness adopted by the circuits have not been
uniform. 34 The dissemblance arises from Hochfelder's ambiguous definition
of scienter. Justice Powell, writing for the Hochfelder majority, first defined
scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud. ' '35 Later in the opinion, Justice Powell also stated that the language
of section 10(b) strongly suggested it was intended to proscribe "knowing or
intentional misconduct."' 36  Thus, after Hochfeldr, scienter would seem to
include at least two criteria: knowledge and state of mind.3 7 With such
ambiguity surrounding the definition of scienter, interpreting and applying
a standard of recklessness has been a dilemma for circuit courts of appeal.
3 8
The different approaches by the circuits led to a number of formula-
tions, the typologies for which are almost as varied as the formulations them-
selves, and have been the subject of much comment.3 9 Among the many
formulations are objective, fixed standards and flexible standards. An objec-
tive, fixed standard is considered preferable to a flexible, factoral analysis
because it allows for certainty, predictability, ease of application, and satis-
fies policy considerations. 40 If one conceptualizes culpability as a continuum
ascending from purely innocent conduct, through negligence, reckless behav-
ior, knowing, and intentional action, the problem is exactly where reckless-
ness fits on this line between negligent and knowing conduct.
scienter under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, because recklessness was "closer to being a
lesser form of intent than merely a greater degree of ordinary negligence," the trial court's
finding of negligence invalidated any reckless conduct argument. Id at 767 (citing Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977)).
Recently, in Cronin v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980), the
court noted that evidence of intent or recklessness was essential to establish scienter. Id. at 862.
33. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971). See Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 595-96 (10th Cir. 1979)
(knowledge equated with willful action).
34. See generally Recklessness and Rule lOb-5, supra note 17, at 819.
35. 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12.
36. Id at 197.
37. See Kaler, supra note 19, at 342-43. Kaler adds a third criterion, duty, based on: the
Seventh Circuit's ratto decidendi in favor of the plaintiff, Hochfelder; a footnote in the majority's
opinion (see 425 U.S. at 214-16 n.33); and the grounds for Justice Blackmun's Hochfelder dissent
(425 U.S. at 215-18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
38. Kaler, supra note 19, at 343.
39. See id. at 344-51 (should have known, must have known, carelessness, and flexible duty
standards); Steinberg & Gruenbaum, Variations of "Recklessness" After Hochfelder and Aaron, 8
SEC. REG. L.J. 179, 191-208 (1980) (barely reckless, highly reckless, pre-Hochfelder, and flexible
duty standards); Recklessness and Rule lOb-5, supra note 17, at 819 n.8 (fiduciary duty, should have
known, must have known, and flexible duty standards).
40. The Ninth Circuit at one time subscribed to a flexible duty standard comprised of five
factors to be considered by juries in determining the duty owed by a Rule IOb-5 defendant. See
White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). Such a standard results in scienter requirements
which vary from case to case depending on the facts. See Steinberg & Gruenbaum, supra note
39, at 203-04. Insofar as the standard contemplated is negligence, its use was proscribed by
Hochfelder. Nevertheless, there is still uncertainty regarding the status of the flexible duty stan-
dard. Id at 203-08. Further, inasmuch as Blue Chip Stamps, Hochfelder, and Chiarella reflect the
Supreme Court's attempts to provide more certainty under Rule 1Ob-3 through a series of sub-
stantive pronouncements and a departure from previous liberal interpretations of the securities
laws, the flexible duty analysis appears similarly incompatible. See.Ruder,judicial Developments
Under Rule lob-5. Standing, Sienter, Reliance, Materiality and Implied Rtghts ofAction, 7 INST. SEC.
REG. 303 (1976) and supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
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Under common law fraud, recklessness is best seen as a species of im-
puted knowing conduct. 4' The actor's knowledge of the truth of his state-
ments is implied from the objective circumstances surrounding his
conduct.4 2 The theoretical distinctions may thus be described as: the negli-
gent actor should have known; the reckless actor must have known; the
knowing actor had actual knowledge. 43 The most prevalent definition of
recklessness among the circuits reflects this common law classification:
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omis-
sion, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable, negligence,
but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and
which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is
either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must
have been aware of it.
4 4
Theoretically, 4 5 this definition has several merits. The "must have known"
language clearly distinguishes recklessness from negligence, and actual proof
of subjective knowledge is not required. Constructive knowledge may be
imputed from the surrounding objective circumstances. The definition satis-
fies the requirements of objectivity and predictability, while not imposing on
plaintiffs the onerous burden of proving a defendant's subjective state of
mind, thus striking an equitable balance. 46 Furthermore, because the defini-
tion "comes closer to being a lesser form of intent than merely a greater
degree of ordinary negligence," 4 7 it should reduce the size of the potential
class of Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs, comporting with the recent shift in judicial
policy. 48 This definition, with minor variations, has been adopted by six
circuits.
49
The Hackbart court noted that its previous decisions implicitly accepted
reckless behavior as sufficient to meet the scienter requirement. Thus, it had
no difficulty explicitly adopting this standard. The court then found that
the prevalent definition of reckless behavior was the best definition and
adopted it. 50
41. See Recklessness and Rule Iob-5, supra note 17, at 823-24.
42. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 107 at 701.
43. See Recklessness and Rule Ob-5, supra note 17, at 824-25.
44. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting
Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 429 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
45. From a practical standpoint, proof of the defendant's subjective state of mind proceeds
from objective evidence. Although an honest belief that the representation is true negates the
required finding of scienter, the unreasonableness of the belief is most often strong evidence that
it does not exist. See W. PRossER, supra note 22, § 107 at 701. This focus on the reasonableness
of belief results in a blurring of the distinction between negligence and recklessness. See Newton,
supra note 21, at 90. Accord Note, supra note 32, at 351.
46. See Recklessness and Rule Iob-5, supra note 17, at 837.
47. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977).
48. See Steinberg & Gruenbaum, supra note 39, at 198, and supra text accompanying notes
19-20.
49. See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961 (5th Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 454
U.S. 965 (1981); McClean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Pres-
cott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977). It was adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Hackbart, 675 F.2d
at 1118.
50. 675 F.2d at 1118.
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In applying this definition, the Hackbarl court closely examined the trial
court's factual finding of recklessness. 5' Under the particular facts presented
by the case, the court had little difficulty in its task. As the trial court found,
neither Holmes nor his attorney explicitly informed Hackbart of the non-
participating nature of his stock.5 2 Furthermore, neither the articles of in-
corporation, the share certificates, nor any other corporate document ade-
quately described the stocks' rights or preferences, 53 thus failing to comply
with Colorado law. 54 Additionally, Hackbart's share certificates indicated
he owned common stock. 55 The first financial statement of the corporation
showed only common stock outstanding. 56 Hackbart testified that Holmes
showed him the original financial statement and, pointing to the equity sec-
tion, told him that his share of the company had increased. 57 The trial court
concluded that neither the discussions between the parties nor the docu-
ments available to the plaintiff provided adequate notice of the plaintiff's
rights, or the extent to which the original deal had been changed.5
After reversing the trial court's findings of fact, the court determined
that Holmes' behavior presented such an obvious danger of misleading the
plaintiff that Holmes must have been aware of it.5 9 Holmes knew the plain-
tiff expected to share in the ownership of the corporation, but failed to ex-
plain adequately the change in plans. Furthermore, Holmes knew the
plaintiff was naive in business affairs, but made no effort to ascertain if he
understood the terms of the deal, or verify the accuracy of the corporate
documents. Under these circumstances, the court had no difficulty uphold-
ing the trial court's finding that Holmes acted with reckless disregard for the
truth.60
In Loveridge v. .Dreagoux,6 1 the defendants sold the plaintiffs the last two
debentures in a series of twenty debentures for $5000 each. Proceeds from
the sale were to be used to finance a joint venture to import commodities
from the Philippines.6 2 Although the plaintiffs received the last numbered
debentures, only one other was sold. The proceeds of the sale were utilized
before the defendants ever engaged in the intended business. The trial court
found the defendants' action in connection with this sale to be in violation of
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
63
51. As a finding of fact, it would not be disturbed upon appeal unless clearly erroneous. Id.
52. Id
53. Id at 1119.
54. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-2-102(e) (1973) requires that the articles of incorporation con-
tain a statement of the preferences, limitations, and relative rights of each class of stock. Section
7-4-108(2) requires that each share certificate set forth a full statement of the designations, pref-
erences, limitations, and relative rights of the shares of each class of stock to be issued.
55. 675 F.2d at 1119. The trial court found, however, that this was the result of clerical
error and not intentional. Id
56. Id at 1119-20. The shareholder's equity section was corrected on later financial state-
ments. d
57. Id
58. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
59. 675 F.2d at 1120.
60. Id
61. 678 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1982).




On appeal, the defendants argued that there had been no finding of
scienter. After disposing of a jurisdictional question, 64 the Tenth Circuit re-
sponded that under the facts of the case, a specific finding of scienter was
unnecessary. 6 5 The trial court had made several findings of the defendants'
knowing misrepresentations. These included the defendants' representations
that all, not one, of the earlier numbered debentures had been sold;6 6 his
representations that the corporation was formally organized when actual in-
corporation took place subsequent to the sale;6 7 and representations that the
proceeds would be used to lease ships, when in reality the money was utilized
to pay pre-incorporation expenses. 68 Under these specific facts, the court
found implicit in the trial court's findings that the defendant either knew of
the falsity of the information or acted in reckless disregard of its truth and
with the intent to deceive or mislead the plaintiffs. A specific finding by the
trial court that scienter had been established was not necessary.
69
II. SCIENTER AND SEC INJUNCTIVE ACTIONS
In two brief opinions, the Tenth Circuit had its first opportunity to ap-
ply the rule laid down inAaron v. SEC.70 The Aaron Court held that proof of
scienter was a requisite element when the SEC seeks to enjoin violations of
section 17(a)(l) of the 1934 Act, 7' section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule
lOb-5. Scienter was found not to be a requirement under sections 17(a)(2)
and (a)(3). 72 However, the Court noted that scienter was not to be disre-
garded in connection with section 17(a)(2) and (a)(3) actions. In order for
the SEC to enjoin future violations of these sections, Aaron requires the
charging party to establish that the future violations of the law are likely to
occur. The degree of intentional wrongdoing in the defendant's past behav-
ior is an important element in proving the likelihood of future violations.
District courts were counseled by the Aaron opinion that they might appro-
priately consider scienter (or the lack of it) when exercising their equitable
64. Defendants argued that their contacts with the plaintiffs by intrastate telephone calls
were insufficient to establish that interstate commerce was involved. The court rejected this
argument, 678 F.2d at 873-74 (citing Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.
1974)).
65. 678 F.2d at 876.
66. Id. at 875.
67. Id.
68. Id
69. Id at 876.
70. 446 U.S. 680 (1980). The two Tenth Circuit cases were submitted on appeal prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Aaron.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 7 7q (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
72. Id. § 77 q(a)(2), (3).
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discretion in deciding whether to issue an injunction. 73
In SEC v. Haswell,74 the defendant was charged with violating section
17(a) and the registration provisions of the 1933 Act 75 and the anti-fraud
provisions of the 1934 Act. 76 The Commission sought to enjoin those viola-
tions. 77 The district court, anticipating the Supreme Court's holding in
Aaron, concluded that proof of scienter was required before a court could
enjoin the violations. The district court found that the defendant had not
violated any of the provisions. Furthermore, the district court held that even
if the defendant had violated the securities laws, an injunction would be
denied because there was no reasonable likelihood the defendant's behavior
would be repeated.
78
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found the issue squarely settled by
Aaron. 79 The fact the trial court had failed to differentiate between section
17(a)(1) requiring scienter and sections 17(a)(2) and (a) (3), not requiring sci-
enter, did not compel reversal. The court relied on language in Aaron dis-
cussing the relevance of scienter in actions under sections 17(a) (2) and (a) (3)
to prove the likelihood of future violations80 The court summarized the
Aaron Court's treatment of this issue: "The presence or absence of scienter in
a defendant's past conduct, even if that conduct constitutes a violation of the
securities laws absent scienter, is a circumstance which bears heavily on a
district court's decision to issue an injunction.""'
The court found additional support from Chief Justice Burger's concur-
rence in Aaron.8 2 The Chief Justice wrote that in order to prove the reason-
able likelihood of repeated wrongs, "it would almost always be necessary to
demonstrate that the defendant's past sins have been the result of more than
negligence." 8 3 Applying these principles, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
even assuming the defendant had violated sections 17(a)(2) and (a)(3), the
trial court's finding that the defendant lacked scienter sufficiently supported
the denial of the injunction.
8 4
Similarly, in SEC v. Mik Stack Associates,85 the Tenth Circuit applied
the Aaron principles and remanded the case. The district court had granted
summary judgment and injunctive relief in the section 10(b), Rule lOb-5,
and Rule lOb-13 8 6 action prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Aaron.
73. Id at 701.
74. 654 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1981).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (c) (1976).
76. Id. § 78j.
77. Authority to seek injunctive relief is provided under § 20(b) of the 1933 Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 77t(b) (1976)) and § 21(d) of the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C. § 78u(d). (1976)).
78. 654 F.2d at 698-99. When the Commission seeks an injunction barring future actions
that "will constitute" a violation of § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3), there must be proof that a future
violation will occur. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 702.
79. 654 F.2d at 699.
80. See supra text accompanying note 65.
81. 654 F.2d at 699.
82. Id at 700. See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 702 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
83. Id. at 703.
84. 654 F.2d at 700.
85. 675 F.2d 1148 (10th Cir. 1982).
86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1982). This rule prohibits a person who has made a tender
1983]
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However, the SEC had not alleged scienter in its complaint, nor had the
district court made specific findings of scienter. 8 7 In light of the Aaron re-
quirement that scienter be pleaded and proven in a section 10(b) action, the
court remanded for a determination of whether the pleadings could "be
amended to permit appropriate allegations."88 The court required specific
findings regarding the presence of scienter.
The court also held that, on remand the SEC must prove scienter with
respect to the alleged Rule lOb-13 violation. 89 This issue was not addressed
in Aaron. The Tenth Circuit used reasoning from Hochfelder to arrive at its
conclusion. The Hochfelder Court found that because the SEC's rulemaking
powers were derived from the authority of section 10(b), that section's re-
quirement of scienter applied equally to rules promulgated under its author-
ity. The Tenth Circuit found such reasoning was applicable where the
Commission had alleged manipulation and deceptive practices under section
10(b) through open market purchases during a tender offer.9° The court
failed to address whether a showing of scienter was required "to sustain all
alleged violations of Rule 10b-13 absent specific allegations of manipulative
and deceptive practices in connection with open market purchases of the
target's securities during an announced tender offer." 91
III. DUE DILIGENCE AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In both Hackbart v. Holmes92 and Loveridge v. Dreagoux,93 the defendants
contended that the applicable statute of limitations barred the actions. De-
fendants argued that the plaintiffs had, or by exercise of due diligence should
have, discovered the facts constituting the fraud at a much earlier date. In
both cases, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district courts' findings that the
actions were not barred.
Both section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 contain no specific statute of limita-
tions provision. Suits brought under these federal laws are subject to the
limitations period for actions of the same type in the state where the alleged
violation occurred.9 4 This follows from the rule that state statutes govern
limitations on federal causes of action unless Congress has specifically pro-
vided otherwise. 95 In determining the applicable limitations period, states
offer for a company's shares from purchasing that company's shares on the open market during
the pending tender offer.
87. "When the substantive law changes while a case is pending appeal, the general rule
requires that the appellate court apply the law in effect at the time the appeal is to be decided,
so long as manifest in justice does not occur." 675 F.2d at 1149. See also Bradley v. Richmond
School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711-21 (1974); Key v. Rutherford, 645 F.2d 880, 883 (10th Cir. 1981).
88. 675F.2d at 1150.
89. Id at 1150 n.1.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982).
93. 678 F.2d 870 (lOth Cir. 1982).
94. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976); Hackbart v. Holmes,
675 F.2d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 1982); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036,
1041 (10th Cir. 1980).
95. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); M'Cluny v. Sillerman, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
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choose between their respective Blue Sky Laws or fraud statutes. The deci-
sion rests upon which statute bears the closest resemblance to the particular
federal statute involved.96 Although the factors considered in selecting the
appropriate limitations period are fairly well agreed upon, their application
yields different results.
9 7
In Hackbart the parties had agreed that Colorado's three-year statute of
limitations for fraud applied.98 Under this statute, the limitations period
begins the day the fraud was committed. The court noted that there was
uncertainty over whether Colorado or federal law governed the tolling of the
statute. However, under both Colorado and federal law, the limitations pe-
riod is tolled until the aggrieved party either learns of the fraud, or should
have discovered it through reasonable diligence.99 Hackbart asserted that
he did not learn of his lack of equity ownership until 1977, when he and
Holmes terminated their relationship. Holmes argued that if Hackbart had
exercised reasonable diligence, he would have discovered the nature of his
ownership at the time he purchased the stock, which was 1972, well beyond
the three-year limitations period.' 00
The trial court found that Hackbart did not learn the true nature of his
ownership interest until February 1977, and assessed damages as of that
date.' 0 ' The Tenth Circuit found that the trial court implicitly concluded
that Hackbart would not have discovered the fraud earlier.10 2 The court
96. See Comment, Whether the Statute of Limitations for Common Law Fraud on the Blue Sky
Limitation Period Should be Appled in a Federal Securities Claim is Decided by Determining Which State
Cause ofAction Bears the Closest Resemblance to the Federal Cause ofAction Created Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 10(b) andRule lOb-5-IDS Progressive Fund Inc. v. First of Mich. Corp., 4
N. Ky. L. REV. 175 (1977).
97. Id. at 177. For examples of circuits applying state fraud statutes see Aldrich v. McCul-
loch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980); Nickels v. Koehler Mgt. Corp., 541 F.2d
611 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973); Klein v. Shields & Co., 470 F.2d 1344 (2d Cir. 1972);
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
For examples of federal appellate courts applying state Blue Sky Laws, see Fox v. Kane-
Miller Corp., 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976); In re Alodex Corp., 533 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1976),
Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1976),cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042
(1977).
98. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 13-80-108, -109 (1973). Colorado's blue sky analogue to § 10(b),
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-123 (Supp. 1981), does not provide for any specific statute of limita-
tions. However, CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-106 (1973) provides for a two-year statute of limita-
tions for all actions founded upon a federal statute, or the period specified for comparable
actions under Colorado law, whichever is longer. As a result, courts interpreting the scheme
have applied the three-year period prescribed by the state fraud statutes CoLo. REV. STAT.
§§ 13-80-108, -109 (1973). See Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402
(D. Colo. 1979) af'd, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
99. Hackbart, 675 F.2d at 1120. The court cited Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d
1036, 1041 (10th Cir. 1980), for the proposition that the law was unsettled regarding the appli-
cability of federal or state law to tolling. The confusion arises from Board of Regents v. Tomi-
ano, 446 U.S. 478 (1980). The Supreme Court in Tomiano held that in a civil rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts must apply both state statutes of limitations and state tolling princi-
ples. The Tenth Circuit in Ohio v. Peterson Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981), expressly decided that Tomiano applied only to civil rights
actions and that federal tolling rules applied in cases under the federal securities acts. 651 F.2d
at 691.
100. 675 F.2d at 1121-22.
101. Id
102. Id. Although Holmes argued that in the exercise of reasonable diligence, Hackbart
19831
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found substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion; this evi-
dence consisted of Hackbart's conversations with Holmes and his account-
ant, Hackbart's business naivete, and Holmes' failure to disclose the change
in plans. 1
0 3
In Loveridge v. Dreagoux,'10 4 the defendants argued that plaintiffs were
put on notice regarding the problems of the securities at the time of the
purchase and that plaintiffs should have inquired about the other purchas-
ers. Alternatively, they argued because plaintiffs were promised quarterly
reports and none were issued, they should have been aware of problems by
the second or third quarter after the purchase.'
0 5
The Utah statute of limitations for fraud provides that actions must be
brought within three years of the fraud. The cause of action does not accrue
until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud. 10 6 In
rejecting the defendants' argument concerning the timing of plaintiffs' no-
tice, the trial court found that the statute did not begin to run until after the
maturity date of the debentures when plaintiffs discovered that no payments
would be made. 10 7 As in Hackbari, under the particular facts of the case, the
Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's findings.
IV. BENEFIT-OF-THE-BARGAIN DAMAGES
In Hackbart v. Holmes, the trial court applied a benefit-of-the-bargain 08
measure of damages and awarded the plaintiff forty-nine percent of the
value of the company as of the date the parties terminated their relation-
ship. 10 9 On appeal, the defendant argued that the usual measure of dam-
ages in securities fraud cases was out-of-pocket damages.10 This measure of
damages would have limited the plaintiff to a recovery of the $5000 paid for
the ownership interest." 'I
The Tenth Circuit agreed that the out-of-pocket loss was the customary
measure, but found support for allowing a trial court discretion in fashioning
should have discovered the fraud, the court failed to discuss this contention, or define reason-
able diligence. Id. at 1120.
103. Id See also supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
104. 678 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1982).
105. Id at 875.
106. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3) (1953). Utah's § 10(b) analogue, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 61-1-1 (1953), carries a two year statute of limitations under UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(5)
(1953 & Supp. 1981). The statute has been held not to give rise to a private right of action.
Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974). Therefore the Utah fraud statutes of
limitatiorr controls in § 10(b) actions.
107. 678 F.2d at 875.
108. Benefit-of-the-bargain damages is usually taken to mean the difference between the
value of the security purchased as represented by the defendant, and the fair value of the secur-
ity on the day of sale. Some courts will, however, consider the value at a date subsequent to the
purchase. See Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule 1Oh-5 Cases, 65 GEO. L.J. 1093, 1108-09
(1977). See a/so W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 110 at 734.
109. 675 F.2d at 1121.
110. Out-of-pocket damages generally means the fair value of the consideration paid minus
the fair value of the security received (if the security is still held). See Jacobs, supra note 108, at
1099-102. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 110 at 733-34.
111. 675 F.2d at 1121.
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a remedy peculiar to the particular case.' 12 However, this was unnecessary.
The court found that the trial court's damage award could be sustained as
an out-of-pocket loss because the plaintiff had relinquished his right to a
forty-nine percent ownership interest in the prosperous corporation.1 13 After
mentioning these alternative justifications, the court upheld the award under
the unjust enrichment exception to the Rule lOb-5 out-of-pocket loss stan-
dard.' 14 The court noted that unjust enrichment occurs when fraud is used
to induce another to sell securities that subsequently increase in value, but
may also occur when an innocent party is induced to purchase securities.' ' 5
The award of forty-nine percent of the value of the business was seen by the
court as giving the plaintiff credit for his years of hard work while the com-
pany prospered, and was thus necessary to prevent Holmes' unjust
enrichment.' 16
V. CONCLUSION
The most significant contribution to the status of securities law in the
Tenth Circuit was the adoption of an objective recklessness standard to sat-
isfy the scienter requirement in private damage actions under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. The definition of recklessness utilized comports well with
the changed judicial policy in favor of reducing the number of actions
brought under the general anti-fraud sections of the federal securities laws,
yet does not unduly burden plaintiffs by requiring a more difficult subjective
standard of proof. The objective standard also provides needed certainty
and predictability for participants in the securities markets. The court's de-
cisions in other areas of securities law-SEC injunctive actions, statutes of
limitations, and damages, while following well-established principles and
precedents, provided further clarification and guidance.
Richard P Manczak
112. Id (citing Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1978); Blackie
v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. dented, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cerl. dented, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971)).
113. The court seems to be taking notice of the concept of "sweat equity," familiar to entre-
preneurs, whereby actual management of an enterprise is substituted for capital. See infra text
accompanying note 116. Under tlie general rule in federal courts, only the out-of-pocket meas-
ure is allowed, but it may include "such outlays as are attributable to the defendant's fraudu-
lent conduct." Estate Counseling Serv. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d
527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962).
114. 675 F.2d at 1122. "Preventing unjust enrichment is a well-recognized exception to the
rule limiting damages to the out-of-pocket loss." Id (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1978); Zeller v. Bogue
Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973);Janigan v. Taylor, 344
F.2d 781 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965)).






The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed over thirty cases in the
area of taxation during the past year. Many of these were tax "protester"
cases that involved specious defenses and as such, will not be reviewed here.
Of the remaining cases, few broke new ground in the field of tax law. Sev-
eral cases did highlight splits among the circuits, showing the need for
Supreme Court review or congressional clarification.
I. ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL SUMMONS
A. Background
The Secretary' is empowered, under section 7602 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, to examine any books, papers, records,2 or other data necessary to
audit a taxpayer's return, and to summon the taxpayer or any person having
possession of such books, papers, records, or data to appear before the Secre-
tary to give testimony or to produce the documents. This authorization is
limited to the purposes of:
[A]scertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where
none has been made, determining the liability of any person for
any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any
transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal reve-
nue tax, or collecting any such liability . . .
Noticeably absent from the list of authorized purposes is that of obtaining
information for a criminal prosecution or investigation. The possible consti-
tutional problems that would be associated with such an authorization are
obvious. Nonetheless, "[t]he legislative history of the Code supports the con-
clusion that Congress intended to design a system with interrelated criminal
and civil elements," '4 and Congress as well as the courts have attempted to
draw the line that separates the permissible from the impermissible use by
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) of its summons authority.
In those cases in which a summons is issued under the authority of sec-
tion 7602 and directed at a third-party recordkeeper, 5 the taxpayer must be
1. "The term 'Secretary' means the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate." I.R.C.
§ 7701(a)(l )(B) (1976). "The term 'or his delegate' when used with reference to the Secretary
of the Treasury, means any officer, employee, or agency of the Treasury Department duly au-
thorized by the Secretary of the Treasury directly, or indirectly by one or more redelegations of
authority, to perform the function mentioned or described in the context. Id.
§ 7701(a)(12)(A).
2. I.R.C. § 6001 authorizes the Secretary to prescribe rules and regulations requiring
every person liable for tax to keep records, render statements, and make returns. See also 26
C.F.R. §§ 1.6001-1 to 1.6011-1 (1982).
3. I.R.C. § 7602(a) (1976).
4. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 310 (1978).
5. The definition of a "third-party recordkeeper" is found in I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3) (1976)
(amended 1982).
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given notice of the summons.6 The taxpayer has the right to intervene in
any summons enforcement proceeding, as well as the right to stay compli-
ance with the summons by giving written notice to the person summoned
not to comply with the summons. 7 The growth of the Service's use of these
summonses, and the increasing number of taxpayers refusing to produce re-
quested material or ordering third-party recordkeepers to stay compliance
with such summonses8 have compelled the courts to establish guidelines that
strike a balance between the Service's right to obtain information under sec-
tion 7602 and the taxpayer's individual rights.
One of the early Supreme Court cases in this area was United States v.
Powell,9 in which the Court rejected the taxpayer's contention that the IRS
must show probable cause to suspect fraud before it could seek enforcement
of a summons. The Court held instead that the Service must demonstrate
that there is a legitimate purpose for the investigation, that the inquiry is
relevant to the purpose, that the Commissioner does not already possess the
information, and that he has followed all of the administrative steps required
by the Code.10 The Court then added a general prohibition against issuing
a summons for any purpose that would reflect upon the "good faith" of the
investigation. I I
Later, in Donaldson v. United States, 12 the Court apparently laid down
two separate standards, which resulted in confusion and inconsistency
among the circuit courts. At one point in the opinion the Court ruled that
where the sole purpose of the investigation is to gather evidence for a crimi-
nal prosecution, enforcement may properly be denied.13 The Court's stated
holding, however, was slightly different: "[A section 7602] summons may be
issued in aid of an investigation if it is issued in good faith and prior to a
recommendation for criminal prosecution."'
4
Seven years later, the Court was presented with an opportunity to settle
this confusion. In United States v. La Salle National Bank,' 5 the trial court
found that the motivation of the IRS agent in conducting the investigation
was solely to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution. The taxpayer then
6. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1), (2) (1976) (amended 1982).
7. Id. § 7609(b). IRS summonses are not self-enforcing; rather, the Service must proceed
under I.R.C. § 7604 to enforce a summons. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 331, 96 Stat. 324, 620-21 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 7609(b)(2)(A)),
also grants the taxpayer the right to commence a proceeding to quash such a summons.
8. Nuzum, LaSalle National Bank and the J'udtical Defenses to the Enforcement ofan Administra-
tive Summons, 32 TAX LAW. 383, 384 (1979).
9. 379 U.S. 48 (1964). See also Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964) (IRS summons
may be challenged on any appropriate ground, including defense that the material is sought for
use in a criminal prosecution).
10. 379 U.S. at 57-58.
11. [A] court may not permit its process to be abused. Such an abuse would take
place if the summons had been issued for an improper purpose, such as to harass the
taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute or for any other pur-
pose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation.
Id. at 58.
12. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
13. Id. at 533.
14. Id. at 536.
15. 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
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argued, and the trial court agreed, that he was not required to prove the
absence of a civil purpose for the summons.
The Court rejected this argument and reaffirmed its adoption of the
Powell elements of a good faith exercise of the summons authority.' 6 The
Court summarized the several requirements for enforcement. The summons
must be issued before the Service recommends criminal prosecution to the
Justice Department, and the Service must at all times exercise the summons
authority in good faith.' 7 This second prerequisite, according to the Court,
incorporated the Powell standards of good faith and included the further
requirement that the Service not abandon the pursuit of court tax determi-
nation or collection."8 Whether the Service has abandoned its civil investi-
gation depends upon the institutional posture of the IRS and not the
objective of the individual agent. 19 The Court offered two examples of insti-
tutional bad faith: 1) delay by the Service in recommending a criminal in-
vestigation to the Justice Department once the institutional commitment for
the referral has been made; and 2) action by the Service as an information-
gathering agency for other departments.
20
B. Some Questions Answered, Some Remain Unsettled
Powell, Donaldson, and LaSalle supply the backdrop for three major
Tenth Circuit opinions addressed to IRS summons enforcement proceedings.
In the first of the three cases, United States v. Security Bank and Trust Co. ,21 the
court was called upon to rule on the extent to which discovery by a taxpayer
would be permitted when he or she asserted the defense that the Service was
pursuing a purely criminal investigation into his tax affairs. In Security Bank,
the Service had issued a summons to the bank pursuant to its investigation of
the income tax liability of Virgil Fox. At Fox's request the bank refused to
comply with the summons. The Service petitioned the district court for en-
forcement of the summons, and Fox intervened as authorized by section
7609(b)(1). 22 Prior to the enforcement proceeding, Fox served eighteen in-
terrogatories on the IRS agent who had issued the summons, but the agent
objected to all but one as being irrelevant.2 3 At the enforcement hearing,
Fox filed a motion for an order to compel answers to the interrogatories.
The trial court denied the motion, instead directing Fox to propound the
interrogatories to the agent who was present at the hearing. The agent an-
swered some of the questions but objected to several others, and the court
sustained the objections.24 After the court ordered enforcement of the sum-
mons, Fox appealed the trial court's rulings on the objections.
16. Id. at 313-14.
17. /d. at 318.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 316.
20. Id. at 316-17.
21. 661 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1981).
22. I.R.C. § 7609(b)(1) (1976).
23. 661 F.2d at 849.
24. Id. The interrogatories in question read as follows:
9. State whether or not the Internal Revenue Service has ever had [appellant]
under surveillance either by wire or any other means.
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The court of appeals reasoned that since the Supreme Court in LaSalle
placed the burden of disproving a valid civil purpose for the investigation
upon the party opposing enforcement of the summons25 "the LaSalle Court
must have envisioned at least limited discovery." '2 6 This is necessarily so
because a taxpayer asserting the defense of improper purpose must rely on
information within the knowledge of the Service.2 7 Although most of the
circuits have recognized the taxpayer's right to discovery, the proof required
to obtain discovery, as well as the extent of discovery permitted, varies
among the circuits. The Tenth Circuit has adopted the relatively restrictive
position that discovery is available only in "extraordinary situations. '28
Fox had objected to enforcement solely on the ground that the IRS was
pursuing a purely criminal investigation. The court of appeals, following the
guidelines set down in LaSalle, directed its inquiry to whether the interroga-
tories might yield information suggesting the IRS was not actively engaged
in a civil investigation and found Interrogatories Nine through Twelve whol-
ly irrelevant to this issue. 29 The court also observed that, although part (c)
of Interrogatory Thirteen could be relevant in determining whether the IRS
was investigating possible criminal violations, "even if a criminal investiga-
tion is underway, the Service may use the summons power so long as it is still
actively engaged in a civil investigation."'30 The court suggested that "the
a) If [appellant] has been under surveillance, state when, where, how, at
whose direction, and under what authority.
b) State whether [appellant] is currently under surveillance, at whose dis-
cretion, and under what authority.
10. State whether IRS received information from any law enforcement agency
regarding [appellant], at any time prior to the commencement of this investigation.
a) If yes, state from whom and the substance of that information.
b) State the dates on which such information was received.
I1. State whether IRS has received information from any law enforcement
agency regarding [appellant] subsequent to the commencement of this investigation.
a) If yes, state from whom and the substance of that information.
b) State the dates on which such information was received.
12. State whether the Internal Revenue Service has sought information from
any law enforcement agency regarding [appellant].
a) If yes, state to whom inquiries were made, the nature of the inquiries,
and the substance of any information received by the IRS.
b) State the date on which such inquiries were made.
13. State whether or not any information or informants have been or are being
used by the Internal Revenue Service in their investigation of [appellant].
a) If yes, state the identity of the informants.
b) State the substance of the information the informants have given you
regarding the tax liability of [appellant].
c) State the substance of any information received from informants regard-
ing any criminal tax violations by [appellant].
Id. at 851-52.
25. [T]hose imposing enforcement of a summons do bear the burden to disprove the
actual existence of a valid civil tax determination for collection purpose by the Serv-
ice . ..
Without doubt, this burden is a heavy one. Because criminal and civil fraud
liabilities are coterminous, the Service will rarely be found to have acted in bad faith
by pursuing the former.
Id. at 851-52 (quoting LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 316).
26. 661 F.2d at 850.
27. Id.
28. United States v. Southern Tanks, Inc., 619 F.2d 54, 56 (10th Cir. 1980).
29. 661 F.2d at 852.
30. Id. (emphasis in original).
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taxpayer could obtain more direct evidence whether there is an active civil
investigation simply by asking the status of the civil investigation, whether
and when an institutional posture of recommending criminal investigation
was reached, and the dates the investigation was begun and summonses were
issued."
3
In dictum, the court of appeals briefly discussed one of the defenses not
raised by the taxpayer, namely, the Service's functioning as an information-
gathering agency for other government agencies. Because Interrogatories
Ten through Thirteen inquired into the information that other government
agencies had furnished the IRS, and not whether the IRS was providing
information to other agencies, these interrogatories were also irrelevant to
the establishment of that defense.
32
Judge McKay, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that
the real issue was the tension between the possibility that the taxpayer would
use the discovery device as a means to delay the investigation and the possi-
bility that the Service would abuse its civil information-gathering powers to
further a criminal investigation. 33 On the possibility of delay, Judge McKay
argued that the primary means of taxpayer delay had already been checked
by confining discovery to the required summons enforcement hearing.
34
Judge McKay contended that the taxpayer's interest should be recognized
by allowing the taxpayer to present evidence of the times and frequency of
contacts between civil IRS agents and those agents who conduct criminal
investigations. Such contacts raise "an implication of entanglement of pur-
poses, ' 3 5 which requires the trial court to determine whether it should make
further inquiry.
The dissenting opinion ignores, however, that an "entanglement of pur-
poses" is perfectly legitimate under the LaSalle rule. The Supreme Court in
LaSalle recognized the "interrelated criminal/civil nature of a tax fraud in-
quiry," 36 and thus ruled that in order to block the enforcement of a sum-
mons, the taxpayer must disprove the existence of a valid civil tax
determination or collection purpose by the Service.
37
One possible defense that the court of appeals did not discuss, and to
which Interrogatory Nine 38 appears to have been relevant, was the Service's
delay in referring the case to the Justice Department for criminal investiga-
tion once the Service had made the "institutional commitment" to do so.
Delay in recommending criminal prosecution in order to gather additional
information was one of the LaSalle Court's examples of institutional bad
faith. 39 The LaSalle Court expressed concern that countenancing such a de-
lay "would permit the Government to expand its criminal discovery
31. Id.
32. Id. at 853.
33. Id. at 854 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 437 U.S. at 314.
37. Id. at 316.
38. See supra note 24.
39. 437 U.S. at 317.
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rights."'40 LaSalle does not seem to suggest, however, that a court must deter-
mine whether the Service has abandoned its civil investigation. The critical
point that must be determined is the time at which there was an institutional
commitment by the IRS to make a referral. Use of its compulsory process to
gather any additional information after this point in time, regardless of a
civil purpose, is impermissible.
4 1
In the next summons enforcement case to be decided, Untted States o.
Scholbe, 4 2 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed two issues arising
under the LaSalle standards: 1) whether the Service had recommended
criminal prosecution to the Justice Department; 2) whether the Service was
acting as an information-gathering agency for the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration (DEA). The case contained an additional quirk in that both
parties agreed the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard, and
the party prevailing at the trial court level asserted that the trial court had
made incorrect findings of fact.
The IRS began investigating the taxpayers in early 1978 and was noti-
fied shortly thereafter by the DEA of the Department of Justice that some of
the taxpayers were suspected of being "Class I" drug traffickers. Pursuant to
its investigation, the IRS issued over twenty summonses to third-party
recordkeepers, but the taxpayers intervened and stayed compliance with
each of the summonses.4 3 Later in 1978, the IRS agent in charge of the
investigation recommended that the case be referred to the Department of
Justice for a grand jury investigation. The Service, however, asked the Jus-
tice Department not to proceed with any summons enforcement actions un-
til the Service decided whether it would recommend criminal prosecution for
tax fraud to the Justice Department. 44 Shortly thereafter, the IRS agent
rescinded his request for a grand jury investigation, and served the summons
on a third-party recordkeeper that formed the basis for this case. After the
taxpayers once again intervened, the Service commenced the enforcement
proceeding.
Four evidentiary hearings were conducted by the trial court over the
following year, and the district court judge found that the IRS had recom-
mended to the Justice Department that the taxpayers be prosecuted for tax
fraud.45  Nonetheless, the district court granted enforcement of the sum-
40. Id.
41. Note, The Instituttinal Bad Faith Defense to the Enforcement ofIRS Summonses, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 621, 629 (1980). See also Note, Dircovery in the IRS Summons Enforcement Proceeding: Less
Certain than Death and Taxes, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 321, 332-33 (1979).
Congress enacted legislation in 1982 that prohibits the issuance of a summons under I.R.C.
§ 7602 or the commencement of a summons enforcement proceeding under § 7604 if a "Justice
Department referral" is in effect with respect to the taxpayer. A "Justice Department referral"
is in effect if the "Secretary" (see supra note 1) has recommended to the Attorney General a
grand jury investigation or criminal prosecution of the taxpayer, or if a request for a "return" or
"return information" (see inf/a note 53) is made by the Justice Department. Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 333(a), 96 Stat. 324, 622-23 (to be
codified at I.R.C. § 7602(c)).
42. 664 F.2d 1163 (10th Cir. 1981).





mons, because of an inadvertent error appearing in a previous Tenth Circuit
case.46 The previous case was United Slates v. MacKay, 47 in which the court of
appeals mistakenly referred to the recommendation "of" the Justice Depart-
ment, rather than recommendation "to" the Justice Department as the legal
ground for denying enforcement. 48 Since there was no recommendation
"of" the Justice Department for criminal prosecution, the trial judge ordered
the summons enforced. This was the legal error that both parties agreed the
trial court had made. In response, the Service, which had prevailed at trial,
urged that the trial court judge had also made incorrect findings of fact,
namely, that the IRS had recommended criminal prosecution to the Justice
Department.
Upon an independent review of the facts, the court of appeals agreed
with the government and concluded that the trial judge's finding was clearly
erroneous.49 The trial judge had not made specific references to evidence
from which it concluded that the IRS had recommended criminal prosecu-
tion. Nor could the court of appeals find any such evidence upon its in-
dependent review of the record.
The only evidence the court of appeals found that alluded to any such
recommendation was the testimony of an attorney in the Miami IRS District
Counsel's Office. This attorney gave hearsay evidence that he believed that
the IRS agent in charge of the investigation asked either an Assistant United
States Attorney or a Department of Justice Attorney, or both, whether a
grand jury could be used. The attorney further testified that he believed
that the Justice Department's response to the agent in charge was that it did
not want the case because there was insufficient information to warrant use
of a grand jury investigation. The agent in charge of the investigation, how-
ever, testified that he had never spoken with anyone outside the IRS.
50
The testimony given by the attorney for the Miami District Counsel's
Office might raise the spectre of bad faith on the part of the Service in delay-
ing a recommendation for criminal prosecution, after commitment to refer
has been reached, while gathering additional evidence for the prosecution.
The court of appeals correctly concluded, however, that "even if the trial
court believed that [the agent in charge of the investigation] asked the De-
partment of Justice whether a grand jury could be summoned, this inquiry
does not constitute an institutional recommendation for criminal prosecu-
tion or commitment to make that recommendation at a future date."
5
1
Thus, the LaSalle bad faith defense did not apply.
The trial court had also apparently concluded, and the court of appeals
agreed, that the IRS had agreed to provide the DEA with information the
IRS obtained during its tax investigation. Although the LaSalle "good-faith
standard will not permit the IRS to become an information-gathering
46. Id. at 1164-65.
47. 608 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1979).
48. Id. at 833.
49. Scholbe, 664 F.2d at 1165.




agency for other departments," 52 section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code
permits the Service, under carefully prescribed conditions, to disclose to cer-
tain individuals or groups, a taxpayer's "return" or "return information.
' 53
The court of appeals recognized a duty in Scholbe to attempt to "recon-
cile the right to disclose information under I.R.C. § 6103(i)(2) with the ad-
monition in LaSalle that the IRS may not become an 'information-gathering
agency for other departments.' 54 Examining the institutional posture of
the IRS, the court found nothing in the record suggesting that the IRS had
abandoned its civil investigation or that it intended to violate the strict
guidelines of section 6103. There was thus no reason to refuse enforcement
of the summons.55 The court specifically pointed out that information au-
thorized to be shared under section 6103 included information that the Serv-
ice might obtain by means of the summons process.
56
The third major summons enforcement case reviewed by the court of
appeals was United States v. Silvestain.5 7 Silvestain was an accountant in
whose office the taxpayer's records had been placed for convenience during a
routine audit conducted by the IRS. The agent in charge of the audit ex-
amined these books and records, and, after approximately twenty hours of
examination, concluded that there was a possibility that tax fraud was in-
volved in the case. 58 The agent then referred the case to the Criminal Inves-
tigation Division of the Service. A special agent subsequently issued a
summons to the accountant for the production of the books and records.
The taxpayer intervened pursuant to section 7609(b)(2),5 9 alleging that the
information sought to be obtained by means of the summons was already
within the possession of the IRS (a violation of the Powell good-faith stan-
dard).6° The taxpayer also alleged the special agent was effectively con-
ducting a "second examination" of the taxpayer's records, without providing
notice of the necessity for such examination, in contravention of section
52. Id. at 1168 (quoting LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 317).
53. A "return" includes "any tax or information return, declaration of estimated tax, or
claim for refund . . . including supporting schedules, attachments, or lists which are supple-
mental to, or part of, the return." I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1) (1976). "Return information" includes
"a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deduc-
tions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies,
overassessments, or tax payments." Id. § 6103(b)(2)(A) (1976). Under this section, the Service
is authorized to disclose returns or return information to state tax officials, state audit agencies,
persons having a material interest, congressional committees, the President, certain federal offi-
cials for purposes of tax administration (including officials of the Department of Justice), and
certain federal officers or employees for non-tax criminal investigations. Id. § 6103(d)-(i) (1976
& Supp. IV 1980) (amended 1982).
54. 664 F.2d at 1167. The court's duty is consistent with the congressional intent behind
I.R.C. § 6103, contained in JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1976 315, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 1, 327: "[Tihe
Congress strove to balance the particular office or agency's need for the information involved
with the citizen's right to privacy and the related impact of the disclosure upon the continuation
of compliance with our country's voluntary tax assessment system."
55. 664 F.2d at 1168.
56. Id. at 1167.
57. 668 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1982).
58. Id. at 1162.
59. I.R.C. § 7609(b)(2) (1976) (amended 1982).
60. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
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7605(b).6 1 In defense, the taxpayer also asserted his fifth amendment privi-
lege, claiming that the accountant was merely a conduit for him and that he
still maintained possession of the records.
The court of appeals rejected the taxpayer's contention that the infor-
mation sought by means of the summons was already in the possession of the
Service because of the initial investigation. Since a tax fraud audit differs
both quantitatively and qualitatively from a routine audit, the government
could not be deemed already to possess the information sought. 62 The tax-
payer also asserted that the administrative steps required by the Code in
section 7605(b) were not followed by the Service. The court of appeals also
rejected this argument, citing authority from other circuits holding that noti-
fication to the taxpayer is not necessary where the second inspection is, as a
practical matter, merely a continuation of the original investigation. 63 Since
the revenue agent had not completed her audit at the time she referred the
case, the investigation by the special agent was merely a continuation of the
original investigation. No notification to the taxpayer was necessary, be-
cause a second examination had not begun.
The court of appeals also denied the taxpayer's fifth amendment claim
by rejecting the contention that he retained constructive possession of the
records. The United States Supreme Court established the limits of the fifth
amendment privilege in two cases in which tax records sought by the govern-
ment were in possession of third persons. In the first of these cases, Couch v.
Unied States,64 the taxpayer was the sole proprietress of a restaurant. For
several years she had given statements and records to her accountant for the
purpose of preparing her income tax returns. In holding the privilege un-
available, the Court pointed out that the fifth amendment privilege is a per-
sonal one that attaches to the individual and not to the information
sought. 65 The Court concluded that the privilege should be tied to the con-
cept of possession of the evidence rather than ownership of it. The Court did
leave open the possibility that in some situations constructive possession
might be "so clear" or the relinquishment of possession by the owner of the
record might be "so temporary and insignificant" that the fifth amendment
privilege would still be available.6 6 In Fisher o. UnitedStates,6 7 after an inves-
tigation had begun into the possibility of civil or criminal violations by the
taxpayers, the taxpayers transferred certain records from their accountants
to their attorneys. When summonses were served on the attorneys, the attor-
neys invoked a fifth amendment privilege on behalf of their clients. The
Court, relying on Couch, concluded that the Fisher situation was not a case of
61. I.R.C. § 7605(b) (1976) provides: "No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary ex-
amination or investigations, and only one inspection of a taxpayer's books of account shall be
made for each taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or unless the Secretary, after
investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that an additional inspection is necessary."
62. 668 F.2d at 1163.
63. Id. at 1163-64.
64. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
65. Id. at 328.
66. Id. at 333.
67. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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constructive possession or merely temporary and insignificant relinquish-
ment of possession.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted constructive possession
under Fisher and Couch to mean that "the records sought remain within the
actual physical control of the party asserting the constitutional privilege
even though they may be placed with another party for custodial safekeep-
ing."'68 In Silvestain, the accountant was not given the records merely for
custodial safekeeping. Hence, the court ruled enforcement of the summons
would not violate the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege.
69
II. EMPLOYEE PROFIT SHARING PLANS
In Tamko Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Commissioner,7° the court of appeals re-
viewed a United States Tax Court decision upholding the Service's ruling
that Tamko's profit sharing trust did not meet the qualifications for tax ben-
efits under section 401 of the Code.
A profit sharing plan such as the one drawn up by Tamko is a type of
deferred compensation plan with tax benefits to both the employee and the
employer. In general, the amounts contributed to the trust by the employer
are deductible by the employer in the year the contributions are made, 71 as
if the compensation were paid directly to the employee in the same year.
The employee, however, pays no income tax on these contributions until he
or she receives retirement benefits from the fund. 72 Furthermore, the income
earned by a qualified trust is not taxable until it is distributed to the
employee.
73
In order to qualify for this special tax treatment, such a profit sharing
trust must meet several requirements, including minimum vesting require-
ments 74 and a requirement that contributions or benefits do not discriminate
in favor of employees who are officers, shareholders, or highly
compensated.
75
Several vesting alternatives that meet the minimum requirements are
given in section 411 of the Code, and compliance with any one of these alter-
natives automatically satisfies the antidiscrimination provisions of section
401(a) (4), unless there is reason to believe that accrual of benefits or forfeit-
ures will tend to discriminate in favor of key employees. 76 The Service has
provided further guidelines for vesting and antidiscrimination. A plan
under which an employee has a nonforfeitable (ze., vested) right to forty
percent of his or her accrued benefits derived from employer contributions
after four years of service automatically meets the nondiscrimination re-
quirements of section 401(a) (4) ('4-40 vesting'). A plan that does not qualify
68. Slvestain, 668 F.2d at 1164.
69. Id. at 1165.
70. 658 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1981).
71. I.R.C. § 404 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (amended 1982).
72. Id. §§ 402(a), 501(a) (West Supp. 1982) (amended 1982).
73. Id. § 401 (West Supp. 1982) (amended 1982).
74. Id. §§ 401(a)(7), 411 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
75. Id. § 
4 01(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
76. Id. § 411(d)(1)(B) (1976).
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for the 4-40 safe harbor must meet the "key employee test" or the "turnover
test."'7 7 The "key employee test" is applicable only during the first seven
years of an employer's existence, and was therefore irrelevant to Tamko's
situation. Under the "turnover test," a plan would meet the nondiscrimina-
tion requirements of section 401(a) (4) if the turnover rate for rank and file
employees during the last five years did not exceed the greater of six percent
or the turnover rate of the prohibited group.
78
The plan submitted by Tamko called for vesting of an employee's rights
to twenty-five percent of the employer's contributions after five years of serv-
ice, and thus did not qualify for the antidiscrimination safe harbor provided
by 4-40 vesting. If an employee were terminated prior to full vesting (15
years), the unvested portion of his account would be distributed among the
remaining participants in the plan. The data submitted by Tamko showed
that the turnover rate of rank and file employees during the past five years
was sixteen percent, while the turnover rate for the prohibited group was
zero. (Only one officer was covered by the plan, and this officer had been
continuously employed by Tamko for over fifteen years).
79
Based on these facts, the Service concluded that the plan submitted by
Tamko did not qualify under section 401 of the Code. 80 This determination
was upheld by the Tax Court, and Tamko sought review by the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. On appeal, Tamko objected to the Tax Court's inclu-
sion of the turnover rates of rank and file employees employed by Tamko's
parent corporation and another subsidiary. The court of appeals noted,
however, that the plan provided that employees who transferred between
Tamko and its parent or the other subsidiary retained their previous years of
service for vesting purposes, and that such transfers did not amount to termi-
nation. It was proper, therefore, in determining whether Tamko's plan was
qualified, to consider the turnover rate of the affiliated corporations, since
employees of the affiliated corporations could benefit from forfeitures under
the Tamko plan.8 1 Thus, the Tax Court decision was affirmed.
III. BASIS OF PARTNER'S PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
In Long v. Commssloner,8 2 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
the taxpayer's calculation of the basis of an interest in a partnership formerly
held by the taxpayer's father's estate. The taxpayer's father and brother
formed a partnership to do business as the Long Construction Co., with the
taxpayer's brother owning a seventy-five percent interest and his father a
twenty-five percent interest.8 3 Upon the father's death in 1963, the partner-
ship was insolvent. Liabilities outstanding against the partnership included
77. See Rev. Proc. 76-11, 1976-1 C.B. 550; Rev. Proc. 75-49, 1975-2 C.B. 584.
78. Rev. Proc. 75-49, 1975-2 C.B. 584, 585.
79. Tamko Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 658 F.2d 735, 736-37 (10th Cir. 1981).
80. Id. at 738.
81. Id. at 740-41.
82. 660 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1981).
83. Id. at 417. The taxpayer had been a partner for six years, but he withdrew from the
partnership in 1958. Long v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1, 2 (1978), supplemental opinion, 71 T.C.
724 (1979), modi fied, 660 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1981).
19831
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
two contingent liabilities in the form of lawsuits and two debts owed to sepa-
rate banks in the area. The lawsuits were later settled, the estate paying the
entire amount of the settlement, including attorneys' fees. The estate also
paid the entire amount due on the notes executed in favor of the banks.84
The father had died testate, leaving his wife, the taxpayer, and the tax-
payer's brother each one-third of his estate. In addition, the estate succeeded
to the decedent's interest in the partnership.85
Although the estate paid these claims, the administrator sought and ob-
tained an order of the probate court that the taxpayer's brother was liable as
a general partner for seventy-five percent of all partnership liabilities. Since
the brother had no assets with which to satisfy these liabilities, the probate
court offset this debt against the brother's distributive share of the estate,
thus leaving nothing for the brother under the will. 86 Six years later the
partnership was liquidated, and the estate, in calculating its basis in its part-
nership interest, included the entire amount of the obligations previously
paid by the estate. It thus ended up with a long-term capital loss from the
partnership liquidation, which it was unable to use. The taxpayer, acting
pursuant to section 642(h) of the Code, then claimed his share (now fifty
percent, due to the probate court order) of the capital loss as a beneficiary of
the estate. The IRS disallowed the loss claimed by the taxpayer, asserting
that the estate had miscalculated its basis in its partnership interest.
Section 1014 of the Code provides that the basis of a partnership inter-
est acquired from a decedent is equal to the fair market value of the interest
at death.8 7 This basis is increased by the estate's share of partnership liabili-
ties8 8 and by its distributive share of partnership income. 89 This basis is
then decreased by the estate's share of partnership losses.9° Finally, any lia-
bilities assumed by the estate that result in an increase in the estate's share of
partnership liabilities or in the estate's individual liabilities are treated as a
contribution of money by the estate to the partnership. 91 In the instant case,
all parties agreed that the fair market value of the partnership interest at the
date of the father's death was zero; the adjustments due to the estate's dis-
tributive share of partnership income and losses were also not disputed. The
dispute was over the estate's increase in its basis of 100% of the liabilities
paid by the estate, even though the probate court had determined that the
taxpayer's brother was liable to the estate for seventy-five percent of these
payments.
The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner, holding that the estate
could increase the basis in its partnership interest only by an amount equal
to twenty-five percent of the payment actually made by the estate.92 The
84. 71 T.C. at 2, 3.
85. 660 F.2d at 417, 418.
86. Id. at 418.
87. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.742-1 (1956).
89. I.R.C. § 705(a)(I) (1976).
90. Id. § 705(a)(2).
91. Id. § 752(a).
92. 71 T.C. at 10.
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Tax Court stated that the record was unclear as to the amount that the
estate was able to obtain from the taxpayer's brother and simply concluded
that "the estate did receive [the brother's] full contribution. '93 Under sec-
tion 752, the Tax Court thus increased the estate's basis by twenty-five per-
cent of the partnership liabilities, the share actually assumed individually by
the estate. 94 With an increase in basis equal only to twenty-five percent,
instead of 100% of the partnership liabilities, the Tax Court concluded that
there was a net capital gain to the estate upon liquidation of the partnership.
The taxpayer, therefore, could not claim a capital loss under section 642(h).
The court of appeals agreed with the Tax Court's analysis, except for
the Tax Court's conclusion that the record was unclear as to how much the
estate was able to collect from the brother. 95 The appellate court, relying on
state law, noted that when a distributee is indebted to the estate, the admin-
istrator may offset the debt against any property to which such indebted
distributee is entitled.96 The court further noted that was exactly what was
done by the probate court in this case. After the offset nothing was left for
the brother, and the probate court ordered the administrator to distribute
the entire residue of the estate equally between the taxpayer and the father's
wife.9 7 From these facts, the court of appeals concluded that the estate had
collected from the indebted son an amount exactly equal to his distributive
share, namely, one-third of the net estate.98 Thus, while the estate could
increase its basis in the partnership by the entire amount of the brother's
partnership liabilities assumed by the estate, the basis, in turn, had to be
reduced by the amount deemed collected from the brother. These calcula-
tions gave the estate a net long term capital loss, and the case was remanded
to the Tax Court for proceedings consistent with the calculations.
IV. SECTION 337 LIQUIDATIONS
Congress enacted section 337 to allow corporations (primarily closely
held corporations) to liquidate all of their assets tax free, without having to
worry about the trap laid by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Court Hold-
ing Co. ,99 and United States v. Cumberland Pub/c Servze Co. 100 In Court Holding
Co., negotiations for the sale of an apartment building took place between
the corporate owner of the building and the prospective purchaser. After an
oral agreement was reached and the prospective purchasers had paid $1,000
to the corporation, the parties met to reduce the agreement to writing. The
corporation's tax attorney halted the transactions when he realized that the
sale would result in a large tax liability to the corporation. It would have
been far more advantageous for the corporation's shareholders (husband and
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 660 F.2d at 418.
96. See, e.g., Thompson v. McCune, 333 Mo. 758, 63 S.W.2d 41 (1933); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 473.630 (1978).
97. 660 F.2d at 418.
98. Id. at 420.
99. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
100. 338 U.S. 451 (1950). For discussion of the history of§ 337, see Central Tablet Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 417 U.S. 673, 677-83 (1974).
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wife) first to liquidate the corporation's assets, which consisted only of the
apartment building, by having the corporation deed the building to the hus-
band and wife in exchange for the surrender of their shares, and then to have
the husband and wife sell the property to the purchasers.' 0°
This is precisely what was done; however, the Tax Court concluded that
despite these formalities the corporation had not abandoned the sales negoti-
ations. Thus, the gain from the sale was attributed to the corporation. The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that "[a] sale by one person cannot be trans-
formed for tax purposes into a sale by another by using the latter as a con-
duit through which to pass title.
'10 2
Five years later, in Cumberland Public Service Co., the Supreme Court up-
held this procedure as a means to avoid corporate tax on the sale, dist-
inguishing Court Holding Co. on its facts. Since the sale in Cumberland was
negotiated by the stockholders rather than by the corporation, the share-
holders were not deemed to be a mere conduit for a sale by the
corporation. '
03
Section 337, the "anti-Court Holding Co. provision," was enacted to per-
mit the liquidation and sale by a corporation of its assets without the neces-
sity for Cumberland-type machinations undertaken in the hope that courts
would continue to exalt the form over the substance. Section 337(a) pro-
vides that if a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation and distrib-
utes all of its assets (less those retained to meet claims) in a complete
liquidation within twelve months after the adoption of such plan, the corpo-
ration shall not recognize gain or loss from the sale or exchange of property
within the twelve-month period. The tax consequences to the shareholders
will be identical whether the corporation sells the assets and then distributes
the proceeds in liquidation, or distributes the assets in kind to the sharehold-
ers who then sell the assets. The term "property" is not defined for purposes
of subsection (a); however, subsection 337(b)(1) excludes from the definition
of "property" the following: (A) stock in trade and inventory;
(B) installment obligations acquired in the sale of stock in trade or inventory;
and (C) installment obligations acquired in respect of property, other than
stock in trade or inventory, sold or exchanged before the date of adoption of
the plan of liquidation.'° 4 Notwithstanding these exclusions, these items are
included within the definition of "property" if "substantially all" of such
property is sold or exchanged to one person in one transaction.' 0 5
In Bear v. Commissioner,10 6 the court of appeals was faced with deciding
whether the corporation had sold or exchanged substantially all of its prop-
erty to one person in one transaction. In 1972, the corporation, Brookridge
Development Company, Inc., adopted a plan of liquidation pursuant to
which it entered into an agreement with Pacesetter Homes Co. The agree-
101. Court Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 531, 532-36 (1943), rev'd, 143 F.2d 823 (5th
Cir. 1944), rev'd, 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
102. 324 U.S. at 334.
103. 338 U.S. at 455.
104. I.R.C. § 337(b)(1) (1976)
105. Id. § 337(b)(2).
106. 650 F.2d 1167 (10th Cir. 1981).
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ment called for Pacesetter to purchase from Brookridge thirty-eight real es-
tate lots, the entire inventory of Brookridge's property. The contract recited
a single price for the purchase of all thirty-eight lots, but it also contained a
schedule of payment for the lots. 107 Deeds were to be delivered at the time
of payment in full for each lot, and Pacesetter was entitled to select lots
individually as it progressed through its development project. Pacesetter was
not required to pay interest on the purchase price. The final lots were not
conveyed until nearly two years after the adoption of the plan of
liquidation. 108
The court of appeals agreed with the Tax Court that the contract did
not call for a completed sale within the meaning of section 337.'09 As to
when a sale is completed, the court ruled that this question is essentially one
of fact. Among factors to be considered are the transfer of legal title and the
shift in the benefits and burdens of the property.1 10 In Bear the transfer of
legal title, the proration of taxes, and the shift in benefits and burdens with
respect to each lot occurred upon payment for that lot." ' The court held
these sales could not qualify as a disposition in one transaction to one pur-
chaser completed within twelve months of the adoption of the plan of liqui-
dation; consequently, the nonrecognition provisions of section 337 were
unavailable. 12
In another section 337 case, Libery National Bank and Trust Co. v. Commzs-
sioner, '' the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with the installment obli-
gation provision of section 337(b)(1)(B). In this case the corporation, as part
of its liquidation scheme, had sold its accounts receivable for $50,000 less
than their book value. The corporation claimed that the loss was recogniza-
ble, arguing that accounts receivable are a type of installment obligation
under section 337(b)(l)(B) and are thus specifically excluded from the non-
recognition provisions of the statute. The government, on the other hand,
claimed that the definition of "installment obligation" should be limited to
the terms in section 453 of the Code.' 14
The court agreed with the taxpayer, ruling that section 453 merely pro-
vides a means by which a taxpayer who regularly sells or disposes of property
on an installment basis may report the income from such sales.'-,) Judge
McWilliams, writing for the majority, found authority in Coast Coll Co. V.
Commissioner 116 and Famiy Record Plan, Inc. v. Commissioner. 117 In Coast Coil,
the Tax Court adopted the view, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the
term "installment obligations" under section 337(b)(1)(B) is broader than
107. Id. at 1169.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1170.
Ill. Id.
112. M.
113. 650 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1981).
114. Id. at 1176-77.
115. Id. at 1177 n.4.
116. 50 T.C. 528 (1968), a.fd, 422 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1970).




that envisioned by section 453. In Family Record Plan the accounts receivable
were sold at a gain. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's position that
the gain was taxable on the ground that the accounts receivable were install-
ment obligations.
V. CAPITAL VERSUS ORDINARY LOSS-COMMODITY FUTURES
TRANSACTIONS
In Oringderjfv. Commissioner," 9 the court of appeals reviewed the Tax
Court's upholding of a deficiency assessment in connection with a taxpayer's
losses incurred in the cattle feeding business. The taxpayer had treated
losses arising from transactions in cattle futures as ordinary losses; however,
the Commission successfully argued that the losses should be treated as capi-
tal losses.
Section 1221 of the Code contains a broad general definition of "capital
assets" and a few explicit exceptions from the defintion.' 2 0 The rule for
treatment of gains and losses arising from transactions in commodity futures
was established in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissi'oner,' 2 ' wherein the
taxpayer was a manufacturer of products made from corn. In order to avoid
having to pay increased prices for corn brought on by shortages, the com-
pany began purchasing corn futures at harvest time when the price appeared
favorable. ' 22 If no shortages were likely, it would take delivery on contracts
only as required to supply its manufacturing process and would sell the re-
mainder. If, on the other hand, shortages in the corn supply arose, the com-
pany would sell futures covering only the amount of corn that it was able to
purchase on the spot market. The company treated the profits and losses
arising from transactions in the futures as capital in nature, arguing that its
futures trading was a separate business from its manufacturing operation
and that it was acting as a "legitimate capitalist."'' 2 3 The Tax Court found,
however, that the transactions constituted an integral part of its manufactur-
ing business,' 24 and that the profits and losses were thus ordinary in nature.
The Supreme Court refused to overturn these findings of fact, noting instead
that "it appears that the transactions were vitally important to the com-
pany's business as a form of insurance against increases in the price of raw
corn."1
25
In Or'ngderff, the Tax Court found that many of the futures transactions
were opened and closed on the same day, a clear indication of a substantial
investment or speculative motive.' 26 Furthermore, although the period for
118. Family Record Plan, 36 T.C. at 310-11. In Liberty Nat'l Bank the Service urged the court
of appeals to adopt the opinion of Judge Ely, dissenting in Coast Coil. The court rejected this
invitation. 650 F.2d at 1177 n.5.
119. No. 79-1703 (10th Cir. Aug. 10, 1981).
120. Excluded are inventory-type property, depreciable property, and certain types of intel-
lectual property.
121. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
122. Id. at 48.
123. Id. at 49.
124. Id. at 50.
125. Id.
126. No. 79-1703, slip op. at 2.
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fattening cattle is between 120 and 150 days, the majority of the contracts
were closed within ten days. From this, as well as the lack of correlation
between the taxpayer's cattle purchases and sales and his futures transac-
tions, the Tax Court found that the futures transactions were not "true hedg-
es."1 27 The court of appeals upheld the Tax Court's factual finding that the
futures transactions were primarily speculative in nature, and not an integral
part of the taxpayer's cattle business.' 28 Thus, the gains and losses should
have been treated as capital rather than ordinary.
VI. DISMISSAL UNDER TAX COURT RULE 123(B)
In Drury v. Commissioner 129 the taxpayer appealed the Tax Court's order
of dismissal under Rule 123(b) of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure for failure to prosecute his petition for review of deficiencies. Rule
123(b) provides that the Tax Court may dismiss a case and enter a decision
against the petitioner for failure to prosecute properly his or her petition.
Such a decision "shall operate as an adjudication on the merits."' 30 The
taxpayer's appeal of the 123(b) dismissal was based on his contention that
the Tax Court had no jurisdiction over his case and was therefore without
power to dismiss. The taxpayer claimed that the Tax Court was divested of
jurisdiction because of his offer to withdraw his petition from the Tax Court.
The Tax Court had treated this offer as a motion to withdraw, and had
denied the motion. Apparently the taxpayer desired to commence an action
for refund in federal district court.
The court of appeals viewed the taxpayer's jurisdictional argument as
an attempt to circumvent the effects of section 6512(a),1 3 ' which provides for
an election of remedies by a taxpayer who has been served with a notice of
deficiency. Under section 6512(a), once a petition for review of deficiencies
is filed with the Tax Court, no suit may be filed by the taxpayer for the
recovery of any part of the tax except as to overpayments determined by the
Tax Court, amounts collected in excess of tax liability computed by the Tax
Court, and amounts collected after the period of limitation has expired. '
3 2
The taxpayer in Drury fell into none of these exceptions. Thus, once he filed
his petition, he was unable to withdraw the petition and file suit in district
court. According to the court of appeals, the Tax Court was never divested
of jurisdiction. Given that more than two years had elapsed between the
notice of deficiency and the taxpayer's motion to withdraw, the court of ap-
peals believed the Tax Court justifably saw the attempted withdrawal as a
dilatory tactic. The Tax Court was therefore warranted in granting the
Commissioner's Rule 123(b) motion to dismiss the case on the merits for
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id. at 3.
129. No. 81-1670 (10th Cir. Feb. I, 1982).
130. T.C. R. PRAC. AND P. 123(d). Rule 123(b) is thus similar to FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
131. No. 81-1670, slip op. at 4. See I.R.C. § 6512(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (amended
1982).
132. A fourth exception, overpayments attributable to partnership items, was added by the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 402(c)(8), 96 Stat. 324,
668 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 6512(a)(4)).
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failure to prosecute. 133
VII. DETERMINATION OF INCOME
Injosin v. United States, 134 the taxpayer was assessed a deficiency based
on his method of valuing income under section 61(a)(1). The taxpayer was
an attorney who provided legal services to his clients in exchange for pay-
ment in silver dollars. 1 35 The attorney's normal billing rate was, by his own
characterization, fifty "one-dollar" Federal Reserve notes per hour. 136 In
the situation under review, the attorney rendered twenty hours of legal serv-
ices to his client and received 200 silver dollars as his fee. Although he could
have billed the client for 1,000 "one-dollar" Federal Reserve notes rather
than the 200 silver dollars, he reported only $200 as income from this trans-
action on his return.
The district court dismissed the attorney's suit to recover the deficiency
assessment. 137 The court of appeals affirmed, essentially characterizing the
silver dollars as "property" other than cash. 138 Under the Treasury Regula-
tions, 139 such property is measured at its fair market value for income pur-
poses. The taxpayer in effect had admitted that the silver dollars had a
market value of five times their face value. The court ruled it inconsequen-
tial that silver dollars have a face value of one dollar and can be exchanged
for a one dollar Federal Reserve note, pointing out that Congress has pro-
vided a means by which the Treasury Department can sell silver dollars at
their fair market value, rather than at their face value.
140
VIII. AVAILABILITY OF DEDUCTIONS
The court of appeals reviewed three cases in which deductions taken by
the taxpayer were disallowed by the Commission. In Pilcher v. Commis-
sioner,'4 1 the taxpayer was employed as a pipefitter at a construction site
located sixty-seven miles from his residence. There were no living quarters
available at the construction site, and the taxpayer could find none closer
than his place of residence. The taxpayer worked at the construction site for
several months in 1970 or 1971, and again from late 1973 until early 1978.
The taxpayer deducted the costs of commuting to and from the job site on
his 1974 and 1975 income tax returns. These deductions were disallowed by
133. No. 81-1670, slip op. at 4-5.
134. 666 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1306-07.
137. The same argument was rejected by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Ware, 608
F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979), a case in which Mr. Joslin represented the taxpayer. In that case, Mr.
Joslin "stated that his concern was not with the defendant, his client. Such as it was, his con-
cern was with obtaining a ruling which would nullify the use of Treasury notes as legal tender
and which would compel such obligations to be paid in gold coin." Id. at 402.
138. 666 F.2d at 1307.
139. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1), T.D. 7554, 1978-2 C.B. 71, 73.
140. See Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, P.L. 91-607, § 205, 84 Stat.
1760, 1769 (authorizing sale by Secretary of the Treasury of approximately three million silver
dollars).
141. 651 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
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the Commission, and the Tax Court upheld the disallowance. 1
42
Section 162(a)(2) allows as a deduction "all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business, including. . . traveling expenses. . . while away from home in
the pursuit of a trade or business." On the other hand, no deduction is al-
lowed for personal, living, or family expenses.14 3 In determining whether a
deduction is available under section 162(a)(2), a key question that must be
answered is whether the taxpayer is "away from home."' 144 The Commis-
sioner has ruled that a taxpayer's "home," for purposes of section 162(a)(2),
is his regular or principal place of business or employment. 145 This concept
of a section 162 "tax home" is not universally accepted by the courts, as the
Second Circuit rejects this definition. 146 The next obstacle the taxpayer con-
fronts is establishing that the assignment is only "temporary" in nature. The
Tax Court has recognized a distinction between employment that is tempo-
rary and that which is merely indefinite.'
4 7
When the taxpayer in Pi/cher resumed working in 1973 it was antici-
pated that construction on the project would continue for several additional
years. Given this record, the Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals concluded
there was ample evidence to support the Tax Court's decision that the tax-
payer's employment at the construction site was not temporary. Thus, the
court affirmed the disallowance.
The court considered another case involving a deduction under section
162(a), this one supported by a claim that the deduction could also be made
under section 212.148 In Snyder v. United States 149 the taxpayer was a practic-
ing attorney who began work on a book of photographs of Colorado in 1972.
Pursuant to his expectation and goal of publishing the book, the taxpayer
acquired sophisticated photographic equipment and devoted approximately
thirty hours a week to the effort. The number of rolls of film that the tax-
payer exposed increased dramatically from 1971 to 1972, and the taxpayer
began to keep detailed records of technical data regarding his photographs.
After corresponding with several publishers to promote interest in his book,
the taxpayer traveled to New York and San Francisco to meet with some of
them. Although almost all of the taxpayer's income was derived from prac-
ticing law, he claimed deductions for his photographic efforts on his 1972
and 1973 income tax returns. The IRS determined that the deductions were
not allowable under either section 162 or section 212 and assessed the tax-
payer accordingly. The taxpayer paid the amount assessed, filed a claim for
142. Id. at 718.
143. I.R.C. § 262 (1976).
144. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946).
145. See Rev. Rul. 71-247, 1971-1 C.B. 54; Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 C.B. 60.
146. See, e.g., Six v. United States, 450 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1971); Rosenspan v. United States,
438 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
147. See, e.g., McCallister v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 508 (1978); Blatnick v. Commissioner,
56 T.C. 1344 (1971); cf. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946). But see Harvey v. Com-
missioner, 283 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1960) (rejecting the "temporary-indefinite" distinction).
148. I.R.C. § 212(a) (1976) allows a deduction of "all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year for the production or collection of income."
149. 674 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1982).
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a refund, and instituted a suit to recover the assessments.' 50
The trial judge, in what he termed to be "rough" oral findings of fact
and conclusions of law from the bench, found that the taxpayer had "sincere
hopes" of selling his photography book and that he "does hope to make a
profit."'' 5  Nonetheless, the judge concluded that the taxpayer was not en-
gaged in the "trade or business" of publishing a book, and upheld the Com-
mission's disallowance of the deductions under both sections 162 and 212.
The term "trade or business" is not defined in the Code, nor has a defin-
itive answer appeared in the case law. The Supreme Court has stated that
the determination whether the activities of a taxpayer amount to "carrying
on a business" requires an examination of the facts in each case. 152 As the
court of appeals in Snyder pointed out, lower courts have seized upon the
profit motive as a major test in determining whether a taxpayer is engaged
in a trade or business.' 5 3 It is this element that generally distinguishes a
trade or business from a mere hobby. Expenses incurred in the pursuit of
hobbies are clearly not deductible under either section. 154 Relying on a
Third Circuit case,t 55 the court admonished the trial court on remand to sift
through the facts carefully to determine whether the taxpayer was "primar-
ily motivated .. .by his love of photography as a hobby or by a good faith
expectation of making a profit."' 56 Even if the taxpayer were primarily mo-
tivated by profit, he was also required to show that the activities were "ex-
tensive" and were carried on over a "substantial" period of time.
157
The court directed that if the trial court were to find that the taxpayer
was not engaged in a trade or business, it must then examine whether under
section 212 the expenses were deductible as "ordinary and necessary. . . for
the production or collection of income." As the court noted, sections 162
and 212 are to be read together, and in order to be deductible under section
212, the expense "must satisfy the same requirements that apply to a trade
or business expense under section 162 except that the person claiming the
deduction need not be in the trade or business."' 58 The case was remanded
for further factual findings and legal reasoning.
In Kilgroe v. United States, 159 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals consid-
ered depreciation deductions taken under section 167 of the Code.' 60 The
taxpayer in this case was the transferee of KIP Corporation, and as such was
responsible for the prior tax liabilities of the corporation. In 1969, KIP Cor-
poration had constructed some prefabricated buildings that were then leased
150. Id. at 1361-62.
151. Id. at 1362.
152. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 217 (1941).
153. 674 F.2d at 1362.
154. See, e.g., American Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1958);
Wrightsman v. United States, 428 F.2d 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
155. Imbesi v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1966).
156. Snyder, 674 F.2d at 1364.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting Fischer v. United States, 450 F.2d 218, 222 (7th Cir. 1973)).
159. 664 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1981).
160. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1976) allows "as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for
the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) of property
used in the trade or business, or of property held for the production of income."
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to a community college for three years. For the years 1970 through 1974 the
corporation took deductions under section 167 based on a three-year useful
life of the buildings. The result of this rapid depreciation was that loss de-
ductions were carried over into the taxpayer's 1973 tax return. The Service
disallowed these deductions, claiming that the buildings had either a useful
life of forty years, with no salvage value, or three years with a salvage value
of $389,375. The buildings originally cost $578,030 to construct.
16 1
The district court found that the buildings had a useful life of ten years
with no salvage value, a finding that was not disputed by either party on
appeal. The dispute was over the method of calculating the allowable de-
preciation for the remaining seven years of the buildings' useful lives. The
taxpayer maintained that the deductions taken by KIP in the first three
years were not allowed by the Internal Revenue Service and thus could not
be counted when figuring the depreciation for the following years. The
Service maintained that the depreciation for the first three years had not
been challenged, and therefore was allowed under section 167. As a result,
the government argued, the adjusted basis, for calculating the remaining de-
preciation, was the difference between the original basis and the amount
already deducted (to the extent such deductions produced a tax benefit) dur-
ing the first three years of the buildings' lives. The district court ruled for
the taxpayer on this issue, and ordered a refund. On appeal, the government
claimed that the district court had made an error in arriving at the amount
of refund due the taxpayer, and the taxpayer apparently conceded that the
government's position was correct. 1
62
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's holdings, stating that the
deductions taken during the first three years of the buildings' lives had not
been challenged and were, therefore, "allowed" under section 167. The
court noted that the district court's result, reducing the basis by only the
amount that should have been deducted during the first three years, rather
than by the amount actually taken, would violate the well-established rule
that a taxpayer's total claimed depreciation deduction could not exceed the
cost of the asset minus its salvage value.1
63
IX. CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
In two noteworthy cases, the court of appeals reviewed criminal convic-
tions, upholding both. In United States v. Erickson,' 6 4 the taxpayers, husband
and wife, owned and operated a tax service in Oklahoma. In addition to
being charged with willfully aiding and abetting in the preparation of false
income tax returns of their clients, the taxpayers were charged with willfully
failing to file their income tax returns for three years. On appeal, the de-
fendants contended that the affidavit supporting the issuance of a search
warrant was insufficient due to the staleness of its contents. The court of
appeals rejected this argument, noting that some of the incriminating infor-
161. 664 F.2d at 1169.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1170.
164. 676 F.2d 408 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 118 (1982).
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mation had been supplied by a current employee of the tax service.' 65 Fur-
thermore, the affidavit indicated that the violations were ongoing.
One of the other defenses, advanced by the husband, was that he lacked
the ability to form a specific intent to commit the crime with which he was
charged. An expert defense witness testified that the husband had "over the
years developed a 'delusion' about the tax laws to the end that although
Erickson could control his conduct, he nonetheless did not believe that he
was doing anything wrong by disobeying the tax laws."' 16" The trial judge
accordingly instructed the jury that evidence concerning the husband's
mental state could be considered only for the purpose of determining
whether he had the requisite specific intent to violate the tax laws. The
taxpayer apparently had wanted an instruction on the insanity defense, an
instruction the trial court did not give. The court of appeals upheld the
instruction given, since the expert testimony addressed merely the inability
to form a specific intent.
167
The trial court had also excluded evidence that the taxpayers in good
faith believed that the tax laws were unconstitutional. Citing United States v.
Dillon,'168 the court of appeals rejected this defense. An evil motive or bad
purpose is not required to establish the offense. 1
69
United States v. Lawson 170 was a tax protester case in which the defendant
had filed blank income tax returns for 1978 and 1979, and had claimed
ninety-nine exemptions on the withholding certificate he gave to his em-
ployer in 1979, thus claiming total exemption from withholding. On appeal,
the court found most of Lawson's contentions specious.
Lawson claimed that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial mo-
tions to dismiss because his wages were not income within the meaning of the
Internal Revenue Code and the Constitution. Lawson also claimed error in
the trial court's refusal to hold his trial in Casper, Wyoming, rather than in
Cheyenne, its refusal to exclude federal government employees from the jury
panel, and its refusal to allow Lawson to inspect and copy jury selection
records.'7' The court of appeals rejected the first three claims, but re-
manded the case to allow Lawson's counsel to inspect the jury selection
records pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1867(f).172 The court ruled that reversal of
the conviction was not called for at that time; however, if, upon inspection of
the jury selection records Lawson could prove an improper method of select-
ing the jury, the conviction would be set aside at that point.
1 73
Lawson also asserted the trial court erred in denying his motions for
acquittal at the end of the government's case and at the close of all evidence.
165. Id. at 410.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 566 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978).
169. 676 F.2d at 411.
170. 670 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1982).
171. Id. at 925.
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(o (1976) permits a party, in preparing a motion to dismiss for failure
to comply with the statutory jury selection provisions, to inspect and copy records used by the
jury commission or clerk in connection with the selection process.
173. 670 F.2d at 926.
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These motions were based upon the failure of the government to establish
jurisdiction, and his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Lawson also contended the government failed to prove willfulness in not
filing returns and in claiming ninety-nine exemptions on the withholding
certificate, or specific intent to deceive his employer upon claiming the
ninety-nine exemptions. Lawson further claimed that the jury's verdict was
against the weight of the evidence and thus could not stand. He also ap-
pealed his sentence and the probation conditions imposed by the trial judge.
The court of appeals rejected all of Lawson's contentions.
t 74
The sentencing and probation conditions imposed by the trial judge did
raise some noteworthy points. As a condition of his probation, the trial court
required that Lawson "disassociate himself with any organization that has
[as] its purpose defeating the Internal Revenue Service laws, including an
organization known as the Wyoming Patriots and shall not encourage other
individuals to disobey the laws of the United States."'175 Lawson's appeal
was based on the first amendment right of association. The court of appeals
construed the condition so as to prohibit association only with groups that
advocated violation of the tax laws and thus upheld the condition of
probation. 1
76
The court relied on two other tax protester cases, United States v. Smith '77
and Porth v. Templar. 178 In Smith, a condition of parole that the parolee "di-
vorce [himself] from any organization advocating the willful disobediance of
any local, state or federal law and. . . refrain from making any statement to
others advocating any disobedience of any local, state or federal law," 179 was
modified by the court of appeals. The court struck the phrase "any local,
state, or federal law" as too broad a restriction that was not reasonably re-
lated to the rehabilitation of the parolee. The court substituted the phrase
"the Internal Revenue Code."' 80 Similarly, in Porth, the probationer was
prohibited from circulating materials questioning the constitutionality of the
Federal Reserve System and the Federal Income Tax Law, from speaking or
writing activities questioning the constitutionality of the same, and from
leaving the jurisdiction of the court without prior written authorization.
The court of appeals in Porth held that the conditions were invalid to the
extent that they prohibited the expression of opinions as to invalidity or un-
174. Id. at 927-30.
175. Id. at 929.
176. Id. at 930. Trial courts have broad discretion in sentencing matters, including prescrib-
ing conditions of probation. See, e.g., Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1974)
(defendant convicted of unlawful exportation of firearms from the United States to the United
Kingdom; conditions of probation included that he not participate in any American Irish Re-
publican movement; that he belong to no Irish organizations, cultural or otherwise; that he not
belong to or participate in any Irish Catholic organizations or groups; that he not visit any Irish
pubs; and that he accept no employment that directly or indirectly associated him with any
Irish organization or movement); United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1973)
(defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of mailing obscene matter; condition of probation in-
cluded that he not associate with any known homosexuals).
177. 618 F.2d 280 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 868 (1980).
178. 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971).




constitutionality of the laws in question but were valid so far as they prohib-
ited urging or encouraging others to violate the laws. 181
The trial court had also sentenced Lawson to four months in prison for
failing to file the 1978 return, assessed him the costs of prosecuting the case
for failing to file the 1979 return, and fined him $2,000 for falsely filling out
the withholding certificate. Sometime afterwards, but before Lawson had
paid the fine or begun serving his sentence, the trial court realized that the
fine for filing a false withholding certificate could not exceed $500. 182 The
judge then modified the sentence by eliminating the fine for filing the false
certificate but imposing a $2,000 fine for failing to file the 1979 return. On
appeal, Lawson asserted that the judge could not increase his sentence once
it had been imposed. The court of appeals, relying on United States V.
DiTFrancesco 183 also rejected this assertion. 184
Jeff ey, Bartholomew
181. 453 F.2d at 334.
182. 670 F.2d at 929. Set I.R.C. § 7205 (West Supp. 1982) (amended 1982) (fine was in-
creased to $1,000 maximum for tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 1981).
183. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
184. 670 F.2d at 929.
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF
TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
I. UNITED STTES v NEw MEXIcO-AFFIRMED
In United Stales v. New Mexi'co,' the Supreme Court unanimously af-
firmed the Tenth Circuit's decision 2 that three Department of Energy
(DOE)3 contractors and their suppliers were subject to state taxes. The
Court upheld the constitutional validity of the imposition of these state taxes
because the contractors could "be considered entities independent of the
United States."'4 The Court's decision clarified the extension of federal im-
munity from state tax burdens to federal contractors.5
The three contractors, Sandia Corp. (Sandia), Zia Co. (Zia), and Los
Alamos Constructors, Inc. (LACI), had separate contracts with DOE to pro-
vide services at federally-owned laboratories in New Mexico.6 In 1975, the
United States filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico seeking a declaratory judgment on behalf of these three private
corporations. 7 Specifically, the United States sought clarification as to
whether these contractors must pay the following taxes: 1) the compensating
use tax8 on property purchased by the contractors outside of the state but
used in New Mexico; and 2) the gross receipts tax9 on federal funds ad-
vanced to the contractors to pay creditors and employees. In addition, the
United States wanted to clarify whether vendors selling property to these
contractors must pay New Mexico's gross receipts tax on such sales. 10
1. 455 U.S. 720 (1982).
2. United States v. New Mexico, 624 F.2d III (10th Cir. 1980), aff', 455 U.S. 720 (1982).
3. This agency was formerly called the Atomic Energy Commission. 455 U.S. at 722-23.
4. d. at 738-44.
5. Id. at 733-44.
6. Sandia's contract authorized Sandia's management of the government-owned Sandia
Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico as well as engagement in federally-sponsored re-
search. Id. at 723. Zia's contract governed its responsibilities concerning "management, main-
tenance, and related functions at the [gjovernment's Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory." Id. at
724. LACI's contract limited its operations to "construction and repair work at the Los Alamos
facility." Id.
7. Id. at 728; 624 F.2d at 113.
8. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-7 (1953 & Supp. 1975) (current version at N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 7-9-7 (1978 & Supp. 1982)).
9. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-4 (1953 & Supp. 1975) (current version at N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 7-9-4 (1978 & Supp. 1982)).
10. See 455 U.S. at 728, 741-43. The Court used the phrase "sales tax" in discussing this
issue. Id. at 741-43.
An analysis of the structure of the Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act is necessary
for a more technical understanding of the tax issues involved. Section 72-16A-4 imposes an
excise tax on "gross receipts" of "any person engaging in business in New Mexico." N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 72-16A-4 (1953 & Supp. 1975) (current version at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-4 (1978 &
Supp. 1982)). Section 72-16A-7 imposes an excise tax for the privilege of "using" both property
and services in New Mexico. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-7 (1953 & Supp. 1975) (current ver-
sion at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-7 (1978 & Supp. 1982)). Section 72-16A-12.1 provides that "re-
ceipts" of the United States, its agencies, and its instrumentalities are "exempted" from the
gross receipts tax. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-12.1 (1953 & Supp. 1975) (current version at
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-13 (1978)). Similarly, § 72-16A-12.2 provides that the "use of property
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The United States claimed that the contractors and their suppliers were
consz-'utt'onally immune from state taxation.'" The district court agreed,1
2
but the Tenth Circuit reversed.' 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to
consider the seemingly intractable problems posed by [s]tate taxation of fed-
eral contractors." 14
Beginning with M'Culloch v. Maryland,1'5 the Court reviewed its decisions
involving the doctrine of federal immunity from state taxation. According
to the Court, MCulloch relied on the general notion of federal supremacy to
invalidate Maryland's tax on the Second Bank of the United States.' 6 Cases
subsequent to M'Culloch, however, have not been consistently decided.'
7
Thus, the Court decided to "return to the underlying constitutional princi-
ple" of federal supremacy to decide this and future cases. 18
The rule announced by the Court is that "tax immunity is appropriate
in only one circumstance: where the levy falls on the United States itself, or
on an agency or instrumentality so closely connected to the Government that
the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities, at least insofar as
the activity being taxed is concerned."' Thus, the Court went beyond re-
quiring merely an agency relationship.20 Any deviation from this narrow
constitutional limit must expressly be made by Congress.
2' 1
In determining whether the compensating use tax applied to the con-
tractors, the Court emphasized that the contractors were privately owned
by the United States, its agencies, and its instrumentalities are "exempted" from the compensat-
ing tax. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15A-12.2 (Supp. 1975) (current version at N.M. STFAT. ANN.
§ 7-9-14 (1978)). In contrast, § 72-16A-14.9 provides that "/r/ecetpts from sd/hg tangible per-
sonal property . . . to the United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof. . . may be
deducted from gross receipts." N.M. SlTrT. ANN. § 72-16A-14.9 (Supp. 1976-77) (current version
at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-54 (1978)) (emphasis added).
The district court correctly identified the tax issue concerning the suppliers as one involv-
ing "the deduction provision" of the gross receipts tax. United States v. New Mexico, 455 F.
Supp. 993, 995 (D. N.M. 1978), rev d, 624 F.2d I 11 (10th Cir. 1980), qft'd, 455 U.S. 720 (1982).
The Tenth Circuit also identified this issue as concerning a "tax deduction." 624 F.2d at 114.
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court referred to a "sales tax" and failed to distinguish
between exemptions and deductions, this lack of technical accuracy does not affect the outcome
of the case. The constitutional issues depend on the activities of the contractors. See 455 U.S. at
733-44.
11. Id. at .728. The United States also claimed that it must, "as a matter of constitutional
law, be permitted to intervene in any New Mexico administrative proceeding involving the
tax status of the three corporations." 624 F.2d at 113. The Tenth Circuit agreed. Id. at 121.
This issue was not discussed, however, in the Supreme Court's decision. See 455 U.S. at 720.
12. 455 F. Supp. 993 (D. N.M. 1978).
13. 624 F.2d Ill (10th Cir. 1980).
14. 455 U.S. at 730.
15. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819) ("ITihe power to tax involves the power to destroy.").
16. 455 U.S. at 730-31.
17. Id. at 730-33. The Court stated that this field of law has been "one that has been
marked from the beginning by inconsistent decisions and excessively, delicate distinctions." Id.
at 730.
18. Id. at 733.
19. Id. at 735.
20. Id. at 736. Prior cases discussing agency relationships included: United States v. Boyd,
378 U.S. 39 (1964); United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958); Alabama v.
King & Boozer, 314 U.S. I (1941); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937). These
cases, however, "failled] to speak with one voice on the relevance of traditional agency rules in
determining the tax-immunity status of federal contractors." 455 U.S. at 732-33.
21. Id. at 737.
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corporations with specially created and closely limited governmental rela-
tionships.22 Furthermore, the governmental relationships were established
to make a profit. 23 The fact that the property being used was for the govern-
ment's benefit was irrelevant 24 since the government did not have an owner-
ship interest.
25
Having determined that the contractors were independent taxable enti-
ties for purposes of the use tax, the Court concluded that the contractors
were also subject to the gross receipts tax on the funds advanced by the
United States. 26 Furthermore, the Court concluded, "[i]f receipt of ad-
vanced funding is coextensive with status as a federal instrumentality, virtu-
ally every federal contractor is, or could easily become, immune from state
taxation.
'2 7
Finally, the Court examined whether vendors selling supplies to the
contractors must pay gross receipts on the proceeds of such sales. The Court
called this issue "a more complex problem . . . [for] it is arguable that an
entity serving as a federal procurement agent can be so closely associated
with the Government, and so lack an independent role in the purchase, as to
make the sale . . . a sale to the United States."'28 The Court emphasized,
however, that the contractors here made purchases in their own names with-
out prior governmental approval for each purchase. Also, the contractors
did not inform the suppliers that the government had an independent inter-
est in the purchase of the property. Furthermore, the government dis-
claimed any intention of designating the contractors as purchasing agents.
2 9
The fact that title passed directly from the suppliers to the government was
not controlling, "so long as the purchasing entity in this role as a purchaser is
sufficiently distinct from the Government."'30 Thus, because the contractors
were independent entities, the vendors could not escape the gross receipts tax
on the proceeds from sales to the contractors.
3i
It is clear that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to attempt to clar-
ify state taxation of federal contractors. It remains to be seen, however, if
this opinion will send American courts "in an entirely unwavering line
' ' : '-
with future decisions.
Sharon K Tarr
22. Id. at 740.
23. Id. at 739.
24. Id. See also United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964).
25. 455 U.S. at 740. See also First Agricultural Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339.
354 (1968) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26. 455 U.S. at 741.
27. Id. The Court stated in its discussion of the advanced funds issue that "incurring obli-
gations to achieve contractual ends is not significantly different from using property for the
same purposes." Id. It is not clear what this statement means, especially in light of the Tenth
Circuit's discussion that advanced funding had surface appearances of giving the contractors
the power to pledge the credit of the United States. 624 F.2d at 119.
28. 455 U.S. at 741-42.
29. Id. at 743.
30. Id. See also Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 13 (1941).
31. 455 U.S. at 743.
32. Id. at 732.
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II. UNITED STATES V SECURITY INDUSTRIAL BANK-AFFIRMED
Urnted States v. Securty Industrial Bank ' was a consolidation of seven cases
from the United States Bankruptcy Courts for the districts of Kansas and
Colorado.2 In each case creditors had acquired valid liens on personal prop-
erty of the debtor. The debtor claimed that the liens could be avoided under
the exemption provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 3 (Reform Act) and
the creditors claimed that their liens were created before the Reform Act
became effective and were therefore not subject to discharge. 4 The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals5 affirmed the Bankruptcy Court decisions 6 uphold-
ing the creditors' liens. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed.
7
A. Background
The Reform Act represents the first major change in the bankruptcy
laws in over forty years. Under the new Act, the debtor is allowed certain
exemptions which permit him to retain property after discharge is granted.'
Specifically, section 5229 allows the debtor to exempt certain household
items and to avoid the fixing of a non-possessory, non-purchase money secur-
ity interest in some of those items.
In Securiy Industrial Bank, each creditor had acquired a non-possessory,
non-purchase money security interest prior to the Reform Act's effective date
1. 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982), afg, Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir.
1981).
2. Three cases were consolidated at the Bankruptcy Courts. The remaining four cases
were then appealed directly to the Tenth Circuit where they were consolidated. The seven cases
were: Jackson v. Security Indus. Bank, 4 Bankr. 293 (D. Colo. 1980) (Stevens v. Liberty Loan
Corp. was consolidated with Jackson in the Bankruptcy Court); Rodrock v. Security Indus.
Bank, 3 Bankr. 629 (D. Colo. 1980) (Krenzel v. Security Indus. Bank was consolidated with
Rodrock in the Bankruptcy Court); Hoops v. Freedom Fin., 3 Bankr. 365 (D. Colo. 1980);
Schulte v. Beneficial Fin. of Kan., Inc., No. 79-11745 (Bankr. D. Kan. Oct. 27, 1980) (Hunter v.
Beneficial Fin. of Kan., Inc., was consolidated with Schulte in the Bankruptcy Court).
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-151326 (Supp. IV 1980)).
4. 103 S. Ct. at 409.
5. Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 407
(1982).
6. Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed all judgments, it did not affirm
on the grounds used in the two Kansas cases.
7. 103 S. Ct. 402 (1982). Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice
Blackmun concurred, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Prior to this decision, there was
general disarray in the lower courts. Compare Paden v. G.E.C.C. Consumer Discount Co., 10
Bankr. 206 (E.D. Pa. 1981) and Campbell v. Afco Fin. Serv. Co., 8 Bankr. 425 (S.D. Ohio 1981)
(holding retroactive application constitutional) with Baker v. GFC Corp., 11 Bankr. 125 (W.D.
Mo. 1981) and Woods v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 9 Bankr. 325 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (holding retro-
active application unconstitutional).
8. The federal exemptions were designed to permit individual debtors to enjoy a "fresh
start" after bankruptcy. Formerly, exemptions were granted by each state's law and were ex-
cluded ab initio from the bankruptcy estate. Federal bankruptcy courts did not have jurisdiction
to resolve disputes concerning exempt assets. If a state court upheld a lien on assets that were
otherwise exempt, repossession could leave the debtor without assets for a fresh start. The Re-
form Act now includes exempt property ah initio in the estate and protects it from antecedent
claims once exempted. Note, Lien Avoidance Under § 522() of the Bankruptcy Code.- Is Retrospective
Application Constitutional?, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 615 (1981).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (Supp. IV 1980).
1983] US SUPREME COURT REVIEW
of October 1, 1979.'0 The debtors filed for bankruptcy after the effective
date and sought to avoid the liens under section 522(0.11 The question
presented in each case was whether section 522(f) should be retroactively
applied, and if so, whether such a retroactive application would violate the
Constitution.
B. The Constitutional Question
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that section 522 was intended
to be retroactively applied,1 2 and therefore, squarely faced the constitutional
question. In deciding this issue, the Tenth Circuit held that retroactive ap-
plication of section 522 would constitute a "taking" of the creditors' vested
rights in the debtor's property in violation of the fifth amendment.1 3
The Tenth Circuit was influenced by Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radfo d. 14 In Radford, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional under
the fifth amendment, an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act which allowed a
defaulting farm property mortgagor to retain ownership and possession of
the farm, thereby divesting the mortgagee of its property rights in the secur-
ity.1 5 Despite a later Supreme Court decision casting doubt on the vitality
of Radford, 16 the Tenth Circuit applied the case's fundamental premise:
Congress may not completely take a creditor's rights and property for the
benefit of a debtor.1
7
The Supreme Court's analysis of the constitutional issue was similar to
the Tenth Circuit's. The Supreme Court first recognized the distinction be-
tween property rights and contractual rights.t 8 Although Congress has the
constitutional authority to retroactively impair contractual obligations,t 9
additional difficulty arises when Congress seeks to impair a property interest.
10. 103 S. Ct. at 409.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Supp. IV 1980) reads in pertinent part as follows:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien
on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemp-
tion to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section,
if such lien is
(I) a judicial lien; or
(2) a non-possessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any
(A) Household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances,
books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for
the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
12. Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 407
(1982).
13. 642 F.2d at 1196. The fifth amendment provides that: "No person shall be . . .de-
prived of . . .property, without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken . . .
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
15. Id. at 602.
16. See Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 443 (1937),
where the Court upheld a law that merely postponed a mortgagee's right to foreclose on a
mortgagor's property upon default.
17. Additionally, the Court noted that the situation in Radord was not even as extreme as
the situation presented in Security Indusnrat Bank. In Radford, the mortgagee still realized some
value for his mortgage interest. 642 F.2d at 1197 n.4.
18. 103 S. Ct. at 410.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
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The creditors' interests in this case were property rights20 and Congress may
not, even under its bankruptcy powers, 2 1 impair such an interest without
violating the fifth amendment.
22
Unlike the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, the Supreme
Court used the above discussion to point out the prudence of avoiding the
constitutional issue and proceeded to decide the case on statutory grounds.
23
This, the Court pointed out, was an application of the "cardinal principle"
that if possible a statute should be construed in order to avoid constitutional
questions.24 The result, however, was the same as that reached by the Tenth
Circuit.
C. Retroactivity--The Statutory Question
As noted above, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, before reaching
the constitutional question, held that section 522 was intended to be retroac-
tively applied.25 This decision was based on legislative history and statutory
construction. The effective date of the Reform Act was October 1, 1979.26
The Reform Act provided that as of that date the former Bankruptcy Act
was repealed, 27 and all proceedings initiated on or after that date were to be
governed by the new Act. 28 In a case filed on or after October 1, 1979, if the
Reform Act does not apply to a creditors' interests which came into existence
prior to October 1, 1979, then there would be no bankruptcy law governing
their interests at all. The Tenth Circuit held that such a "statutory gap" was
not intended by Congress.
29
The Supreme Court acknowledged this argument but thought the anal-
ysis inadequate. The Court stated that the liens exist under state law inde-
pendently of the Reform Act. Thus, it is not true that there would be no law
governing liens perfected prior to October 1, 1979.
30
The Court then relied on legislative history to hold that section 522(f)
was intended to be prospectively applied. 3 1 It was pointed out that prelimi-
20. The government, arguing in favor of retroactive application of § 522, contended that
the creditors' rights in the debtor's property were so insubstantial that it did not amount to a
full property interest. Justice Rehnquist stated that the decisions in Radford and Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), militated against such a proposition. 103 S. Ct. at 411.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
22. The Court also pointed out that a taking under the fifth amendment may involve more
than the government acquiring property for itself. 103 S. Ct. at 412.
23. "The foregoing discussion satisfies us that there is substantial doubt whether the retro-
active destruction of the appellees' liens, in these cases comports with the fifth amendment. We
now consider whether, as a matter of statutory construction, § 522(0(2) must necessarily be
applied in that manner." Id.
24. Id.
25. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 642 F.2d at 1196. Bankruptcy Court Judge Glen E. Keller, Jr., in a well-reasoned
opinion, reiected "as a mere play on words," an argument by the United States that § 522(l)
would not operate retroactively if applied to pre-enactment security interests because it simply
acts prospectively on previously acquired security interests. Hoops v. Freedom Fin., 3 Bankr.
635, 637 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
30. 103 S. Ct. at 412-13.
31. Id. at 414 (citing H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 10-103(a) (1975), reprinted in Bank-
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nary drafts of the savings clause expressly required retroactive application.
32
During the House hearings in 1976, however, a consultant to the Bankruptcy
Commission suggested certain exceptions to retroactive application or a
"separability clause" to avoid and lessen the impact of constitutional chal-
lenges to the Act. 33 Although the consultant raised no significant constitu-
tional arguments against retroactive application of federal exemptions,3 4 the
Court reasoned that Congress, by dropping the express language requiring
retroactivity, had supplied some evidence of its intent to have the Act ap-
plied prospectively.
35
Further, the Court pointed out the basic principle that statutes are pre-
sumed to operate prospectively only.3 6 This principle applies to bankruptcy
statutes affecting property rights.37 Considering the legislative intent the
Court found favoring prospective application, it was unwilling to construe
section 522(f) as an exception to this general rule.
D. Consequences
The Supreme Court's holding undoubtedly has the same result as the
Tenth Circuit's holding-it maintains creditors pre-Reform Act liens. How-
ever, in its overzealous desire to avoid the constitutional question, the Court
provides a classic example of result-oriented analysis. By resting its decision
on the failure of Congress to adopt express language requiring retroactivity 38
it is evident that many possible indications of congressional intent were not
considered.
First, numerous substantive and editing changes were made by the con-
gressional staff, including the collection of all transition provisions in a sepa-
rate title.39 The express language of the preliminary drafts to which Justice
Rehnquist makes reference may have been altered for the sake of clarity,
brevity, and organization, rather than deleted to demonstrate intent.4 °
Second, many constitutional problems concerning retroactivity of the
particular provisions were addressed by rewriting those particular provi-
sions41 and by evincing intent favoring separability. 4 2 Because a congres-
sional choice to address a matter in one part of the statute and not in
rupicy Act Revision: Hearings on I.R. 31/& 32 before the Subcomm. on Civil& Constitutional Rights of/he
House Comm. on theJudiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), n.4 app., at 320-21)) [hereinafter Bank-
ruptcy Act Revision].
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing Bankruptcy Act Revision, supra note 31, at 2066-67 (statement of William
Plumb, Jr.)).
34. Id.
35. Id. See also I COLLIER ON BANKRUiTCY 7.12 (15th Ed. 1982); Note, supra note 8, at
624.
36. 103 S. Ct. at 413.
37. Id. (citing Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 367 (1914)).
38. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
39. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941, 944 (1979).
40. Congress worked on the proposed legislation for two years, during which time countless
drafting changes were made. Id. at 945-57.
41. The consultant expressed concern over § 4-405(b), which eliminated state recognized
priorities in marital property interest for creditors. Note, supra note 8, at 624.
42. Id. at 625.
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another is presumed to be intentional, 43 the alteration of some substantive
provisions precludes the inference of a general prohibition against
retroactivity.
Finally, even after the deletion of the express language, statements
made on the floor of the House and Senate, 44 as well as in the House report,
evidenced clear congressional intent to apply the Act retroactively. Thus,
the Court has virtually ignored the overwhelming evidence that Congress
intended section 522 to be applied retroactively. 45 Although the Court's de-
sire to avoid the constitutional question is admirable,46 it must not selec-
tively review legislative history. If the Court can ignore clear statements of
congressional intent to obtain a satisfactory outcome, its power will be ex-
panded immeasurably.
Alan David Sweetbaum
III. ESPINOSA V RUSK-AFFIRMED
In Espinosa v. Rusk I the Supreme Court, by memorandum opinion, af-
firmed a Tenth Circuit decision2 which held that an ordinance regulating
solicitation by charitable organizations had been unconstitutionally ap-
plied. 3 The case involved the annual fund drive of the Seventh Day Advent-
ist Church. An Albuquerque ordinance regulated and required licensing of
solicitation by charitable groups, but provided exemptions for religious
groups if the solicitation was for "evangelical, missionary or religious but not
secular purposes."'4 Some of the money raised was used to provide food,
clothing, and shelter to those in need.5 Because the ordinance defines secu-
lar as "relating to affairs of the present world, such as providing food, cloth-
ing and counseling," the city determined that the church's fund drive
43. United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972).
44. Note, supra note 8, at 625.
45. The concurring opinion also makes reference to this point. 103 S. Ct. at 415 (Black-
mun, J., concurring). The emphasis of Blackmun's concurring opinion is twofold: 1) Were
there no authority to control the case, the constitutional issue should be addressed and resolved
in favor of the debtor, but 2) under the authority of Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 367 (1914), the
bankruptcy laws must be construed so as to confine their effect to property rights established
after they were passed.
46. This decision could conceivably pose problems for Congress when it responds to the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co.,
102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982). Northern Pipeline essentially held that Congress had unconstitutionally
granted Article III powers to the Bankruptcy Courts, which were held to be Article I courts.
Congress must now enact legislation curing this defect. In order to avoid challenges to Bank-
ruptcy Court actions taken prior to this congressional enactment, the legislation must necessar-
ily be retroactive. In light of the Supreme Court's reluctance to interpret legislation in this
manner, Congress must take steps to clearo show that retroactive application was intended.
1. 102 S.Ct. 2025 (1982), afg, 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980).
2. 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980), atd, 102 S. Ct. 2025 (1982).
3. 634 F.2d at 478.
4. Id. at 479.
5. Id at 479 n.1.
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included secular activities. Therefore the church was required to comply
with the city's ordinance. Compliance included filing an application, paying
a twenty-five dollars fee, providing details of the fund drive, and making
financial disclosures. The church challenged the constitutionality of the
city's action by filing suit for injunctive relief.6 The Tenth Circuit court
upheld the trial court's decision to enjoin permanently the city from enforc-
ing the ordinance against the church, 7 citing the holding of the landmark
first amendment case of Cantwell v. Connecticut .8
In Cantwell the Supreme Court struck down the conviction of several
Jehovah's Witnesses for soliciting funds without a license. A statute allowed
a licensing official to determine who would be permitted to engage in solici-
tation based on hir view of what constitutes a "religious cause." The offi-
cials' decision as to whether a cause was religious was viewed itself as a
religious test. The statute requiring this test was therefore found to be a
denial of liberty protected by the first amendment and included in the liber-
ties protected under the fourteenth amendment.9
The city of Albuquerque argued that its ordinance, unlike the one in
Cantwell, does not result in a prohibition of the right to solicit but merely
imposes regulations to prevent fraud in the solicitation of funds.' 0 More-
over, it was argued the ordinance did not require a determination as to what
was religious as did the statute in Cantwell."
Rejecting this argument, the Tenth Circuit stated: "The setting up of a
city agency to make distinctions as to that which is religious and that which
is secular so as to subject the latter to regulation is necessarily a suspect ef-
fort.' 12 As in Cantwell, the officials in Esp'nosa were called upon to ascertain
and determine whether the proposed solicitations were for religious pur-
poses. This type of discretion vested in an official was found to violate the
principles of the free exercise of religion. 13 It is the very attempt at defining
"religious" and "secular" which the courts find objectionable, not just that
an ordinance might express an anti-religious object.
14
Judge Barrett dissented, stating that the Supreme Court has recognized
that a certain amount of entanglement between church and state is inevita-
ble.' 5 This issue has been addressed in a series of cases involving the estab-
lishment clause, and Judge Barrett believed that the free exercise issue in
Espinosa deserved a similar approach. Judge Barrett would pose the issue as:
"Does the Albuquerque ordinance challenged here impose an undue, excessive
restraint upon the Seventh Day Adventist Church's religious activity. . . by
requiring a prior application for a permit to solicit for funds intended for
6. Id. at 479.
7. Id at 480.
8. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In this decision the Court held the free exercise clause applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment.






15. 634 F.2d at 482 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
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'secular activities?' ",16 He thought the ordinance constitutional because the
city's interest in protecting the community from fraudulent solicitations by
regulating "activities overwhelmingly secular in nature" was not an onerous
burden on the free exercise of religious organizations.1
7
Marissa Richker
16. Id. at 483 (emphasis in original).
17. Id
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